area handbook series 



Guyana and Belize 

country studies 




Guyana and Belize 

country studies 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Tim Merrill 
Research Completed 




On the cover: Linden Forbes Burnham, first prime minister of 
independent Guyana, and George Cadle Price, first prime 
minister of independent Belize 



Second Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Guyana and Belize : country studies / Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress ; edited by Tim L. Merrill. — 2d ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-82) 

"Supersedes the 1969 edition of Area Handbook for Guyana, 
coauthored by William B. Mitchell, et. al." — T.p. verso. 
"Research completed January 1992." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 345-369) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0778-X 

1. Guyana 2. Belize. I. Merrill, Tim L., 1949- 
II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area 
handbook for Guyana. IV. Area handbook for Belize. V. 
Series. VI. Series: DA pam ; 550-82. 
F2368.G88 1993 

988.1— dc20 93-10956 

CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-82 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of 
William B. Mitchell, William A. Bibbiani, Carole E. DuPre, 
Diane Fairbank, Janice H. Hopper, Ransford W. Palmer, Theo- 
dore L. Stoddard, and Robert L. Wood, who wrote the 1969 first 
edition of Guyana: A Country Study. The present volume incorporates 
portions of their work. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research 
materials, and expertise in the production of this book. These in- 
dividuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies — Area Handbook Program for the Department of the 
Army. None of these individuals, however, is in any way respon- 
sible for the work of the authors. 

The authors also would like to thank those people on the staff 
of the Federal Research Division who contributed directly to the 
preparation of the manuscript. They include Sandra W. Meditz, 
who reviewed drafts, provided valuable advice on all aspects of 
production, and conducted liaison with the sponsoring agency; 
Marilyn L. Majeska, who reviewed editing and managed produc- 
tion; Andrea T. Merrill, who edited figures and tables; and Bar- 
bara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing. 
In addition, thanks go to Vincent Ercolano and Richard Kollodge, 
who edited chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the 
final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who compiled 
the index; and Malinda B. Neale and Linda Peterson of the Library 
of Congress Printing and Processing Section, who performed the 
phototypesetting, under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Thanks also go to David P. Cabitto of the Federal Research Di- 
vision, who provided valuable graphics support and who, along 
with the firm of Greenhorne and O'Mara, prepared the maps; and 
to Wayne Home, who did the cover art and chapter illustrations. 
Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals 
and the public and private agencies who allowed their photographs 
to be used in this study. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xv 

Introduction xvii 

Guyana: Country Profile xxix 

Chapter 1. Guyana: Historical Setting 1 

Scott B. MacDonald 

THE EARLY YEARS 4 

THE COMING OF THE EUROPEANS 6 

TRANSITION TO BRITISH RULE 7 

THE EARLY BRITISH COLONY AND THE 

LABOR PROBLEM 9 

ORIGINS OF THE BORDER DISPUTE WITH 

VENEZUELA 10 

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL AWAKENINGS 11 

Nineteenth-Century British Guiana 11 

Political and Social Changes in the 1900s 13 

The Development of Political Parties 15 

PREINDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT, 1953-66 18 

The PPP's First Government, 1953 18 

The Interim Government, 1953-57 19 

The Second PPP Government, 1957-61, and 

Racial Politics 19 

PPP Reelection and Debacle 21 

INDEPENDENCE AND THE BURNHAM ERA 22 

Burnham in Power 23 

The Cooperative Republic 24 

From Burnham to Hoyte 27 

Chapter 2. Guyana: The Society and Its 

Environment 29 

Frederick J. Conway 

GEOGRAPHY 31 

Terrain 31 

Hydrology 34 



vii 



Climate 34 

POPULATION 35 

Demographic Profile 35 

Ethnic Composition 37 

Population Distribution and Settlement 

Patterns 37 

Urban Population 38 

Emigration 38 

ETHNIC GROUPS 40 

Afro-Guyanese 40 

Indo-Guyanese 41 

Portuguese and Chinese 41 

Amerindians 42 

Development of Ethnic Identity 43 

Ideologies of Race and Class 44 

FAMILY AND KINSHIP STRUCTURE 44 

Afro-Guyanese Patterns 44 

Indo-Guyanese Patterns 46 

RELIGION 47 

Christianity 48 

Hinduism 48 

Islam 49 

Obeah and Amerindian Practices 50 

Cults 50 

Religion and Politics 51 

EDUCATION 52 

Education Policy and the Teaching Profession 54 

Primary Schools 55 

Secondary Schools 55 

Institutions of Higher Education 56 

Attitudes Toward Education 58 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 60 

Food and Diet 60 

Health 60 

Health and Welfare Services 61 

Chapter 3. Guyana: The Economy 65 

Brian D. McFeeters 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 68 

History 68 

Structure 74 

Parallel Economy 75 

Infrastructure 77 

GOVERNMENT POLICY 78 



viii 



The Economic Recovery Program 78 

Results of the Economic Recovery Program 81 

LABOR 82 

AGRICULTURE 84 

Sugar 84 

Rice 86 

Forestry 86 

Fisheries 88 

Livestock 88 

MINING 89 

Aluminum 89 

Gold and Diamonds 91 

INDUSTRY 92 

Energy Supply 92 

Manufacturing 93 

SERVICES 94 

Banking 94 

Transportation 96 

Communications 97 

EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 97 

Foreign Trade 97 

Foreign Debt 99 

Balance of Payments 101 

Foreign Investment 102 

Foreign Aid 104 

Regional Integration 104 

Chapter 4. Guyana: Government and Politics ... 107 

Georges A. Fauriol 

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 109 

Preindependence Constitutions 109 

Independence Constitution Ill 

Constitution of 1980 112 

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 113 

Executive 113 

Legislature 115 

Judiciary 115 

Other National Institutions 116 

Local Government 117 

Civil Service 118 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 118 

Electoral Process 118 

Political Parties 119 

Interest Groups 120 



IX 



FOREIGN RELATIONS 123 

Relations with the United States 123 

Relations with Venezuela 125 

Relations with Brazil 127 

Relations with Suriname 127 

Relations with Britain 128 

Relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean 128 

Relations with Communist Countries 129 

Chapter 5. Guyana: National Security 131 

Christopher S. Simmons 

THE ARMED FORCES 133 

Mission, Organization, and Capabilities 136 

Involvement in Political Affairs 137 

THE SECURITY FORCES 140 

Mission and Organization 140 

Human Rights Violations 143 

THE COURTS AND THE PENAL SYSTEM 144 

BORDER DISPUTES 145 

Guyana- Venezuela Dispute 145 

Guyana- Suriname Dispute 147 

Belize: Country Profile 151 

Chapter 6. Belize: Historical Setting 155 

0. Nigel Bolland 

ANCIENT MAYAN CIVILIZATION 157 

PRE-COLUMBIAN MAYAN SOCIETIES AND THE 

CONQUEST 161 

THE EMERGENCE OF THE BRITISH SETTLEMENT ... 163 

Colonial Rivalry Between Spain and Britain 163 

Beginnings of Self-Government and the 

Plantocracy 164 

Slavery in the Settlement, 1794-1838 166 

Emigration of the Garifuna 169 

THE EARLY COLONY 169 

Constitutional Developments, 1850-62 169 

Mayan Emigration and Conflict 170 

Formal Establishment of the Colony, 1862-71 172 

COLONIAL STAGNATION AND CRISIS 172 

The Colonial Order, 1871-1931 172 

The Genesis of Modern Politics, 1931-54 174 

DECOLONIZATION AND THE BORDER DISPUTE 

WITH GUATEMALA 181 



x 



Chapter 7. Belize: The Society and 

Its Environment 187 

Charles C. Rutheiser 

GEOGRAPHY 189 

Boundaries, Area, and Relative Size 189 

Geology 191 

Physical Features 191 

Natural Resources 192 

Climate 192 

POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS 193 

Size, Growth, and Distribution 193 

Migration 195 

THE CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF BELIZEAN 

SOCIETY 196 

Ethnicity 196 

Language 200 

Religion 201 

Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Diversity 202 

STRUCTURE OF BELIZEAN SOCIETY 204 

The Upper Sector 204 

The Middle Sector 206 

The Lower Sector 208 

Social Dynamics 210 

EDUCATION 211 

School System 213 

Patterns of Access and Performance 215 

STANDARD OF LIVING 217 

Food and Diet 217 

Health and Welfare 218 

Chapter 8. Belize: The Economy 221 

Uwe Bott 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY ... 223 

The Colonial Economy 223 

The Small Economy 225 

Economic History 226 

Growth During 1980-85 227 

Growth after 1985 229 

Peripheral Factors 229 

GOVERNMENT POLICY 230 

Economic Diversification 230 

Balance of Payments 231 

Investments 231 



xi 



Fiscal Performance 233 

External Debt 233 

LABOR 234 

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 235 

AGRICULTURE 236 

Sugar 236 

Citrus 237 

Bananas 238 

Other Crops 239 

FISHING AND FORESTRY 240 

INDUSTRY 240 

Mining and Energy 240 

Manufacturing 241 

Construction 241 

TOURISM 242 

OTHER SERVICES 243 

Transportation and Telecommunications 243 

Banking and Finance 244 

ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 245 

Chapter 9. Belize: Government and 

Politics 247 

Steven R. Harper 

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 249 

Constitutional and Political Structures prior 

to Independence 249 

Constitution of 1981 253 

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 255 

Executive 255 

Legislature 258 

Judiciary 261 

Public Service 262 

Local Government 263 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 264 

Electoral Procedures 264 

Electoral Process since Independence 266 

Political Parties 269 

Interest Groups 274 

Mass Communications 279 

FOREIGN RELATIONS 280 

Relations with the United States 280 

Relations with Guatemala 282 

Relations with Other Latin American and Caribbean 

Countries 284 



Xll 



Relations with Britain 285 

Relations with Other Countries 286 

Chapter 10. Belize: National Security 289 

Melinda W. Cooke 
BELIZE'S MILITARY HISTORY AND STRATEGIC 

SETTING 292 

THE BELIZE DEFENCE FORCE 296 

Personnel and Training 296 

Organization and Equipment 298 

Defense Spending 299 

Foreign Military Relations 300 

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL 

SECURITY 301 

Crime 302 

The Belize National Police 303 

The Criminal Justice System 305 

Appendix A. Tables 309 

Appendix B. The Commonwealth of Nations ... 319 

Deborah Cinchon 

Appendix C. The Caribbean Community 

and Common Market 327 

Jeffrey Taylor 

Appendix D. Caribbean Basin Initiative 337 

Daniel Seyler 

Bibliography 345 

Glossary 371 

Index . . . 377 

List of Figures 

1 Guyana: Administrative Divisions, 1991 xxviii 

2 Guyana: Topography and Drainage 32 

3 Guyana: Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1985 ... 36 

4 Guyana: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of 

Origin, 1989 76 

5 Guyana: Transportation System, 1991 98 

6 Guyana: Organization of the Government, 1991 114 

7 Guyana: Border Disputes, 1991 126 

8 Guyana: Military Ranks and Insignia, 1991 138 

9 Belize: Administrative Divisions, 1991 150 



xiii 



10 Belize: Mayan Settlements, A.D. 700-1700 160 

11 Belize: Topography and Drainage 190 

12 Belize: Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1986 194 

13 Belize: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector 

of Origin, 1987 232 

14 Belize: Transportation System, 1991 244 

15 Belize: Organization of the Government, 1991 256 

A Organization of the Caribbean Community and Common 

Market (Caricom), 1992 330 



xiv 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to examine ob- 
jectively and concisely the dominant historical, social, economic, 
political, and military aspects of contemporary Guyana and Be- 
lize. Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, 
monographs, official reports of governments and international or- 
ganizations, and numerous periodicals. Chapter bibliographies 
appear at the end of the book; brief comments on sources recom- 
mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. To 
the extent possible, place-names follow the system adopted by 
the United States Board on Geographic Names. Measurements are 
given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist 
readers unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix 
A). A glossary is also included. 

The body of the text reflects information available as of Janu- 
ary 1992. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that have 
occurred since the completion of research; the Country Profile in- 
cludes updated information as available; several figures and tables 
are based on information in more recently published sources; and 
the Bibliography lists recently published sources thought to be par- 
ticularly helpful to the reader. 



xv 



Introduction 



GUYANA AND BELIZE belie their geographic location. Although 
both are located on the mainland of the Americas, they more closely 
resemble the English-speaking islands of the Caribbean than they 
do their Latin American neighbors. Christopher Columbus passed 
near the coasts of both countries, but later Spanish explorers and 
settlers ignored the areas because they lacked the mineral riches 
that brought the Spanish to the New World. The wealth of both 
areas would prove to be not gold but agriculture. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, the indigenous populations of both regions 
had been greatly reduced or driven to remote areas, and the coastal 
lands held growing populations of British or Dutch plantation own- 
ers. Plantation work was labor intensive, and initially African slaves, 
then other ethnic groups, were imported to work the land. As the 
colonies expanded economically, Britain claimed formal sover- 
eignty, but title to each colony remained contested. 

The twentieth century saw a shift in political power from the 
old plantocracy to a new nonwhite middle class, a rising self- 
consciousness among the various ethnic groups, and a slow evolu- 
tion toward independence. Formal ties to Britain eventually were 
broken, but, like their anglophone Caribbean neighbors, Guyana 
and Belize today still strongly bear the mark of their colonial heri- 
tage. They retain their British institutions, their use of the English 
language, their economies based on agriculture, and their societies 
composed of a complex ethnic mix often divided along racial lines. 

Unlike the great civilizations of Middle America that left monu- 
ments and records for archaeologists to decipher, the early socie- 
ties in Guyana were relatively simple, nomadic cultures that left 
few traces. Early Spanish records and linguistic studies of the Carib- 
bean reveal only a broad outline of pre-Columbian events. We do 
know that several centuries before the arrival of the Europeans, 
the Arawak moved north from Brazil to settle and farm the area 
along the northeast coast of South America before expanding far- 
ther north onto the Caribbean islands. Shortly before the arrival 
of the Europeans, the aggressive, warlike Carib pushed into the 
area and largely destroyed Arawak society. 

Because of the warlike Carib and the region's apparent lack of 
gold or silver, the Spanish ignored the northeastern coast of South 
America. Settlement by Europeans would wait until 1616, when 
a group of Dutch arrived to establish a trading post. The Dutch 
soon realized the agricultural potential of the swampy coastal land 



xvn 



and aggressively set out to drain the coast, using a vast system of 
seawalls, dikes, and canals. What had been swampy wasteland de- 
cades before, soon turned into thriving sugar plantations. 

The development of agriculture brought rapid change to the col- 
ony. Because the plantation economy needed labor, the Dutch 
imported African slaves for the task. The growing economy also 
attracted the attention of the British, and British settlers from neigh- 
boring Caribbean islands poured into the three Dutch colonies es- 
tablished along the coast. By the late 1700s, the new British settlers 
effectively controlled the colonies. Formal control by Britain would 
come in 1814, when most Dutch colonies were ceded to Britain 
after the Napoleonic wars. 

In 1838 Britain completed the abolition of slavery throughout 
the British Empire, and the problem of obtaining cheap and plen- 
tiful labor arose anew. The planters first sought to attract Por- 
tuguese, then Chinese, workers, but both groups soon left plantation 
work. Concerned that the decline in labor would ruin the sugar- 
based economy, the planters finally contracted laborers from India 
to work the sugar fields. Large numbers of indentured workers 
poured into British Guiana in the late 1800s. Although theoreti- 
cally free to return after their contract period had expired, most 
East Indians remained, adding a new ethnic group to the colony's 
melange of Africans, Europeans, and Amerindians. 

The twentieth century saw a rising consciousness among the 
country's ethnic groups and a struggle for political power between 
the new, disenfranchised, nonwhite middle class and the old plan- 
tocracy. Economic changes gave momentum to the growing call 
for political changes. The country saw rice production, dominated 
by the Indo-Guyanese (descendants of East Indians), and bauxite 
mining, dominated by the Afro-Guyanese (descendants of Africans), 
grow in importance, whereas sugar growing, controlled by the Eu- 
ropean plantation owners, declined. The British colonial adminis- 
tration responded to demands for reform by establishing universal 
suffrage in 1950 and allowing the formation of political parties. 

The People's Progressive Party (PPP), the country's first politi- 
cal party, quickly became a formidable force. The PPP was formed 
by two men who would dominate Guyanese politics for decades 
to come: Cheddi Jagan, a Marxist Indo-Guyanese, and Linden 
Forbes Burnham, an Afro-Guyanese with leftist political ideas. A 
new constitution allowing considerable self-rule was promulgated 
in 1953; in elections that year, the PPP, headed by Jagan, won 
a majority of seats in the new legislature. The new administration 
immediately sought legislation giving the labor unions expanded 
power. This legislation and the administration's leftist rhetoric 



xvm 



frightened the British colonial authorities, who suspended the new 
government after only four months. 

Conflict with the British was not the only problem facing the 
PPP. Personal rivalries between Jagan and Burnham and grow- 
ing conflict between the Indo-Guyanese and the Afro-Guyanese 
widened into an open split. In 1957 Burnham and most of the Afro- 
Guyanese left the PPP and formed the rival People's National 
Congress (PNC). The two parties shared left-wing ideologies; the 
differences between them were largely based on ethnicity. 

The British promulgated a new constitution in 1957. Elections 
in that year and in 1961 resulted in more PPP victories. Under 
the new constitution, considerable power resided in the hands of 
the governor, who was appointed by the British. The PPP adminis- 
tration headed by Jagan was therefore unable to implement most 
of its radical policy initiatives. The Marxist rhetoric, however, in- 
tensified. 

Convinced that independence under a PPP administration would 
result in a communist takeover, the British authorities permitted 
and even encouraged a destabilization campaign by the opposi- 
tion PNC. Antigovernment demonstrations and riots increased, 
and in 1963 mobs destroyed parts of Georgetown, the capital. When 
labor unrest paralyzed the economy, British troops were called in 
to restore order. In the midst of the unrest, the government sched- 
uled new elections in 1964. 

Voting along ethnic lines again gave the PPP the largest num- 
ber of seats in the legislature. But the rival PNC, by allying itself 
with a small business-oriented party, was able to form a coalition 
government. Jagan had to be forcibly removed as prime minister, 
and in December 1964 Burnham assumed the post. Under the new 
administration, events stabilized, and independence was set for May 
26, 1966. 

The independent Guyana inherited by the PNC was one of the 
least-populated and least-developed countries in South America. 
Located on the northeast coast of the continent just north of the 
equator, the Idaho-sized country is wedged among Venezuela, 
Brazil, and Suriname (former Dutch Guiana). More than 90 per- 
cent of the population lives within five or six kilometers of the sea. 
This coastal plain, constituting only 5 percent of the country's to- 
tal area, was originally low swampland but was transformed by 
the Dutch into the country's most productive agricultural land. In- 
land from the coastal plain lies the white-sand belt, site of most 
of Guyana's mineral wealth of bauxite, gold, and diamonds. Far- 
ther inland are the interior highlands, consisting of largely unin- 
habited mountains and savannahs. 



xix 



Guyana's ethnic mix at independence, still the same in 1993, 
consisted primarily of Indo-Guyanese — about half the population — 
and Afro-Guyanese — slightly more than 40 percent of the total. 
Smaller numbers of Amerindians, Asians, and Europeans com- 
pleted Guyana's ethnic melange. More than two-thirds of the popu- 
lation was Christian, with significant Hindu and Muslim minorities. 
Established by the British, the school system has resulted in high 
literacy rates (more than 90 percent). 

The small military, the Guyana Defence Force, existed primar- 
ily as a deterrent to Venezuela's territorial claim. Venezuela's claim 
to the western three-fifths of Guyana, a dispute that dated from 
the colonial era, was thought to have been settled by arbitration 
in 1899. When later evidence showed that one of the judges had 
been influenced to vote against Venezuela, that country declared 
the arbitration settiement invalid and in the 1960s aggressively pur- 
sued its territorial claim on western Guyana. This border dispute 
was to flare periodically after Guyana's independence. 

The first years of PNC administration after independence saw 
Prime Minister Burnham vigorously establishing control over 
Guyana's political and economic life. The 1968 elections were won 
by the PNC, despite charges of widespread fraud and coercion of 
voters. As the government's control over the country's political in- 
stitutions increased, Burnham began nationalizing industries and 
financial institutions. In 1970 Guyana was declared a "coopera- 
tive republic," and government control of all economic activity 
increased. The 1973 elections were considered the most un- 
democratic in Guyana's history, and by 1974 all organs of the state 
had become agencies of the ruling PNC . 

In the late 1970s, a number of events increased opposition to 
the Burnham regime. The economy, which had grown immedi- 
ately after independence, began to contract because of nationali- 
zation. In addition, in 1978 negative international attention was 
focused on Guyana when more than 900 members of the People's 
Temple of Christ led by Jim Jones committed mass murder and 
suicide at their community in western Guyana. As opposition to 
the government increased, the government responded by violence 
against opposition members and meetings. The authoritarian na- 
ture of the Burnham government caused the loss of both foreign 
and domestic supporters. 

A new constitution was promulgated in 1980, shifting power from 
the prime minister to the new post of executive president, but the 
political and economic situation continued to decline. Government 
programs had been financed by increasing the foreign debt, but 
in the early 1980s, most foreign banks and lending organizations 



xx 



refused further loans. The quality of life deteriorated: blackouts 
were frequent, and shortages of rice and sugar, Guyana's two larg- 
est crops, appeared. In 1985 in the midst of this turbulence, Burn- 
ham died while undergoing throat surgery. 

Vice President Hugh Desmond Hoyte became the country's new 
executive president. He had two stated goals: to secure political 
power and revitalize the economy. Establishing political control 
was easy. The PNC chose Hoyte as its new leader, and in the 1985 
elections the PNC claimed more than 79 percent of the vote. Eco- 
nomic growth, however, would require concessions to foreign 
lenders. Hoyte therefore began to restructure the economy. An eco- 
nomic recovery plan was negotiated with the International Mone- 
tary Fund (see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary), 
allowing for new loans in exchange for free-market reforms and 
reversal of the Burnham administration's nationalization policies. 
To win favor with Western governments and financial institutions, 
Hoyte also moderated the previous administration's leftist tilt in 
international relations. 

The results of economic reform were slow to appear, but by 1990 
the economy began to grow again. The last legitimate date for new 
elections was December 1990. Sensing, however, that the PNC 
might be able to win a fair election (and thus regain a measure 
of international respect) if the economy continued to improve, the 
government invoked a clause in the constitution allowing elections 
to be postponed a year. Seeing a chance for an honest election, 
a group of Guyanese civic leaders created the Elections Assistance 
Board (EAB) to monitor the upcoming elections. The EAB appealed 
to the Carter Center in Atlanta for international support in its effort. 

Despite threats and intimidation, in July 1991 the EAB conducted 
a door-to-door survey to verify voter lists. When the lists were shown 
to be grossly inaccurate, the Hoyte administration, under pressure 
from the EAB and the international community, declared a state 
of emergency and agreed to postpone the elections until October 
1992 and implement a series of reforms suggested by the Carter 
Center. The reforms included appointment of a new election com- 
missioner and agreement that the ballots be counted at polling 
centers in view of poll watchers instead of being taken to govern- 
ment centers and army bases for tallying. 

The election date was finally set for October 5, 1992. Hoyte based 
the PNC campaign on the improving economy, which he credited 
to his free-market reforms. The PPP, still headed by Jagan after 
forty-two years, renounced its past Marxist policies and embraced 
elements of a free-market economy. In a reversal of decades of ra- 
cial politics, Jagan attempted to downplay the country's ethnic 



xxi 



polarization by naming an Afro-Guyanese, Sam Hinds, as his run- 
ning mate. 

Monitored by an international team of observers headed by 
former United States President Jimmy Carter, election results gave 
an alliance of the PPP, the smaller Working People's Alliance 
(WPA), and the United Force (UF) 54 percent of the vote, and 
the PNC, 45 percent. These results translated into thirty-two seats 
in the National Assembly for the PPP, thirty-one seats for the PNC, 
and one apiece for the WPA and the UF. Foreign observers certi- 
fied the elections as "free, fair, and transparent." The PNC con- 
ceded defeat on October 7 and, after twenty-eight years, stepped 
down from power. Following brief consultations, the PPP formed 
a coalition government with the WPA and the UF (named the PPP- 
Civic coalition) and named Jagan executive president. 

Two days of rioting and looting in Georgetown and Linden in 
eastern Guyana followed announcement of the election results. By 
the time the army and police restored order, two demonstrators 
had been killed and more than 200 injured. Many analysts attrib- 
uted the violence to the fear that a PPP government would mean 
fewer economic benefits for the Afro-Guyanese population. Former 
President Carter, however, stated that the violence was localized 
and the looting unrelated to the voting. 

In a radio broadcast on October 13, Jagan outlined the direc- 
tion of the new government. He stated his intention to build a po- 
litical consensus that cut across ethnic lines and to continue the 
privatization policies of his predecessor. Analysts speculated that 
the new administration would have difficulty in getting measures 
approved by the National Assembly and would face strong oppo- 
sition from the PNC -dominated military and civil service. Elec- 
tion observers noted also the need to lower racial tension in a society 
that some characterized as one of the most racially divided they 
had witnessed. The motto on the Guyanese coat of arms proudly 
proclaims, "One people, one nation, one destiny." In 1993, 
however, this motto remained a distant goal. 

The history of preindependence Belize parallels in many ways 
the history of Guyana. Unlike the pre-Columbian inhabitants of 
Guyana, however, the Maya in Belize left majestic ruins of their 
civilization. Remains of the earliest settlers of the area date back 
at least to 2500 B.C. By 250 A.D. the classic period of Maya cul- 
ture had begun; this period of city-building lasted for more than 
700 years. During this time, the Maya built large ceremonial cen- 
ters, practiced large-scale agriculture using irrigation, and developed 
writing and a sophisticated calendar. Around the tenth century, 
evidence suggests that the great cities were abandoned, perhaps 



xxii 



because of increased warfare among the city-states, revolt of the 
peasants against the priestly class, overexploitation of the environ- 
ment, or a combination of these and other factors. Even though 
the great ceremonial centers were left to decay, the Maya continued 
to inhabit the region until the arrival of the Europeans. 

The first European settlers in the area were not Spanish but En- 
glish. Although Christopher Columbus passed through the area 
on his fourth voyage to the Americas in 1502, Spanish explorers 
and settlers ignored the region because it lacked gold. English pirates 
roaming the Caribbean in the seventeenth century began estab- 
lishing small camps near the Belize River to cut logwood, from 
which a black dye was extracted. Logwood extraction proved more 
profitable than piracy, and the English settlements on the Carib- 
bean coast grew. 

The Spanish sent expeditions throughout the eighteenth century 
to dislodge the British settlers. The British were repeatedly forced 
to evacuate but returned shortly after each attack. Several treaties 
in the late 1 700s recognized the British settlers' right to extract log- 
wood but confirmed Spanish sovereignty over the region, a con- 
cession that later would lead to a territorial dispute. 

The colony continued to grow throughout the nineteenth cen- 
tury. Logwood extraction was replaced by mahogany cutting as 
the settlement's principal economic activity, and slaves were in- 
troduced to increase production. By the time emancipation was 
completed in 1838, the settlement had evolved into a plantation 
society with a small number of European landowners and a large 
population of slaves from Africa. 

In the nineteenth century, the colony was also a magnet for dis- 
possessed groups throughout the region. The Garifuna (see Glos- 
sary), an Afro-indigenous people descended from the Carib Indians 
and slaves of the Eastern Caribbean, found refuge in the area in 
the early 1800s. In the mid- and late 1800s, large numbers of Maya, 
many of whom had intermarried with or become culturally assimi- 
lated to the Spanish-speaking population of Central America, fled 
fighting in the Yucatan or forced labor in Guatemala and settled 
in the colony. 

The nineteenth century also saw the development of formal 
government. As early as 1765, a common law system for the set- 
tlers was formalized, and a superintendent was named in 1794. 
A rudimentary legislature began meeting in the early 1800s, and 
in 1854 the British produced a constitution and formally established 
the colony of British Honduras in 1862. Political power in the colony 
remained firmly in the hands of the old settler elite, however; blacks 



xxin 



working the plantations were disenfranchised, and smaller popu- 
lations of smallholder Garifuna and Maya lived on the periphery 

of society. 

The early 1900s were a period of political and social change. Non- 
white groups, particularly an emerging black middle class, began 
to agitate for the vote and political power. Mahogany production 
slowed, and the colony began to depend on sugar for revenue. Ad- 
ditional immigrants from neighboring Spanish- speaking countries 
drifted in and settled among the rural Maya. Creoles (see Glos- 
sary), as the English-speaking blacks called themselves, began to 
participate in colonial politics. 

The Great Depression of the 1930s greatly accelerated the pace 
of change. Mahogany exports virtually collapsed, and the colonial 
officials responded with measures designed primarily to protect the 
interests of the plantation owners. As a result, widespread labor 
disturbances broke out. Pressured by persistent labor unrest, the 
government eventually legalized trade unions in 1941 . The unions 
soon broadened their demands to include political reform, and in 
1950 the first and most durable political party, the People's United 
Party (PUP), was formed with strong backing from the labor move- 
ment. Universal suffrage was granted to literate adults in 1954, 
and by the 1960s the colony was being prepared for independence. 

The final obstacle to independence proved to be not internal 
problems or resistance from the colonial power, but an unresolved 
territorial claim over all of Belize by neighboring Guatemala. The 
dispute dated to treaties signed in the 1700s, in which Britain agreed 
to Spanish sovereignty over the region. Guatemala later claimed 
it had inherited Spanish sovereignty over Belize. Although negoti- 
ations over the issue had occurred periodically for more than a cen- 
tury, the matter of sovereignty became a particularly important 
issue for Guatemala in the 1960s and 1970s, when it realized Brit- 
ain might grant independence to Belize. 

Guatemala's demand for annexation of Belize was largely fought 
in the international arena. Realizing that Belize's small defense force 
of 700 was no match for Guatemala's army, the British stationed 
a garrison force to deter any aggression. Belize sought support for 
sovereignty from the United Nations, the Nonaligned Movement, 
the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Organization of Ameri- 
can States. First, individual states and then the international or- 
ganizations themselves came to support Belize's cause. By 1980 
Guatemala was completely without international support for its ter- 
ritorial claim, and the British granted Belize independence in 1981 . 

Belize at independence was a small country whose economy de- 
pended on one crop. Unlike many other newly emerging nations, 



xxiv 



however, Belize was underpopulated in the early 1990s. The country, 
approximately the size of Massachusetts, consists largely of tropical 
forest, flat in the north and with a low range of mountains in the 
south. Belize has traditionally depended on one crop (forest products 
in the 1700s and 1800s; sugar in the mid- 1900s) for its economic 
livelihood. A collapse in the price of sugar in the 1980s forced the 
government to diversify the economy. The growth of tourism and 
increased citrus and banana production in the 1990s made the econ- 
omy less vulnerable to the price swings of a single commodity. 

Ethnic diversity characterized Belizean society. The two largest 
groups were the Creoles, an English-speaking group either partly 
or wholly of African descent, and Mestizos (see Glossary), the 
Hispanic descendants of immigrants from neighboring Spanish- 
speaking countries or Hispanicized indigenous groups. Smaller 
groups included the Garifuna and the various Maya peoples. The 
1980 census showed the population to be about 40 percent Creole 
and 33 percent Mestizo. A considerable influx of people from Cen- 
tral America shifted these percentages, however, so that the 1991 
census showed the Mestizos to be the larger group, a change that 
distanced the country from the anglophone Caribbean and made 
it increasingly resemble its Hispanic neighbors on the isthmus of 
Central America. 

The British legacy included a parliamentary democracy based 
on the British model, a government headed by the British monarch 
but governed by a prime minister named by the lower house of 
the bicameral legislature, and an independent judiciary. The con- 
stitutional safeguards for citizens' rights were respected, and the 
two elections since independence had seen power alternate between 
the country's two political parties with an absence of irregularities 
or political violence. The last election in 1989 saw George Cadle 
Price, leader of the PUP, regain the position of prime minister, 
a post he had held at the time of independence. 

In 1993 Belize faced a number of challenges. The nation endeav- 
ored to meet the needs of a growing population with only limited 
resources. The makeup of the population itself was changing as 
Belizeans became more like their Central American neighbors and 
less like the English-speaking Caribbean. Most analysts agreed, 
however, that as the twentieth century drew to a close, Belize seemed 
well-positioned to deal successfully with the economic and social 
changes confronting it. 

March 3, 1993 



XXV 



In the months following completion of research and writing of 
this book, significant political developments occurred in Belize. On 
May 13, 1993, the British government, saying that it felt its mili- 
tary presence in Belize was no longer necessary because resolution 
of Guatemala's long-standing territorial claim seemed imminent, 
announced that it would remove most of its troops from Belize 
within a year. On June 1 , buoyed by overwhelming victories in 
by-elections for the Belize City Council and for a vacated parliamen- 
tary seat, Prime Minister George Price called for the governor 
general to dissolve the National Assembly on June 30 and hold 
general elections the following day, fifteen months before the man- 
date of his People's United Party (PUP) was due to expire. The 
main opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP) headed 
by Manuel Esquivel, and the newly formed National Alliance for 
Belizean Rights headed by veteran UDP politician Philip Gold- 
son announced they would participate in the election. The PUP 
was confident of victory because the economy was growing and 
the opposition appeared disorganized. The PUP also claimed that 
recently passed legislation giving Guatemala access to the Carib- 
bean through Belizean territorial waters had finally settled the dis- 
pute with Guatemala. 

Events in neighboring Guatemala, however, came to dominate 
the issues in the Belizean election. On June 2, the Guatemalan mili- 
tary removed President Jorge Serrano Elfas, who had earlier ac- 
cepted Belize's right to exist and established diplomatic relations 
with Belize. Later in June, the Guatemalan military announced 
plans to impeach Serrano in absentia for his accord with Belize. 

In its election campaign, the UDP seized on many Belizeans' 
fears of renewed Guatemalan territorial claims, the consequence 
of the British troop withdrawal, and resentment by Creoles over 
the growing hispanicization of the country. Esquivel accused Price's 
administration of making too many concessions to Guatemala to 
obtain a settlement to the dispute and promised to suspend the legis- 
lation granting Guatemala access to the Caribbean. The UDP also 
charged that the PUP had not fought hard enough to keep the Brit- 
ish garrison in Belize and promised to reopen talks to maintain 
a British presence if it were brought to power. In addition, the UDP 
accused the PUP of having allowed too many Spanish-speaking 
refugees into Belize (the 1991 census revealed that for the first time 
there were more Mestizos than Creoles in the country) and then 
catering to the Spanish-speaking vote. 

These campaign charges, along with attacks on the PUP as be- 
ing corrupt and secretly planning to devalue the Belizean dollar, 
resulted in a surprise victory for the UDP on July 1 . Although the 



xxvi 



PUP won a slim majority of the total votes cast, the UDP won six- 
teen of the twenty-nine seats in the National Assembly. The UDP 
victory for several seats was razor-thin (six of the seats were won 
with a majority of five or fewer votes), and several recounts were 
held. Results of the sixteen-seat victory for the UDP were con- 
firmed, however, and on July 5, Manuel Esquivel was sworn in 
as Belize's new prime minister. 



July 12, 1993 Tim L. Merrill 



XXVll 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 




! 



Mahdia 



MAHAICA-BERBICE 

fort Wellington 

New Amsterdam 
_Qd?riverton , 

s 

i/ppe/? / J 

V DEMERARA- / * 
- BERBICE 



BRAZIL 



POTARO-SIPARUNI \ 



1 
/ 
1 

\ 



N 



International boundary 

x International boundary 

in dispute 

District boundary 

® National capital 

• Populated place 

25 50 75 Kilometers 



25 



50 75 Miles 



UPPER TAKUTU- 
UPPER ESSEQUIBO 



% 

EAST BERBICE- % 
CORENTYNE 



/ 



BRAZIL 



Figure 1. Guyana: Administrative Divisions, 1991 



xxvm 



Guyana: Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Cooperative Republic of Guyana. 

Short Form: Guyana. 

Term for Citizens: Guyanese. 

Capital: Georgetown. 

Independence: May 26, 1966, from Britain. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



XXIX 



Geography 



Size: Approximately 215,000 square kilometers. Land area about 
197,000 square kilometers. 

Topography: Three major regions: the coastal plain comprising 
only 5 percent of land area but with 90 percent of population; the 
white sand belt inland from coastal plain with hardwood forest and 
most of Guyana's mineral deposits; and interior highlands, larg- 
est and southernmost of three regions consisting of mountains, high 
plateaus, and savannahs. 

Climate: Tropical with uniformly high temperatures and humid- 
ity, modified slightly by trade winds along coast. Summer rainy 
season countrywide and second rainy season in coastal areas. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 764,000 in 1990. Rate of annual growth 
estimated at 1.9 percent in 1990s. 

Ethnic Groups: In the 1980s, 51 percent of the population Indo- 
Guyanese (descended from immigrants from India), 42 percent 
Afro-Guyanese (of African or partial African descent), 4 percent 
Amerindian (descended from indigenous population), and less than 
3 percent European or Chinese. 

Language: English official language and spoken by almost all 
Guyanese. Some Amerindian languages spoken, as well as Por- 
tuguese near Brazilian border. 

Religion: In 1990 about 52 percent of population Christian, 34 
percent Hindu, and 9 percent Muslim. Christians primarily Afro- 
Guyanese; Hindus and Muslims primarily Indo-Guyanese. Two- 
thirds of Christians Protestant, one-third Roman Catholic. 

Education and Literacy: Approximately 96 percent of adult popu- 
lation considered literate in the 1990s. Public education system in- 
cluded two years of preschool, six years of basic education 
(compulsory), five years of secondary education, four years of 
university education, and several master's degree programs. One 
university — University of Guyana. 

Health: Malnutrition increased in 1980s. Malaria most serious 
disease. Medical facilities and potable water inadequate, espe- 
cially in rural areas. In 1988 infant mortality rate 43.9 per 1,000 



xxx 



live births; life expectancy sixty-six years. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In 1990 US$275 million, or 
US$369 per capita, one of lowest in the Western Hemisphere. 

Agriculture: Most important sector of economy, accounting for 
30 percent of GDP in 1989. Sugar and rice most important crops. 

Mining: One of largest bauxite reserves in the world. Nationali- 
zation of the industry and labor disputes have hampered mining 
operations and refining of bauxite into alumina; in 1991 Guyana 
exported only small amounts of unprocessed bauxite ore. Unknown 
reserves of gold and diamonds. 

Manufacturing: Small sector consisting of food processing, mineral 
processing, textiles, ceramics, and pharmaceuticals. 

Exports: US$204 million in 1990. Major commodities: sugar, 
bauxite, shrimp, rice, and gold. 

Imports: US$250 million in 1990. Primarily fuel, machinery, and 
consumer goods. 

Debt: US$1.96 billion (Dec. 1990) 

Currency: Guyanese dollar (G$) divided into 100 cents. G$ repeat- 
edly devalued in 1980s; official exchange rate dropped from 
US$1 = G$4.252 in 1985 to US$1 = G$10 in 1987. In April 1989, 
official exchange rate US$1 =G$33. As of December 1992, offi- 
cial rate US$1 =G$125, with adjustments made weekly. 

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. 

Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: None. 

Roads: 7,200 kilometers total in 1993; about 700 kilometers paved, 
5,000 kilometers gravel, and rest earthen. 

Inland waterways: Only lower reaches of Berbice, Demerara, and 
Essequibo rivers navigable. 

Ports: Georgetown only significant port. New Amsterdam in east 
minor port. 

Airports: Timehri, south of Georgetown, Guyana's only interna- 
tional airport. 



xxxi 



Communications: Underdeveloped network with only 27,000 tele- 
phones in 1983, or 3.3 per 100 inhabitants. Rudimentary broad- 
cast facilities with three television stations, three AM radio, and 
three FM radio stations in 1993. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Parliamentary- style government based on modified 
British model. Head of state executive president chosen by fifty- 
three-member unicameral National Assembly. Judicial system based 
on English common law. 

Politics: Two major parties whose constituents predominantly from 
one of Guyana's two largest ethnic groups. The People's National 
Congress (PNC), headed by Hugh Desmond Hoyte, largely Afro- 
Guyanese; the People's Progressive Party (PPP), headed by Cheddi 
Jagan, mostly Indo-Guyanese. The PNC held power from indepen- 
dence in 1966 until 1992 by manipulation of electoral process and 
racial politics. The PPP assumed power in October 1992 elections. 

International Organizations: Member of United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, Nonaligned Movement, Commonwealth of 
Nations, Organization of American States, and Caribbean Com- 
munity and Common Market. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: In 1991 armed forces included 1,700-member 
Guyanese Defence Force (GDF), unified service with ground, naval, 
and air elements; 2,000-member National Guard Service, reserve 
unit; and two paramilitary organizations: 2,000-member Peoples 's 
Militia and 1,500-member Guyana National Service. 

Army: Ground forces organized into two infantry battalions, one 
guard battalion, one Special Forces battalion, one support weapons 
battalion, one artillery battery, and one engineer company. 

Maritime Corps: Naval element of GDF consisted of four patrol 
craft and 100 personnel based in Georgetown and New Amsterdam. 

Air Command: Air element of GDF consisted of 200 personnel 
with five aircraft and five helicopters based at Timehri Airport. 

Equipment: Most weaponry supplied by Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and the United States. Some naval craft acquired from North 
Korea. 



xxxn 



Defense Budget: US$5.5 million in 1989, about 6 percent of GDP. 

Internal Security Forces: National police, the Guyana Police 
Force, with about 5,000 members. 



xxxiii 



Chapter 1. Guyana: Historical Setting 



Amerindian wood carving 



MORE THAN TWENTY-FIVE YEARS after gaining indepen- 
dence, Guyana retained the clear imprint of its colonial past. Sighted 
by Columbus during his third voyage, the area was virtually ig- 
nored by later Spanish explorers and conquistadors. The first Eu- 
ropean settlers were the Dutch, who established a trading post in 
1616. The native Carib and Awarak peoples were killed by dis- 
ease or conflict over the land or forced into the interior. The Dutch, 
realizing the agricultural potential of the swampy coast, drained 
the land with a network of dikes and canals. In the 1700s, the three 
Dutch colonies in present-day Guyana grew and prospered with 
plantation economies based on sugarcane and slave labor. Increas- 
ing numbers of British settlers were also drawn to the area in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. Dutch rule ended in 1814 
when the colonies were awarded to Britain following the Napoleonic 
wars. 

Much of British rule in the 1800s was simply a continuation of 
the policies of the Dutch. Consolidated into one colony — British 
Guiana — in 1831, the sugar-based economy continued to expand, 
and when emancipation was completed in 1838 other ethnic groups, 
most notably from India, were imported to work the plantations. 
The 1900s saw an increased political awareness of the varied eth- 
nic groups and a slow transfer of political power from the old plan- 
tocracy and colonial administration to the Afro-Guyanese and the 
Indo-Guyanese. Amid growing polarization between these two 
groups, self-government was granted in the 1950s. Political con- 
flict between the Afro-Guyanese and the Indo-Guyanese, some- 
times marked with violence, caused the British to delay 
independence until 1966. Since independence, two characteristics 
have dominated Guyanese society and politics: the presence of 
strong political personalities (Cheddi Jagan, Linden Forbes Burn- 
ham, and Hugh Desmond Hoyte) and ethnic and racial divisions 
based on mutual suspicion and manipulation by these strong per- 
sonalities. 

Ideology played a large part in the newly independent coun- 
try's approach to economic development. The initial selection of 
a Marxist-Leninist economic system was motivated by a desire 
to break with the capitalist past. But authoritarian rule by one 
dominant political personality and continued ethnic tension under- 
mined the crafting of a coherent or pragmatic development stra- 
tegy. Independent Guyana's history under its first prime minister, 



3 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Forbes Burnham, is one of political confrontation and prolonged 
economic decline. Desmond Hoyte's tenure appeared to repre- 
sent a departure from the economic and authoritarian policies 
of his predecessor, but in 1991 it was unclear if the historical pat- 
terns of personal political dominance and ethnic tension could be 
changed. 

The Early Years 

The first humans to reach Guyana belonged to the group of peo- 
ples that crossed into North America from Asia perhaps as much 
as 35,000 years ago. These first inhabitants were nomads who slowly 
spread south into Central America and South America. Although 
great civilizations later arose in the Americas, the structure of 
Amerindian society in the Guianas remained relatively simple. At 
the time of Christopher Columbus's voyages, Guyana's inhabi- 
tants were divided into two groups, the Arawak along the coast 
and the Carib in the interior. One of the legacies of the indigenous 
peoples was the word Guiana, often used to describe the region en- 
compassing modern Guyana as well as Suriname (former Dutch 
Guiana) and French Guiana. The word, which means "land of 
waters," is highly appropriate, considering the area's multitude 
of rivers and streams. 

Historians speculate that the Arawak and Carib originated in 
the South American hinterland and migrated northward, first to 
the present-day Guianas and then to the Caribbean islands. The 
peaceful Arawak, mainly cultivators, hunters, and fishermen, 
migrated to the Caribbean islands before the Carib and settled 
throughout the region. The tranquility of Arawak society was dis- 
rupted by the arrival of the bellicose Carib from the South Ameri- 
can interior. Carib warlike behavior and violent movement north 
made an impact still discussed today. By the end of the fifteenth 
century, the Carib had displaced the Arawak throughout the is- 
lands of the Lesser Antilles (see Glossary). The Carib settlement 
of the Lesser Antilles also affected Guyana's future development. 
The Spanish explorers and settlers who came after Columbus found 
that the Arawak proved easier to conquer than the Carib, who 
fought hard to maintain their freedom. This fierce resistance, along 
with a lack of gold in the Lesser Antilles, contributed to the Span- 
ish emphasis on conquest and settlement of the Greater Antilles 
and the mainland. Only a weak Spanish effort was made at con- 
solidating Spain's authority in the Lesser Antilles (with the argu- 
able exception of Trinidad) and the Guianas. 



4 




Kaieteur Falls on the Potaro River. Its 226-meter perpendicular drop is one 

of the world's most spectacular. 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 



5 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The Coming of the Europeans 

Although Columbus sighted the Guyanese coast in 1498, dur- 
ing his third voyage to the Americas, the Dutch were the first Eu- 
ropeans to settle what is now Guyana. The Netherlands had 
obtained independence from Spain in the late 1500s and by the 
early 1600s had emerged as a major commercial power, trading 
with the fledgling English and French colonies in the Lesser An- 
tilles. In 1616 the Dutch established the first European settlement 
in the area of Guyana, a trading post twenty-five kilometers up- 
stream from the mouth of the Essequibo River. Other settlements 
followed, usually a few kilometers inland on the larger rivers. The 
initial purpose of the Dutch settlements was trade with the in- 
digenous people. The Dutch aim soon changed to acquisition of 
territory as other European powers gained colonies elsewhere in 
the Caribbean. Although Guyana was claimed by the Spanish, who 
sent periodic patrols through the region, the Dutch gained control 
over the region early in the seventeenth century. Dutch sovereignty 
was officially recognized with the signing of the Treaty of Mun- 
ster in 1648. 

In 1621 the government of the Netherlands gave the newly 
formed Dutch West India Company complete control over the 
trading post on the Essequibo. This Dutch commercial concern 
administered the colony, known as Essequibo, for more than 
170 years. The company established a second colony, on the Ber- 
bice River southeast of Essequibo, in 1627. Although under the 
general jurisdiction of this private group, the settlement, named 
Berbice, was governed separately. Demerara, situated between Es- 
sequibo and Berbice, was settled in 1741 and emerged in 1773 as 
a separate colony under direct control of the Dutch West India 
Company. 

Although the Dutch colonizers initially were motivated by the 
prospect of trade in the Caribbean, their possessions became sig- 
nificant producers of crops. The growing importance of agricul- 
ture was indicated by the export of 15,000 kilograms of tobacco 
from Essequibo in 1623. But as the agricultural productivity of the 
Dutch colonies increased, a labor shortage emerged. The indigenous 
populations were poorly adapted for work on plantations, and many 
people died from diseases introduced by the Europeans. The Dutch 
West India Company turned to the importation of African slaves, 
who rapidly became a key element in the colonial economy. By 
the 1660s, the slave population numbered about 2,500; the num- 
ber of indigenous people was estimated at 50,000, most of whom 
had retreated into the vast hinterland. Although African slaves were 



6 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



considered an essential element of the colonial economy, their work- 
ing conditions were brutal. The mortality rate was high, and the 
dismal conditions led to more than half a dozen slave rebellions. 

The most famous slave uprising began in February 1763. On 
two plantations on the Canje River in Berbice, slaves rebelled, tak- 
ing control of the region. As plantation after plantation fell to the 
slaves, the European population fled; eventually only half of the 
whites who had lived in the colony remained. Led by Cuffy (now 
the national hero of Guyana), the rebels came to number about 
3,000 and threatened European control over the Guianas. The in- 
surgents were defeated with the assistance of troops from neigh- 
boring French and British colonies and from Europe. 

One of the most significant Dutch legacies in Guyana was the 
method of land management. Settlement and agriculture initially 
were limited to a belt of land extending 50 to 150 kilometers up- 
river. The marshy coast flooded at high tide and did not appear 
conducive to European settlement. The prospect of large profits 
for tropical agricultural products, especially sugar, led to the recla- 
mation of coastal lands in the second half of the 1700s. The Dutch 
were eminently suited to this task, having originated the polder 
system, a technique by which a tract of usable land is created by 
damming and then draining a water-covered area. Using this sys- 
tem, the Dutch created a coastal plain that remains one of Guyana's 
most productive plantation areas. 

The polder system entailed the use of a front dam, or facade, 
along the shorefront. This dam was supported by a back dam of 
the same length and two connecting side dams, which formed a 
rectangular tract of land known as a polder. The dams kept the 
salt water out, and fresh water was managed by a network of canals 
that provided drainage, irrigation, and a system of transportation. 
The labor for the "polderization" of Guyana's coast was provided 
by the Dutch colony's African slaves. 

Transition to British Rule 

Eager to attract more settlers, in 1746 the Dutch authorities 
opened the area near the Demerara River to British immigrants. 
British plantation owners in the Lesser Antilles had been plagued 
by poor soil and erosion, and many were lured to the Dutch colo- 
nies by richer soils and the promise of landownership. The influx 
of British citizens was so great that by 1760 the English constituted 
a majority of the population of Demerara. By 1786 the internal 
affairs of this Dutch colony were effectively under British control. 

As economic growth accelerated in Demerara and Essequibo, 
strains began to appear in the relations between the planters and 



7 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

the Dutch West India Company. Administrative reforms during 
the early 1770s had greatly increased the cost of government. The 
company periodically sought to raise taxes to cover these expendi- 
tures and thereby provoked the resistance of the planters. In 1781 
a war broke out between the Netherlands and Britain, which result- 
ed in the British occupation of Berbice, Essequibo, and Demer- 
ara. Some months later, France, allied with the Netherlands, seized 
control of the colonies. The French governed for two years, dur- 
ing which they constructed a new town, Longchamps, at the mouth 
of the Demerara River. When the Dutch regained power in 1784, 
they moved their colonial capital to Longchamps, which they re- 
named Stabroeck. The capital eventually would become known as 
Georgetown (see fig. 1). 

The return of Dutch rule reignited the conflict between the 
planters of Essequibo and Demerara and the Dutch West India 
Company. Disturbed by plans for an increase in the slave tax and 
a reduction in their representation on the colony's judicial and policy 
councils, the colonists petitioned the Dutch government to consider 
their grievances. In response, a special committee was appointed, 
which proceeded to draw up a report called the Concept Plan of 
Redress. This document called for far-reaching constitutional re- 
forms and later became the basis of the British governmental struc- 
ture. The plan proposed a decision-making body to be known as 
the Court of Policy. The judiciary was to consist of two courts of 
justice, one serving Demerara and the other, Essequibo. The mem- 
bership of the Court of Policy and of the courts of justice would 
consist of company officials and planters who owned more than 
twenty-five slaves. The Dutch commission that was assigned the 
responsibility of implementing this new system of government 
returned to the Netherlands with extremely unfavorable reports 
concerning the Dutch West India Company's administration. The 
company's charter therefore was allowed to expire in 1792, and 
the Concept Plan of Redress was put into effect in Demerara and 
Essequibo. Renamed the United Colony of Demerara and Esseq- 
uibo, the area then came under the direct control of the Dutch 
government. Berbice maintained its status as a separate colony. 

The catalyst for formal British takeover was the French Revo- 
lution and the resulting Napoleonic Wars. In 1795 the French oc- 
cupied the Netherlands. The British declared war on France and 
in 1796 launched an expeditionary force from Barbados to occupy 
the Dutch colonies. The British takeover was bloodless, and local 
Dutch administration of the colony was left relatively uninterrupted 
under the constitution provided by the Concept Plan of Redress. 



8 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



Both Berbice and the United Colony of Demerara and Essequi- 
bo were under British control from 1796 to 1802. By means of the 
Treaty of Amiens, both were returned to Dutch control. Peace was 
short-lived, however. War between Britain and France resumed 
in less than a year, and the United Colony and Berbice were seized 
once more by British troops. At the London Convention of 1814, 
both colonies were formally ceded to Britain. In 1831 Berbice and 
the United Colony of Demerara and Essequibo were unified as Brit- 
ish Guiana. The colony would remain under British control until 
independence in 1966. 

The Early British Colony and the Labor Problem 

Political, economic, and social life in the 1800s was dominated 
by a European planter class. Although the smallest group in terms 
of numbers, members of the plantocracy had links to British com- 
mercial interests in London and often enjoyed close ties to the gover- 
nor, who was appointed by the monarch. The plantocracy also 
controlled exports and the working conditions of the majority of 
the population. The next social stratum consisted of a small num- 
ber of freed slaves, many of mixed African and European heritage, 
in addition to some Portuguese merchants. At the lowest level of 
society was the majority, the African slaves who lived and worked 
in the countryside, where the plantations were located. Unconnected 
to colonial life, small groups of Amerindians lived in the hinterland. 

Colonial life was changed radically by the demise of slavery. 
Although the international slave trade was abolished in the British 
Empire in 1807, slavery itself continued. However, the momen- 
tum for abolition remained, and by 1838 total emancipation had 
been effected. The end of slavery had several ramifications. Most 
significantly, many former slaves rapidly departed the plantations. 
Some ex- slaves moved to towns and villages, feeling that field labor 
was degrading and inconsistent with freedom, but others pooled 
their resources to purchase the abandoned estates of their former 
masters and created village communities. Establishing small set- 
tlements provided the new Afro-Guyanese communities an oppor- 
tunity to grow and sell food, an extension of a practice under which 
slaves had been allowed to keep the money that came from the sale 
of any surplus produce. The emergence of an independent-minded 
Afro-Guyanese peasant class, however, threatened the planters' po- 
litical power, inasmuch as the planters no longer held a near- 
monopoly on the colony's economic activity. 

Emancipation also resulted in the introduction of new ethnic and 
cultural groups into British Guiana. The departure of the Afro- 
Guyanese from the sugar plantations soon led to labor shortages. 



9 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

After unsuccessful attempts throughout the 1800s to attract Por- 
tuguese workers from Madeira, the estate owners were again left 
with an inadequate supply of labor. The Portuguese had not taken 
to plantation work and soon moved into other parts of the econo- 
my, especially retail business, where they became competitors with 
the new Afro-Guyanese middle class. Some 14,000 Chinese came 
to the colony between 1853 and 1912. Like their Portuguese 
predecessors, the Chinese forsook the plantations for the retail trades 
and soon became assimilated into society. 

Concerned about the plantations' shrinking labor pool and the 
potential decline of the sugar sector, British authorities, like their 
counterparts in Dutch Guiana, began to contract for the services 
of poorly paid indentured workers from India. The East Indians, 
as this group was known locally, signed on for a certain number 
of years, after which, in theory, they would return to India with 
their savings from working in the sugar fields. The introduction 
of indentured East Indian workers alleviated the labor shortage and 
added another group to Guyana's ethnic mix. 

Origins of the Border Dispute with Venezuela 

When Britain gained formal control over what is now Guyana 
in 1814, it also became involved in one of Latin America's most 
persistent border disputes. At the London Convention of 1814, the 
Dutch surrendered the United Colony of Demerara and Essequi- 
bo and Berbice to the British. Although Spain still claimed the 
region, the Spanish did not contest the treaty because they were 
preoccupied with their own colonies' struggles for independence. 
In 1835 the British government asked German explorer Robert Her- 
mann Schomburgk to map British Guiana and mark its bound- 
aries. As ordered by the British authorities, Schomburgk began 
British Guiana's western boundary with Venezuela at the mouth 
of the Orinoco River. A map of the British colony was published 
in 1840. Venezuela protested, claiming the entire area west of the 
Essequibo River. Negotiations between Britain and Venezuela over 
the boundary began, but the two nations could reach no com- 
promise. In 1850 both agreed not to occupy the disputed zone. 

The discovery of gold in the contested area in the late 1850s re- 
ignited the dispute. British settlers moved into the region, and the 
British Guiana Mining Company was formed to mine the deposits. 
Over the years, Venezuela made repeated protests and proposed 
arbitration, but the British government was uninterested. Venezuela 
finally broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1887 and appealed 
to the United States for help. The British at first rebuffed the United 
States government's suggestion of arbitration, but when President 



10 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



Grover Cleveland threatened to intervene according to the Mon- 
roe Doctrine, Britain agreed to let an international tribunal arbi- 
trate the boundary in 1897. 

For two years, the tribunal consisting of two Britons, two Ameri- 
cans, and a Russian studied the case. Their three-to-two decision, 
handed down in 1899, awarded 94 percent of the disputed territo- 
ry to British Guiana. Venezuela received only the mouth of the 
Orinoco River and a short stretch of the Atlantic coastline just to 
the east. Although Venezuela was unhappy with the decision, a 
commission surveyed a new border in accordance with the award, 
and both sides accepted the boundary in 1905. The issue was con- 
sidered setded for the next half-century (see Relations with Venezue- 
la, ch. 4; Guy ana- Venezuela Dispute, ch. 5). 

Political and Social Awakenings 
Nineteenth-Century British Guiana 

The constitution of the British colony favored the white planters. 
Planter political power was based in the Court of Policy and the 
two courts of justice, established in the late 1700s under Dutch rule. 
The Court of Policy had both legislative and administrative func- 
tions and was composed of the governor, three colonial officials, 
and four colonists, with the governor presiding. The courts of justice 
resolved judicial matters, such as licensing and civil service appoint- 
ments, which were brought before them by petition. 

The Court of Policy and the courts of justice, controlled by the 
plantation owners, constituted the center of power in British Gui- 
ana. The colonists who sat on the Court of Policy and the courts 
of justice were appointed by the governor from a list of nominees 
submitted by two electoral colleges. In turn, the seven members 
of each College of Electors were elected for life by those planters 
possessing twenty-five or more slaves. Though their power was re- 
stricted to nominating colonists to fill vacancies on the three major 
governmental councils, these electoral colleges provided a setting 
for political agitation by the planters. 

Raising and disbursing revenue were the responsibility of the 
Combined Court, which included members of the Court of Policy 
and six additional financial representatives appointed by the Col- 
lege of Electors. In 1855 the Combined Court also assumed respon- 
sibility for setting the salaries of all government officials. This duty 
made the Combined Court a center of intrigues resulting in peri- 
odic clashes between the governor and the planters. 

Other Guianese began to demand a more representative politi- 
cal system in the 1800s. By the late 1880s, pressure from the new 



11 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Afro-Guyanese middle class was building for constitutional reform. 
In particular, there were calls to convert the Court of Policy into 
an assembly with ten elected members, to ease voter qualifications, 
and to abolish the College of Electors. Reforms were resisted by 
the planters, led by Henry K. Davson, owner of a large planta- 
tions. In London the planters had allies in the West India Com- 
mittee and also in the West India Association of Glasgow, both 
presided over by proprietors with major interests in British Guiana. 

Constitutional revisions in 1891 incorporated some of the changes 
demanded by the reformers. The planters lost political influence 
with the abolition of the College of Electors and the relaxation of 
voter qualifications. At the same time, the Court of Policy was en- 
larged to sixteen members; eight of these were to be elected mem- 
bers whose power would be balanced by that of eight appointed 
members. The Combined Court also continued, consisting, as 
previously, of the Court of Policy and six financial representatives 
who were now elected. To ensure that there would be no shift of 
power to elected officials, the governor remained the head of the 
Court of Policy; the executive duties of the Court of Policy were 
transferred to a new Executive Council, which the governor and 
planters dominated. The 1891 revisions were a great disappoint- 
ment to the colony's reformers. As a result of the election of 1892, 
the membership of the new Combined Court was almost identical 
to that of the previous one. 

The next three decades saw additional, although minor, politi- 
cal changes. In 1897 the secret ballot was introduced. A reform 
in 1909 expanded the limited British Guiana electorate, and for 
the first time, Afro-Guyanese constituted a majority of the eligible 
voters. 

Political changes were accompanied by social change and jock- 
eying by various ethnic groups for increased power. The British 
and Dutch planters refused to accept the Portuguese as equals and 
sought to maintain their status as aliens with no rights in the colo- 
ny, especially voting rights. The political tensions led the Portuguese 
to establish the Reform Association. After the anti-Portuguese 
riots of 1889, the Portuguese recognized the need to work with other 
disenfranchised elements of society, in particular the Afro-Guya- 
nese. By the turn of the century, organizations including the Reform 
Association and the Reform Club began to demand greater par- 
ticipation in the colony's affairs. These organizations were largely 
the instruments of a small but articulate emerging middle class. 
Although the new middle class sympathized with the working class, 
the middle-class political groups were hardly representative of a 



12 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



national political or social movement. Indeed, working-class 
grievances were usually expressed in the form of riots. 

Political and Social Changes in the 1900s 

The 1905 Ruimveldt Riots rocked British Guiana. The severity 
of these outbursts reflected the workers' widespread dissatification 
with their standard of living. The uprising began in late Novem- 
ber 1905 when the Georgetown stevedores went on strike, demand- 
ing higher wages. The strike grew confrontational, and other 
workers struck in sympathy, creating the country's first urban-rural 
worker alliance. On November 30, crowds of people took to the 
streets of Georgetown, and by December 1, 1905, now referred 
to as Black Friday, the situation had spun out of control. At the 
Plantation Ruimveldt, close to Georgetown, a large crowd of porters 
refused to disperse when ordered to do so by a police patrol and 
a detachment of artillery. The colonial authorities opened fire, and 
four workers were seriously injured. 

Word of the shootings spread rapidly throughout Georgetown, 
and hostile crowds began roaming the city, taking over a number 
of buildings. By the end of the day, seven people were dead and 
seventeen badly injured. In a panic, the British administration called 
for help. Britain sent troops, who finally quelled the uprising. 
Although the stevedores' strike failed, the riots had planted the seeds 
of what would become an organized trade union movement. 

Even though World War I was fought far beyond the borders 
of British Guiana, the war altered society. The Afro-Guyanese who 
joined the British military became the nucleus of an elite Afro- 
Guyanese community upon their return. World War I also led to 
the end of East Indian indentured service. British concerns over 
political stability in India and criticism by Indian nationalists that 
the program was a form of human bondage caused the British 
government to outlaw indentured labor in 1917. 

In the closing years of World War I, the colony's first trade 
union was formed. The British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) 
was established in 1917 under the leadership of H.N. Critchlow. 
Formed in the face of widespread business opposition, the BGLU 
at first mostly represented Afro-Guyanese dockworkers. Its mem- 
bership stood around 13,000 by 1920, and it was granted legal status 
in 1921 under the Trades Union Ordinance. Although recogni- 
tion of other unions would not come until 1939, the BGLU was 
an indication that the working class was becoming politically aware 
and more concerned with its rights. 

After World War I, new economic interest groups began to clash 
with the Combined Court. The country's economy had come to 



13 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

depend less on sugar and more on rice and bauxite, and producers 
of these new commodities resented the sugar planters' continued 
domination of the Combined Court. Meanwhile, the planters were 
feeling the effects of lower sugar prices and wanted the Combined 
Court to provide the necessary funds for new drainage and irriga- 
tion programs. 

To stop the bickering and resultant legislative paralysis, in 1928 
the British Colonial Office announced a new constitution that would 
make British Guiana a crown colony (see Glossary) under tight 
control of a governor appointed by the Colonial Office. The Com- 
bined Court and the Court of Policy were replaced by a Legisla- 
tive Council with a majority of appointed members. To middle-class 
and working-class political activists, this new constitution represent- 
ed a step backward and a victory for the planters. Influence over 
the governor, rather than the promotion of a particular public poli- 
cy, became the most important issue in any political campaign. 

The Great Depression of the 1930s brought economic hardship 
to all segments of society. All of the colony's major exports — sugar, 
rice and bauxite — were affected by low prices, and unemployment 
soared. As in the past, the working class found itself lacking a po- 
litical voice during a time of worsening economic conditions. By 
the mid- 1930s, British Guiana and the whole British Caribbean 
were marked by labor unrest and violent demonstrations. In the 
aftermath of riots throughout the British West Indies, a royal com- 
mission under Lord Moyne was established to determine the rea- 
sons for the riots and to make recommendations. 

In British Guiana, the Moyne Commission questioned a wide 
range of people, including trade unionists, Afro-Guyanese profes- 
sionals, and representatives of the Indo-Guyanese community. The 
commission pointed out the deep division between the country's 
two largest ethnic groups, the Afro-Guyanese and the Indo- 
Guyanese. The largest group, the Indo-Guyanese, consisted primar- 
ily of rural rice producers or merchants; they had retained the coun- 
try's traditional culture and did not participate in national politics. 
The Afro-Guyanese were largely urban workers or bauxite miners; 
they had adopted European culture and dominated national polit- 
ics. To increase representation of the majority of the population 
in British Guiana, the Moyne Commission called for increased 
democratization of government as well as economic and social 
reforms. 

The Moyne Commission report in 1938 was a turning point in 
British Guiana. It urged extending the franchise to women and 
persons not owning land and encouraged the emerging trade union 
movement. Unfortunately, many of the Moyne Commission's 



14 



The Umana Yana Benab, a traditional meeting place built by the 

Waiwai, Georgetown 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 

recommendations were not immediately implemented because of 
the outbreak of the World War II. 

With the fighting far away, the period of World War II in Brit- 
ish Guiana was marked by continuing political reform and improve- 
ments to the national infrastructure. The reform-minded governor, 
Sir Gordon Lethem, reduced property qualifications for officehold- 
ing and voting, and made elective members a majority on the Legis- 
lative Council in 1943. Under the aegis of the Lend-Lease Act of 
1941, a modern air base (now Timehri Airport) was constructed 
by United States troops. By the end of World War II, British Gui- 
ana's political system had been widened to encompass more ele- 
ments of society, and the economy's foundations had been 
strengthened by increased demand for bauxite. 

The Development of Political Parties 

The immediate postwar period witnessed the founding of 
Guyana's major political parties, the People's Progressive Party 
(PPP) and the People's National Congress (PNC). These years also 
saw the beginning of a long and acrimonious struggle between the 
country's two dominant political personalities — Cheddi Jagan and 
Linden Forbes Burnham. 



15 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The end of World War II began a period of worldwide decoloni- 
zation. In British Guiana, political awareness and demands for in- 
dependence grew in all segments of society. At the same time, the 
struggle for political ascendancy between Burnham, the "Man on 
Horseback" of the Afro-Guyanese, and Jagan, the hero of the Indo- 
Guyanese masses, left a legacy of racially polarized politics that 
remained in place in the 1990s. 

Jagan had been born in British Guiana in 1918. His parents were 
immigrants from India. His father was a driver, a position consi- 
dered to be on the lowest rung of the middle stratum of Guianese 
society. Jagan 's childhood gave him a lasting insight into rural 
poverty. Despite their poor background, the senior Jagan sent his 
son to Queen's College in Georgetown. After his education there, 
Jagan went to the United States to study dentistry, graduating from 
Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, in 1942. 

Jagan returned to British Guiana in October 1943 and was soon 
joined by his American wife, the former Janet Rosenberg, who 
was to play a significant role in her new country's political develop- 
ment. Although Jagan established his own dentistry clinic, he was 
soon enmeshed in politics. After a number of unsuccessful forays in- 
to Guiana's political life, Jagan became treasurer of the Manpower 
Citizens' Association (MPCA) in 1945. The MPCA represented 
the colony's sugar workers, many of whom were Indo-Guyanese. 
Jagan 's tenure was brief, as he clashed repeatedly with the more 
moderate union leadership over policy issues. Despite his depar- 
ture from the MPCA a year after joining, the position allowed Ja- 
gan to meet other union leaders in British Guiana and throughout 
the English-speaking Caribbean. 

The springboard for Jagan' s political career was the Political Af- 
fairs Committee (PAC), formed in 1946 as a discussion group. The 
new organization published the PAC Bulletin to promote its Marxist 
ideology and ideas of liberation and decolonization. The PAC's 
outspoken criticism of the colony's poor living standards attracted 
followers as well as detractors. 

In the November 1947 general elections, the PAC put forward 
several members as independent candidates. The PAC's major com- 
petitor was the newly formed Labour Party, which, under J. B. 
Singh, won six of fourteen seats contested. Jagan won a seat and 
briefly joined the Labour Party. But he had difficulties with his 
new party's center-right ideology and soon left its ranks. The 
Labour Party's support of the policies of the British governor and 
its inability to create a grass-roots base gradually stripped it of liberal 
supporters throughout the country. The Labour Party's lack of a 
clear-cut reform agenda left a vacuum, which Jagan rapidly moved 



16 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



to fill. Turmoil on the colony's sugar plantations gave him an op- 
portunity to achieve national standing. After the June 16, 1948, 
police shootings of five Indo-Guyanese workers at Enmore, close 
to Georgetown, the PAC and the Guiana Industrial Workers' Un- 
ion (GIWU) organized a large and peaceful demonstration, which 
clearly enhanced J agan's standing with the Indo-Guyanese popu- 
lation. 

Jagan's next major step was the founding of the People's Progres- 
sive Party (PPP) in January 1950. Using the PAC as a founda- 
tion, Jagan created from it a new party that drew support from 
both the Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese communities. To in- 
crease support among the Afro-Guyanese, Forbes Burnham was 
brought into the party. 

Born in 1923, Burnham was the sole son in a family that had 
three children. His father was headmaster of Kitty Methodist 
Primary School, which was located just outside Georgetown. As 
part of the colony's educated class, young Burnham was exposed 
to political viewpoints at an early age. He did exceedingly well in 
school and went to London to obtain a law degree. Although not 
exposed to childhood poverty as was Jagan, Burnham was acutely 
aware of racial discrimination. 

The social strata of the urban Afro-Guyanese community of the 
1930s and 1940s included a mulatto or "coloured" elite, a black 
professional middle class, and, at the bottom, the black working 
class. Unemployment in the 1930s was high. When war broke out 
in 1939, many Afro-Guyanese joined the military, hoping to gain 
new job skills and escape poverty. When they returned home from 
the war, however, jobs were still scarce and discrimination was still 
a part of life. By the time of Burnham 's arrival on the political 
stage in the late 1940s, the Afro-Guyanese community was ready 
for a leader. 

The PPP's initial leadership was multiethnic and left of center, 
but hardly revolutionary. Jagan became the leader of the PPP's 
parliamentary group, and Burnham assumed the responsibilities 
of party chairman. Other key party members included Janet Ja- 
gan and Ashton Chase, both PAC veterans. The new party's first 
victory came in the 1950 municipal elections, in which Janet Ja- 
gan won a seat. Cheddi Jagan and Burnham failed to win seats, 
but Burnham' s campaign made a favorable impression on many 
urban Afro-Guyanese. 

From its first victory in the 1950 municipal election, the PPP 
gathered momentum. However, the party's often strident anti- 
capitalist and socialist message made the British government un- 
easy. Colonial officials showed their displeasure with the PPP in 



17 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

1952 when, on a regional tour, the Jagans were designated pro- 
hibited immigrants in Trinidad and Grenada. 

A British commission in 1950 recommended universal adult 
suffrage and the adoption of a ministerial system for British Gui- 
ana. The commission also recommended that power be concen- 
trated in the executive branch, that is, the office of the governor. 
These reforms presented British Guiana's parties with an oppor- 
tunity to participate in national elections and form a government, 
but maintained power in the hands of the British-appointed chief 
executive. This arrangement rankled the PPP, which saw it as an 
attempt to curtail the party's political power. 

Preindependence Government, 1953-66 
The PPP's First Government, 1953 

Once the new constitution was adopted, elections were set for 
1953. The PPP's coalition of lower-class Afro-Guyanese and rural 
Indo-Guyanese workers, together with elements of both ethnic 
groups' middle sectors, made for a formidable constituency. Con- 
servatives branded the PPP as communist, but the party cam- 
paigned on a center-left platform and appealed to a growing 
nationalism. The other major party participating in the election, 
the National Democratic Party (NDP), was a spin-off of the League 
of Coloured People and was largely an Afro-Guyanese middle-class 
organization, sprinkled with middle-class Portuguese and Indo- 
Guyanese. The NDP, together with the poorly organized United 
Farmers and Workers Party and the United National Party, was 
soundly defeated by the PPP. Final results gave the PPP eighteen 
of twenty-four seats compared with the NDP's two seats and four 
seats for independents. 

The PPP's first administration was brief. The legislature opened 
on May 30, 1953. Already suspicious of Jagan and the PPP's 
radicalism, conservative forces in the business community were fur- 
ther distressed by the new administration's program of expand- 
ing the role of the state in the economy and society. The PPP also 
sought to implement its reform program at a rapid pace, which 
brought the party into confrontation with the governor and with 
high-ranking civil servants who preferred more gradual change. 
The issue of civil service appointments also threatened the PPP, 
in this case from within. Following the 1953 victory, these appoint- 
ments became an issue between the predominantly Indo-Guyanese 
supporters of Jagan and the largely Afro-Guyanese backers of Burn- 
ham. Burnham threatened to split the party if he were not made 
sole leader of the PPP. A compromise was reached by which 



18 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



members of what had become Burnham's faction received minis- 
terial appointments. 

The PPP's introduction of the Labour Relations Act provoked 
a confrontation with the British. This law ostensibly was aimed 
at reducing intraunion rivalries, but would have favored the GIVVU, 
which was closely aligned with the ruling party. The opposition 
charged that the PPP was seeking to gain control over the colo- 
ny's economic and social life and was moving to stifle the opposi- 
tion. The day the act was introduced to the legislature, the GIWU 
went on strike in support of the proposed law. The British govern- 
ment interpreted this intermingling of party politics and labor 
unionism as a direct challenge to the constitution and the authori- 
ty of the governor. The day after the act was passed, on October 
9, 1953, London suspended the colony's constitution and, under 
pretext of quelling disturbances, sent in troops. 

The Interim Government, 1953-57 

Following the suspension of the constitution, British Guiana was 
governed by an interim administration consisting of small group 
of conservative politicians, businessmen, and civil servants that 
lasted until 1957. Order in the colonial government masked a grow- 
ing rift in the country's main political party as the personal con- 
flict between the PPP's Jagan and Burnham widened into a bitter 
dispute. In 1955 Jagan and Burnham formed rival wings of the 
PPP. Support for each leader was largely, but not totally, along 
ethnic lines. J. B. Lachmansingh, a leading Indo-Guyanese and head 
of the GIWU, supported Burnham, whereas Jagan retained the 
loyalty of a number of leading Afro-Guyanese radicals, such as Syd- 
ney King. Burnham's wing of the PPP moved to the right, leaving 
Jagan' s wing on the left, where he was regarded with considerable 
apprehension by Western governments and the colony's conser- 
vative business groups. 

The Second PPP Government, 1957-61, and Racial Politics 

The 1957 elections held under a new constitution demonstrated 
the extent of the growing ethnic division within the Guianese elec- 
torate. The revised constitution provided limited self-government, 
primarily through the Legislative Council. Of the council's twenty- 
four delegates, fifteen were elected, six were nominated, and the 
remaining three were to be ex officio members from the interim 
administration. The two wings of the PPP launched vigorous cam- 
paigns, each attempting to prove that it was the legitimate heir to 
the original party. Despite denials of such motivation, both fac- 
tions made a strong appeal to their respective ethnic constituencies. 



19 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The 1957 elections were convincingly won by Jagan's PPP fac- 
tion. Although his group had a secure parliamentary majority, its 
support was drawn more and more from the Indo-Guyanese com- 
munity. The faction's main planks were increasingly identified as 
Indo-Guyanese: more rice land, improved union representation 
in the sugar industry, and improved business opportunities and 
more government posts for Indo-Guyanese. The PPP had abrogated 
its claim to being a multiracial party. 

Jagan's veto of British Guiana's participation in the West In- 
dies Federation resulted in the complete loss of Afro-Guyanese sup- 
port. In the late 1950s, the British Caribbean colonies had been 
actively negotiating establishment of a West Indies Federation. The 
PPP had pledged to work for the eventual political union of Brit- 
ish Guiana with the Caribbean territories. The Indo-Guyanese, 
who constituted a majority in Guyana, were apprehensive of be- 
coming part of a federation in which they would be outnumbered 
by people of African descent. Jagan's veto of the federation caused 
his party to lose all significant Afro-Guyanese support. 

Burnham learned an important lesson from the 1957 elections. 
He could not win if supported only by the lower-class, urban Afro- 
Guyanese. He needed middle-class allies, especially those Afro- 
Guyanese who backed the moderate United Democratic Party. 
From 1957 onward, Burnham worked to create a balance between 
maintaining the backing of the more radical Afro-Guyanese lower 
classes and gaining the support of the more capitalist middle class. 
Clearly, Burnham 's stated preference for socialism would not bind 
those two groups together against Jagan, an avowed Marxist. The 
answer was something more basic — race. Burnham 's appeals to 
race proved highly successful in bridging the schism that divided 
the Afro-Guyanese along class lines. This strategy convinced the 
powerful Afro-Guyanese middle class to accept a leader who was 
more of a radical than they would have preferred to support. At 
the same time, it neutralized the objections of the black working 
class to entering an alliance with those representing the more moder- 
ate interests of the middle classes. Burnham 's move toward the right 
was accomplished with the merger of his PPP faction and the United 
Democratic Party into a new organization, the People's National 
Congress (PNC). 

Following the 1957 elections, Jagan rapidly consolidated his hold 
on the Indo-Guyanese community. Though candid in expressing his 
admiration for Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, and, later, Fidel Castro 
Ruz, Jagan in power asserted that the PPP's Marxist-Leninist prin- 
ciples must be adapted to Guyana's own particular circumstances. 
Jagan advocated nationalization of foreign holdings, especially in 



20 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



the sugar industry. British fears of a communist takeover, however, 
caused the British governor to hold Jagan's more radical policy 
initiatives in check. 

PPP Reelection and Debacle 

The 1961 elections were a bitter contest between the PPP, the 
PNC, and the United Force (UF), a conservative party represent- 
ing big business, the Roman Catholic Church, and Amerindian, 
Chinese, and Portuguese voters. These elections were held under 
yet another new constitution that marked a return to the degree 
of self-government that existed briefly in 1953. It introduced a bi- 
cameral system boasting a wholly elected thirty-five-member Legis- 
lative Assembly and a thirteen-member Senate to be appointed by 
the governor. The post of prime minister was created and was to 
be filled by the majority party in the Legislative Assembly. With 
the strong support of the Indo-Guyanese population, the PPP again 
won by a substantial margin, gaining twenty seats in the Legisla- 
tive Assembly, compared with eleven seats for the PNC and four 
for the UF. Jagan was named prime minister. 

Jagan's administration became increasingly friendly with com- 
munist and leftist regimes; for instance, Jagan refused to observe 
the United States embargo on communist Cuba. After discussions 
between Jagan and Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara 
in 1960 and 1961, Cuba offered British Guiana loans and equip- 
ment. In addition, the Jagan administration signed trade agree- 
ments with Hungary and the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany). 

From 1961 to 1964, Jagan was confronted with a destabiliza- 
tion campaign conducted by the PNC and UF. Riots and demon- 
strations against the PPP administration were frequent, and during 
disturbances in 1962 and 1963 mobs destroyed part of Georgetown. 

Labor violence also increased during the early 1960s. To coun- 
ter the MPCA with its link to Burnham, the PPP formed the Gui- 
anese Agricultural Workers Union. This new union's political 
mandate was to organize the Indo-Guyanese sugarcane field- 
workers. The MPCA immediately responded with a one-day strike 
to emphasize its continued control over the sugar workers. 

The PPP government responded to the strike in March 1964 by 
publishing a new Labour Relations Bill almost identical to the 1953 
legislation that had resulted in British intervention. Regarded as 
a power play for control over a key labor sector, introduction of 
the proposed law prompted protests and rallies throughout the cap- 
ital. Riots broke out on April 5; they were followed on April 18 
by a general strike. By May 9, the governor was compelled to 



21 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

declare a state of emergency. Nevertheless, the strike and violence 
continued until July 7, when the Labour Relations Bill was allowed 
to lapse without being enacted. To bring an end to the disorder, 
the government agreed to consult with union representatives be- 
fore introducing similar bills. These disturbances exacerbated ten- 
sion and animosity between the two major ethnic communities and 
made a reconciliation between Jagan and Burnham an impossibility. 

Jagan's term had not yet ended when another round of labor 
unrest rocked the colony. The pro-PPP GIWU, which had become 
an umbrella group of all labor organizations, called on sugar work- 
ers to strike in January 1964. To dramatize their case, Jagan led 
a march by sugar workers from the interior to Georgetown. This 
demonstration ignited outbursts of violence that soon escalated be- 
yond the control of the authorities. On May 22, the governor fi- 
nally declared another state of emergency. The situation continued 
to worsen, and in June the governor assumed full powers, rushed 
in British troops to restore order, and proclaimed a moratorium 
on all political activity. By the end of the turmoil, 160 people were 
dead and more than 1,000 homes had been destroyed. 

In an effort to quell the turmoil, the country's political parties 
asked the British goverment to modify the constitution to provide 
for more proportional representation. The colonial secretary pro- 
posed a fifty- three-member unicameral legislature. Despite oppo- 
sition from the ruling PPP, all reforms were implemented and new 
elections set for October 1964. 

As Jagan feared, the PPP lost the general elections of 1964. The 
politics of apanjhaat, Hindi for "vote for your own kind," were 
becoming entrenched in British Guiana. The PPP won 46 percent 
of the vote and twenty-four seats, which made it the majority party. 
However, the PNC, which won 40 percent of the vote and twenty- 
two seats, and the UF, which won 1 1 percent of the vote and seven 
seats, formed a coalition. The socialist PNC and unabashedly 
capitalist UF had joined forces to keep the PPP out of office for 
another term. Jagan called the election fraudulent and refused to 
resign as prime minister. The constitution was amended to allow 
the governor to remove Jagan from office. Burnham became prime 
minister on December 14, 1964. 

Independence and the Burnham Era 

Burnham in Power 

In the first year under Burnham, conditions in the colony began 
to stabilize. The new coalition administration broke diplomatic ties 
with Cuba and implemented policies that favored local investors 



22 



Saint George's Anglican Church in Georgetown, built in 1889, is one 
of the tallest wooden buildings in the world. 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 

and foreign industry. The colony applied the renewed flow of 
Western aid to further development of its infrastructure. A con- 
stitutional conference was held in London; the conference set May 
26, 1966, as the date for the colony's independence. By the time 
independence was achieved, the country was enjoying economic 
growth and relative domestic peace. 

The newly independent Guyana at first sought to improve rela- 
tions with its neighbors. For instance, in December 1965 the country 
had become a charter member of the Caribbean Free Trade As- 
sociation (Carifta). Relations with Venezuela were not so placid, 
however. In 1962 Venezuela had announced that it was rejecting 
the 1899 boundary and would renew its claim to all of Guyana west 
of the Essequibo River. In 1966 Venezuela seized the Guyanese 
half of Ankoko Island, in the Cuyuni River, and two years later 
claimed a strip of sea along Guyana's western coast. 

Another challenge to the newly independent government came 
at the beginning of January 1969, with the Rupununi Rebellion. 
In the Rupununi region in southwest Guyana, along the Venezue- 
lan border, white settlers and Amerindians rebelled against the cen- 
tral government. Several Guyanese policemen in the area were 
killed, and spokesmen for the rebels declared the area independent 



23 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

and asked for Venezuelan aid. Troops arrived from Georgetown 
within days, and the rebellion was quickly put down. Although 
the rebellion was not a large affair, it exposed underlying tensions 
in the new state and the Amerindians' marginalized role in the coun- 
try's political and social life. 

The Cooperative Republic 

The 1968 elections allowed the PNC to rule without the UF. 
The PNC won thirty seats, the PPP nineteen seats, and the UF 
four seats. However, many observers claimed the elections were 
marred by manipulation and coercion by the PNC . The PPP and 
UF were part of Guyana's political landscape but were ignored as 
Burnham began to convert the machinery of state into an instru- 
ment of the PNC . 

After the 1968 elections, Burnham 's policies became more leftist 
as he announced he would lead Guyana to socialism. He consoli- 
dated his dominance of domestic policies through gerrymander- 
ing, manipulation of the balloting process, and politicalization of 
the civil service. A few Indo-Guyanese were coopted into the PNC, 
but the ruling party was unquestionably the embodiment of the 
Afro-Guyanese political will. Although the Afro-Guyanese mid- 
dle class was uneasy with Burnham 's leftist leanings, the PNC re- 
mained a shield against Indo-Guyanese dominance. The support 
of the Afro-Guyanese community allowed the PNC to bring the 
economy under control and to begin organizing the country into 
cooperatives. 

On February 23, 1970, Guyana declared itself a "cooperative 
republic" and cut all ties to the British monarchy. The governor 
general was replaced as head of state by a ceremonial president. 
Relations with Cuba were improved, and Guyana became a force 
in the Nonaligned Movement. In August 1972, Burnham hosted 
the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Nonaligned Countries in 
Georgetown. He used this opportunity to address the evils of im- 
perialism and the need to support African liberation movements 
in southern Africa. Burnham also let Cuban troops use Guyana 
as a transit point on their way to the war in Angola in the mid-1970s. 

In the early 1970s, electoral fraud became blatant in Guyana. 
PNC victories always included overseas voters, who consistently 
and overwhelmingly voted for the ruling party. The police and mili- 
tary intimidated the Indo-Guyanese. The army was accused of tam- 
pering with ballot boxes. 

Considered a low point in the democratic process, the 1973 elec- 
tions were followed by an amendment to the constitution that 
abolished legal appeals to the Privy Council in London. After 



24 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



consolidating power on the legal and electoral fronts, Burnham 
turned to mobilizing the masses for what was to be Guyana's cul- 
tural revolution. A program of national service was introduced that 
placed an emphasis on self-reliance, loosely defined as Guyana's 
population feeding, clothing, and housing itself without outside help. 

Government authoritarianism increased in 1974 when Burnham 
advanced the "paramountcy of the party." All organs of the state 
would be considered agencies of the ruling PNC and subject to its 
control. The state and the PNC became interchangeable; PNC ob- 
jectives were now public policy. 

Burnham' s consolidation of power in Guyana was not total; op- 
position groups were tolerated within limits. For instance, in 1973 
the Working People's Alliance (WPA) was founded. Opposed to 
Burnham 's authoritarianism, the WPA was a multiethnic combi- 
nation of politicians and intellectuals that advocated racial harmony, 
free elections, and democratic socialism. Although the WPA did 
not become an official political party until 1979, it evolved as an 
alternative to Burnham' s PNC and Jagan's PPP. 

Jagan's political career continued to decline in the 1970s. Out- 
maneuvered on the parliamentary front, the PPP leader tried 
another tactic. In April 1975, the PPP ended its boycott of parlia- 
ment with Jagan stating that the PPP's policy would change from 
noncooperation and civil resistance to critical support of the Burn- 
ham regime. Soon after, Jagan appeared on the same platform with 
Prime Minister Burnham at the celebration of ten years of Guyanese 
independence, on May 26, 1976. 

Despite Jagan's conciliatory move, Burnham had no intention 
of sharing power and continued to secure his position. When over- 
tures intended to bring about new elections and PPP participation 
in the government were brushed aside, the largely Indo-Guyanese 
sugar work force went on a bitter strike. The strike was broken, 
and sugar production declined steeply from 1976 to 1977. The PNC 
postponed the 1978 elections, opting instead for a referendum to 
be held in July 1978, proposing to keep the incumbent assembly 
in power. 

The July 1978 national referendum was poorly received. 
Although the PNC government proudly proclaimed that 71 per- 
cent of eligible voters participated and that 97 percent approved 
the referendum, other estimates put turnout at 10 to 14 percent. 
The low turnout was caused in large part by a boycott led by the 
PPP, WPA, and other opposition forces. 

Burnham' s control over Guyana began to weaken when the 
Jonestown massacre brought unwanted international attention. In 
the 1970s, Jim Jones, leader of the People's Temple of Christ, 



25 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

moved more than 1 ,000 of his followers from San Francisco to 
Jonestown, a Utopian agricultural community near Port Kaituma 
in western Guyana. The People's Temple of Christ was regarded 
by members of the Guyanese government as a model agricultural 
community that shared its vision of settling the hinterland and its 
view of cooperative socialism. The fact that the People's Temple 
was well-equipped with openly flaunted weapons hinted that the 
community had the approval of members of the PNC's inner cir- 
cle. Complaints of abuse by leaders of the cult prompted United 
States congressman Leo Ryan to fly to Guyana to investigate. The 
San Francisco-area representative was shot and killed by members 
of the People's Temple as he was boarding an airplane at Port Kai- 
tuma to return to Georgetown. Fearing further publicity, Jones 
and more than 900 of his followers died in a massive communal 
murder and suicide. The November 1978 Jonestown massacre sud- 
denly put the Burnham government under intense foreign scrutiny, 
especially from the United States. Investigations into the massacre 
led to allegations that the Guyanese government had links to the 
fanatical cult (see Cults, ch. 2). 

Although the bloody memory of Jonestown faded, Guyanese pol- 
itics experienced a violent year in 1979. Some of this violence was 
directed against the WPA, which had emerged as a vocal critic of 
the state and of Burnham in particular. One of the party's lead- 
ers, Walter Rodney, and several professors at the University of 
Guyana were arrested on arson charges. The professors were soon 
released, and Rodney was granted bail. WPA leaders then or- 
ganized the alliance into Guyana's most vocal opposition party. 

As 1979 wore on, the level of violence continued to escalate. In 
October Minister of Education Vincent Teekah was mysteriously 
shot to death. The following year, Rodney was killed by a car bomb. 
The PNC government quickly accused Rodney of being a terrorist 
who had died at the hands of his own bomb and charged his brother 
Donald with being an accomplice. Later investigation implicated 
the Guyanese government, however. Rodney was a well-known 
leftist, and the circumstances of his death damaged Burnham's im- 
age with many leaders and intellectuals in less-developed countries 
who earlier had been willing to overlook the authoritarian nature 
of his government. 

A new constitution was promulgated in 1980 (see Constitution 
of 1980, ch. 4). The old ceremonial post of president was abolished, 
and the head of government became the executive president, chosen, 
as the former position of prime minister had been, by the majority 
party in the National Assembly. Burnham automatically became 
Guyana's first executive president and promised elections later in 



26 



Guyana: Historical Setting 



the year. In elections held on December 15, 1980, the PNC claimed 
77 percent of the vote and forty-one seats of the popularly elected 
seats, plus the ten chosen by the regional councils. The PPP and 
UF won ten and two seats, respectively. The WPA refused to par- 
ticipate in an electoral contest it regarded as fraudulent. Opposi- 
tion claims of electoral fraud were upheld by a team of international 
observers headed by Britain's Lord Avebury. 

The economic crisis facing Guyana in the early 1980s deepened 
considerably, accompanied by the rapid deterioration of public ser- 
vices, infrastructure, and overall quality of life. Blackouts occurred 
almost daily, and water services were increasingly unsatisfactory. 
The litany of Guyana's decline included shortages of rice and sugar 
(both produced in the country), cooking oil, and kerosene. While 
the formal economy sank, the black market economy in Guyana 
thrived. 

In the midst of this turbulent period, Burnham underwent sur- 
gery for a throat ailment. On August 6, 1985, while in the care 
of Cuban doctors, Guyana's first and only leader since indepen- 
dence unexpectedly died. An epoch had abruptly ended. Guyana 
was suddenly in the post-Burnham era. 

From Burnham to Hoyte 

Despite concerns that the country was about to fall into a peri- 
od of political instability, the transfer of power went smoothly. Vice 
President Desmond Hoyte became the new executive president and 
leader of the PNC. His initial tasks were threefold: to secure authori- 
ty within the PNC and national government, to take the PNC 
through the December 1985 elections, and to revitalize the stag- 
nant economy. 

Hoyte 's first two goals were easily accomplished. The new leader 
took advantage of factionalism within the PNC to quietly consoli- 
date his authority. The December 1985 elections gave the PNC 
79 percent of the vote and forty-two of the fifty-three directly elected 
seats. Eight of the remaining eleven seats went to the PPP, two 
went to the UF, and one to the WPA. Charging fraud, the oppo- 
sition boycotted the December 1986 municipal elections. With no 
opponents, the PNC won all ninety-one seats in local government. 

Revitalizing the economy proved more difficult. As a first step, 
Hoyte gradually moved to embrace the private sector, recognizing 
that state control of the economy had failed. Hoyte 's administration 
lifted all curbs on foreign activity and ownership in 1988. 

Although the Hoyte government did not completely abandon the 
authoritarianism of the Burnham regime, it did make certain politi- 
cal reforms. Hoyte abolished overseas voting and the provisions 



27 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

for widespread proxy and postal voting. Independent newspapers 
were given greater freedom, and political harassment abated con- 
siderably. 

In September 1988, Hoyte visited the United States and became 
the first Guyanese head of state to meet with his United States coun- 
terpart. By October 1988, Hoyte felt strong enough to make pub- 
lic his break with the policies of the Burnham administration. In 
a nationally televised address on October 1 1 , he focused Guyana's 
economic and foreign policies on the West, linking Guyana's fu- 
ture economic development to regional economies and noting that 
the strengthening of Guyana's relations with the United States was 
"imperative." While these objectives were in contrast to the poli- 
cies of the past two decades, it was unclear what the long-term poli- 
tical and economic results would be. 

* * * 

Several good books are available on Guyanese history. For the 
region's early history, see Michel Deveze's Antilles, Guyanes, LaMer 
des Caraibes de 1492 a 1789, and Vere T. Daly's The Making of Guyana. 
Walter Rodney's A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905 
is excellent on the colonial period. Four books on the modern period 
stand out: Chaitram Singh's Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society; 
Thomas J. Spinner, Jr.'s A Political and Social History of Guyana, 
1945-1983; Reynold Burrowes's The Wild Coast: An Account of Po- 
litics in Guyana; and Henry B. Jeffrey and Colin Baber's Guyana: 
Politics, Economics and Society. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



28 



Chapter 2. Guyana: 
The Society and Its Environment 



Georgetown's public market building 



The composition of Guyanese society is a reflec- 
tion of the country's colonial past. The colony was created by Dutch 
and British planters who grew sugarcane using the labor of slaves 
and indentured workers. Ignoring the country's vast interior, the 
planters constructed dikes and dams that transformed the coast into 
an arable plain. With the exception of the indigenous Amerindi- 
ans and a few Europeans, the entire population consists of imported 
plantation workers or their descendants. 

Guyanese culture developed with the adaptation of the forced 
and voluntary immigrants to the customs of the dominant British. 
Brought to Guyana as slaves, Africans of diverse backgrounds had 
been thrown together under conditions that severely constrained 
their ability to preserve their respective cultural traditions. In adopt- 
ing Christianity and the values of British colonists, the descendants 
of the African slaves laid the foundations of today's Afro-Guyanese 
culture. Arriving later and under somewhat more favorable cir- 
cumstances, East Indian immigrants were subjected to fewer pres- 
sures to assimilate than the Africans had been. As a result, more 
of their traditional culture was preserved. 

Although the culture of independent Guyana has become more 
truly national, the Guyanese people remain divided by ethnic mis- 
trust. The Guyanese elite that has emerged to replace the colonial 
administration faces the enormous challenge of satisfying the aspi- 
rations of the people concerning economic development and educa- 
tional opportunity. 

Geography 
Terrain 

With a land area of approximately 197,000 square kilometers, 
Guyana is about the size of Idaho. The country is situated between 
1° and 9° north latitude and between 56° and 62° west longitude. 
With a 430-kilometer Atlantic coastline on the northeast, Guyana 
is bounded by Venezuela on the west, Brazil on the west and south, 
and Suriname on the east. The land comprises three main geo- 
graphical zones: the coastal plain, the white sand belt, and the in- 
terior highlands (see fig. 2). 

The coastal plain, which occupies about 5 percent of the coun- 
try's area, is home to more than 90 percent of its inhabitants. The 



3! 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 




Figure 2. Guyana: Topography and Drainage 

plain ranges from five to six kilometers wide and extends from the 
Courantyne River in the east to the Venezuelan border in the 
northwest. 



32 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

The coastal plain is made up largely of alluvial mud swept out 
to sea by the Amazon River, carried north by ocean currents, and 
deposited on the Guyanese shores. A rich clay of great fertility, 
this mud overlays the white sands and clays formed from the ero- 
sion of the interior bedrock and carried seaward by the rivers of 
Guyana. Because much of the coastal plain floods at high tide, ef- 
forts to dam and drain this area have gone on since the 1700s (see 
The Coming of the Europeans, ch. 1). 

Guyana has no well-defined shoreline or sandy beaches. Ap- 
proaching the ocean, the land gradually loses elevation until it in- 
cludes many areas of marsh and swamp. Seaward from the 
vegetation line is a region of mud flats, shallow brown water, and 
sandbars. Off New Amsterdam, these mud flats extend almost 
twenty-five kilometers. The sandbars and shallow water are a major 
impediment to shipping, and incoming vessels must partially un- 
load their cargoes offshore in order to reach the docks at Georgetown 
and New Amsterdam. 

A line of swamps forms a barrier between the white sandy hills 
of the interior and the coastal plain. These swamps, formed when 
water was prevented from flowing onto coastal croplands by a se- 
ries of dams, serve as reservoirs during periods of drought. 

The white sand belt lies south of the coastal zone. This area is 
150 to 250 kilometers wide and consists of low sandy hills inter- 
spersed with rocky outcroppings. The white sands support a dense 
hardwood forest. These sands cannot support crops, and if the trees 
are removed erosion is rapid and severe. Most of Guyana's reserves 
of bauxite, gold, and diamonds are found in this region. 

The largest of Guyana's three geographical regions is the interior 
highlands, a series of plateaus, flat-topped mountains, and savan- 
nahs that extend from the white sand belt to the country's southern 
borders. The Pakaraima Mountains dominate the western part of 
the interior highlands. In this region are found some of the oldest 
sedimentary rocks in the Western Hemisphere. Mount Roraima, 
on the Venezuelan border, is part of the Pakaraima range and, 
at 2,762 meters, is Guyana's tallest peak. Farther south lie the 
Kaieteur Plateau, a broad, rocky area about 600 meters in eleva- 
tion; the 1 , 000-meter high Kanuku Mountains; and the low Acarai 
Mountains situated on the southern border with Brazil. 

Much of the interior highlands consist of grassland. The largest 
expanse of grassland, the Rupununi Savannah, covers about 15,000 
square kilometers in southern Guyana. This savannah also extends 
far into Venezuela and Brazil. The part in Guyana is split into 
northern and southern regions by the Kanuku Mountains. The 
sparse grasses of the savannah in general support only grazing, 



33 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

although Amerindian groups cultivate a few areas along the 
Rupununi River and in the foothills of the Kanuku Mountains. 

Hydrology 

Guyana is a water-rich country. The numerous rivers flow into 
the Atlantic Ocean, generally in a northward direction. A num- 
ber of rivers in the western part of the country, however, flow east- 
ward into the Essequibo River, draining the Kaieteur Plateau. The 
Essequibo, the country's major river, runs from the Brazilian border 
in the south to a wide delta west of Georgetown. The rivers of 
eastern Guyana cut across the coastal zone, making east-west travel 
difficult, but they also provide limited water access to the interior. 
Waterfalls generally limit water transport to the lower reaches of 
each river. Some of the waterfalls are spectacular; for example, 
Kaieteur Falls on the Potaro River drops 226 meters, more than 
four times the height of Niagara Falls. 

Drainage throughout most of Guyana is poor and river flow slug- 
gish because the average gradient of the main rivers is only one 
meter every five kilometers. Swamps and areas of periodic flood- 
ing are found in all but the mountainous regions, and all new land 
projects require extensive drainage networks before they are suitable 
for agricultural use. The average square kilometer on a sugar plan- 
tation, for example, has six kilometers of irrigation canals, eight- 
een kilometers of large drains, and eighteen kilometers of small 
drains. These canals occupy nearly one-eighth of the surface area 
of the average sugarcane field. Some of the larger estates have more 
than 550 kilometers of canals; Guyana itself has a total of more 
than 8,000 kilometers. Even Georgetown is below sea level and 
must depend on dikes for protection from the Demerara River and 
the Atlantic Ocean. 

Climate 

Guyana has a tropical climate with almost uniformly high tem- 
peratures and humidity, and much rainfall. Seasonal variations in 
temperature are slight, particularly along the coast. Although the 
temperature never gets dangerously high, the combination of heat 
and humidity can at times seem oppressive. The entire area is un- 
der the influence of the northeast trade winds, and during the mid- 
day and afternoon sea breezes bring relief to the coast. Guyana 
lies south of the path of Caribbean hurricanes, and none is known 
to have hit the country. 

Temperatures in Georgetown are quite constant, with an aver- 
age high of 32 °C and an average low of 24°C in the hottest month 
(July), and an average range of 29°C to 23 °C in February, the 



34 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

coolest month. The highest temperature ever recorded in the cap- 
ital was 34°C and the lowest only 20°C. Humidity averages 70 
percent year-round. Locations in the interior, away from the moder- 
ating influence of the ocean, experience slightly wider variations 
in daily temperature, and nighttime readings as low as 12°C have 
been recorded. Humidity in the interior is also slightly lower, aver- 
aging around 60 percent. 

Rainfall is heaviest in the northwest and lightest in the southeast 
and interior. Annual averages on the coast near the Venezuelan 
border are near 2,500 millimeters, farther east at New Amsterdam 
2,000 millimeters, and 1,500 millimeters in southern Guyana's 
Rupununi Savannah. Areas on the northeast sides of mountains 
that catch the trade winds average as much as 3,500 millimeters 
of precipitation annually. Although rain falls throughout the year, 
about 50 percent of the annual total arrives in the summer rainy 
season that extends from May to the end of July along the coast 
and from April through September farther inland. Coastal areas 
have a second rainy season from November through January. Rain 
generally falls in heavy afternoon showers or thunderstorms. Over- 
cast days are rare; most days include four to eight hours of sun- 
shine from morning through early afternoon. 

Population 

Demographic Profile 

Guyana's population was counted at 758,619 in the census of 
1980 and estimated to be 764,000 in 1990. This slow growth was 
in sharp contrast to the decades following World War II, when the 
population rose from 375,000 in 1946 to 700,000 in 1970. The 
natural increase in population in 1990 was 1.9 percent; this growth 
was almost completely negated, however, by the large numbers 
of Guyanese who emigrated. The population was relatively young, 
with 37 percent under fifteen years of age in 1985 (see fig. 3). 

Guyana's birthrate, which averaged thirty-two live births per 
1 ,000 residents in the two decades prior to 1940, jumped to an ex- 
ceptionally high forty live births per 1 ,000 in the two decades after 
1940. The rate began to drop after 1960 and by 1990 had fallen 
to twenty-five live births per 1,000. 

Efforts to control malaria and to improve sanitation in the 1940s 
resulted in a dramatic decrease in infant mortality and in the overall 
death rate. In the 1930s, the infant mortality rate was 149 for every 
1,000 live births. By 1946 this rate had dropped to eighty-seven 
per 1,000, and in 1990 it stood at thirty deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Statistics on the general death rate mirror the decline in the infant 



35 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



AGE-GROUP 




FEMALES 



60 40 20 20 40 60 
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 

Note: Figures based on United Nations estimates, which are 14 
percent higher than official government estimates. 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Guyana, 1987, Wiesbaden, 1987, 17. 

Figure 3. Guyana: Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1985 

mortality rate. The death rate (including infant mortality) in 1944 
was twenty-two per 1,000 residents; in 1963, eight per 1,000; and 
in 1990, five per 1,000, one of the lowest rates in the Western 
Hemisphere. 

Indo-Guyanese women had a higher birthrate than Afro-Guya- 
nese women in the years after World War II. However, by the early 
1960s the fertility rate for Indo-Guyanese women had begun to drop. 
Statistics for the 1980s showed Indo-Guyanese women marrying at 
a later age and having fewer children than had been customary in 
the 1950s. By the 1990s, the difference in birthrates between Indo- 
Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese women had disappeared. 

A general decline in fertility rates among women in all eth- 
nic groups was attributed to the increased availability and use of 



36 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

contraceptives. In 1975 the Guyana Fertility Survey found that 57 
percent of women who had been married had used contraceptives 
at some time and that about 40 percent currently were using them. 
This high rate of contraceptive use was maintained in the absence 
of public or private family-planning campaigns. 

Ethnic Composition 

Ethnic diversity is one of the most significant characteristics of 
the Guyanese population (see table 2, Appendix A). As of 1980, 
Guyanese of East Indian descent (Indo-Guyanese) constituted 51 
percent of the total population. Guyanese wholly of African de- 
scent made up 31 percent of the population. Those listed as of mixed 
ancestry constituted 12 percent. Since the mixed-ancestry category 
comprised individuals of partial African ancestry who were usually 
included in the Afro-Guyanese community, the Afro-Guyanese pop- 
ulation in effect constituted 42 percent of the total population. The 
remainder of the population was composed of Amerindians (4 per- 
cent) and individuals of European or Asian descent (3 percent). 

A higher growth rate for the Indo-Guyanese population in the 
post- World War II period resulted in a change in the ethnic com- 
position of Guyanese society. The Indo-Guyanese population grew 
from 43 percent of the total in 1946 to a majority — 51 percent — in 
1980. During the same period, the Afro-Guyanese proportion of 
the population decreased from 49 percent to 42 percent. Although 
the small European (mostly Portuguese) and Asian (almost entirely 
Chinese) sectors continued to grow in absolute numbers after World 
War II, they represented a decreasing proportion of the population. 

Population Distribution and Settlement Patterns 

Statistics indicate that Guyana is one of the most lightly popu- 
lated countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The World 
Bank (see Glossary) estimated that there were four people per square 
kilometer in Guyana in 1988, far fewer than the average of twenty 
people per square kilometer for all of Latin America. However, 
more than 90 percent of Guyana's population lived along the coast, 
on a strip constituting only 5 percent of the country's total land 
area. A more useful figure is the population density per square 
kilometer of agricultural land, which was estimated at forty-six in 
1988. In Latin America as a whole, the average population densi- 
ty on agricultural land was fifty-five per square kilometer. 

More than 70 percent of Guyana's coastal population is rural, 
living on plantations or in villages strung along the coastal road. 
The villages range in size from several hundred to several thou- 
sand inhabitants. The layout of the villages is dictated by the 



37 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

drainage and irrigation systems of the plantations, both active and 
abandoned. The villages are most heavily concentrated along the 
estuary of the Demerara River and the eastern environs of George- 
town, near the mouth of the Berbice River close to New Amster- 
dam, and along the extreme east coast near the Courantyne River 
(see table 3, Appendix A). 

The pattern of population distribution in Guyana is a product 
of nineteenth-century economic development, which was based on 
the cultivation of sugarcane (see The Early British Colony and the 
Labor Problem, ch. 1). Because the swampy coast was fertile and 
sugar production was geared to export, the large sugar estates con- 
fined their operations to a narrow coastal strip. Most of the vil- 
lages had ethnically diverse populations, but usually one ethnic 
group predominated. The urban population was predominantly 
African, but it would be misleading to suggest that all Afro- 
Guyanese were urban. Indeed, the majority of the Afro-Guyanese 
population was rural. A far greater majority of Indo-Guyanese, 
however, lived outside the cities. The interior of the country was 
left mainly to the Amerindians. Even the later exploitation of tim- 
ber, bauxite, and manganese in the interior failed to effect any size- 
able migration. 

Urban Population 

Guyana remained a primarily rural country in 1991. The only 
significant urban area, the capital city of Georgetown, was home 
to more than 80 percent of the urban population. The smaller towns 
served primarily as regional distribution centers. Georgetown had 
an estimated population of 195,000 in 1985 and an annual growth 
rate of 6.6 percent. Linden, the country's second largest town with 
a population of 30,000, was a bauxite mining complex on the Dem- 
erara River. The port of New Amsterdam in eastern Guyana had 
a population of about 20,000. 

The proportion of the population living in urban areas increased 
only slightly between 1960, when it was 29 percent, and 1980, when 
it was 30.5 percent. By 1985, 32.2 percent of the population was 
living in urban areas. 

Emigration 

Guyanese statistics indicated an average of 6,080 declared 
emigrants a year between 1969 and 1976, increasing to an aver- 
age of 14,400 between 1976 and 1981. Figures for 1976 showed 
43 percent of the emigrants going to the United States, 31 percent 
to Canada, 10 percent to Britain, and 9 percent to the Caribbean. 
Deteriorating economic conditions caused emigration to increase 



38 



view of the low-lying coast with its Dutch-built seawalls 
of Georgetown showing the layout designed by the Dutch, 

mostly on a grid pattern 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 



39 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

sharply in the 1980s. Unofficial estimates put the number leaving 
the country in the late 1980s at 10,000 to 30,000 annually. Many 
of these emigrants were reported to be middle-class professionals, 
largely Indo-Guyanese, who opposed government policies that fa- 
vored employment of Afro-Guyanese in the public sector. This 
emigration resulted in a significant loss of skilled personnel. 

Ethnic Groups 

Guyana's ethnic mix is the direct product of the colonial econo- 
my. Except for the Amerindians and a few Europeans, the coun- 
try's ethnic groups are the descendants of groups brought in to work 
the early plantations. An economy based on sugar production re- 
quired a large labor force. Attempts to enslave the Amerindian 
population failed, and the planters soon turned to African slaves. 
By 1830 there were 100,000 such slaves in British Guiana. 

After the abolition of slavery became totally effective in 1838, 
the planters found a new source of cheap labor in the form of in- 
dentured workers, foreigners recruited to work for a specific num- 
ber of years, usually five, with the possibility of reenlisting for an 
additional period and eventually being repatriated. Even before 
slavery was abolished, the importation of indentured workers be- 
gan. They were recruited from Portugal, India, China, and the 
West Indies. Although the terms of indenture were nearly as harsh 
as slavery, the planters succeeded in bringing about 286,000 per- 
sons into the country by the early twentieth century. More than 
80 percent of these indentured workers were East Indians; their 
arrival would profoundly affect Guyana's ethnic composition and 
the nature of Guyanese society in general. 

Afro-Guyanese 

Descendants of the Africans, the Afro-Guyanese came to see 
themselves as the true people of British Guiana, with greater rights 
to land than the indentured workers who had arrived after them. 
The fact that planters made land available to East Indians in the 
late nineteenth century when they had denied land to the Africans 
several decades earlier reinforced Afro-Guyanese resentment toward 
other ethnic groups in the colony. The Afro-Guyanese people's per- 
ception of themselves as the true Guyanese derived not only from 
their long history of residence, but also from a sense of superiority 
based on their literacy, Christianity, and British colonial values. 

By the early twentieth century, the majority of the urban popu- 
lation of the country was Afro-Guyanese. Many Afro-Guyanese 
living in villages had migrated to the towns in search of work. Un- 
til the 1930s, Afro-Guyanese, especially those of mixed African and 



40 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

European descent, comprised the bulk of the nonwhite professional 
class. During the 1930s, as the Indo-Guyanese began to enter the 
middle class in large numbers, they began to compete with Afro- 
Guyanese for professional positions. 

Indo-Guyanese 

Between 1838 and 1917, almost 240,000 East Indian indentured 
workers were brought to British Guiana. The indentured workers 
had the right to be repatriated at the end of their contracts, but 
as of 1890, most of the East Indian indentured workers had chosen 
to settle in British Guiana. 

Although the great majority of the East Indian immigrants work- 
ers were from northern India, there were variations among them 
in caste and religion. Some 30 percent of the East Indians were 
from agricultural castes and 31 percent were from low castes or 
were untouchables. Brahmans, the highest caste, constituted 14 
percent of the East Indian immigrants. About 16 percent were Mus- 
lims. The only acknowledgment the colonial government and the 
plantation managers gave to caste differences was their distrust of 
the Brahmans as potential leaders. East Indian workers were housed 
together and placed in work gangs without consideration of caste. 
Unlike the African slaves, the East Indian indentured workers were 
permitted to retain may of their cultural traditions. But the process 
of assimilation has made the culture of the modern Indo-Guyanese 
more homogeneous than that of their caste-conscious immigrant 
ancestors. 

Portuguese and Chinese 

The Portuguese were among the first indentured workers brought 
to Guyana. Portuguese indentured immigration began in 1835 and 
ended in 1882, with most of the immigrants having arrived by the 
1860s. Most of the Portuguese came from the North Atlantic is- 
land of Madeira. 

Economically successful in Guyana, the Portuguese nonetheless 
experienced discrimination. Even though of European origin, they 
were treated as socially inferior by the British plantation owners 
and officials because of their indentured past and Roman Catho- 
lic religion. Despite discrimination, by the end of the nineteenth 
century the Portuguese were firmly established as an important 
part of Guyana's middle class and commercial sector. 

Indentured Chinese workers first came to British Guiana from the 
south coast of China in 1853. Relatively few in number, the Chi- 
nese became the most acculturated of all the descendants of inden- 
tured workers. The Chinese language and most Chinese customs, 



41 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

including religion, disappeared. There were no clans or other ex- 
tended kinship organizations, and soon most Chinese did not trace 
their ancestry beyond the first immigrant. Because almost all of 
the Chinese indentured immigrants were men, they tended to in- 
termarry with both East Indians and Africans, and thus the Chinese 
of Guyana did not remain as physically distinct as other groups. 

Like the Portuguese, the Chinese left the plantations as soon as 
their indenture contracts were fulfilled. Many entered the retail 
trade. Other Chinese engaged in farming and pioneered wet-rice 
production, using techniques they brought from China. The 
Chinese tended to live in urban settings. 

Amerindians 

The Amerindians are the descendants of the indigenous people 
of Guyana; they are broadly grouped into coastal and interior tribes. 
The term tribes is a linguistic and cultural classification rather than 
a political one. The coastal Amerindians are the Carib, Arawak, 
and Warao, whose names come from the three language families 
of the Guyanese Amerindians. The population of coastal Carib in 
Guyana declined in the nineteenth century, but Arawak and Warao 
communities can be found near the Pomeroon and Courantyne 
rivers. 

The interior Amerindians are classified into seven tribes: 
Akawaio, Arekuna, Barama River Carib, Macusi, Patamona, 
Waiwai, and Wapisiana. The Barama River Carib, Akawaio, 
Arekuna, and Patamona live in river valleys in western Guyana. 
Two Amerindian groups live in the Rupununi Savannah region: 
the Macusi in the northern half and the Wapisiana in the southern 
half. The Waiwai live in the far south of the country, near the head- 
waters of the Essequibo River. All of the interior Amerindians origi- 
nally spoke Carib languages, with the exception of the Wapisiana, 
whose language is in the Arawak linguistic family. 

By the 1990s, all of the Amerindian groups had undergone ex- 
tensive acculturation. The coastal Amerindians were the most ac- 
culturated, sharing many cultural features with lower-class 
Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese. There had been considera- 
ble intermarriage between coastal Amerindians and Afro- Guyanese. 
The Waiwai and the Barama River Carib were probably the least 
acculturated of the Amerindians. Nevertheless, most Amerindi- 
ans spoke English (or near Brazil, Portuguese) as a first or second 
language. Almost all Amerindians had been affected by mission- 
ary efforts for many decades. Finally, most Amerindians had been 
integrated in one way or another into the national economic sys- 
tem, though usually at the lowest levels. 



42 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

Development of Ethnic Identity 

One of the dominant characteristics of Guyanese society and pol- 
itics, ethnicity has received much attention from social scientists 
and historians. It is an oversimplification to describe Guyanese so- 
ciety as made of up of separate racial groups. Terms such as Afro- 
Guyanese and Indo- Guyanese refer to ethnic identities or categories. 
Significant physical and cultural variations exist within each eth- 
nic category. Thus, two Guyanese with quite different ancestry, 
political and economic interests, and behavior may share the same 
ethnic identity. 

All of the immigrant groups in British Guiana adapted to the 
colony's dominant British culture. In many ways, the descendants 
of the various immigrant groups have come to resemble each other 
more than their respective ancestors. Moreover, the immigrants' 
descendants have spread out from their original social niches. Indo- 
Guyanese are to be found not only on the sugar plantations or in 
rice-producing communities, but also in the towns, where some 
are laborers and others are professionals or businessmen. Afro- 
Guyanese are likewise found at all levels of society. 

Among the experiences shared by all of the immigrant groups 
was labor on the plantations. After the abolition of slavery, the na- 
ture of the labor force changed, but not the labor itself. East Indi- 
ans performed the same work as the slaves before them and lived 
in the same kind of housing; they were subject to the same manage- 
ment structure on the plantations. All of the immigrant groups were 
exposed to the same dominant British value system and had to ac- 
commodate their own values to it. Africans saw themselves as be- 
longing to different cultural groups; Indian society was differentiated 
by religion and caste. To the British, however, race was the primary 
social determinant, and East Indians found themselves categorized 
as a single race distinct from the Africans. 

Perhaps nowhere was assimilation more evident than in language 
use. English, the official language, has become the primary lan- 
guage of all Guyanese, with the exception of a few elderly Indo- 
Guyanese and some Amerindians. The universal use of English 
is a strong unifying cultural force. English also brings the nation 
closer to other countries of the English-speaking Caribbean, 
although it has isolated Guyana from Spanish- and Portuguese- 
speaking Latin America. 

As the descendants of the immigrant groups became more Angli- 
cized, cultural differences grew less pronounced, and even physical 
differences became blurred through intermarriage. The cultural dif- 
ferences that remained took on a symbolic importance as indicators 



43 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

of ethnic identity. Many of these cultural differences had not been 
passed on by ancestors, but developed in the colony. Guyanese Hin- 
duism, for example, is closer to Islam and Christianity than any- 
thing observed by the ancestors of the Indo-Guyanese, yet it serves 
to rally ethnic solidarity. 

Ideologies of Race and Class 

Racial stereotypes developed early in the colony. British planters 
characterized Africans as physically strong but lazy and irrespon- 
sible. East Indians were stereotyped as industrious but clannish 
and greedy. To some extent, these stereotypes were accepted by 
the immigrant groups themselves, each giving credence to posi- 
tive stereotypes of itself and negative stereotypes of other groups. 
The stereotypes provided a quick explanation of behavior and justi- 
fied competition among groups. Africans were described as im- 
provident when they refused to work for low wages or make 
long-term contracts with the plantations. East Indians were consid- 
ered selfish when they minimized their expenses to acquire capital. 

In modern Guyana, the association of behavior with ethnicity 
is less rigid than in colonial days. Where once there was a sharp 
and uniform distinction between behavior considered "British" 
and behavior considered "coolie," now there is a continuum of 
behaviors, which receive different ethnic labels in different con- 
texts. What is considered "British" in a rural village might be con- 
sidered "coolie" in the capital. 

Along with stereotyping, the colonial value system favoring Eu- 
ropean, specifically British, mores and behavior has persisted. Eu- 
rocentrism was promoted by the colonial education system, which 
idealized British customs. The superiority of British culture was 
accepted by the ex-slaves, who perceived their Christianity, for ex- 
ample, as an indication that they too were civilized. From the late 
nineteenth century, the emerging middle class of urban Afro- 
Guyanese, Indo-Guyanese, and others developed a nationalist ideol- 
ogy based largely on British values. They claimed a place in socie- 
ty because they met standards that had been set by the British. 

Family and Kinship Structure 

Afro-Guyanese Patterns 

The Africans brought to Guyana as slaves came from cultures 
with highly developed family systems. Slavery had a devastat- 
ing effect on African social life and especially on family structures. 
Spouses could be separated, children could be sold away from 
their mothers, and sexual exploitation by planters was common. 



44 



Main Street, Georgetown, with the Cenotaph, a memorial to those who died 

in the World Wars, in the foreground 
Courtesy Leslie B. Johnson, Sr. 
Central business district, Main Street, Georgetown 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 



45 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Although legal marriage was forbidden to the slaves, Africans at- 
tempted to sustain relationships between men and women and their 
children. 

The monogamous nuclear family is but one family structure ac- 
cepted among Afro -Guyanese. Although the Christian church wed- 
ding has become a important popular ideal, it is more likely to be 
achieved by middle-class than by lower-class Afro-Guyanese. For 
many, a church wedding comes not at the beginning of a union, 
but as a sort of culmination of a relationship. Many common-law 
marriages are recognized socially but lack the status of a legal wed- 
ding. Afro-Guyanese, especially in the lower socioeconomic groups, 
may have a series of relationships before entering into a legal or 
common-law marriage. Some such relationships do not entail the 
establishment of a separate household. The children of such rela- 
tionships live with one of the parents, usually the mother. 

Because of the variety of conjugal relationships that Afro- 
Guyanese adults may form over the course of their lives, the com- 
position of households varies. They may be headed by fathers or 
mothers and may include children from several parents. Afro- 
Guyanese households tend to be clustered around females rather 
than males because the men frequently leave their homes in search 
of paid work. A three-generation household is likely to include 
daughters with children whose fathers are away or do not live in 
the household. Children born out of wedlock are not stigmatized. 

Indo-Guyanese Patterns 

The plantation system had an effect on the family life of East 
Indians as well as on that of Africans. In rural India, the basic so- 
cial unit was the large extended family. Caste position was the first 
criterion in choosing an appropriate mate. In the plantation hous- 
ing of British Guiana, it was not possible to maintain extended 
households even if the kin were available. Considerations of caste 
became less important in choosing a spouse largely because there 
were so few women among the East Indian indentured workers. 

A wedding is not only an ideal to the Indo-Guyanese; it is the 
usual rite of passage to adulthood. An elaborate wedding is a neces- 
sary affirmation of the social prestige of a Hindu family, as well 
as a major ritual in the life cycle. Muslim weddings are less 
elaborate, but also confer prestige on the families involved. Par- 
ents usually play a role in selecting the first mate. Religion and 
sect are important in choosing a marriage partner; caste notions 
may be as well. However, first marriages are not necessarily ex- 
pected to endure. 



46 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

An increasing number of East Indian marriages are regarded 
as legal, especially since Hindu and Muslim clergy have legal 
authority to perform wedding ceremonies. No social stigma is at- 
tached to civil wedding ceremonies, common-law unions, or con- 
jugal unions between couples who remain legally married to others 
but have ended their past relationships by mutual consent. 

The Indo-Guyanese family tends to be organized through male 
lines. Extended-family members do not necessarily share the same 
household, but they often live near each other and may engage 
in economic activities together. Young couples typically live with 
the husband's family for several years, eventually establishing their 
own cooking facilities and later their own home. In contrast to Afro- 
Guyanese practice, three-generation households with males at the 
head are not uncommon among the Indo-Guyanese. The role of 
the woman is typically more subordinate in Indo-Guyanese fami- 
lies than in Afro-Guyanese households. 

Religion 

Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam are the dominant religions 
in Guyana. The majority of the Indo-Guyanese are Hindus, 
although a substantial number are Muslims. Some Indo-Guyanese 
have converted to Christianity, but conversion is often for profes- 
sional reasons. Some converts continue their Hindu or Muslim ritu- 
als in addition to participating in Christian services. Most 
Afro-Guyanese are Christians, although a few have converted to 
Hinduism or Islam. Guyana's other ethnic groups are largely Chris- 
tian. In 1990 some 52 percent of Guyanese were Christian, 34 
percent were Hindu, and 9 percent were Muslim. Of the Chris- 
tians, 65 percent were Protestant and 35 percent Roman Catholic 
(see table 4, Appendix A). 

Christianity's status as Guyana's dominant system of values is 
a consequence of colonial history. To the European planters, coloni- 
al administrators, and missionaries, the profession of Christian be- 
liefs and observance of Christian practices were prerequisites to 
social acceptance. Even though the planters discouraged the teach- 
ing of their religion to the slaves, Christianity eventually became 
as much the religion of the Africans as of the Europeans. Indeed, 
after abolition, Christian institutions played an even more impor- 
tant role in the lives of the former slaves than in the lives of the 
masters. By the time the East Indians and other indentured groups 
arrived in Guyana, a new syncretic Afro-Guyanese culture in which 
Christianity played an important part had already been established. 
Only since the mid-twentieth century, with the growth of the Indo- 
Guyanese population and the efforts of their ethnic and religious 



47 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

organizations, have Muslim and Hindu values and institutions been 
recognized as having equal status with those of Guyana's Christians. 

Christianity 

Among the Christian denominations active in Guyana in the 
1990s, the Anglican Church claimed the largest membership: about 
125,000 adherents as of 1986. Anglicanism was the state religion 
of British Guiana until independence. The Roman Catholic Church 
had a membership of about 94,000 in 1985. The majority of Ro- 
man Catholics lived in Georgetown, and the Portuguese were the 
most active members, although all the ethnic groups were represent- 
ed. The Presbyterian Church was the third largest denomination, 
with nearly 39,000 members in 1980. Several other Christian 
churches had significant memberships in 1980, including the 
Methodists, Pentecostals, and Seventh-Day Adventists, each of 
which had about 20,000 members. There were smaller numbers 
of Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Congregationalists, Nazarenes, 
Moravians, Ethiopian Orthodox, and other mainstream Chris- 
tians. Other sects in Guyana included Rastafarianism (see Glos- 
sary), which looks to Ethiopia for religious inspiration, and the 
Hallelujah Church, which combines Christian beliefs with Amerin- 
dian traditions. There were also at least 60,000 people describing 
themselves as Christian who had no formal church affiliation. 

Hinduism 

The majority of the East Indian immigrants were Hindu, and 
their dominant sect was Vaishnavite Hinduism. Status differences 
were attached to castes, and rituals varied with caste status. The 
higher castes worshipped the classic pantheon of Vishnu and Shi- 
va. Vaishnavite Hinduism remains the predominant religion of the 
Indo-Guyanese, although it has been considerably modified. 

During the indenture period, the East Indian caste system, with 
its reinforced variations of rites and beliefs within the Vishnu cult, 
broke down. Hinduism was redefined, and caste-distinguishing 
practices were eliminated. Christian missionaries attempted to con- 
vert East Indians during the indenture period, beginning in 1852, 
but met with little success. The missionaries blamed the Brahmans 
for their failure: the Brahmans began administering spiritual rites 
to all Hindus regardless of caste once the Christian missionaries 
started proselytizing in the villages, hastening the breakdown of 
the caste system. After the 1930s, Hindu conversions to Christianity 
slowed because the status of Hinduism had improved and discrimi- 
nation against Hindus had diminished. 



48 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

Orthodox Hinduism stresses the festivities accompanying reli- 
gious rites. Festivals may last several days and are usually held in 
times of crisis or prosperity. Because the sponsor of a festival pro- 
vides a tent and feeds a large number of guests, orthodox Hindu 
rituals require considerable outlays of money. A Hindu family has 
difficulty fulfilling ritual obligations unless it has accumulated a 
surplus of cash. 

Since the late 1940s, reform movements have caught the atten- 
tion of many Guyanese Hindus. The most important, the Arya 
Samaj movement (Aryan Society), was founded in India in 1875; 
the first Arya Samaj missionary arrived in Guyana in 1910. Arya 
Samaj doctrine rejects the idea of caste and the exclusive role of 
Brahmans as religious leaders. The movement preaches mono- 
theism and opposition to the use of images in worship as well as 
many traditional Hindu rituals. 

Islam 

Like the Hindus, Guyana's Muslims are organized into ortho- 
dox and reform movements. The Sunnatival Jamaat is the ortho- 
dox Sunni (see Glossary) Islamic movement. The largest Islamic 
organization in the country is the Guyana United Sadr Islamic An- 
juman. The reform movement, the Ahmadiyah, was founded in 
India in the late nineteenth century; its first missionary to Guyana 
arrived in 1908. The reform movement has had considerable suc- 
cess, even including some Afro-Guyanese among its converts. The 
rites of orthodox and reform Islam are similar, but the reform move- 
ment allows the Quran to be read in English and women to enter 
a designated section of the mosque. In contrast to the situation found 
on the Indian subcontinent, Muslims and Hindus experience lit- 
tle friction in Guyana. These two religious communities have a 
tacit agreement not to proselytize each other's members. In smaller 
villages, Christians and Muslims come together to participate in 
each other's ceremonies. 

Until the 1970s, Hindu and Muslim holidays were not officially 
recognized. A number of non-Christian religious days are now pub- 
lic holidays. Hindu holidays include Holi, the spring festival, and 
Divali, the festival of lights. Muslim holidays include Id al Fitr, 
the end of Ramadan, the sacred month of fasting; Id al Adha, the 
feast of sacrifice; and Yaum an Nabi, the birthday of Muhammad. 
The dates for these holidays vary. An East Indian heritage day is 
celebrated and on May 5, and an Amerindian festival is held on 
Republic Day, in February. 



49 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Obeah and Amerindian Practices 

A number of folk beliefs continue to be practiced in Guyana. 
Obeah, a folk religion of African origin, incorporates beliefs and 
practices of all the immigrant groups. Obeah practitioners may be 
Afro-Guyanese or Indo-Guyanese, and members of all the ethnic 
groups consult them for help with problems concerning health, 
work, domestic life, and romance. Some villagers wear charms or 
use other folk practices to protect themselves from harm. 

Traditional Amerindian religious beliefs vary, but shamans play 
a significant role in all of them. The shaman is believed to com- 
municate with the world of spirits in order to detect sorcery and 
combat evil. The shaman is also a healer and an adviser, the 
representative of the village to the spiritual world and sometimes 
its political leader as well. Missionary activity to the Amerindians 
has been intense. As a result, the traditional beliefs and practices 
of all the Amerindian groups have been modified; some have even 
disappeared. 

Cults 

The House of Israel was established by a fugitive from the United 
States, David Hill, also known as Rabbi Edward Washington, who 
arrived in Guyana in 1972. The cult had no ties to traditional Jewish 
religion but was a black supremacist movement. In the 1970s, the 
group claimed a membership of 8,000. The House of Israel had 
a daily radio program in which it preached that Africans were the 
original Hebrews and needed to prepare for a racial war. Oppo- 
nents of the government claimed that the House of Israel constituted 
a private army for Guyana's ruling party, the People's National 
Congress (PNC). During an anti- government demonstration, a 
House of Israel member murdered a Roman Catholic priest be- 
cause he was on the staff of a religious opposition newspaper, the 
Catholic Standard. The House of Israel also engaged in strikebreak- 
ing activities and disruptions of public meetings. Critics of the 
government alleged that House of Israel members acted with im- 
punity during the government of Linden Forbes Burnham. 
However, under Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Burnham's successor, 
Rabbi Washington and key associates were arrested on a long- 
standing manslaughter charge and imprisoned. 

Guyana acquired international notoriety in 1978 following a mass 
murder-suicide at the commune of the People's Temple of Christ, 
which had been led by the Reverend Jim Jones, of Oakland, Califor- 
nia. In 1974 the People's Temple, a Utopian commune, leased a 
tract of land near Port Kaituma in western Guyana to escape from 



50 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

mounting scrutiny of the group by California authorities. The 
government welcomed the People's Temple in part because of its 
interest in populating the interior of the country, especially the area 
claimed by Venezuela, where Jonestown was situated. Members 
of the People's Temple also became close to PNC leaders, and the 
group was allowed to function without interference from the govern- 
ment. Allegations of atrocities by commune leaders and charges 
that the commune was holding people against their will led a United 
States congressman, Leo Ryan, to go to Jonestown to investigate 
the allegations of abuse (see The Cooperative Republic, ch. 1). 

Fearing that Congressman Ryan's report on the commune would 
bring unwanted publicity and restrictions on his operations, Jones 
had the congressman shot as he was boarding an airplane to return 
to Georgetown. The United States immediately asked Guyana to 
send in its army. Before the army could reach Jonestown, however, 
Jones coerced and cajoled more than 900 members of the commune 
to commit murder and suicide. 

Religion and Politics 

Through much of Guyana's history, the Anglican and Roman 
Catholic churches helped maintain the social and political status 
quo. The Roman Catholic Church and its newspaper, the Catholic 
Standard, were vocal opponents of the ideology of the People's 
Progressive Party (PPP) in the 1950s and became closely associat- 
ed with the conservative United Force. However, in the late 1960s 
the Roman Catholic Church changed its stance toward social and 
political issues, and the Catholic Standard became more critical of 
the government. Subsequently, the government forced a number 
of foreign Roman Catholic priests to leave the country. By the 
mid-1970s, the Anglicans and other Protestant denominations had 
joined in the criticisms of government abuse. The Anglican and 
Roman Catholic churches also worked together, unsuccessfully, 
to oppose the government's assumption of control of church schools 
in 1976. 

The Guyana Council of Churches was the umbrella organiza- 
tion for sixteen major Christian denominations. Historically, it had 
been dominated by the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches. 
The Guyana Council of Churches became an increasingly vocal 
critic of the government in the 1970s and 1980s, focusing interna- 
tional attention on its shortcomings. The conflict between the 
government and the Guyana Council of Churches came to a head 
in 1985, when members of the PNC -influenced House of Israel 
physically prevented the council from holding its annual meeting. 
Later that year, police searched the homes of the major Christian 



51 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

church leaders. The PNC maintained the support of a number of 
smaller Christian denominations, however. 

In contrast to the most prominent Christian clergy, who main- 
tained connections with international denominations, Hindu and 
Muslim leaders depended on strictly local support. For them, 
resistance to political pressure was more difficult. In the 1970s, the 
PNC succeeded in splitting many of the important Hindu and Mus- 
lim organizations into pro-PNC and pro-PPP factions. 

Education 

Free education from nursery school through university was a 
major reason for Guyana's 1990 estimated literacy rate of 96 per- 
cent, one of the highest in the Western Hemisphere. As of 1985, 
the average worker in Guyana had completed 6.8 years of school- 
ing. Families of all ethnic groups and classes took interest in the 
schooling of their children, and education reform has had a cen- 
tral place in government policy since the 1960s. 

The earliest record of schooling in Guyana dates back to Dutch 
rule and the arrival of a religious instructor in Essequibo in 1685. 
Because seventeenth- and eighteenth-century planters sent their chil- 
dren to Europe to study, local education developed slowly. Pri- 
vate schools and academies for the children of prospering 
non-British colonists were established and maintained in the colo- 
ny during the nineteenth century; the first known reference to the 
establishment of public schools was made early in the 1800s. 

By 1834 there were numerous schools, both elementary and 
secondary, in British Guiana's urban centers. After the cessation 
of slavery in 1838, many Africans quickly made use of the educa- 
tional opportunities open to them. By 1841 there were 101 elemen- 
tary schools, most of them under the direction of the London 
Missionary Society. A teacher-training school and a college were 
opened in the 1850s. Primary education became compulsory in 
1876. Truancy, however, was common. 

The British planters and bureaucrats discouraged the education 
of the Indo-Guyanese indentured laborers. The government stat- 
ed in 1904 that Indo-Guyanese should not be prosecuted if they 
objected on religious grounds to sending their daughters to school. 
Planters used this policy to discourage workers from sending their 
children to school. Not until 1933 was the Indo-Guyanese leader- 
ship successful in changing government policy. 

For most of the colonial period, secondary education was re- 
stricted to the upper and middle classes. With the exception of a 
very few scholarships, secondary education was paid for by parents, 



52 




City Hall, Georgetown. Completed in 1889, it is one of the finest examples 

of Gothic architecture in South America. 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 



53 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

not the government. Thus, most of the students who completed 
primary school were excluded from a secondary education. 

Guiding the development of the colonial school system was the 
traditional British view that the purpose of secondary education 
was to prepare the elite for its role in society. The two best second- 
ary schools, Queen's College and Bishop's High School, both in 
Georgetown, employed the same curricula and methods used in 
British "public" schools. During most of the colonial period, there 
was litde interest either in vocational training or in expanding educa- 
tional opportunities. The requirement of a single, standard cer- 
tificate based on a highly literary curriculum prevented education 
reform well into the twentieth century. 

In 1961 the government took steps that greatly increased access 
to education. Many new secondary schools were opened, especially 
in rural areas, and school fees were abolished. Two years later, 
the University of Guyana was established. The percentage of chil- 
dren between the ages of twelve and seventeen attending school 
increased from 63 percent in 1960 to 76 percent in 1985. For those 
between ages eighteen and twenty-three, school attendance in- 
creased almost threefold, from 4.7 percent to 12.9 percent, between 
1960 and 1985 (see table 5, Appendix A). 

Education Policy and the Teaching Profession 

The postindependence government placed particular emphasis 
on education, both to develop a skilled labor force and to increase 
opportunity for disadvantaged people. Primary and secondary edu- 
cation was supervised by the Education Department of the Minis- 
try of Education, Social Development, and Culture. District officers 
inspected schools at the local level. The university and institutions 
of technical education were administered by the Ministry of Higher 
Education, established in 1980. In 1988 expenditures on educa- 
tion constituted 6.4 percent of government spending. Many lead- 
ing members of the government, including presidents Burnham 
and Hoyte, were former schoolteachers; others were the children 
of teachers. Yet critics of the government asserted that the educa- 
tion system had undergone decline in the 1970s and 1980s, despite 
the priority given it by the government. Critics also charged the 
government with using the school system to disseminate political 
propaganda. 

In 1976 the government abolished private education and became 
responsible for providing free education from nursery school 
through the university level. The government took over about 600 
schools. The great majority of the private schools taken over by the 
government had been religious. Most of them had been Christian, 



54 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

and a few had been Hindu or Muslim. The takeover was opposed 
by the churches and by a large segment of the middle class, which 
feared a decline in education standards and increased competition 
from lower-class students. 

Guyana had no shortage of teachers through the 1980s. The 
teaching profession remained an honored one, even though teachers 
were no longer the most educated members of their community. 
Teaching had long been a means of advancement for Afro- 
Guyanese, who made up the majority of teachers until the 1950s; 
they instructed both Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese children. 
Indo-Guyanese began to enter the profession in the 1920s, but there 
was little room for advancement for non-Christians in the 
denominational schools. After World War II, Indo-Guyanese took 
a greater interest in schooling and a large number went into edu- 
cation. Schoolteachers became the largest professional group among 
the Indo-Guyanese; they tended to teach in government schools, 
where religious differences were less important. About 7 percent 
of the primary school instructors in the country were Indo-Guyanese 
in 1935; by 1965, this segment had increased to 54 percent, sur- 
passing the proportion of Indo-Guyanese in the general population. 

Primary Schools 

Nursery school was available to Guyanese children for two years, 
beginning at age four. Children began primary school at age six. 
Primary schools had six grades: Preparatory A and B and Stan- 
dards I through IV. Primary schools were attended five hours a 
day, Monday through Friday. A school year usually had 189 days, 
beginning in September and ending in July. The school year was 
divided into three trimesters: Christmas Term, Easter Term, and 
Summer Term. Primary education for students with disabilities 
was provided by the Thomas Lands School in Georgetown. 

In 1984 there were 368 nursery schools and 418 primary schools 
in Guyana. In 1981 about 130,000 students attended primary 
schools, an enrollment rate of 96 percent. With 3,909 teachers in 
Guyana, the national teacher-pupil ratio was one teacher to thirty- 
three pupils. 

Secondary Schools 

Entry into secondary education was based on students' perfor- 
mance in a placement examination, the Secondary School Entrance 
Examination (SSEE) administered to eleven-year-old students. For 
those students who scored poorly on the SSEE, a continuation of 
primary education for three years was also available in the so-called 
senior department of the primary schools, which were also known 



55 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

as all-age schools. Students who completed primary school or all- 
age school were eligible to continue in secondary school. 

There were three kinds of secondary schools to which students 
who had taken the SSEE could be admitted: the general second- 
ary school, the multilateral school, and the community high school. 
General secondary schools had a six-year program, with Forms I 
through VI. (Form VI was the equivalent of the senior year of high 
school in the United States.) At the end of the secondary program, 
students could take the Secondary Schools Proficiency Examina- 
tion for entry into trade school, or examinations at the General 
Certificate of Education (GCE) Advanced Level or Caribbean Ex- 
amination Council examinations for university admission. 

The multilateral schools, established in 1974, provided five years 
of education for students ages ten through eighteen. After a basic 
three-year course, students concentrated on science, technology, 
agriculture, home economics, or commerce for their final two years 
of study. The multilateral schools ended at the Form-V level. The 
final examinations were for the Ordinary Levels of the GCE. 

A third type of secondary school was the community high school, 
open to students over twelve years of age. During the first half of 
the four-year program, students were taught basic academic skills 
as well as prevocational subjects. In the final two years, they con- 
centrated on a vocational area, such as agriculture, arts and crafts, 
industrial arts, or home economics. The program included on-the- 
job training. 

There were fifty-eight general secondary schools and thirty multi- 
lateral and thirty community high schools in Guyana in 1983. In 
1981 there were 73,700 secondary students in Guyana, an enroll- 
ment rate of 57 percent. The teacher-pupil ratio was one to seventeen. 

Institutions of Higher Education 

The principal institution of higher education was the Universi- 
ty of Guyana; there were also several specialized schools and an 
elaborate adult education program. Established as an independent 
institution in 1963, the University of Guyana occupied its campus 
near Georgetown in 1969. The university had faculties of natural 
science, social science, arts, technology, and education. In addi- 
tion to these areas, the university offered bachelor's degrees in public 
administration, social work, pharmacy, and education. The univer- 
sity also provided an undergraduate degree for law students. The 
first master' s-level graduate program in Guyanese history was start- 
ed in 1973. Master's degrees have also been awarded in biology, 
chemistry, economics, education, and political science. There were 
2,004 university students in July 1983. 



56 




A five-year multilateral school in Georgetown 
Graduates at the University of Guyana's graduation exercises 

Courtesy Leslie B. Johnson, Sr. 



57 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Training of primary and secondary school teachers was provid- 
ed by three institutions: the Cyril Potter College of Education, the 
Lilian Dewar College of Education, and the University of Guyana. 
These institutions provided preservice training, postgraduate diplo- 
ma courses, and a one-year course for trained teachers, culminat- 
ing in presentation of a Certificate in Education. Primary teachers 
underwent a two-year program of study and secondary teachers, 
a three-year program. The University of Guyana had diploma pro- 
grams in education that provided certification in vocational train- 
ing, music, art, physical education, and evaluation. Additional 
training was provided by the Institute of Education, and in-service 
training was common. 

Among Guyana's vocational institutes were the Government 
Technical Institute, where mechanics, machine tooling, plumbing, 
electronic repair, construction, and business were taught; the In- 
dustrial Training Centre, run by the Ministry of Labour; the Car- 
negie School of Home Economics; and the Burrowes School of Art. 
Agricultural sciences and management were taught at the Guyana 
School of Agriculture under the direction of the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture and by the Burnham Agricultural Institute. 

The government created the Kuru Kuru Cooperative College in 
1973 and the Cuffy Ideological Institute in 1977 to advance its ideo- 
logical objective of promoting socialism. The Workers' Education 
Unit was also formed to provide ideological programs at work. 

Adult education was provided by the Extramural Department 
of the University of Guyana, the Extramural Department of the 
Kuru Kuru Cooperative College, and the Adult Education As- 
sociation. 

Attitudes Toward Education 

Guyana's high literacy and school attendance rates evinced a 
great interest in education. From the time of slavery, Afro-Guyanese 
saw education as a means of escape from the drudgery of planta- 
tion labor. The schoolteacher became an important figure in vil- 
lage life and a cornerstone of the incipient middle class. Parents 
made economic sacrifices so their children could attend school. 
Literacy improved the position of villagers in dealing with the 
government and commercial institutions. An education created the 
possibility that one could become a clerk or administrator in the 
public or private sectors. For the very few who acquired a second- 
ary education, entry into medicine, law, and other professions might 
become possible. 

Until the 1930s, Indo-Guyanese often were opposed to primary 
schooling for their children. The Indo-Guyanese plantation workers 



58 



Mass games, in which school children of all ages perform 

gymnastics in a large stadium 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 

feared both discrimination and the influence of Christian educa- 
tion on their children. They were also reluctant to forgo the labor 
their children provided. In addition, the planters discouraged the 
workers and their children from pursuing an education. In the 1930s 
and 1940s, however, a significant number of Indo-Guyanese be- 
came successful rice producers and began to regard the education 
of their children as an opportunity rather than a hindrance. There- 
after, the increasing enrollment of Indo-Guyanese children in 
elementary and secondary schools reflected the revision in parents' 
attitudes. New schools were built in the predominantly Indo- 
Guyanese sugar-estate areas. 

Curriculum content was considered secondary to passing exami- 
nations and becoming eligible for a white-collar job. For this rea- 
son, parents showed little interest in a vocational curriculum that 
would prepare students for agricultural or mechanical jobs. Par- 
ents resisted attempts by the government to channel students into 
courses that it considered more relevant to Guyana's needs if those 
courses did not lead to a secondary education. 

A high level of demand for expanded educational opportunities 
persisted in the postindependence period, especially at the secondary 
level. At the same time, parents continued to exhibit conservatism 



59 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

concerning curricula, not because they favored the traditional course 
contents, but because they continued to regard an academic cur- 
riculum as the best avenue to employment opportunities. 

Health and Welfare 
Food and Diet 

Although the 1990 average daily nutritional intake in Guyana, 
2,450 calories, exceeded the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) recommended level by about 10 per- 
cent, malnutrition remained a problem. Intake of protein calories 
averaged 62.7 grams, of which 23.1 came from animal sources. 

The national food supply generally is adequate, but a high inci- 
dence of malnutrition persists, especially in rural areas where defi- 
ciencies in vitamin A, iron, folic acid, and protein are common. 

Not everyone in Guyana has the means to produce or purchase 
the food needed for an adequate diet. Also, some foods are not avail- 
able in sufficient supply to ensure good nutrition. Malnutrition is 
still estimated to affect more than a third of all children under five 
years of age. 

Peas, rice, and bread are staples in the diet of many Guyanese. 
Locally grown foods that are high in carbohydrates, such as cassava, 
plantains, and breadfruit, are widely consumed, but are available 
only in season. Green and yellow vegetables are plentiful, but are 
usually of poor quality. Chicken bought in local markets is frequent- 
ly contaminated with salmonella. 

Health 

Many of Guyana's health problems are the result of its human 
geography. Most of the population is crowded in the low-lying 
coastal plain, where cycles of flooding and drought have histori- 
cally made sanitation difficult. The coastal plain is a hospitable en- 
vironment for the malaria-carrying mosquito, and crowded hous- 
ing on the plantations facilitates the spread of disease. It was not 
until after World War II that nationwide efforts to improve health 
conditions were made. 

Among the endemic illnesses in Guyana are malaria, typhoid, 
filariasis, and tuberculosis. Measles remains a common infectious 
disease. The leading causes of death are circulatory, respiratory, 
infectious, and parasitic diseases. In the late 1940s, the govern- 
ment began a malaria-control campaign that largely eradicated the 
disease on the coastal plain. Nevertheless, in 1990 malaria remained 
a problem in the interior and had returned to some areas of the 
coast as well. Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) also 



60 



Patients in line to buy medicines 
subsidized by the government, 
West Demerara Hospital, 
west of Georgetown 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(David Mangurian) 




was a growing problem. A total of 145 cases of AIDS had been 
reported by the end of 1990. 

The infant mortality rate for Guyana in 1988 was 43.9 per 1 ,000 
live births. This figure was considerably below the average rate 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (52 per 1,000), and was a 
great improvement over the rate of 141 per 1,000 in the 1930s. 
However, for low-income families, the rate was 72.6 per 1,000. 
Life expectancy at birth was estimated at sixty-six years in 1988, 
about the same as the average for Latin America. 

Sewage treatment remains inadequate in many rural households, 
especially in the villages. More than 90 percent of the urban popu- 
lation, but only 65 percent of the rural population, had access to 
safe water in 1988. According to World Bank estimates, access to 
safe water in rural areas had declined 10 percent in the two previ- 
ous decades because of poor maintenance of purification facilities. 
In 1960 the government initiated a successful environmental sani- 
tation program in the Essequibo area, where parasitic-infection rates 
had run between 80 percent and 90 percent. In sugar-estate com- 
munities, potable water was supplied by the sugar industry. 

Health and Welfare Services 

Until World War II, medical facilities in rural areas were in- 
adequate. The extension of workers' compensation to agricultural 
workers in 1947 and the subsequent establishment of the medical 



61 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

services on the sugar estates did much to improve rural health care. 
The World Bank estimated that 89 percent of the population had 
access to health care in the late 1980s. Some children under twelve 
had been immunized against measles (52 percent), and diphthe- 
ria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) (67 percent), figures that are about 
average for the region. Health expenditures by the government 
were 3.7 percent of all expenditures in 1984. 

In 1988 there were 21 hospitals, 47 health clinics, and 115 rural 
health centers in Guyana. The country counted 2,933 hospital beds 
for a bed to population ratio of approximately one to 280. Guyana's 
seven private hospitals and the largest public hospitals are in 
Georgetown. 

Statistics for 1988 showed 164 physicians in Guyana, which made 
for a physician-to-patient ratio of one to 5,000. About 90 percent 
of the physicians were in public service. Most physicians in the 
private sector were also holding government jobs. Approximately 
half of the country's physicians were expatriates from communist 
countries, such as Cuba and the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea), who were assigned to work in Guyana as 
part of bilateral agreements. These foreign professionals experienced 
significant language and cultural difficulties in dealing with patients. 

Guyana's 789 nurses made for a nurse-to-patient ratio of one 
to 1,014 in 1988. There were an additional 875 nursing assistants 
and 409 trained midwives. Because of the shortage of nurses, many 
health care functions that in developed countries would be per- 
formed by nursing personnel were assigned to nursing students. 
Thirty-eight pharmacists were licensed to operate. 

A national insurance program was established in 1969. It covers 
most workers and self-employed people for disability, sickness, and 
maternity. The program is administered by the National Insur- 
ance Board. Workers with permanent total disabilities are paid their 
full salary; those with temporary disabilities get at least 60 percent 
of their salary. Employees with illnesses may receive 60 percent 
of their salary for up to six months. Women may take maternity 
leave for up to thirteen weeks with 60 percent of their salary. 
Guyana also has a pensions system that provides a basis of 30 per- 
cent of earnings starting at age sixty-five. Employers and employees 
alike pay into all of these insurance funds, which are administered 
by the National Insurance Board. Social security and welfare ac- 
counted for 2.7 percent of government expenditures in 1984. 

* * * 

Current information on Guyanese society is difficult to obtain, 



62 



Guyana: The Society and Its Environment 

especially in book form. Some of the most useful books about 
Guyana that have appeared since independence include Henry B. 
Jeffrey and Colin Baber's Guyana: Politics, Economics and Society, 
which focuses on the political system but also contains several in- 
teresting analyses and observations on Guyanese social structure 
and ethnicity, and on the impact of government policies on edu- 
cation and religion; and A Political and Social History of Guyana, 
1945-1983, by Thomas J. Spinner, Jr., which offers a detailed dis- 
cussion of the social and economic forces operating in Guyana dur- 
ing the turbulent 1950s and through independence, including most 
of the Burnham period. 

Andrew Sanders's The Powerless People: An Analysis of the Amerin- 
dian People of the Corentyne River is about the ethnic identity and values 
of a small population of coastal Amerindians living along the Sur- 
iname border. Although the topic sounds somewhat narrow, the 
analysis offers much on how ethnicity is experienced and handled 
throughout Guyanese society. The book includes a clear discus- 
sion of the various approaches to the study of Guyanese ethnicity 
taken by social scientists since the 1950s. 

Perhaps the most famous book published about Guyana since 
independence is Walter Rodney's posthumous A History of the Guyanese 
Working People, 1881-1905, published in 1981. Less than a decade 
after its publication, this book had become a classic in the literature 
on Caribbean societies. Rodney's careful analysis of the forces shap- 
ing Guyanese society at the end of the nineteenth century provides 
a basis for understanding the conflicts of modern Guyana. 

The works of two anthropologists, Raymond T. Smith and Leo 
A. Despres, are very helpful in understanding Guyanese society 
between World War II and independence. Smith's British Guiana 
is regarded by many as the best book on Guyanese society in the 
colonial period. Other works by Smith have focused on kinship 
structure, especially among Afro-Guyanese. Smith's The Negro Fa- 
mily in British Guiana: Family Structure and Social Status in the Villages 
is a classic of Caribbean anthropology. In the late 1980s, he pub- 
lished a further analysis of his field data in Kinship and Class in the 
West Indies: A Genealogical Study of Jamaica and Guyana. Cultural Plural- 
ism and Nationalist Politics in Guyana, by Leo Despres, is concerned 
with understanding the nature of ethnicity in Guyana. Despres sees 
Guyana as an example of a "plural society" composed of separate 
cultural communities. His analysis is based on fieldwork in Afro- 
Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese villages. 

It is impossible to understand Guyanese society in the second 
half of the twentieth century without an acquaintance with the 



63 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

economic history of the country. Two works published in the 1970s 
are very helpful in this regard. Alan H. Adamson's Sugar Without 
Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-1904 looks at 
the indentured labor system in the nineteenth century. Jay R. Man- 
die's The Plantation Economy: Population and Economic Change in Guyana 
1838-1960 is concerned with British Guiana from the end of slav- 
ery to the closing years of the colonial period. 

A number of books on specialized topics were published in the 
1980s. Education for Development or Underdevelopment?, by M.K. Bac- 
chus, provides an analysis of changes in the Guyanese education 
system since World War II. Peter Riviere's Individual and Society 
in Guiana is a review of anthropological knowledge about the 
Amerindian cultures of the Guianas. The book focuses on kinship 
and political systems at the village level. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



64 



Chapter 3. Guyana: The Economy 



Worker harvesting 



GUYANA'S ECONOMY WAS IN DIRE CONDITION in the 
early 1990s. When the country gained independence in 1966, it 
was one of the least developed areas in the Western Hemisphere. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the economy deteriorated further after the 
government nationalized foreign-owned companies and took con- 
trol of almost all economic activity. Output of bauxite, sugar, and 
rice — the country's three main products — fell sharply. Guyana's 
gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) reflected the decline 
in output. Real GDP fell during the late 1970s and decreased by 
an estimated 6 percent per year during the 1980s. The fall in GDP 
in terms of United States dollars was even more dramatic because 
of repeated devaluations of the Guyanese dollar (for value of the 
Guyanese dollar— see Glossary). In 1990 the GDP was only US$275 
million. Per capita GDP amounted to less than US$369 per capita, 
making Guyana one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere (see 
table 6, Appendix A). 

Declining GDP was but one symptom of the malaise that had 
overcome Guyana's economy in the 1980s. Other indications were 
the nation's crumbling infrastructure, especially the electrical power 
supply; the high level of external debt and payments arrears; and 
the emigration of professionals and skilled workers. Conditions were 
harsh for the roughly 764,000 people living in the country. In 1990 
an estimated 40 percent of workers earned the minimum wage, 
equivalent to only US$0.50 per day. Three factors — the flourish- 
ing illegal economy, the cash remittances that Guyanese citizens 
received from relatives living abroad, and the country's near self- 
sufficiency in food production — were all that kept the economic 
decline from becoming a disaster. 

But in the early 1990s, there were signs that twenty years of stagna- 
tion and decline could be ending. The government of Guyana was at 
last coming to grips with the deep economic crisis. The economy's 
performance had not yet recovered, but the government was dismant- 
ling statist policies and opening up the country to foreign investment. 

There were two principal reasons for the dramatic policy rever- 
sal. The first reason was the death in 1985 of then-President Lin- 
den Forbes Burnham, who had been in power since the mid-1960s. 
Burnham refused to recognize the ill effects of "cooperative" so- 
cialism, which he had designed. The second reason for the reversal 
was Guyana's debt. President Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Burnham 's 
successor, inherited a tremendous external debt burden and large 



67 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

debt payment arrears. By 1988 those arrears exceeded US$885 mil- 
lion (equal to four times the country's annual exports), and 
Guyana's international creditors had exhausted their patience. 
Hoyte faced the stark alternatives of having all credit to his coun- 
try cut off or enacting a package of reforms approved by the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary). He chose the latter 
option, launching an ambitious Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP) in 1988 with the goal of dismantling Guyana's socialist econ- 
omy and ending the country's self-imposed isolation. "My single 
ambition," Hoyte told the Financial Times in 1989, "is to put this 
economy right. I want to put it on the path to recovery." 

Guyana's economy was still far from recovery in 1991, but the 
Hoyte government's commitment to reform was clear. The govern- 
ment had cut its budget deficit (in real terms), removed most price 
controls, legalized foreign currency trading, liberalized trade regula- 
tions, encouraged foreign investment, and had begun privatizing 
state-owned companies. In early 1991, the official and market ex- 
change rates were unified for the first time since independence. 
Market forces were replacing state intervention; incentives to private 
individuals were replacing government regulations. Foreign inves- 
tors appeared ready to tap Guyana's considerable natural resource 
potential. 

Economic reform still faced formidable obstacles, however. Chief 
among these was the shortage of financial resources to improve the 
nation's infrastructure and rebuild its productive base. The IMF 
and other international creditors had refinanced the debt, prop- 
ping up the financial side of the economy. But Guyana needed ad- 
ditional loans — even though its debt burden was already huge — so 
that the productive side of the economy could be rebuilt. A second 
obstacle was the social cost of the government's austerity plan. 
Guyanese citizens could ill afford to receive lower wages or pay 
higher taxes to help eliminate the budget deficit. Thus, Guyana 
needed international assistance for humanitarian as well as eco- 
nomic reasons. For the government then, the economic reform pro- 
gram posed two sizable challenges: to maintain the political initiative 
at home and to garner the continued support of the international 
financial community. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

History 

Preindependence 

Guyana was first colonized by Dutch settlers in the 1600s. Spanish 
explorers had ignored the area because it lacked obvious mineral 



68 



Guyana: The Economy 



wealth. Key features of Guyana's current economic structure, es- 
pecially the patterns of land use, can be traced to the period of Dutch 
stewardship. The Dutch West India Company, which administered 
most of the colony from 1621 to 1792, granted early Dutch and 
then British settlers ownership over 100-hectare tracts of land (see 
The Coming of the Europeans, ch. 1). Settlers augmented these 
narrow coastal tracts by clearing swampland and expanding their 
holdings inland, for several kilometers in some cases. Many of the 
large sugar plantations that formed the basis of the colonial econ- 
omy were established in this manner. Dutch settlers also left their 
mark on the land. They built a system of dikes and drainage canals 
on Guyana's low-lying coastal plain, using techniques developed 
in the Netherlands. Parts of this original sea-defense system con- 
tinued to operate in the 1990s. 

Sugar soon emerged as the most important plantation crop. Su- 
gar was first grown in colonial Guyana in 1658 but was not 
produced on a large scale until the late 1700s, about 100 years later 
than in the rest of the Caribbean region. Because Guyana's plan- 
tation owners entered the sugar industry late, they were able to 
import relatively advanced equipment for milling sugarcane. This 
investment in advanced equipment gave the local sugar industry 
a firm foundation and made it the leading sector of the local econ- 
omy. By 1800 there were an estimated 380 sugar estates along the 
coast. In the 1990s, almost two centuries later, the population was 
still concentrated on the same coastal strip of land, and sugar was 
still one of the nation's two most valuable products. 

Guyana's distinct ethnic makeup can be traced to conditions that 
prevailed during the colonial period. To supply the labor required 
for sugar cultivation, plantation owners at first imported slaves from 
West Africa. (The indigenous Amerindian population of Guyana 
was small and lived mostly in the impenetrable interior.) Thou- 
sands of slaves were imported each year as plantations expanded; 
more than 100,000 slaves worked in the colony by 1830 (see Afro- 
Guyanese, ch. 2). 

The British formally took over the colony in 1814. But British 
Guiana's plantation economy fell into turmoil after 1833, when 
Britain passed the Act for the Abolition of Slavery Throughout the 
British Colonies. The law provided a five-year transitional period 
during which plantation owners were to begin paying soon-to-be- 
freed slaves for their services. In practice, however, owners alienated 
the slaves by wringing as much work as possible from them dur- 
ing the last years in bondage. Upon emancipation in 1838, almost 
all of the former slaves abandoned the plantations. Agricultural 
production plummeted. Some groups of former slaves were able 



69 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

to buy failed plantations, but they lacked the capital to reconstruct 
the complex operations after years of neglect. Most former slaves 
reverted to subsistence farming. By 1848 only 20,000 Africans 
worked on sugar estates. Even so, few Africans left the country; 
more than 40 percent of Guyana's postindependence population 
was descended from African slaves. 

Faced with the prospect of a complete extinction of the sugar 
industry, plantation owners looked abroad for laborers. Free im- 
migrants had little enthusiasm for the harsh working conditions 
on sugar estates, but indentured servants were less discriminat- 
ing. Indentured servants typically contracted to work for five years 
in exchange for a one-way passage to British Guiana as well as food 
and housing. (In some cases, a return voyage was offered in ex- 
change for extra years of service.) After taking on indentured ser- 
vants from Portugal, China, and the West Indies (see Glossary), 
plantation owners turned to what would become the most impor- 
tant source of immigrants: India. About 240,000 indentured East 
Indians were brought to British Guiana between 1838 and 1917, 
the date when indentured labor was abolished (see Indo-Guyanese, 
ch. 2). The British government supported this intraempire trans- 
fer of labor. In the short term, the influx of labor saved British 
Guiana's sugar industry. In the long term, the immigration deeply 
affected British Guiana's ethnic makeup. Most of the East Indi- 
ans remained in the colony after completing their terms of inden- 
ture; many became independent rice farmers. Their descendants, 
along with later immigrants from India, account for about half of 
Guyana's postindependence population. 

The racial and ethnic divisions that arose out of the two great 
waves of immigration into Guyana in the colonial period had a 
profound effect on the country. The divisions between Afro- 
Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese persisted into the modern period, 
in both economic and political terms. In the early 1990s, most Indo- 
Guyanese were still employed in agriculture, growing sugar and 
rice, while the majority of Afro-Guyanese lived in Guyana's few 
urban areas (see Population Distribution and Settlement Patterns, 
ch. 2). 

The most important change in Guyana's economy after the turn 
of the century was the development of the bauxite (aluminum ore) 
industry by North American companies. Mining of bauxite be- 
gan in 1914, and the ore would alternate with sugar as Guyana's 
most valuable product. Guyana possessed vast reserves of bauxite 
in the northeast, and by the 1960s, the country had become the 
world's fourth largest producer (after the Soviet Union, Jamaica, 
and Suriname). Until the 1980s, Guyana was also the leading 



70 



Guyana: The Economy 



producer of calcined bauxite, a high grade of the mineral required 
for specialized applications. 

Postindependence 

Guyana achieved political independence in 1966, but economic 
independence did not immediately follow. Most decisions affect- 
ing the economy continued to be made abroad because foreign com- 
panies owned most of the agricultural and mining enterprises. Two 
British companies, Booker McConnell and Jessel Securities, con- 
trolled the largest sugar estates and exerted a great deal of influence 
on the nation. In the early 1970s, the Booker McConnell compa- 
ny alone accounted for almost one-third of Guyana's gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary). The company produced 85 percent 
of Guyana's sugar, employed 13 percent of the work force, and 
took in 35 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. 

Two other foreign companies dominated the mining sector: the 
Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba), a subsidiary of the Alu- 
minum Company of Canada (Alcan); and the Reynolds Bauxite 
Company, a subsidiary of the Reynolds Metals Company of the 
United States. Together these firms accounted for 45 percent of 
the nation's foreign exchange earnings. Foreign companies also 
controlled the major banks. 

The Burnham government, which took office in 1964, saw con- 
tinued foreign domination of the economy as an obstacle to progress 
(see Independence and the Burnham Era, ch. 1). As economist 
DeLisle Worrell pointed out, foreign ownership was considered the 
root cause of local economic difficulties. Emerging nations of the 
Caribbean region shared this viewpoint, which was supported by 
a number of arguments. Foreign-owned companies were said to 
use inappropriate production technologies in the Caribbean. These 
technologies were capital intensive, rather than labor intensive, be- 
cause they had been developed for the industrialized world. Thus, 
local unemployment remained higher than necessary. Furthermore, 
local economies were geared to producing only primary products 
(sugar and bauxite in Guyana) rather than value-added products 
(processed foods and aluminum parts, for example). Guyana sold 
its inexpensive primary products abroad at world market prices 
that made local economies vulnerable to international price swings. 
At the same time, local economies had to import expensive products, 
such as machinery, because most small, less-developed countries 
had no manufacturing base. 

According to critics of the country's economic system, foreign 
companies were satisfied with the existing arrangements and had 
no incentive to develop the local economies. In short, foreign 



71 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



control was stifling regional aspirations. Many people in Caribbean 
countries, particularly those with left-leaning political sympathies, 
called for government control of the economies. 

The government moved vigorously to take control of the econo- 
my. In 1970 Burnham proclaimed Guyana as the world's first 
"cooperative republic." He said that the country would continue 
to welcome foreign investors but that the government would own 
at least 51 percent of any enterprise operating in Guyana. The Burn- 
ham government originally planned not to exceed this 51 percent 
ownership; it wanted majority control of the companies but want- 
ed to maintain foreign management teams and the flow of foreign 
investment. In practice, however, major foreign companies balked 
at the idea of shared ownership, and the Burnham government took 
complete control of the economy, eliminating both foreign owner- 
ship and foreign management. 

During the 1970s, Guyana nationalized the major companies 
operating in the country. Demba became a state-owned corpora- 
tion in 1971 . Three years later, the government took over the Rey- 
nolds Bauxite Company. The Burnham government then turned 
its attention to the sugar industry. Some observers believe the lat- 
ter move was largely for political reasons; in their view, the Burn- 
ham government was seeking to extend its base of support among 
Indo-Guyanese sugar laborers (see The Cooperative Republic, ch. 
1). Guyana nationalized Jessel Securities in 1975 after the compa- 
ny began laying off workers to cut costs. In 1976 the government 
nationalized the huge Booker McConnell company. By the late 
1970s, the government controlled over 80 percent of the economy. 

Nationalization of large foreign companies was but one aspect 
of pervasive government control of economic activity. By the ear- 
ly 1980s, the government had also taken over the bulk of the retail- 
ing and distribution systems. It controlled the marketing of all 
exports, even those few products, such as rice, that were still 
produced privately. It owned all but two financial institutions and 
tightly regulated currency exchange. The government controlled 
prices and even attempted to dictate patterns of consumption by 
banning a wide range of consumer imports. Local substitutes for 
even the most basic imports were proposed, such as rice flour for 
imported wheat flour. 

The nationalized economy at first appeared to be performing 
well. During the early 1970s, world prices of both sugar and bauxite 
rose, allowing the newly nationalized enterprises to reap sizable 
profits. Increased government spending helped stimulate the econ- 
omy, and GDP grew at about 4 percent per year from 1970 to 1975. 



72 



Guyana: The Economy 

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the world commodity 
prices that had favored Guyana declined, reversing the earlier gains. 
Economic output dropped as demand for sugar and bauxite fell. 
Nonetheless, government spending continued at a high rate, and 
Guyana was forced to begin borrowing abroad. This pattern of 
declining GDP, continued high levels of government spending, and 
foreign borrowing was common throughout Latin America in the 
1980s. 

Guyana's economic decline grew more acute during the 1980s. 
Unfavorable world prices were only part of the problem. There 
were two more basic difficulties: the lack of local managers capa- 
ble of running the large agricultural and mining enterprises, and 
the lack of investment in those enterprises as government resources 
were depleted. Bauxite production, which had dropped from 3 mil- 
lion tons per year in the 1960s to 2 million tons in 1971, fell to 
1.3 million tons by 1988 (see table 7, Appendix A). Similarly, su- 
gar production declined from 330,000 tons in 1976 to about 245,000 
tons in the mid-1980s, and had declined to 168,000 tons by 1988. 
Rice production never again reached its 1977 peak of 210,000 tons. 
By 1988, national output of rice was almost 40 percent lower than 
in 1977. 

The decline in productivity was a serious problem, and the Burn- 
ham government's reaction to the downturn aggravated the situa- 
tion. As export revenues fell, foreign exchange became scarce. 
Rather than attacking the root of the problem, low domestic out- 
put, the government attempted to ration foreign exchange. The 
government regulated all transactions requiring foreign exchange 
and severely restricted imports. These controls created their own 
inefficiencies and shortages. More significantly, tight government 
control encouraged the growth of a large parallel market (see Parallel 
Economy, this ch.). Smugglers brought in illegal imports, and cur- 
rency traders circumvented government controls on foreign ex- 
change. Although many citizens began working and trading in the 
parallel economy, many others were leaving the country. An esti- 
mated 72,000 Guyanese, almost one-tenth of the population, 
emigrated between 1976 and 1981 (see Emigration, ch. 2). Among 
those who left the country were many of the most skilled managers 
and entrepreneurs. Finally, the hostile political orientation of the 
Burnham government foreclosed the possibility of aid from the Unit- 
ed States (see Relations with the United States, ch. 4). 

The crisis finally came to a head in the late 1980s because of 
Guyana's unsustainable foreign debt. As export revenues fell, the 
government began borrowing abroad to finance the purchase of 
essential imports. External debt ballooned to US$1.7 billion by 



73 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

1988, almost six times as large as Guyana's official GDP. Because 
the government funneled the borrowed money into consumption 
rather than productive investment, Guyana's economy did not grow 
out of debt. Instead, the government became increasingly unable 
to meet its debt obligations. Overdue payments, or arrears, reached 
a staggering US$1 billion in 1988. Rather than risk a curtailment 
of all foreign credit (even short-term loans for imported machinery 
and merchandise), the Hoyte government embarked on an IMF- 
backed austerity and recovery program. The Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) introduced in 1988 amounted to a reversal of the 
statist policies that had dominated Guyana's economy for two de- 
cades (see Government Policy, this ch.). 

Structure 

The structure of Guyana's export-oriented economy in the 1980s 
was much the same as it had been since colonial times. Sugar, baux- 
ite, and rice were the most important products. In fiscal year (FY — 
see Glossary) 1989, agriculture accounted for 30 percent of 
Guyana's official GDP, mining for 10 percent, manufacturing and 
construction for 15 percent, services for 22 percent, government 
for 18 percent, and other activities for about 5 percent (see fig. 
4). The existence of a large unofficial parallel market in Guyana 
made it difficult to obtain reliable data on overall economic activi- 
ty. But according to some estimates, as much as one-half of 
Guyana's actual economic activity occurred in the parallel market. 

The most important agricultural concern was the sugar indus- 
try, operated by the state-owned Guyana Sugar Corporation (Guy- 
suco). Sugar production declined significantly during the 1980s. 
The magnitude of the decline became apparent in 1988, when 
Guyana imported sugar for the first time in the twentieth century. 
The second most important agricultural product was rice. In con- 
trast to sugar, rice was produced mostly on privately owned farms, 
and most rice was consumed domestically. Rice production fluc- 
tuated widely during the 1980s. Droughts, floods, and plant dis- 
ease often interfered with crops, especially in 1988, when Guyana 
imported rice as well as sugar. Guyana also produced livestock for 
domestic consumption and exported fishery products (see Livestock, 
this ch.). Forest resources remained largely unexploited (see For- 
estry, this ch.). 

Bauxite production was the most important part of the mining 
sector. The major bauxite mines, operated by the Guyana Mining 
Enterprise Limited (Guymine), were in the Linden area and on 
the Berbice River at Kwakwani. Bauxite production declined to 
1.3 million tons in 1988 compared with the 1966 level of 3 million 



74 



Guyana: The Economy 



tons. Guyana also mined gold and diamonds, but the exact value 
of all of these goods was not known because smugglers commonly 
absconded with these valuable minerals (see Mining, this ch.). 

Processing of sugar, bauxite, rice, and other primary products 
accounted for three-quarters of Guyana's manufacturing activity. 
Guyanese industry produced some consumer goods, but the country 
lacked heavy manufacturers (see Manufacturing, this ch.). The 
service component of GDP included transport, communications, 
financial activities, trade, and distribution. Official statistics did 
not include many services, which the parallel market provided. 

Parallel Economy 

A growing share of economic activity in Guyana took place out- 
side of the official economy in the 1980s. The rise of the so-called 
parallel market was alarming for several reasons. In general terms, 
the parallel economy, or black market, was harmful because it in- 
dicated that the official economy was not providing enough goods 
and services, and that a "norm of illegality" existed in Guyana. 
More specifically, the illegal economy drained talent and initia- 
tive from the official economy, deprived the government of tax 
revenues, and led to inefficient use of resources. In addition, the 
parallel market was considered a major source of inflation and cur- 
rency instability. 

The size of Guyana's parallel economy was difficult to estimate 
because illegal traders and businessmen kept a low profile to avoid 
both foreign currency regulations and taxation. The Financial Times 
and the Economist both estimated in 1989 that the parallel market 
carried out between US$50 million and US$100 million worth of 
business annually. By the higher estimate, the parallel economy 
was about one-third the size of the official economy. Economist 
Clive Thomas argued in various studies that the parallel economy 
ranged from one-half to roughly the same size as the official 
economy. 

The key feature of the illegal economy was foreign currency trad- 
ing, an activity that arose when the government began restricting 
legal access to foreign exchange. When it introduced foreign ex- 
change controls in the late 1970s, the government was trying to 
keep Guyana's balance of payments from worsening by controll- 
ing the flow of money and goods to and from the country (see 
Balance of Payments, this ch.). The government also had to re- 
strict access to foreign currency in order to maintain an overvalued 
exchange rate. If Guyanese citizens had had unlimited access to 
foreign currency, many of them would have bought United States 



75 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



GDP 1989 = US$285 million 

OTHER 




22% 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Guyana, 
Barbados, Windward and Leeward Islands, 1989-90, London, 1989. 

Figure 4. Guyana: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin, 1989 

dollars, depleting Guyana's foreign exchange reserves, because of 
their anticipation of devaluations of the Guyanese dollar. 

The restriction on foreign exchange helped maintain the fixed 
exchange rate, but it also created a shortage of foreign currency, 
making it nearly impossible for individuals and businesses to im- 
port essential items (foreign merchants would not accept Guyanese 
dollars). Street traders filled the gap by supplying much-needed 
foreign currency; they made a profit by selling foreign currencies 
at a high price. Thus, the black market exchange rate per United 
States dollar was about G$60 in early 1989, compared with the 
official rate of G$33. The Economist reported in mid- 1990 that brick- 
sized stacks of G$100 bills were trading for US$1 ,000 on George- 
town's America Street, dubbed "Wall Street." 

The largest currency traders in the country, known as the Big 
Six, set the parallel exchange rate on a weekly or daily basis by 
tracking supply and demand, according to Thomas. There were 
several sources of the foreign currency supply: illegal exports of 
gold, diamonds, rice, sugar, shrimp, and furniture; cash remittances 
from abroad; unrecorded expenditures by tourists and visitors; 



76 



Guyana: The Economy 



overinvoicing of imports; and sales of illegal drugs. Demand for 
foreign currency came primarily from three groups: local producers 
or retailers needing to import foreign materials or merchandise, 
investors and savers seeking a safe haven against devaluation of 
the local currency, and people exchanging local currency because 
they planned to leave Guyana temporarily or permanently. There 
was a close relationship between foreign currency trading and other 
illegal activities such as smuggling, tax evasion, and narcotics sales. 

The government responded ambivalently to the parallel mar- 
ket. Official policy restricted illegal economic activity, but in prac- 
tice, the government often turned a blind eye to the well-developed 
parallel economy. Government attempts to repress the illegal mar- 
ket, as in the early 1980s, were unsuccessful. Guyana's borders 
were long and unpatrolled, making smuggling relatively easy. In 
addition, cash remittances from abroad were common, meaning 
that many people in Guyana had frequent access to foreign cur- 
rency and could easily trade on the parallel market. Many observ- 
ers also noted that the government tolerated the parallel market 
because it provided goods that were restricted but essential. In fact, 
even state-owned companies traded on the parallel market. 

A fundamental shift in policy toward the parallel economy oc- 
curred in the late 1980s, when the Hoyte government began stress- 
ing the need for a revitalized private sector. To many people in 
Guyana, as well as in the international financial community, the 
existing parallel market was the epitome of private- sector initia- 
tive under difficult conditions. The Hoyte government signaled a 
measure of agreement with this view in 1 989 when it legalized and 
regulated the parallel foreign currency market. The government's 
aim was to eliminate the illegal economy by absorbing it into the 
legal economy. 

Infrastructure 

The country's underdeveloped and decaying infrastructure seri- 
ously handicapped Guyana's economy. Many of the basic facili- 
ties and services that were taken for granted even in other developing 
countries were either never present in Guyana or had deteriorated 
by the late 1980s. This absence of basic infrastructure meant that 
the country's economic recovery would have to begin at the most 
fundamental levels. No reform of Guyana's productive sectors was 
possible without a significant level of investment in electricity, trans- 
portation, communications, the water system, and seawalls. 

The unreliable supply of electricity in Georgetown and throughout 
Guyana was "the single most debilitating infrastructural inadequa- 
cy," according to Minister of Finance Carl Greenidge. The United 



77 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

States Embassy reported that the lack of electricity in the George- 
town area was a leading factor in emigration from Guyana. Black- 
outs of sixteen hours per day were common in 1989-90. Improving 
the electrical system was a government priority (see Energy Sup- 
ply, this ch.). Other infrastructural problems also blocked economic 
development. The poor road system, for example, made it difficult 
to transport bauxite and blocked efforts to harvest timber (see Trans- 
portation, this ch.). 

Government Policy 

When he took office in 1985, President Desmond Hoyte said 
he would accelerate "the pursuit of socialist construction." One 
year later, however, his government began taking the first steps 
toward dismantling Guyana's statist economy. Faced with a deep 
economic crisis — declining production levels and an acute balance 
of payments shortfall — the government began cutting public spend- 
ing and encouraging foreign investment. At first it was not clear 
whether this economic reversal was simply a short-term response 
to the crisis or a long-term change in political philosophy. But af- 
ter 1986 the Hoyte government continued to move toward a free- 
market economy under the guidance of the IMF, despite consider- 
able opposition in the country. By 1990 the nation appeared ready 
to end its disastrous twenty-year experiment with a closed, 
government-controlled economy. 

The Economic Recovery Program 

The Hoyte government signaled its commitment to reform in 
1988 when it announced a far-reaching Economic Recovery Pro- 
gram (ERP). The plan had four interrelated objectives: to restore 
economic growth, to incorporate the parallel economy into the offi- 
cial economy, to eliminate external and internal payments im- 
balances, and to normalize Guyana's financial relations with its 
foreign creditors. 

Restoring Economic Growth 

To create a climate favorable for growth, the government re- 
moved many of the most onerous limitations on economic activity 
that had been put in place during the period following indepen- 
dence. First, the government liberalized foreign exchange regula- 
tions. For the first time in many years, the government allowed 
exporters to retain a portion of their foreign currency earnings for 
future use. Previously, only the government- owned Bank of Guyana 
had had the legal right to hold foreign currency. Second, the 



78 



Guyana: The Economy 



government lifted price controls for many items, although key goods 
such as petroleum, sugar, and rice remained controlled. Third, 
the government lifted import prohibitions for almost all items other 
than food and allowed individuals to import goods directly without 
government intervention. Fourth, private investment was en- 
couraged by offering streamlined approval of projects and incen- 
tives such as tax holidays. To reassure potential foreign investors 
that Guyana's policy had indeed changed, the government an- 
nounced in 1988 that ' i It is no part of Government's policy to na- 
tionalize property .... The era of nationalizations is therefore to 
be considered at an end." 

Absorbing the Parallel Market 

The second major objective of the ERP was to absorb the parallel 
market into the legal economy. The parallel market was seen as 
denying tax revenues to the government, adding to inflationary 
pressures through uncontrolled currency trading, and generally en- 
couraging illegal activity in Guyana. By liberalizing foreign ex- 
change and other regulations, the government began to make 
inroads into the illegal economy. The 1989 Foreign Currency Act 
allowed licensed dealers to exchange Guyanese dollars for foreign 
currency at market-determined rates. By 1990, more than twenty 
licensed exchange houses operated in Georgetown, taking the place 
of some illegal currency traders. 

A related policy focused on the exchange rates. The government 
began devaluing the Guyanese dollar so that the official exchange 
rate would eventually match the market rate. This devaluation 
process was an essential feature of the recovery program. It not 
only targeted the parallel economy but also improved the coun- 
try's export competitiveness. But the devaluations were painful for 
consumers. In April 1989, the government changed the official ex- 
change rate per United States dollar from G$10 to G$33, instant- 
ly tripling the domestic currency price of most imports. The 
unofficial exchange rate at that time was reportedly G$60 per United 
States dollar, so the Guyanese dollar was still overvalued at the 
official rate. As of mid- 1990, the disparity between the two rates 
persisted: the official rate was G$45 but the unofficial rate (at the 
now legal exchange houses) was G$80 per United States dollar. 
An important milestone was reached in early 1991 when Guyana 
adopted a floating exchange, removing the distinction between the 
official and the market exchange rates. The Guyanese dollar stabi- 
lized at US$1 =G$125 in June 1991. 



79 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Eliminating Payments Imbalances 

The third major goal of the ERP was to eliminate internal and 
external payments imbalances. In other words, the government was 
seeking to eliminate the public-sector deficit on the one hand and 
the current account deficit on the other. The public- sector deficit — 
the gap between government revenues and overall government 
spending — had reached 52 percent of GDP by 1986. This level was 
unsustainable and was an alarming increase over earlier deficits: 
an average of 12 percent of GDP during 1975-80 and an average 
of 2 percent of GDP during 1971-75. 

The government attacked the public- sector deficit in a straight- 
forward manner: it cut spending and sought to enhance revenues. 
The government halted all monetary transfers to troubled state- 
owned enterprises (with the exception of the Guyana Electricity 
Corporation). As a longer-term measure, the government began 
studying the public enterprises — the heart of the statist economy — to 
determine which ones should be privatized (wholly or partially) and 
which ones should be closed. By 1990 the government had plans 
to allow significant privatization of the sugar and bauxite indus- 
tries. In addition, the central government planned to limit expen- 
ditures by delaying salary increases and eliminating unnecessary 
civil service positions. Such fiscal austerity was useful to the econ- 
omy. Still, the need to service the foreign debt limited the extent 
to which the government could cut back on spending; the govern- 
ment slated half of 1989 expenditures for interest payments. 

The government attempted to raise revenues by absorbing the 
parallel economy to broaden the tax base, by improving the col- 
lection of the consumption tax, and by reducing import duty ex- 
emptions. Starting in 1988, the government required companies 
to pay taxes on earnings from the current year, rather than the 
previous year. This set of expenditure and revenue policies produced 
measurable results but failed to eliminate the serious financial 
difficulties facing the government. 

Normalizing International Financial Relations 

Even more pressing than the public-sector deficit was Guyana's 
balance of payments shortfall. The extent of the problem was in- 
dicated by the overall balance of payments, which was a record 
of the flow of goods, services, and capital between Guyana and 
the rest of the world. The deficit in the current account had in- 
creased during the early 1980s, reaching almost 50 percent of GDP 
in 1986. In effect, this meant that Guyana was receiving more goods 
and services from the rest of the world than it was providing and 



80 



Guyana: The Economy 



was having to pay for the difference. The government paid part 
of this deficit by using reserves such as stocks of gold. But part 
of the deficit went unpaid when reserves became depleted. This 
unpaid portion was critical. Referred to as "external payment ar- 
rears, ' ' it marked Guyana as a bad credit risk, threatening to com- 
pletely undermine Guyana's ability to obtain even short-term trade 
credits from abroad. Accumulated external payment arrears had 
expanded to almost three times Guyana's official GDP by 1988. 

The Hoyte government attempted to decrease the balance of pay- 
ments deficit by increasing exports and limiting imports; Guyana's 
trade was close to balanced in 1988, but a sizable trade deficit again 
appeared in 1990. Low productivity meant that exports did not 
expand significandy, and the government lacked the resources need- 
ed to eliminate the external payments arrears. Therefore, an agree- 
ment with the country's foreign creditors was crucial. 

The IMF and the World Bank (see Glossary) played a vital role 
in devising Guyana's economic reform program. The two institu- 
tions also helped ensure that the government implemented the 
planned reforms. 

The IMF had curtailed all further lending to Guyana beginning 
in 1983, because payments on previous loans were overdue. In 1988 
the IMF worked with government representatives to draft a reform 
plan, with the understanding that economic reform within Guyana 
would lead to renewed international financial support for the coun- 
try. IMF support was important not only for the resources the in- 
stitution could provide but also because many other lenders, such 
as commercial banks and foreign governments, waited for IMF 
approval before making loans. 

In 1989, after Guyana's government had shown a commitment 
to restructuring the economy, the IMF and the World Bank helped 
eliminate the external payments arrears. A so-called Donor Sup- 
port Group led by Canada and the Bank for International Settle- 
ments paid US$180 million to enable Guyana to repay arrears. 
The IMF, the World Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank 
then refinanced this amount, essentially replacing Guyana's over- 
due payments with a new long-term loan. The elimination of the 
longstanding external payments arrears cleared the way for Guyana 
to borrow abroad if necessary and allowed it to reschedule other 
external debts on more favorable terms (see Foreign Debt, this ch.). 

Results of the Economic Recovery Program 

The reforms introduced by President Hoyte resulted in no im- 
mediate progress. A policy framework paper prepared by the 
government in cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF had 



81 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

predicted that real GDP would grow by 5 percent in 1989. But 
instead, real GDP fell by 3.3 percent. Economic performance con- 
tinued to decline in early 1990, according to the United States Em- 
bassy. Changes in government policy could not erase the profound 
difficulties facing the economy: massive foreign debt, emigration 
of skilled persons, and lack of infrastructure. 

But in early 1991, there were signs of improvement: Guyana 
had rescheduled its debt, making the country eligible for interna- 
tional loans and assistance, and foreign investment surged in the 
country (see Foreign Investment, this ch.). These changes, precon- 
ditions but not guarantees of economic recovery, would not have 
occurred without the Economic Recovery Program. 

Labor 

About 240,000 people, or about 55 percent of the adult popula- 
tion (85 percent of adult men and 25 percent of adult women), were 
economically active in Guyana as of 1990. Official statistics indi- 
cated that 16 percent of the economically active persons were un- 
employed in 1980. In 1985 the government reported that no reliable 
unemployment estimate was available. Unemployment in 1990 was 
estimated at between 12 percent and 15 percent. In the mid-1980s, 
an estimated 30 percent of employed people worked in agriculture, 
20 percent in mining and manufacturing, and 50 percent in con- 
struction, services, and administration. As with other economic 
statistics in Guyana, these figures did not include the substantial 
number of people working in the parallel economy. 

The United States Department of State estimated in 1990 that 
25 percent of Guyana's work force was unionized. Organized labor 
in Guyana was closely tied to the major national political parties. 
In 1990 the largest labor organization, the Trades Union Congress 
(TUC), comprised eighteen unions, most of which were affiliated 
with the ruling People's National Congress (PNC) party. Presi- 
dent Hoyte was honorary president of the oldest TUC member, 
the Guyana Labour Union (GLU). British Guiana's best- 
known labor leader, Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow, started the GLU 
in 1917 (as the British Guiana Labour Union) when he organized 
dockworkers. Another important labor organization was the Guyana 
Agricultural and General Workers' Union (GAWU), which 
represented 14,000 sugar workers. The predominantly Indo- 
Guyanese GAWU was associated with the opposition People's 
Progressive Party (PPP). Intraparty divisions were reflected in labor 
organizations: in 1988 seven unions left the TUC in protest at PNC 
electioneering tactics and formed the Federation of Independent 
Trade Unions of Guyana (FITUG). 



82 




Farmer with harvested 
red chili peppers, 
Essequibo Islands- West 
Demerara District 
Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(David Mangurian) 




**** 



******* 



Labor unions played an important role in the anticolonial move- 
ment in the 1960s and in the nationalization of foreign companies 
in the 1970s. But the close ties between the TUC unions and the 
governing PNC party did not guarantee that workers' interests were 
always advanced. In 1988 the Guyanese National Assembly adopted 
a constitutional amendment under which government no longer 
had to consult with trade unions on labor and social legislation. 
According to the government, this move was an essential step 
toward dismantling the statist economy. As part of the reform pro- 
gram, the government effectively cut workers' purchasing power 
by repeatedly devaluing the Guyanese currency. Wage increases 
did not keep pace with the devaluations. Prolonged strikes followed, 
leading to production losses in all major sectors. During wage 
negotiations in 1990, the unions were again dissatisfied when Presi- 
dent Hoyte announced across-the-board pay increases that were 
significantly lower than what the unions had requested. Economic 
stabilization was taking precedence over union demands. 

Workers in Guyana received overtime pay when they worked 
in excess of an eight-hour day or a forty-hour week. But in 1990, 
about 40 percent of the country's workers were in minimum- wage 
jobs, earning the equivalent of US$0.50 per day (at December 1990 
exchange rates). These low wages, often not enough to even cover 
the costs of commuting to work, helped explain the high rate of 
emigration. The government barred children under age fourteen 



83 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

from working, but the United States Department of State report- 
ed in 1990 that younger children did work, often selling candy, 
cigarettes, and other items along roads. 

Agriculture 

Agriculture is the chief economic activity in Guyana. Only the 
coastal plain, comprising about 5 percent of the country's land area, 
is suitable for cultivation of crops. Much of this fertile area lies 
more than one meter below the high-tide level of the sea and has 
to be protected by a system of dikes and dams, making agricultur- 
al expansion expensive and difficult. In the 1980s, there were reports 
that the 200-year-old system of dikes in Guyana was in a serious 
state of disrepair. Guyana's remaining land area is divided 
into a white sand belt, which is forested, and interior highlands 
consisting of mountains, plateaus, and savanna (see Terrain, ch. 2). 

In the 1980s, sugar and rice were the primary agricultural 
products, as they had been since the nineteenth century. Sugar was 
produced primarily for export whereas most rice was consumed 
domestically. Other crops included bananas, coconuts, coffee, 
cocoa, and citrus fruits. Small amounts of vegetables and tobacco 
were also produced. During the late 1980s, some farmers succeed- 
ed in diversifying into specialty products such as heart-of-palm and 
asparagus for export to Europe. 

Sugar 

The extent of Guyana's economic decline in the 1980s was clearly 
reflected in the performance of the sugar sector. Production levels 
were halved, from 324,000 tons in 1978 to 168,000 tons in 1988. 

A number of factors contributed to the shrinking harvests. The 
first factor was nationalization. The rapid nationalization of the 
sugar industry in the mid-1970s led to severe management difficul- 
ties and an emigration of talent. The Guyana Sugar Corporation 
(Guysuco), which took over the sugar plantations, lacked needed 
experience. Perhaps more important, Guysuco did not have ac- 
cess to the reserves of foreign capital required to maintain sugar 
plantations and processing mills during economically difficult peri- 
ods. When production fell, Guysuco became increasingly depen- 
dent on state support to pay the salaries of its 20,000 workers. 
Second, the industry was hard-hit by labor unrest directed at the 
government of Guyana. A four- week strike in early 1988 and a 
seven- week strike in 1989 contributed to the low harvests. Third, 
plant diseases and adverse weather plagued sugar crops. After dis- 
ease wiped out much of the sugarcane crop in the early 1980s, farm- 
ers switched to a disease-resistant but less productive variety. 



84 



Guyana: The Economy 



Extreme weather in the form of both droughts and floods, espe- 
cially in 1988, also led to smaller harvests. 

Guyana exported about 85 percent of its annual sugar output, 
making sugar the largest source of foreign exchange. But the 
prospects for sugar exports grew less favorable during the 1980s. 
Rising production costs after nationalization, along with falling 
world sugar prices since the late 1970s, placed Guyana in an in- 
creasingly uncompetitive position. A 1989 Financial Times report 
estimated production costs in Guyana at almost US$400 per ton, 
roughly the same as world sugar prices at that time. By early 1991 , 
world sugar prices had declined sharply to under US$200 per ton. 
Prices were expected to continue decreasing as China, Thailand, 
and India boosted sugar supplies to record-high levels. 

In the face of such keen international competition, Guyana grew 
increasingly dependent on its access to the subsidized markets of 
Europe and the United States. The bulk of sugar exports (about 
160,000 tons per year in the late 1980s) went to the European Eco- 
nomic Community (EEC) under the Lome Convention (see Glos- 
sary), a special quota arrangement. The benefits of the quota were 
unmistakable: in 1987, for example, the EEC price of sugar was 
about US$460 per ton, whereas the world price was only US$154 
per ton. (The gap between the two prices was not so dramatic in 
other years, but it was significant.) Guyana was allowed to sell a 
much smaller amount of sugar (about 18,000 tons per year in 1989, 
down from 102,000 tons in 1974) in the United States market at 
prices comparable to those in the EEC under another quota ar- 
rangement, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (see Appendix D). Main- 
taining preferential access to the European market was a priority 
in Guyana; in 1988 and 1989, production levels were too low to 
satisfy the EEC quota, so Guyana imported sugar at low prices 
and reexported it to the lucrative European market. Even so, 
Guyana fell 35,000 tons short of filling the quota in 1989 and 13,000 
tons short in 1990. 

The government of Guyana restructured the sugar industry in 
the mid-1980s to restore its profitability. The area dedicated to sugar 
production was reduced from 50,000 hectares to under 40,000 hect- 
ares, and two of ten sugarcane-processing mills were closed. Guy- 
suco also diversified into production of dairy products, livestock, 
citrus, and other items. Profitability improved, but production levels 
and export earnings remained well below target. In mid- 1990, the 
government took an important step toward long-term reform of the 
sugar industry — and a symbolically important step toward opening 
the economy — when Guysuco signed a management contract with 
the British firms Booker and Tate & Lyle. The Booker company 



85 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

owned most sugar plantations in Guyana until the industry was 
nationalized in 1976. A study by the two companies reportedly es- 
timated that US$20 million would be needed to rehabilitate 
Guyana's sugar industry. 

Rice 

Rice production in Guyana reached a high of over 180,000 tons 
in 1984 but declined to a low of 130,000 tons in 1988. The fluctu- 
ating production levels were the result of disease and inconsistent 
weather. Droughts and heavy rains had an adverse effect on rice 
crops because the irrigation and drainage systems in rice-growing 
areas were poorly maintained. The area under rice cultivation fell 
from 100,000 hectares in 1964 to 36,000 hectares in 1988, accord- 
ing to the Guyana Rice Producers' Association. 

Most rice farms in Guyana were privately owned; the govern- 
ment operated the irrigation systems and rice-processing mills. This 
division of the industry resulted in several difficulties. According 
to the United States Embassy, the government neglected irriga- 
tion and drainage canals because private farmers refused to pay 
taxes for their maintenance. Meanwhile, the government-run mills 
were reportedly slow in paying farmers for their crops. In addi- 
tion, the government-controlled distribution system for tractors, 
fuel, spare parts, and fertilizer was highly inefficient, according 
to some reports. In 1990 the government began privatizing the rice 
industry by putting several rice mills up for sale. 

The bulk of Guyana's rice production was consumed domesti- 
cally. Even so, exports took on increasing importance during the 
1980s as a source of foreign exchange; there were even reports of 
rice being smuggled out of the country. Guyana shared a quota 
for rice exports to the EEC with neighboring Suriname but was 
unable to fill the quota during the late 1980s. In 1988 the govern- 
ment set a 1991 production goal of 240,000 tons and an export 
goal of 100,000 tons. In the first quarter of 1990, however, exports 
fell to a record low of 16,000 tons, for an annual rate of less than 
70,000 tons. Half of these exports came directly from private farm- 
ers, the other half from the Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing 
Authority. 

Forestry 

Timber was the least exploited but most abundant natural 
resource in Guyana in the early 1990s. Forests, many of which 
reportedly had commercial potential, covered three-quarters of the 
country's land. Over 1,000 different species of trees were known 
to grow in the country. 



86 




Combine harvesting rice on 162 -hectare farm in Mahaica-Berbice Region 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian) 
Bags of rice awaiting processing, with silos for storage in background 

Courtesy Leslie B. Johnson, Sr. 



87 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The two main difficulties in timber production were the limited 
access to the forests and electrical power problems at the major lum- 
ber mills. The government and interested groups overseas were 
addressing both difficulties. The government launched the Upper 
Demerara Forestry Project in the early 1980s to improve hardwood 
production on a 220,000-hectare site. In 1985 the International De- 
velopment Association, part of the World Bank, provided a US$9 
million loan for expansion of the forestry industry. In 1990 the 
government sold the state-owned logging company and announced 
plans to allow significant Republic of Korea (South Korean) and 
Malaysian investment in the timber industry. Showing concern for 
the long-term condition of its forests, the government also planned 
to set aside 360,000 hectares of rain forest for supervised develop- 
ment and international research into sustainable management. 

Fisheries 

Fishery products took on increasing importance during the 1980s 
as potential earners of foreign exchange. By the end of the decade, 
shrimp had become the third leading earner of foreign exchange 
after sugar and bauxite. Fisheries production in Guyana totaled 
about 36,000 tons in 1989, down from 45,000 tons in the mid-1980s. 
The most valuable portion of the catch was the 3,800 tons of shrimp. 
Many fishermen reportedly sold their shrimp catch at sea to avoid 
taxes and earn foreign currency. Thus, shrimp exports may have 
been much higher than recorded. Shrimp exports were expected 
to continue increasing as Guyana developed shrimp farms along 
its coast; Guysuco began operating one such farm in the late 1980s. 
The bulk of the fisheries catch was sold at the dockside and con- 
sumed domestically. A US$5 million fish-processing plant was under 
construction on the Demerara River in 1990, raising the possibili- 
ty of frozen fish exports. The government sold Guyana Fisheries 
Limited, which employed about 5,000 people, to foreign investors 
in 1990. 

Livestock 

Livestock production was not a major activity in Guyana be- 
cause of a shortage of adequate pasture land and the lack of ade- 
quate transportation. In 1987 there were an estimated 210,000 
cattle, 185,000 pigs, 120,000 sheep, and 15 million chickens in the 
country. The country imported Cuban Holstein-Zebu cattle in the 
mid-1980s in an effort to make Guyana self-sufficient in milk 
production; by 1987 annual production had reached 32 million 
liters, or only half the target quantity. 



88 



Workers cleaning 
grouper (foreground) 
and mackerel at the 



Guyana Limited Fisheries Plant, 
Georgetown 




Courtesy Inter-American 
Development Bank 
(David Mangurian) 



Mining 

Guyana's mining sector offered the best hope of rapid growth in 
the late 1980s. The government's decision to open the sector to 
foreign management and investment attracted interest from com- 
panies in a number of countries, including the United States, 
Canada, Brazil, Norway, and Australia. Guyana was known to 
have sizable reserves of bauxite, gold, and diamonds. Foreign in- 
vestment was expected to dramatically increase the rate at which 
those reserves were mined. 

Aluminum 

Guyana was known to have a 350-million-ton bauxite reserve, 
one of the world's highest concentrations of the valuable mineral. 
But production of bauxite dipped sharply after the government na- 
tionalized the industry in the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, bauxite 
production hovered around 1.5 million tons per year, or half the 
annual level of the 1960s and 1970s. The state-owned Guyana Min- 
ing Enterprise Limited (Guymine) suffered repeated losses as a 
result of inefficient management, declining world prices for baux- 
ite, and prolonged strikes by workers. The losses drained the com- 
pany's capital reserves and led to deterioration of plants and 
equipment. Guyana's single alumina plant, located in Linden, used 
to separate 300,000 tons per year of aluminum oxide from raw 



89 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

bauxite ore until the facility closed in 1982. From then on, Guyana 
was forced to export only unprocessed bauxite ore, foregoing the 
added revenues to be gained from refining the mineral. 

In the 1970s, Guyana had the advantage of being the world's 
leading supplier of so-called calcined bauxite, a high grade of the 
mineral used for lining steel furnaces and other high-temperature 
applications. After 1981, however, China emerged as a major source 
of calcined bauxite, and Guyana became known as a less reliable 
supplier. By the end of the decade, China had displaced Guyana 
as the leading exporter of calcined bauxite, even though Guyana 
had the advantage of being closer to the major North American 
and European markets. 

Bauxite mining was concentrated in northeast Guyana. The two 
largest mines were located at Linden, on the Demerara River directly 
south of Georgetown, and at Kwakwani on the Berbice River. 
There was little development of new mining areas during the period 
of state ownership. But in the late 1980s, the government began 
offering foreign companies the chance to rebuild and expand the 
bauxite industry. 

The Reynolds Bauxite Company, formerly the owner of the mine 
at Kwakwani, was one of the first foreign firms allowed back into 
Guyana. It provided managerial assistance to Guymine beginning 
in 1985. In the late 1980s, Reynolds began investing an estimated 
US$25 million to open a bauxite mine at Aroaima on the Berbice 
River. An elaborate system of tugboats and barges was required 
to bring the bauxite 126 kilometers down the Berbice River and 
then 120 kilometers along the coast to Georgetown for transport 
to the United States. According to the British Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, Reynolds awarded a ten-year transportation contract 
to Goliath-Knight, an Anglo-Dutch company. The mine was ex- 
pected to produce 1 . 5 million tons of bauxite in its first year of 
operation (July 1990-June 1991) and 2.6 million tons per year by 
1995. Guymine was also negotiating to allow Venezuela's Vena- 
lum company to begin extracting 600,000 tons per year in the region 
around Kwakwani. 

The government anticipated further development of the baux- 
ite industry in the Linden area. A new mine near Linden, called 
the East Montgomery North Mine, was expected to open by 1994. 
It was to take the place of the three largely depleted pits in the area. 
The government sought significant foreign investment for the 
project; production was expected to reach 2 million tons per year 
in the 1990s. Norway's Norsk Hydro was discussing the possibility 
of reopening the alumina plant near Linden at a cost of about 
US$100 million. Furthermore, just as the Reynolds company was 



90 



Bauxite mining in the interior 
Courtesy Leslie B. Johnson, Sr. 

returning to the mines it had previously owned, Alcan was negotiat- 
ing a return to bauxite production facilities in Linden. 

Gold and Diamonds 

The bauxite sector attracted foreign investment in the late 1980s 
because companies knew about Guyana's vast reserves and the 
country's previously formidable production capacity. Gold min- 
ing, in contrast, attracted more speculative investment from com- 
panies eager to explore the country's neglected potential. Gold 
production peaked in 1894 at 4,400 kilograms per year but declined 
to an officially declared level of 160 kilograms per year in 1983. 
Declared production averaged 500 kilograms per year during the 
late 1980s, but undeclared production was thought to be five times 
as high: an estimated 3,000 kilograms of gold were being extracted 
each year. Individual miners working in southern Guyana smug- 
gled most of the gold they found to Brazil to avoid paying taxes 
and to avoid receiving Guyana's low official price, which was based 
on an artificially high exchange rate. 

Lured by the prospect of a 1990s gold boom, at least ten foreign 
companies began operations or preliminary explorations within 
Guyana in the late 1980s. They brought with them industrial equip- 
ment, such as powerful suction dredges, that could extract up to 



91 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

500 grams of gold from a riverbed in a twelve-hour shift. Three 
of the largest companies were Canada's Golden Star Resources and 
Placer Dome, and Brazil's Paranapanema. Others included Aus- 
tralia's Giant Resources, Homestake Mining of the United States, 
and Britain's Robertson Group. The Guyana Geology and Mines 
Commission hosted potential investors' visits to the country, and 
the government promised to pay the market value for gold (US$356 
per ounce in May 1991) in United States dollars. The government's 
promise achieved measurable results in 1990: during the first half 
of the year, declarations increased by 75 percent over the previous 
year. 

Even if only a few of the proposed foreign investments reached 
their expected output levels, the government projected that Guyana 
would still be producing over 6,000 kilograms of gold per year 
(presumably officially declared by the foreign companies) by the 
mid-1990s. Paranapanema, drawing on experience in Brazil's trop- 
ical terrain, expected to produce 1,500 kilograms per year at its 
Tassawini joint venture on the northwest Barama River. In the 
Mahdia region on the Essequibo River, Placer Dome and Golden 
Star Resources reported that an operation capable of producing 
2,000 kilograms per year was probably possible; the companies 
planned a feasibility study before actually starting operations. 

Information on diamond production in Guyana was sketchy be- 
cause the bulk of the stones were reportedly smuggled out of the 
country. Declared production fluctuated between 4,000 and 12,000 
carats per year in the 1980s. Undeclared production was probably 
much higher. In 1966 the industry produced about 92,000 carats, 
60 percent of which were reported as gem quality. 

Industry 

Energy Supply 

The lack of a reliable supply of electricity in Guyana, especially 
in Georgetown, was the most severe constraint on economic ac- 
tivity and a major factor in emigration. By 1990 blackouts of six- 
teen hours per day were common in the capital city, affecting even 
the presidential mansion. Blackouts occurred without warning and 
sometimes lasted for several days. Most businesses in Georgetown 
employed standby generators, raising the demand for imported fuel. 

The electricity supply was unreliable because the facilities of the 
state-owned Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC) had deteriorated 
during the 1980s. In 1991 the GEC had a capacity of 253 mega- 
watts of electricity and generated 647 gigawatt-hours of electricity, 
satisfying about half the estimated demand. The reasons for the 



92 



Guyana: The Economy 

shortfall were not only the lack of funds to replace aging genera- 
tors and to build new power plants, but also periodic fuel short- 
ages because most electrical power was produced thermally. There 
were other less tangible problems: GEC's finances were inadequate 
because the cost of electricity was below the cost of production (es- 
pecially when taking depreciation into account); and the attitude 
of managers and workers was reportedly very poor. The bauxite 
and sugar sectors had their own electricity supply system apart from 
GEC, but they also suffered power shortages. 

Two types of efforts were under way in the early 1990s to rectify 
the electricity shortage. In the short term, GEC was limping along 
with the help of a small floating generator made in the United States 
and two ten-megawatt gas-turbine generators borrowed from Brazil. 
There was also a possibility that electricity would be bought from 
neighboring Venezuela. 

In the longer term, the government was trying to obtain foreign 
investment and assistance to rebuild the electrical system. GEC 
planned to hire a consulting firm to help it develop a least-cost ex- 
pansion program and to improve the pricing of electrical service. 
International financial organizations were also expected to contrib- 
ute funds. As early as 1985, the Inter- American Development Bank 
(IDB) had approved a US$16 million loan for rehabilitation of GEC, 
and an agreement was reached with an Italian company to build 
a US$45 million (thirty-megawatt) power station. Both projects were 
delayed, as were plans to build a hydroelectric plant on the Mazaru- 
ni River. The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that GEC re- 
habilitation still had not started in mid- 1990. In 1990 negotiations 
were under way with the United States firm, Leucadia, to form 
a joint- venture company for the operation of the electrical system. 

Manufacturing 

Most manufacturing in Guyana involved the processing of 
agricultural products (sugar, rice, coconuts, and timber) and miner- 
als (bauxite, gold, and diamonds). The production of alumina from 
bauxite was suspended in 1982. Guyana produced small quanti- 
ties of textiles, ceramics, and pharmaceuticals in state-owned fac- 
tories. Among those industries, the pharmaceutical industry showed 
the most potential for growth, having attracted investments from 
Beecham, a British firm, and from Tecno Bago, an Argentine firm. 
Manufacturers in Guyana also produced wooden furniture, 
cigarettes, and paints, and other products. 

The government was attempting to sell off many of the smaller 
manufacturing companies as part of the Economic Recovery Pro- 
gram. One of the first state-owned manufacturers to be partially 



93 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

privatized was Demerara Distillers Limited, which produced rum 
and other alcoholic beverages. The company was relatively suc- 
cessful under state ownership, having become the world's largest 
producer of rum after Bacardi and the leading supplier of bulk rum 
(sold under various brand names) to Britain, according to the Finan- 
cial Times. The government owned the majority of the company 
until 1988, when Demerara Distillers issued 12 million new shares 
and diluted government ownership to about 47 percent. The 
government did not appear ready to completely relinquish its hold 
on the rum producer, however, because it blocked the company's 
1990 effort to issue more shares. 

Expansion of the manufacturing sector, like expansion in other 
sectors, depended on increased foreign investment. Many observ- 
ers noted that with such investment, Guyana could become a sup- 
plier of manufactured products to other countries in the Caribbean 
region. The Commonwealth Advisory Group, affiliated with the 
Donor Support Group that arranged the refinancing of the debt 
arrears in 1989, had reported in 1989 that Guyana had the poten- 
tial for "vibrant and profitable" manufacturing of garments, shoes, 
leather goods, sawn timber, furniture and other wood products, 
processed agricultural products, paints, pharmaceuticals, and 
refrigerators. Preconditions for that sort of development, according 
to the group, included an easing of the foreign exchange constraint 
(achieved by 1990); improved infrastructure (telecommunications 
and transport); a simpler, less burdensome tax system; injections 
of foreign capital and technical skills; attractive wages for skilled 
workers; and stable government policy in support of private 
manufacturing. 

Services 
Banking 

Apart from the Bank of Guyana (the central bank), five com- 
mercial banks and two foreign banks operated in Guyana. Three 
other foreign banks — the Royal Bank of Canada, Chase Manhat- 
tan of the United States, and Barclays Bank of Britain — were na- 
tionalized in the 1980s. The two remaining foreign-owned banks 
were Canada's Bank of Nova Scotia and India's Bank of Baroda. 
The primary activity for commercial banks was lending to the 
government; private investment opportunities were rare. Accord- 
ing to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the public sector accounted 
for 97 percent of the financial system's claims at the end of 1986. 

In 1987 the banks experienced a shock when the government 
emphasized bond issues rather than borrowing from commercial 



94 



Employee sawing hardwood plank for furniture, Ruimveldt, near Georgetown 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian) 



95 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

banks as a way of financing its deficits. This shift in government 
policy placed the banks in a difficult position because they could 
make few loans and thus few profits; there were then almost no 
private entities seeking financing. But commercial banks benefit- 
ed from the government's legalization of foreign exchange trad- 
ing in 1989. Until then, the Bank of Guyana had been the only 
legal source of foreign currency, forcing local banks to hold 
Guyanese dollars even when a devaluation was expected. Five banks 
opened cambios, or exchange houses, in 1990. 

Transportation 

Next to the poor supply of electricity, the most serious infras- 
tructure problem was the poor transportation system (see fig. 5). 
Travel and transport were difficult within Guyana, and there was 
only one surface link to a neighboring country, a newly paved road 
to Brazil. The domestic transportation system was minimal: only 
500 kilometers of paved roads (mostly along the coast), 5,000 kilo- 
meters of gravel roads, 1,500 of earthen roads, and about 28,000 
vehicles. Buses were aging and needed to be replaced. Commut- 
ing costs for workers were often high enough to dissuade them from 
leaving home each day. Only the lower portions of the major 
rivers — Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice — were navigable, mak- 
ing transport of bauxite and sugar a challenge. Air service within 
the country was sporadic. The country's two ports, at Georgetown 
and at New Amsterdam, were also in need of improvement. An 
Economist report about travel to the Marudi Mountain gold mine 
in the most southern part of Guyana aptly depicted the extremes 
of inland travel: the trip required a ride on a small plane from 
Timehri Airport (near Georgetown) to Lethem, followed by a six- 
hour jeep ride (rain permitting) to Aishalton, and then an eleven- 
hour walk to the mine. 

Guyana's transportation system showed signs of improvement 
in the early 1990s, when foreign investment and foreign aid began 
returning to the country. Brazil financed construction of a 
300-kilometer road from Kurupukari, in central Guyana, to 
Lethem, on the western border with Brazil, giving access to much 
of the interior. The government entered into a joint venture with 
British Airways to establish a company called Guyana Airports 
Limited that would operate and develop Timehri Airport and other 
airports. Air transportation also took a step forward in 1990 when 
Varig, Brazil's national airline, started weekly air service from 
Timehri to Boa Vista and Manaus in northern Brazil. Most air 
travel outside of the country went through Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 
or through Caracas, Venezuela. 



96 



Guyana: The Economy 



Communications 

Guyana's communications system was on par with its under- 
developed transportation system. There were 27,000 telephones 
in use in 1983, or 3.3 per 100 people. Two Japanese companies 
installed a telephone system in 1987, but the telephone network 
still required an estimated US$150 million in repairs and improve- 
ments as of 1988. International direct dialing was available, but 
calling Guyana from the United States required repeated efforts. 

Tele Network, a company from the United States Virgin Islands, 
agreed to take a majority interest in a telecommunications joint 
venture starting in late 1990, according to the United States Em- 
bassy. The state-owned Guyana Telecommunications Corporation 
also reached an agreement with a Canadian company, Northern 
Telecommunications, to rehabilitate the telephone infrastructure, 
according to Guyana Business. 

Georgetown had two privately owned television stations that 
relayed United States programming picked up from satellites and 
one government-operated station in 1991. The government also 
operated two amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations in the cap- 
ital and two frequency modulation (FM) stations, one in George- 
town and one in Lethem. 

External Economic Relations 
Foreign Trade 

Guyana's economy was heavily dependent on foreign trade. Ex- 
ports and imports both amounted to a large share of GDP. The 
two largest exports, sugar and bauxite, set the pace for the entire 
economy. When production of these exports declined in the 1980s, 
Guyana began to experience severe difficulties. A central element 
of the IMF- sponsored recovery program introduced in 1988 was 
to revitalize Guyana's traditional export base. 

Exports 

Guyana's five leading exports in 1989 were sugar, bauxite, shrimp, 
rice, and gold. These products together accounted for 90 percent of 
exports, which amounted to a total of US$204 million in 1990. Other 
exports included timber, textiles, rum, fruit, and vegetables. Because 
of the country's limited industrial development, Guyana exported 
only a few manufactured products, such as refrigerators, freezers, 
and furniture to other nations in the Caribbean region. 

Britain, the United States, and Canada were the destinations for 
about two-thirds of Guyana's officially recorded exports. Exports 



97 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



i 

VENEZUELA^?/ 

Hi 



Charity^) 





International boundary 




International boundary 




in dispute 


® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 




Paved road 




Major airport 




Port 


25 


50 75 Kilometers 





25 50 75 Miles 



s 



A 




SURINAME 



BRAZIL 

Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Figure 5. Guyana: Transportation System, 1991 



to the United States included bauxite, shrimp, gold, sugar (under 
a special quota), and clothing. In 1989 Guyana became a benefici- 
ary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which eliminated United 
States customs duties on selected products. Major exports 
to Britain were bauxite and sugar; the latter was covered by a spe- 
cial quota arrangement with the European Economic Community 
(see Agriculture, this ch.). Exports to Canada were mainly bauxite 



98 



Guyana: The Economy 



and gold. Other markets for Guyana's exports were Germany and 
Japan. 

Imports 

Guyana's largest import categories in 1989 were capital goods 
(mostly machinery) and fuel, followed by other intermediate and 
consumer goods. The United States supplied about 30 percent of 
Guyana's merchandise imports, including most machinery and in- 
dustrial inputs. A surge in imports of capital goods in the late 1980s 
may have reflected the rebuilding of the bauxite and sugar indus- 
tries. In 1990 imports amounted to US$250 million. 

For most of the 1980s, the largest import category by far was 
fuel and lubricants; Guyana made special arrangements with its 
oil-rich neighbors to obtain fuel. Trinidad and Tobago supplied 
most of Guyana's oil until the mid-1980s, when Guyana fell far 
behind on its payments. In 1985 the two nations entered into a 
barter arrangement under which Guyana received oil in exchange 
for rice. But that agreement broke down within the year, and trade 
between Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana dropped off. Guyana 
also had a barter arrangement with Venezuela starting in 1986. 
Guyana shipped almost one-third of its bauxite (540,000 tons) to 
Venezuela in 1987 in exchange for fuel. This barter arrangement 
was essential for Guyana, which had almost no access to credit af- 
ter the country slipped into arrears on debt to major creditors. But 
bartering had its drawbacks. In 1989, for example, Guyana suffered 
recurring fuel shortages when it failed to deliver bauxite shipments 
to Venezuela. 

Foreign Debt 

In the early 1990s, Guyana was one of the world's most heavily 
indebted countries. Its external debt burden was almost US$2 bil- 
lion in 1990, or about seven times official GDP. The debt burden 
accumulated in Guyana — as in many other developing countries — 
beginning in the 1970s. At first, loans were earmarked for develop- 
ment projects. But when rising oil prices adversely affected the 
balance of payments, Guyana began borrowing to finance imports. 
Guyana's foreign debt was unlike that of many other Latin Ameri- 
can nations because most of it was owed to official creditors (loans 
from international financial organizations and foreign governments) 
rather than commercial institutions (loans from foreign banks). 
Roughly one-third of the debt was owed to the IMF and the World 
Bank, and one-fourth to neighboring Trinidad and Tobago. Other 
major creditors were the Caribbean Development Bank and 
Barbados. 



99 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

In 1981 Burnham underlined the severity of the debt crisis when 
he authorized the government to stop making debt-service pay- 
ments. Arrears on debt repayment and trade credits were simply 
allowed to accumulate. (Mexico's 1982 announcement of a simi- 
lar moratorium on its much larger commercial debt sent shock 
waves through the international financial community.) Guyana's 
debt moratorium had two serious results. First, unpaid debts and 
interest payments compounded, leading to rapid growth in total 
debt. Thus, external debt increased from US$1.2 billion in 1984 
to US$1.7 billion in 1987 even though Guyana received few new 
loans. Second, the buildup of arrears destroyed Guyana's credi- 
bility as a debtor. In 1983 the IMF refused to provide further loans; 
many other international organizations and governments followed 
suit. The loss of credibility also directly affected Guyana's trade 
relations: Trinidad and Tobago cut off oil shipments in 1986. 

The debt crisis persisted during the 1980s as Guyana remained 
unable to resume debt service. The country consistentiy had a deficit 
in the overall balance of payments, and the government financed 
the deficit by accumulating even more arrears on debt service pay- 
ments. By 1989 those arrears exceeded US$1 billion, or five times 
the value of annual exports. By the late 1980s, the debt crisis threat- 
ened to shut down the economy; even short-term trade credits were 
difficult to obtain. Venezuela began insisting on prepayment in 
bauxite in exchange for shipments of oil. It was mainly the debt 
crisis that led the government to agree to an IMF-backed austerity 
program in 1988. 

Temporary debt relief arrived after Guyana agreed to enact the 
Economic Recovery Program. A Donor Support Group consist- 
ing of Guyana's major creditors (Canada, the United States, Brit- 
ain, Germany, France, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
provided a bridge loan of US$180 million that enabled the govern- 
ment to pay off arrears to the IMF, the World Bank, and the Carib- 
bean Development Bank. In addition, bilateral creditors agreed 
to reschedule major portions of Guyana's debt, such as US$460 
million owed to Trinidad and Tobago. The complicated refinanc- 
ing scheme, which was conditioned on rigorous economic reforms 
within Guyana, removed the massive arrears and allowed Guyana 
renewed access to international financial support. The IMF and 
the World Bank extended new loans to Guyana in 1990 for infra- 
structure projects. 

The restoration of Guyana's creditworthiness, however, did not 
signal an end to its debt problem. Interest payments on the debt 
were the largest expenditure in the 1990 budget. A priority for the 
government was to increase foreign currency earnings by expanding 



100 



Building a new road through the dense vegetation of the interior 

Courtesy Leslie B. Johnson, Sr. 

exports, but a large share of export revenues would have to be used 
to continue debt service. Thus, debt service absorbed scarce 
resources urgently needed for economic development. There was 
a possibility that Guyana would receive some measure of debt for- 
giveness from the United States under the Enterprise for the Ameri- 
cas Initiative (see Glossary), according to 1991 congressional tes- 
timony by Undersecretary of the Treasury, David Mulford. But 
there were few precedents for official debt forgiveness on the scale 
that Guyana's economy seemed to require. 

Balance of Payments 

Guyana experienced serious balance of payments difficulties 
during the late 1980s. The value of imports was roughly in ba- 
lance with the value of exports in 1988 and 1989 but interest 
payments on the foreign debt drained the nation's financial re- 
sources. The balance of payments situation would have been much 
worse if Guyana had not withheld payment on much of its debt. 
Even though it did not include the mounting arrears on debt pay- 
ments, the deficit in the overall balance of payments averaged 
US$150 million between 1985 and 1990, or about 50 percent of 
GDP. 



101 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Foreign Investment 

Foreign investment was a key element in the Hoyte government's 
plan to revitalize Guyana's economy. After two decades during 
which virtually all foreign companies were nationalized, the govern- 
ment was taking great pains in the early 1990s to convince foreign 
companies that investments in Guyana would be safe and lucra- 
tive. According to a government statement, investments were safe 
because, "The objective circumstances which led to nationaliza- 
tions during the 1970s no longer exist and the present government 
has no plans whatsoever to nationalize investment or property." 
The government allowed investors to enter any sector of the econ- 
omy, repatriate their profits, and own 100 percent of companies 
operating in Guyana. To make investment attractive to foreign- 
ers, the government introduced a number of incentives (negotiat- 
ed on a case-by-case basis), including tax holidays of up to ten years, 
exemption from consumption and capital gains taxes, duty-free im- 
port privileges, and support for investment and tax treaties with 
foreign countries (to avoid double taxation, for example). The 
government established the Guyana Manufacturing and Industri- 
al Development Agency (Guymida) to streamline the foreign in- 
vestment process. 

The government encouraged foreign investment in a broad range 
of activities, including agricultural production, agro-industries, fish- 
ing and shrimping (including aquaculture), forestry and sawmill - 
ing, mining, petroleum, manufacturing, fabrication and assem- 
bly industries, tourism and hotel development, construction, elec- 
trical power generation (including hydropower), telecommunica- 
tions, air transport and airport services, shipping and port facili- 
ties, and banking and financial services. By 1991 foreign investors 
were active in a number of these areas. Several companies from 
the United States, Canada, and other countries were active in baux- 
ite and gold mining as well as infrastructure projects. British com- 
panies had invested in the sugar sector, pharmaceutical products, 
and airport services, among other areas. Brazilian companies were 
involved in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and mining. 

Some of the most promising investments were in nontraditional 
areas. A French company, Amazon Caribbean Guyana Limited, 
was exporting heart-of-palm to Europe. The company employed 
100 people. Six European companies were considering investments 
in engineering or garment manufacturing. A Trinidadian firm, 
Colonial Life Insurance Company, purchased the assets of the state- 
owned logging company, Guyana Timbers. The Japanese Nisshan 



102 



Ground satellite station at Georgetown 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 

Suissan company bought another state-owned company, Guyana 
Fisheries Limited. A United States company, Sahlman Seafoods, 
operated a shrimp-fishing company. 

One activity receiving considerable foreign attention was petrole- 
um exploration. Because fuel was Guyana's costliest import dur- 
ing most of the 1980s, there was great interest in finding domestic 
sources of oil. An exploration study was completed in 1986, and 
the results were promising enough to attract a Trinidadian com- 
pany and a British oil company. Nine petroleum companies were 
reportedly searching for oil in Guyana's coastal waters by 1990. 
These companies included Hunt Oil of the United States, the Lon- 
don and Scottish Marine Oil Company of Britain, Broken Hill 
Proprietary of Australia, and Total from France. The latter com- 
pany had entered into a joint venture agreement with two small 
United States companies and was expected to begin drilling test 
wells in late 1990. 

Though foreign investment had begun to flow into Guyana by 
1991, many potential investors remained hesitant. One concern 
was that a change in government could reverse the favorable poli- 
cies that the Hoyte government had introduced. The Hoyte govern- 
ment maintained that it was planning to change the constitution 
to remove sections that discouraged potential investors. Other 



103 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

concerns for investors were the lack of infrastructure, the shortage 
of skilled labor (even though wages were low), and the politicized 
and strike-prone unions. 

Of particular interest to investors from the United States was 
the possibility that Guyana would become eligible for Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) Code, Section 936 funds from United States 
businesses in Puerto Rico. Under IRS Code, Section 936, United 
States businesses with branches in Puerto Rico were effectively ex- 
empt from income tax on income derived from their Puerto Rican 
subsidiaries as long as those funds remained in Puerto Rico. In 
1986 this tax exemption was expanded to include funds made in 
Puerto Rico but invested in certain countries of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
a United States government organization that provided political 
risk insurance and loans to United States companies, organized 
a fact-finding trip to Guyana in 1990. 

Foreign Aid 

Guyana received little foreign assistance during the early 1980s 
because aid donors disapproved of the Burnham government's po- 
litical orientation. According to the government, total aid flows into 
Guyana were US$71 million in 1981, US$40 million in 1982, 
US$32 million in 1983, US$23 million in 1985, and US$31 mil- 
lion in 1986. 

In the late 1980s, aid donors provided assistance primarily in 
the form of debt refinancing. Help in clearing Guyana's arrears 
on its debt was a form of aid because it made the country eligible 
for various international loans and assistance programs. Guyana 
was slated to receive assistance from the United States Agency for 
International Development (AID) in 1991. Beginning in 1988, the 
year that the Hoyte government announced its Economic Recov- 
ery Program, the United States provided about US$7 million (under 
the Public Law 480 program) in concessional loans for wheat pur- 
chases. Guyana also received aid from the EEC, in the form of 
preferential access to EEC markets and grants for infrastructure 
development. Canada also provided aid. 

Regional Integration 

Guyana's strongest regional ties were to the other former Brit- 
ish colonies in the Caribbean, rather than to Spanish- or Portuguese- 
speaking South America. In the hope of becoming the food source 
and manufacturer for the Caribbean nations, in 1965 Guyana joined 
Antigua and Barbados in forming the Caribbean Free Trade As- 
sociation, known as Carifta (see Appendix C). Membership in 



104 



Guyana: The Economy 



Carifta was expanded to thirteen countries in 1968, and in 1973 
Carifta was renamed the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (Caricom). Caricom appeared to have great potential in 
the 1970s. The Caricom members, along with Canada, Britain, 
Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, created the Caribbean Develop- 
ment Bank (CDB) as a regional lending body. Another such insti- 
tution was the Caribbean Investment Corporation. 

Caricom 's attempts at regional integration have been fraught 
with economic and political problems. Guyana became the largest 
debtor to the CDB and hindered the organization's efforts else- 
where in the region when the country had difficulty servicing its 
debt. When the IMF stopped providing new loans to Guyana in 
1983, the CDB did the same, and Guyana was abruptly cut off 
from major regional assistance. Friction also developed between 
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago when Guyana fell behind on 
its oil payments. In addition, Caricom members were politically 
divided over the United States invasion of Grenada in 1983. 

In the early 1990s, Caricom members were seeking to reinvig- 
orate the organization by creating a customs union. By putting in 
place a common external tariff, members would take the first step 
toward removing trade barriers amongst themselves. The proposed 
tariff structure was to place low rates of duty (as little as 5 percent) 
on imports that did not compete with goods produced within Car- 
icom, but high rates of duty on competing goods (up to 45 per- 
cent). The idea was to protect industries within Caricom countries, 
which had a combined population of 5.5 million people. In 1991 
several members were hesitant about the proposal because it would 
force Caricom consumers to choose between higher priced imports 
(since tariffs would be added on to the final price) or a smaller selec- 
tion of locally produced products. With or without the common 
tariff, Guyana was far from becoming a major regional supplier 
of manufactured goods in the early 1990s. Regional integration 
was less important than the prospect of renewed economic progress 
at home. 

The best sources of up-to-date information on Guyana's small 
economy are British publications: the Financial Times, South, the 
Economist, and surveys by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The 
United States Embassy in Georgetown provides annual summaries 
of economic activity in the Foreign Economic Trends Report and the 
Investment Climate Statement. Useful, but difficult to obtain in the 
United States, are newspapers and periodicals published in Guyana, 



105 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



the Guyana Chronicle, Guyana Business, and the Stabroek News. Two 
excellent background readings on Guyana's economy are DeLisle 
Worrell's "The Impoverishment of Guyana," and Clive Y. 
Thomas's "Foreign Currency Black Markets: Lessons from 
Guyana." A historical perspective on labor issues is provided in 
William L. Cumiford's "Guyana," part of an excellent book on 
labor in Latin America. (For further information and complete ci- 
tations, see Bibliography.) 



106 



Chapter 4. Guyana: Government and Politics 



National Assembly building in Georgetown 



GUYANA IS OSTENSIBLY a parliamentary-style democracy 
with a constitution, a National Assembly, a multiparty system, elec- 
tions, a president chosen by the majority party, a minority leader, 
and a judicial system based on common law. Despite its democratic 
institutions, independent Guyana has seen more than two decades 
of one-party rule and strongman politics, perpetuated by manipu- 
lation, racially based voting patterns, and the disenfranchisement 
of the Guyanese people. 

Since 1964 when People's National Congress (PNC) leader Lin- 
den Forbes Burnham came to power, Burnham, his successor Hugh 
Desmond Hoyte, and the PNC have dominated the politics of 
Guyana. Although Burnham paid lip service to an ambitious po- 
litical and economic experiment, cooperative socialism, which was 
to develop Guyana to the benefit of all Guyanese, his paramount 
concern seemed to be the preservation and enhancement of his own 
political power. Burnham's true agenda became apparent in 1974, 
when he announced the subordination of all other institutions in 
Guyana to the PNC. The late 1970s and early 1980s increasingly 
saw the government system function primarily to benefit Burnham 
and his party. 

After Burnham's death in 1985, the administration of Desmond 
Hoyte abandoned many of the authoritarian policies of Hoyte 's 
predecessor. The new president chose to work largely within the 
framework of the government, tolerated an opposition press, and 
attempted to downplay the significance of rigid racial political blocs. 
Whether these moves represented a strengthening of democracy 
in Guyana or merely a tactical move motivated by economic hard- 
ship remained to be determined. 

Constitutional Background 

Preindependence Constitutions 

Guyana's complex constitutional history provides a useful means 
of understanding the conflict between local interests and those of 
Britain, the long-time colonial power. The colony's first constitu- 
tion, the Concept Plan of Redress, was promulgated under Dutch 
rule in 1 792 and remained in effect with modifications under Brit- 
ish administration until 1928. Although revised considerably over 
the years, the Concept Plan of Redress provided for a governor 



109 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

appointed by the colonial power and for a Court of Policy that 
evolved into the colony's legislature. Reforms throughout the 
nineteenth century gradually broadened the electoral franchise and 
lessened the power of the planters in the colonial government (see 
Transition to British Rule, ch. 1). 

As a result of financial difficulties in the 1920s and conflict be- 
tween the established sugar planters and new rice and bauxite 
producers, the British government promulgated a new constitu- 
tion making British Guiana a crown colony (see Glossary). The 
Court of Policy was replaced by a Legislative Council with thirty 
members (sixteen appointed and fourteen elected), and executive 
power was placed in the hands of a governor appointed by offi- 
cials in London. Modifications throughout the 1930s and 1940s 
made the majority of members of the Legislative Council subject 
to popular election and further broadened the franchise (see Polit- 
ical and Social Changes in the 1900s, ch. 1). 

The formation of British Guiana's first major political party in 
1950 and growing pressure for independence again forced the British 
to overhaul the political framework. A royal commission proposed 
a new constitution that would provide for a bicameral legislature 
consisting of a lower House of Assembly and an upper State Coun- 
cil, a governor appointed by the British, and seven ministers ap- 
pointed by the House of Assembly. This constitution was put into 
effect in early 1953. The electoral success of self-proclaimed Marxist- 
Leninist Cheddi Jagan and his leftist People's Progressive Party 
(PPP) in the April 1953 elections frightened the colonial authori- 
ties. After the new legislature passed a controversial labor bill and 
pressed for independence, the British suspended the constitution 
in October 1953 and put in place an interim government whose 
members were chosen entirely by British authorities (see The PPP's 
First Government, 1953, ch. 1). 

New elections were held in 1957 to choose a majority of mem- 
bers in the new Legislative Council; the rest of the members were 
chosen by the governor. During its four-year tenure, this govern- 
ment set up a committee to make recommendations on yet another 
constitution. The committee proposed that a new government be 
formed with full internal autonomy (see The Second PPP Govern- 
ment, 1957-61, and Racial Politics, ch. 1). Only defense and ex- 
ternal affairs would be managed by the British. 

In 1961 the new constitution went into effect. The legislature 
was bicameral: the lower house, a thirty-five-member Legislative 
Assembly, consisted entirely of elected officials; and the upper 
house, the thirteen-member Senate, consisted entirely of appoin- 
tees. The prime minister, who was chosen by the party with a 



110 



Guyana: Government and Politics 



majority of votes in the Legislative Assembly, held the most power- 
ful executive post. Assisting the prime minister were various other 
ministers. The governor remained the titular head of state. The 
PPP won the elections of August 1961 , and Jagan was named prime 
minister. 

Labor strife and civil disturbances were widespread in 1962 and 
1963. In an effort to quell the unrest, the British colonial secretary 
declared a state of emergency and proposed modifying the consti- 
tution to provide for a unicameral fifty-three-member National As- 
sembly and proportional representation. The proposal was adopted, 
and elections were set for 1964. These elections brought to power 
a new coalition government headed by the PNC. However, the 
PPP administration refused to step down. Not until a constitutional 
amendment was enacted empowering the governor to dismiss the 
National Assembly was the old government removed from power 
(see PPP Reelection and Debacle, ch. 1). 

Independence Constitution 

Independent Guyana's first constitution (a modified version of 
the 1961 constitution) took effect on the first day of independence, 
May 26, 1966. It reaffirmed the principle that Guyana was a 
democratic state founded on the rule of law. The titular head of 
the country was the British monarch, represented in Guyana by 
the governor general, who served in a largely ceremonial capaci- 
ty. Real executive power rested in the prime minister, appointed 
by the majority party in the unicameral fifty-three-member Na- 
tional Assembly, and his ministers. The first postindependence elec- 
tions, conducted in 1968, confirmed the dominant role of the PNC 
and its leader, Forbes Burnham (see Burnham in Power, ch. 1). 

On February 23, 1970, the Burnham government proclaimed 
the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. This move had both eco- 
nomic and political ramifications. The government argued that the 
country's many resources had been controlled by foreign capitalists 
and that organizing the population into cooperatives would pro- 
vide the best path to development. 

The 1970 proclamation severed Guyana's last significant con- 
stitutional tie to Britain. The governor general, heretofore the 
ceremonial head of state, was replaced by a president, also a 
ceremonial figure. Arthur Chung, a Chinese-Guyanese, was the 
country's first president (see The Cooperative Republic, ch. 1). 

Although its ties to the British monarch were broken, Guyana 
remained within the Commonwealth of Nations (see Appendix B). 
Membership in the Commonwealth allowed Guyana to reap the 
benefits of access to markets in Britain and to retain some of the 



111 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

defense arrangements that Britain offered its former colonies. In 
particular, the British defense umbrella was seen as a deterrent to 
Venezuelan claims on Guyanese territory (see Relations with 
Venezuela, this ch.; Guyana- Venezuela Dispute, ch. 5). 

Constitution of 1980 

As Burnham consolidated his control over Guyanese politics 
throughout the 1970s, he began to push for changes in the consti- 
tution that would muffle opposition. He and his colleagues argued 
that the changes were necessary to govern in the best interest of 
the people, free of opposition interference. By the late 1970s, the 
government and the legislature were PNC -dominated, and the party 
had declared its hegemony over the civil service, the military, the 
judiciary, the economic sector, and all other segments of Guyanese 
society. Burnham called the 1966 constitution inadequate and the 
product of British conservatism. Nationalization of private enter- 
prise was to be the first step in revamping a system that Burnham 
felt had been designed to protect private property at the expense 
of the masses. 

Two of the principal architects of the new constitution were the 
minister of justice and attorney general, Mohammed Shahabbud- 
deen, and Hugh Desmond Hoyte, the minister of economic plan- 
ning. Attorney General Shahabbuddeen was given the task of selling 
the new constitution to the National Assembly and the people. He 
decried the 1966 constitution as a capitalist document that supported 
a national economy based on exports and the laws of supply and 
demand. He argued that the constitution safeguarded the acquisi- 
tions of the rich and privileged and did not significantly advance 
the role of the people in the political process. 

The constitution of 1980, promulgated in October of that year, 
reaffirmed Guyana's status as a cooperative republic within the 
Commonwealth. It defines a cooperative republic as having the 
following attributes: political and economic independence, state 
ownership of the means of production, a citizenry organized into 
groups such as cooperatives and trade unions, and an economy 
run on the basis of national economic planning. The constitution 
states that the country is a democratic and secular state in transi- 
tion from capitalism to socialism and that the constitution is the 
highest law in the country, with precedence over all other laws. 
The constitution guarantees freedom of religion, speech, associa- 
tion, and movement, and prohibits discrimination. It also grants 
every Guyanese citizen the right to work, to obtain a free educa- 
tion and free medical care, and to own personal property; it also 
guarantees equal pay for women. However, freedom of expression 



112 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

and other political rights are limited by national interests and the 
state's duty to ensure fairness in the dissemination of information 
to the public. Power is distributed among five "Supreme Organs 
of Democratic Power": the executive president, the cabinet, the 
National Assembly, the National Congress of Local Democratic 
Organs, and the Supreme Congress of the People, a special deliber- 
ative body consisting of the National Assembly in joint session with 
the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs. Of these five 
divisions of government, the executive president in practice has 
almost unlimited powers (see fig. 6). 

The important constitutional changes brought about by the 1980 
document were mostly political: the concentration of power in the 
position of executive president and the creation of local party or- 
ganizations to ensure Burnham's control over the PNC and, in 
turn, the party's control over the people. The constitution's eco- 
nomic goals were more posture than substance. The call for na- 
tionalization of major industries with just compensation was a moot 
point, given that 80 percent of the economy was already in the 
government's hands by 1976. The remaining 20 percent was owned 
by Guyanese entrepreneurs. 

Government Institutions 

Executive 

The office of executive president is by far the most powerful po- 
sition in Guyana. The executive president is head of state and com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces. He or she has the power to 
veto any bill passed in the National Assembly and can dissolve the 
assembly if a veto is overridden. 

Elected to a term not to exceed five years concurrent with the 
term of the incumbent National Assembly, the executive president 
is the nominee of the party with the largest number of votes in the 
assembly. There is no limit on the number of times the executive 
president may be reelected. Grounds for removal from office in- 
clude inability to function for medical reasons, violations of the 
constitution as determined by a two-thirds vote of the National As- 
sembly, and findings of gross misconduct by vote of three-quarters 
of the National Assembly. If a motion to remove the executive presi- 
dent from office passes the National Assembly, he or she has three 
days to vacate the office or dissolve the legislature. The executive 
president may postpone national elections in one-year increments 
for up to five years. 

113 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



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114 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

The executive president appoints several vice presidents, a prime 
minister, and various other ministers. This group is known collec- 
tively as the cabinet. Although the prime minister and other vice 
presidents must be selected from the elected members of the Na- 
tional Assembly, other cabinet ministers need not hold an elective 
post. The number of vice presidents and ministers varies. In 1990 
there were two vice presidents and eight ministers. The executive 
president may dismiss all cabinet members at will. 

Legislature 

The sixty-five-member unicameral National Assembly consti- 
tutes Guyana's legislative branch. Fifty-three members are directly 
elected though a system of proportional representation, ten mem- 
bers are elected by the regional democratic councils (local legisla- 
tive bodies for each region), and two members come from the 
Supreme Congress of the People (a special national-level advisory 
group). The National Assembly has the power to pass bills and 
constitutional amendments, which are then sent to the executive 
president for approval. 

The National Assembly has six months to override the presiden- 
tial veto of a bill. Following an override, the executive president 
has the authority to dissolve the assembly within twenty-one days 
and call for new elections. President Burnham used this authority 
to stifle parliamentary opposition during his administration. 

The 1980 constitution provides for the executive president to ap- 
point the minority leader, formerly known as the leader of the op- 
position. The minority leader must be the elected member of the 
National Assembly, who, in the president's judgment, is best able 
to lead the opposition members of the National Assembly. Nam- 
ing his own chief opponent was yet another tool President Burn- 
ham used to control the government apparatus. 

Judiciary 

Vestiges of a Dutch legal system remain, particularly in the area 
of land tenure. However, the common law of Britain is the basis 
for the legal system of Guyana. The judiciary consists of a magis- 
trate's court for each of the ten regions and a Supreme Court con- 
sisting of a High Court and a Court of Appeal. The 1980 
constitution established the judiciary as an independent branch of 
the government with the right of judicial review of legislative and 
executive acts. 

The constitution secures the tenure of judicial officers by prescrib- 
ing their age of retirement (sixty-two or sixty-five), guaranteeing 
their terms and conditions of service, and preventing their removal 



115 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

from office except for reasons of inability or misconduct established 
by means of an elaborate judicial procedure. These constitutional 
arrangements are supplemented by statutory provisions that es- 
tablish a hierarchy of courts through which the individual under 
scrutiny may secure enforcement of his civil and political rights. 

The lower courts, known as magistrates' courts, have jurisdic- 
tion in criminal cases and civil suits involving small claims. The 
High Court has general jurisdiction in both civil and criminal mat- 
ters. Criminal cases are always tried by a jury of twelve persons. 
Appeals of High Court rulings go to the Court of Appeal. 

Any person in Guyana has the right to bring charges involving 
a breach of criminal law. In practice, the police as the official law 
enforcement body generally institute and undertake criminal prose- 
cutions. Traditionally, the attorney general (a cabinet-level minister) 
exercises supervisory authority over all criminal prosecutions. 

The executive president appoints all judges, with the exception 
of the chancellor of the High Court (the head of the judiciary), the 
chief justice of the Court of Appeal, and the chief magistrate. The 
Judicial Service Commission appoints these top three judges; 
however, the commission itself is selected by the president. Although 
selection of the members of the Judicial Service Commission is sup- 
posed to be made with opposition input, in fact the opposition has 
no say injudicial appointments. Observers have noted that trials 
are generally fair, but if a guilty verdict is reached, the executive 
president often drops strong hints concerning the magnitude of the 
sentence he expects for crimes that have received national publicity. 

Other National Institutions 

The National Congress of Local Democratic Organs is a national 
body charged with representing the interests of local government. 
Members of this body are drawn from the regional governments. 
Each Regional Democratic Council elects two members to sit on 
the national congress. The constitution also provides for members 
of other local councils to elect members; however, no other local 
bodies have been created by the central government. The nation- 
al congress's role is advisory. 

The members of the National Assembly, together with all the 
members of the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, 
form the Supreme Congress of the People. The supreme congress 
meets at times designated by the executive president to make recom- 
mendations to him or her on matters of public interest. It may be 
dissolved by the executive president by proclamation and is auto- 
matically dismissed if the executive president dissolves the National 
Assembly. 



116 



President Hugh Desmond Hoyte with President George Bush, Washington, 1989 

Courtesy The White House (Michael Sargent) 

Local Government 

The 1980 constitution divides Guyana into ten regions, each hav- 
ing a Regional Democratic Council and a regional chairman. 
Regional councillors serve five-year terms concurrent with the term 
of the National Assembly, and the councillors of every region elect 
from among themselves one member to sit in the National Assem- 
bly and two members to sit in the National Congress of Local 
Democratic Organs. The executive president may suspend or dis- 
solve any Regional Democratic Council at will. The system of lo- 
cal governments was designed to decentralize the government and 
place greater political power in the hands of the people. Resistance 
by the president to sharing power and the regional governments' 
fear of dismissal without recourse have, in effect, severely limited 
the capability of regional government to enact policy. 

Six towns in Guyana are incorporated: Georgetown, Corriver- 
ton, Linden, New Amsterdam, Bartica, and Anna Regina, north- 
west of the mouth of the Essequibo River. Each town has a mayor 
and town council, which are responsible for maintenance of the 
municipality. However, city officials lack a political mandate or 
any real power beyond the exercise of municipal duties and are 
usually political appointees of the PNC. 



117 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 
Civil Service 

The civil service is not a neutral body in the traditional British 
sense. Civil servants are regarded as servants of both the govern- 
ment and the PNC . Opposition to the PNC usually results in the 
loss of the incumbent's job because the executive president has 
authority to dismiss anyone whose actions he or she deems con- 
trary to national or party interest. Fear of dismissal and consequent- 
ly being blacklisted is one of the primary reasons large numbers 
of Guyanese professionals emigrated in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. 

Political Dynamics 

Electoral Process 

The constitution provides for free elections, a secret ballot, and 
universal suffrage for citizens over the age of eighteen. Voting for 
the National Assembly is indirect, with voters casting ballots for 
lists of candidates rather than for individuals. Seats are then ap- 
portioned by an Elections Commission on the basis of the percen- 
tage each list receives. There is no minimum percentage required 
for a party to win a seat in the assembly. National elections must 
be held if the executive president dissolves the National Assembly 
or no more than five years after a new assembly has been elected. 
However, the constitution of 1980 allows the executive president 
to postpone national elections in one-year increments for up to five 
years. 

Despite constitutional guarantees of fair elections, every elec- 
tion since the early 1960s has been tainted by charges of fraud. 
The most blatant alleged abuse has concerned the votes of expatriate 
Guyanese. The electoral system allows overseas Guyanese to vote. 
The number of overseas Guyanese has been said to be inflated, 
however, and returns have always heavily favored the PNC. Vot- 
ing districts have been gerrymandered, and the army frequently 
has been accused of tampering with ballot boxes and breaking up 
opposition rallies (see Involvement in Political Affairs, ch. 5). 

Electoral fraud appeared to diminish during the Hoyte adminis- 
tration. Opposition groups continued to pressure the government 
to reform the electoral process. In 1991 the executive president 
agreed to require the use of metal ballot boxes that are less easily 
tampered with and to permit the Elections Commission to operate 
more freely. The commission was given the task of producing a 
new voter list, but by 1991 had failed to do so, prompting the presi- 
dent to declare a state of emergency and postpone national elections. 



118 






?v/(^t *: Jet, 



will Never Cease 



Billboard promoting progress and the PNC 
Courtesy Inter-American Development Bank (David Mangurian) 



Political Parties 

People's National Congress 

The PNC was formed in 1957 when Forbes Burnham broke away 
from the PPP. The PNC represents the country's Afro-Guyanese 
community and many of Guyana's intellectuals. The PNC was the 
main partner in the coalition government formed in 1 964 and has 
been the outright winner of every election held since then. The 
party held fifty-three seats after the 1980 elections. After the 1985 
elections, the PNC held fifty-four seats in the National Assembly — 
forty-two elected seats and all of the twelve appointed seats (see 
table 8, Appendix A). The party came under the leadership of Des- 
mond Hoyte following the death of Forbes Burnham in 1985 (see 
Independence and the Burnham Era, ch. 1). 

Ideologically, the PNC has swung from socialism to middle-of- 
the-road capitalism several times. Although Burnham professed 
leftist views, the party originally adopted a procapitalist policy as 
an alternative to the PPP's socialism and to attract members of 
the Afro-Guyanese middle class. In the mid-1970s, Burnham stated 
that the PNC was socialist and committed to the nationalization of 
foreign-owned businesses and to government control of the economy. 



119 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

In the late 1980s, Executive President Hoyte declared that his 
predecessor's policies had bankrupted the country and that the PNC 
would again encourage private investment. 

People's Progressive Party 

Guyana's oldest political party, the PPP, was founded in 1950 
by Cheddi Jagan as a means to push for independence. After the 
1961 elections, however, the party came to represent almost ex- 
clusively the Indo-Guyanese community. A long-time Marxist- 
Leninist, Jagan declared in 1969 that the PPP was a communist 
party and advocated state ownership of all industry. The PPP won 
elections in 1953, 1957, and 1961, but its leftist policies led to in- 
ternal unrest and opposition from the British colonial authorities 
(see Preindependence Government, 1953-66, ch. 1). The PPP had 
ten National Assembly seats after the 1980 election and in the 1985 
elections won eight seats. 

Other Political Groups 

Concerned that the PPP had been coopted by the more conser- 
vative PNC in the early 1970s, a multiethnic group of politicians 
and intellectuals formed the Working People's Alliance (WPA) in 
1973. Originally a loose organization, the WPA became a formal 
political party in 1979 after three of its leaders were imprisoned 
by the Burnham government. Its membership is drawn from the 
Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese communities, and the party 
advocates moderately leftist policies. The WPA refused to partici- 
pate in the 1980 elections, charging that they would be rigged, but 
won one seat in the 1985 elections. 

A small conservative party, the United Force (UF) was found- 
ed in 1960 by a wealthy Portuguese businessman to represent 
Guyana's business community. It also draws support from 
Guyana's Roman Catholic Church and the small Portuguese, 
Chinese, and Amerindian populations. The party won two seats 
in both the 1980 and 1985 elections. 

After the 1985 elections, five parties — the PPP, the WPA, the small 
Democratic Labour Movement, the People's Democratic Movement, 
and the National Democratic Front — formed the Patriotic Coalition 
for Democracy (PCD). The PCD promised to push for fair elec- 
tions and oppose PNC manipulation of the electoral process. 

Interest Groups 

Trade Unions 

Trade unions traditionally have played a major role in Guyana's 



120 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

political life. They began to emerge when Hubert Nathaniel Critch- 
low mobilized waterfront workers and formed the nation's first labor 
union, The British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU), in 1917. Since 
then, union members have become a significant segment of the 
Guyanese working class. It was from the trade unions that the PPP 
and PNC evolved and drew their strength. 

Most union members work in the public sector, and trade un- 
ions historically have had close ties to the ruling government. Many 
of the twenty-four unions in the Trades Union Congress (TUC), 
the main umbrella group for trade unions in Guyana, are formal- 
ly affiliated with the PNC . Unions have the right to choose their 
own leaders freely, but in practice the ruling party has significant 
influence over union leadership. Government officials are often also 
union leaders. For instance, President Hoyte has been named the 
honorary president of one of the member unions of the TUC. 

Government-labor relations have been marred by the PNC's at- 
tempts to control and silence the unions. This control initially was 
secured through the dominance of the Manpower Citizens Associ- 
ation, a pro-PNC union. When the Guyana Agricultural and 
General Workers' Union (GAWU) entered the TUC in 1976, the 
size of the GAWU's membership (about 15,000) meant that it would 
be the largest union in the TUC, a status that would entitle it to 
the largest number of delegates. The PNC quickly contrived a sys- 
tem whereby the GAWU ended up with far fewer delegates than 
it had previously been entitled to, and as such the TUC remained 
under PNC control. From 1982 to 1984, Minister of Labour Ken- 
neth Denny and Minister of Finance Salim Salahuddin held very 
senior posts in the TUC simultaneously with their ministerial port- 
folios. In March 1984, the National Assembly passed the Labour 
Amendment Act, which stipulated that the TUC would henceforth 
be the only forum through which organized labor could bargain. 

The Labour Amendment Act clearly was designed to stifle labor 
opposition to government policies. The law backfired, however, 
because reaction to it led to the ouster of the PNC -controlled labor 
leadership, which was replaced by leaders professing to be more 
independent. The main resistance to the PNC's control of the TUC 
came from a seven-union opposition bloc within the TUC , head- 
ed by the GAWU. Many unions, including some of the PNC- 
affiliated ones, began to criticize the government. 

In the 1984 TUC elections, the seven-member reform coalition 
made significant inroads. The coalition candidate for TUC presi- 
dent ran against the PNC candidate and won. The changes in union 
leadership were a clear indication of the breadth of dissatisfaction 
with the PNC's efforts to roll back union power, and with Guyana's 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

rapidly deteriorating economy. The seven disaffected unions left 
the TUC and in 1988 formed the Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions of Guyana (FITUG). 

Media 

The 1980 constitution guarantees freedom of the press, but the 
government owns the nation's largest publication and exercises in- 
direct control over other newspapers by controlling the importa- 
tion of newsprint. Administrations have also stifled opposition by 
making frequent charges of libel against the editors of opposition 
newspapers. The newspaper with the largest circulation is the 
government-owned Guyana Chronicle. The PNC's New Nation has 
the second highest circulation. Smaller newspapers include the 
PPP ' s Mirror, the independent Stabroek News, and the Catholic Stan- 
dard, published by the Roman Catholic Church. 

The government's influence over the press has lessened, and in- 
creased criticism has been allowed under President Hoyte. The op- 
position Stabroek News, which started out as a weekly, increased 
publication to six times a week in 1991 . It has become widely regard- 
ed as the only reliable and nonpartisan source of news in Guyana. 
At about the same time the Stabroek News expanded operations, the 
PPP's Mirror was allowed to import new presses and increase its 
size from four to sixteen pages per issue. 

Religious Organizations 

At different times and from different perspectives, the churches 
of Guyana have been a source of opposition to government poli- 
cy. In the 1950s, the Christian churches were vocal opponents of 
Jagan and the PPP's Marxism. These churches also drew interna- 
tional attention with their criticisms of the Burnham government 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 

Much of the criticism of the national government has come from 
the Guyana Council of Churches (GCC), an umbrella organiza- 
tion of sixteen major Christian denominations. Anglicans and Ro- 
man Catholics, confident of foreign support for their positions, often 
have taken the lead. Some of the smaller churches with ties to the 
PNC have been instrumental in getting the GCC to soften its criti- 
cism. One sect, the House of Israel, has been reported to have close 
ties to the PNC (see Cults, ch. 2). The sect's members were ac- 
cused of disrupting a 1985 meeting of the GCC. 

Hindu and Muslim religious organizations traditionally have 
played almost no political role in Guyana. In contrast to many 
Christian organizations, which receive support from adherents 
abroad, Hindu and Muslim leaders rely strictly on a local base. 



122 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

Religious leaders often are dependent on local political bosses, and 
the PNC has successfully recruited many Hindu and Muslim leaders 
into party organizations. 

Other Groups 

The long-standing policy of dividing constituencies into ethnic 
elements has prevented the establishment of a strong independent 
business organization. Fear of the Marxist PPP caused many 
middle-class Afro-Guyanese to support the PNC , beginning in the 
1960s. Members of the business community who oppose govern- 
ment policy often do so through participation in the UF. 

A movement began in the 1940s to press for improvement in 
socioeconomic conditions for women. The first formal women's 
organization was headed by Janet Jagan, wife of Cheddi Jagan, 
but it soon became merely an arm of Jagan 's PPP. There is no 
national women's organization that spans ethnic groups. Rather, 
a women's group functions as part of the PPP, and a Women's 
Affairs Bureau of the ruling government is associated with the PNC . 

Foreign Relations 

The international relations of the former British colony have been 
oriented toward the English-speaking world and guided by ideo- 
logical principles. Except for those countries on Guyana's borders, 
Latin America is largely ignored. Independent Guyana's foreign 
policy has had five predominant themes: political nonalignment, 
support for leftist causes worldwide, promotion of economic unity 
in the English-speaking Caribbean, opposition to apartheid, and 
protection of Guyanese territorial integrity in the resolution of the 
border disputes with Venezuela and Suriname. 

Although upholding the principal foreign policy themes, the PNC 
has adroitly shifted emphasis to reflect changes in domestic poli- 
cy. To consolidate power against the leftist PPP, PNC foreign policy 
from 1964 to 1969 was pro-Western. Confident of its domestic pow- 
er base from 1970 to 1985, the government was nonaligned in in- 
ternational affairs, with strong support for less-developed countries 
and socialist causes. Guyana established diplomatic ties and sym- 
bolic economic ties with the communist governments in Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Since Hoyte's accession to 
the presidency in 1985, foreign policy has again been less support- 
ive of leftist causes, in part to obtain backing for Hoyte's economic 
programs from Western nations. 

Relations with the United States 

Guyana's relations with the United States have ranged from 



123 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

cordial to cool. For the United States, Burnham's policies from 
1964 to 1969 were nonthreatening. Burnham assured the United 
States that he had no intention of pursuing Jagan-style socialism 
or of nationalizing foreign -owned industries. The United States 
felt there was little chance of Guyana becoming a second Cuba. 

Relations between the two nations cooled significantiy after 1969, 
when Burnham began to support socialism both domestically and 
internationally. He established the cooperative republic in 1970 
and nationalized the sugar and bauxite industries in the mid-1970s. 
Guyana also became active in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). 
Burnham attended the NAM conference in Zambia in 1970 and 
hosted the conference in Georgetown in 1972. In 1975 the United 
States accused Guyana of allowing Timehri Airport to be used as 
a refueling stop for planes transporting Cuban troops to Angola. 
United States aid to Guyana virtually stopped, and acrimonious 
rhetoric emanated from both sides. 

Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-81), 
United States-Guyana relations improved somewhat. The United 
States ambassador to the United Nations (UN) told the Guyanese 
government that the region's leaders could expect greater under- 
standing of their alternative development strategies from the Carter 
administration. When the assistant secretary of state said that the 
United States did not feel threatened by Guyana's political 
philosophy, it seemed that the two countries had reached an un- 
derstanding. This rapprochement led to resumption of United States 
aid to Guyana. 

Relations cooled again with the succession of Ronald Reagan 
to the United States presidency in 1981. United States aid to 
Guyana was again halted, and Guyana later was excluded from 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative (see Appendix D). Relations reached 
their lowest point after the United States intervened in Grenada 
in 1983. Burnham had ties to Grenada's New Jewel Movement 
and was vocal in his opposition to the intervention. He criticized 
the United States and chastised fellow regional leaders who sup- 
ported intervention in a speech at the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom — see Appendix C). 

After Burnham's death in 1985, United States-Guyanese rela- 
tions improved under the more market-oriented administration of 
President Hoyte. The new president welcomed Western aid and 
investment, and the government stopped its anticapitalist, anti- 
Western, and socialist rhetoric. The United States responded by 
resuming wheat shipments in 1986. Frictions remained over the 
Guyanese electoral process, however. 



124 



Guyana: Government and Politics 



Relations with Venezuela 

Relations between Guyana and Venezuela have been driven by 
a persistent border dispute (see fig. 7). Venezuela's claim to a 
mineral-rich five-eighths of Guyana's total land mass dates back 
to the early nineteenth century (see Origins of the Border Dispute 
with Venezuela, ch. 1). The dispute was considered settled by ar- 
bitration in 1899. Decades later a memo written by a lawyer in- 
volved in the arbitration and published posthumously indicated that 
the tribunal president had coerced several members into assenting 
to the final decision. In 1962 Venezuela declared that it would no 
longer abide by the 1899 arbitration on the grounds of this new 
information. 

On February 17, 1966, representatives of Britain, Guyana, and 
Venezuela signed an agreement in Geneva that established a border 
commission consisting of two Guyanese and two Venezuelans. The 
commission failed to reach an agreement, but both countries agreed 
to resolve their dispute by peaceful means as stipulated in Article 
33 of the United Nations Charter. In the meantime, relations re- 
mained tense. In February 1967, Venezuela vetoed Guyana's bid 
to become a member of the Organization of American States (OAS). 
The Venezuelan government also attempted to sabotage Guyana's 
development plans for the disputed region by letting it be known 
to would-be foreign investors that it did not recognize Guyanese 
jurisdiction. 

With Venezuelan backing, several prominent ranching families 
and Amerindian followers in the southern part of the disputed region 
began an uprising. The rebels launched a surprise attack on the 
police outpost at Lethem on January 2, 1969, and several police- 
men were killed. The government flew police and military forces 
to the region with orders to raze everything. Only livestock and 
cattie were spared. The Venezuelan government admitted that some 
of the Guyanese insurgents had received training in Venezuela and 
that it would grant refuge to the rebels. Guyana protested this ac- 
tion in the UN. 

Venezuela found itself diplomatically isolated, unable even to 
gain the support of its neighbors in Latin America. Pressure on 
Venezuela to resolve the dispute led to the Protocol of Port-of- Spain, 
whereby in 1970 Guyana and Venezuela agreed to a twelve-year 
moratorium on the dispute. The protocol would be automatically 
renewed unless either party gave notice of its intention to do 
otherwise. 

In 1981 the Venezuelan president, Luis Hererra C ampins, an- 
nounced that Venezuela would not renew the protocol. Relations 



125 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 




ilii! 

VENEZU 





1 



A 



o 

% 



\\\\ 



Bi 



Area claimed by 
Venezuela 

Area claimed by 
Suriname 

International 
boundary 

International 
boundary in dispute 



® National capital 

25 50 75 Kilometers 



25 



50 




Figure 7. Guyana: Border Disputes 



again grew tense. Guyana's government accused Venezuela of 
massing troops near their common border to invade Guyana. The 
Venezuelan government denied this accusation, stating that its 
troops merely were involved in regular maneuvers. The subsequent 
Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands (called the Malvinas by 
Argentina) and the 1983 United States intervention in Grenada 
were heavily criticized by the Guyanese government, which feared 



126 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

that a precedent had been set for Venezuela to resolve its territori- 
al grievance by force. 

In the late 1980s with different administrations in both coun- 
tries, relations between Venezuela and Guyana improved. Rela- 
tions became so cordial, in fact, that Venezuela sponsored Guyana's 
bid for OAS membership in 1990. Although the territorial issue 
remained unresolved, there seemed little imminent threat of a 
Venezuelan invasion. 

Relations with Brazil 

Traditionally, relations between Guyana and Brazil have been 
good. Brazil has provided small amounts of military assistance to 
Guyana in the form of jungle warfare training and logistical 
materiel. Brazil's military assistance to Guyana has been contin- 
gent on Guyana's refusal of any military aid from Cuba. In 1975 
United States allegations that Guyana was allowing Cuban troops 
en route to the Angolan civil war to refuel in Guyana made the 
Brazilian government nervous, and it briefly undertook military 
maneuvers on its border with Guyana. 

In the 1960s, both governments were anxious to complete a high- 
way that would link the Brazilian city of Manaus to Georgetown. 
Completion of the highway would afford Brazil easy access to an 
Atlantic port from its northernmost states, and Guyana would gain 
direct access to Brazilian markets. In 1971 Brazil offered Guyana 
technical assistance to complete the Guyanese portion from Lethem 
to Georgetown. The offer was refused, however, and the road was 
not completed until the early 1990s. 

Relations with Suriname 

Guyana's relations with Suriname have at times been tense. Sur- 
iname has a territorial claim to a triangle of land between the New 
and Courantyne rivers in southeast Guyana. In 1969 Suriname 
sent troops into the disputed territory. They were quickly repelled 
by the Guyanese army. Although Suriname made no further at- 
tempts to take the territory by force, two issues continued to trou- 
ble relations (see Guyana-Suriname Dispute, ch. 5). The first was 
the forced repatriation of Guyanese living in Suriname. When Sur- 
iname 's economic decline began in 1980, Surinamese leader Colonel 
Desi Bouterse blamed Guyanese immigrants, many of whom were 
successful rice farmers. The second issue was the matter of fishing 
rights in the disputed territory. Both countries have periodically 
detained each other's fishermen and confiscated fishing boats on 
the Courantyne River. 



127 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Relations with Britain 

Despite Burnham's anti-Western rhetoric of the 1970s and early 
1980s, Guyana has attempted to maintain good relations with Brit- 
ain, in part to discourage Venezuelan territorial ambitions. Guyana 
remained in the Commonwealth of Nations after independence and 
has played an active role in Commonwealth affairs. Guyana strongly 
criticized the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and was 
a vocal supporter of Britain in the UN. 

Relations with the Commonwealth Caribbean 

Guyana under PNC administrations has consistently encouraged 
greater unity among the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
This policy began in 1961 and was in sharp contrast to the policies 
of the PPP in the 1950s. The Jagan government had refused to 
join the West Indies Federation because of Indo-Guyanese con- 
cerns about becoming an ethnic minority within the federation. 
In an independent Guyana, the Indo-Guyanese would be in the 
majority, and Jagan hoped that such an arrangement would se- 
cure political power for the Indo-Guyanese and the PPP. 

Under the PNC, the Guyanese government joined the Carib- 
bean Free Trade Association (Carifta) with Antigua and Barba- 
dos. By 1973 Carifta had become Caricom and had the expanded 
goal of fostering greater economic, social, and political unity among 
the member countries. Caricom 's headquarters were located in 
Georgetown, and in 1991 membership included all independent 
members of the English-speaking Caribbean and Belize. 

Despite a trend toward economic union since the 1960s, politi- 
cal relations between Guyana and the English-speaking Caribbe- 
an occasionally have been poor. Except for Jamaica and Grenada 
in the 1970s, all of the English-speaking Caribbean countries were 
pro- Western and precapitalist. This stance put them in direct con- 
flict with the often anti-Western, anticapitalist rhetoric of the 
Guyanese government. 

The low point in relations came after the United States interven- 
tion in Grenada. Burnham heavily criticized other Caribbean lead- 
ers for their support of the operation, especially Dominica's prime 
minister, Eugenia Charles, who played a leading role. The rift be- 
tween Burnham and the other Commonwealth leaders grew so great 
that it threatened the future of Caricom. 

After Burnham's death in 1985, President Hoyte moved quick- 
ly to repair relations. At a well-publicized meeting of Caricom heads 
of government in 1986, Hoyte posed for a picture with the other 
leaders. Relations generally were good after that conference. 



128 



Guyana: Government and Politics 

Relations with Communist Countries 

Guyana enjoyed close relations with Cuba in the 1970s and ear- 
ly 1980s. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1972, 
and Cuba agreed to provide medical supplies, doctors, and medi- 
cal training to Guyana. President Burnham flew with Fidel Cas- 
tro Ruz in Castro's airplane to the NAM conference in Algiers 
in 1973. Castro made an official state visit to Guyana in August 
1973, and Burnham reciprocated in April 1975, when he was deco- 
rated with the Jose Marti National Order, Cuba's highest honor. 
After the United States intervention in Grenada, Burnham dis- 
tanced himself somewhat from Cuba, fearing United States inter- 
vention in Guyana. Under Hoyte's administration, relations with 
Cuba have been cordial but not close. 

Relations with other communist countries were close under Burn- 
ham. Diplomatic relations with China were established in June 
1972. In 1975 China agreed to provide interest-free loans to Guyana 
and to import Guyanese bauxite and sugar. In 1976 the Soviet Un- 
ion appointed a resident ambassador to Georgetown. Burnham paid 
official state visits to Bulgaria and China in 1983 to seek increased 
economic aid. 

The rapidly changing world of the 1990s provided numerous 
challenges for the Guyanese government. Two decades of rule by 
the Burnham administration had resulted in a profound weaken- 
ing of the country's democratic process and close ties with socialist 
countries, punctuated by frequent vocal support for leftist causes 
around the world. Driven by the need to obtain financial support 
from the West to rejuvenate a collapsed economy, Burnham' s suc- 
cessor, Desmond Hoyte, began loosening ties with socialist regimes 
and downplaying leftist rhetoric. The fall of communism in the early 
1990s only accelerated this trend. Financial help and closer rela- 
tions with the West, particularly the United States, however, came 
with a price: free-market reforms and genuine respect for Guyana's 
democratic institutions. In 1992 it remained to be seen whether 
Guyana had undergone merely another tactical policy shift as an 
expedient or was truly set on a path of democracy. 

* * * 

The literature on Guyanese politics remains relatively limited 
and perhaps too narrowly focused. The dysfunctional nature of 
modern Guyanese governance has generated studies of race rela- 
tions, ideology, and political economy. Lacking are analyses of the 



129 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

post-Burnham period and, most notably, of the absence of progress 
toward democratization since the late 1980s. 

The most current and balanced book-length overview is Chaitram 
Singh's Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society, a work whose very 
title is suggestive of the environment the author addresses. In the 
same vein, but a bit older and less reliable, is Guyana: Politics, Eco- 
nomics and Society, by Henry B. Jeffrey and Colin Baber. In addi- 
tion to the limited journal literature, any reader interested in 
Guyanese politics should consult, with care, a number of classics, 
including Leo A. Despres's Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics 
in Guyana and The West on Trial by Cheddi Jagan, a fixture on the 
nation's political scene for almost half a century. Tying many ele- 
ments together is Journey to Nowhere: A New World Tragedy, by well- 
known author Shiva Naipaul. 

The nation's foreign relations are to a degree covered by the 
above titles. Guyana's nonaligned foreign policy and the border 
dispute with Venezuela have been the two key subjects. There is 
little to work with, except for a few journal articles. One exception 
is The Venezuela- Guyanese Border Dispute by Jacqueline Anne 
Braveboy- Wagner. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



130 



Chapter 5. Guyana: National Security 



Member of the Guyana Defence Force 



THE GUYANA DEFENCE FORCE (GDF) has been Guyana's 
primary defense service since independence was achieved in 1966. 
In 1991 the GDF, with a total active strength of only 1,700, was 
a unified service divided into land, sea, and air elements. The land 
element was by far the largest of the three, with approximately 1 ,400 
personnel. The Air Command counted 200 personnel; the Mari- 
time Corps, the naval element, had 100 members. The GDF was 
supplemented by the 2,000 member National Guard Service, a 
reserve unit. Besides the GDF, Guyana had two paramilitary or- 
ganizations: the 2,000-member Guyana People's Militia and the 
1,500-member Guyana National Service. 

Heavily politicized, Guyana's defense organizations were un- 
der the control of the leaders of the ruling People's National Con- 
gress (PNC). Troops were required to swear public allegiance to 
the PNC as well as to the nation. Guyana's racial politics affected 
its armed forces as well; the military was staffed almost entirely 
by Afro-Guyanese, the ethnic group most associated with the PNC. 

The principal role of the armed forces since independence has 
been to assure internal security, although the GDF has seen some 
minor action in the course of Guyana's persistent border disputes 
with two of its neighbors, Venezuela and Suriname. The internal 
security role overlapped with the duties of the Guyana Police Force, 
and the two organizations often worked together to intimidate op- 
position political groups and the Indo-Guyanese, the country's larg- 
est ethnic group, or to tamper with electoral counts. The police 
and the military were unable, however, to control a rising level 
of violent and petty crime in Georgetown, the nation's capital. 

The Armed Forces 

The Special Service Unit (SSU) began as a constabulary force 
in 1964. It became the Guyana Defence Force in 1965. Governor 
Richard Luyt created the SSU to aid the police in maintaining in- 
ternal order in British Guiana, as the country was then called. The 
colonial government's goal was for the SSU to evolve into Guyana's 
army after independence was granted. A British officer, Colonel 
Ronald Pope, aided by a British military instructional unit, or- 
ganized and trained the SSU. The Guyanese component of the 
SSU's officers and noncommissioned officers was drawn heavily 
from the Volunteer Force, a reserve unit composed predominant- 
ly of Afro-Guyanese civil servants. However, officer candidates were 



133 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

also selected from outside the Volunteer Force and trained in Brit- 
ain. Once training was completed, the Guyanese officers were rapid- 
ly promoted and positioned to assume command from the British 
upon independence. 

The British government strove to ensure an ethnic balance within 
the SSU. Its reasons were twofold: Guyana was already racially 
polarized in the 1960s, and the police force consisted mostiy of Afro- 
Guyanese. The British were successful in recruiting a balance of 
Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese cadets to fill the junior officer 
ranks. Indo-Guyanese were also well represented among students 
at the Mons Officer Cadet Training School in Britain. 

The SSU was renamed the Guyana Defence Force in 1 965 . The 
transition to complete Guyanese control of the GDF began in 1966, 
shortly after independence was granted. Prime Minister Linden 
Forbes Burnham, who also served as minister of defense, oversaw 
the transition. Major Raymond Sataur, an Indo-Guyanese officer 
and graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, was 
heir apparent to the British GDF commander. But perhaps because 
of ethnic considerations, Burnham selected an Afro-Guyanese 
officer, Major Clarence Price, as the new commander. After the 
1968 election, Burnham began to purge Indo-Guyanese from the 
GDF's officer corps. By 1970 Afro-Guyanese dominated both the 
officer and the enlisted ranks of the GDF. 

Training of Guyanese officer cadets in Britain ceased in the 1970s. 
The Guyanese government then established a six-month cadet 
course at Timehri Airport, south of Georgetown. The ruling PNC 
began using political and ethnic criteria in selecting officer cadets, 
instead of relying on educational requirements as had been done 
in the past (see The Cooperative Republic, ch. 1). 

The PNC attempted both to consolidate and expand the loyalty 
of the GDF by manipulating racial symbols and by materially re- 
warding loyal soldiers. Politically minded officers portrayed the 
PNC as the sole protector of Afro-Guyanese interests. These same 
officers also portrayed the opposition People's Progressive Party 
(PPP) as an Indo-Guyanese organization whose victory would result 
in economic and political domination of Afro-Guyanese by Indo- 
Guyanese. In 1973 an aide to Forbes Burnham openly advocated 
that the GDF pledge its allegiance to the PNC in addition to its 
loyalty to the nation. This recommendation was made policy the 
following year. Although the recommendation was unpopular 
among career officers, disagreement was not voiced openly for fear 
of losing high salaries, duty-free cars, housing, and other privileges. 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1970s and 1980s an undercurrent of 



134 




Guyana Defence Force guard of honor in front of the Bank of 

Guyana building, Georgetown 
Courtesy Embassy of Guyana, Washington 



135 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

tension existed between officers who favored a politically neutral 
GDF and those who favored political activism. 

Mission, Organization, and Capabilities 

Responsible for protecting Guyana from external threats, the 
GDF also concerned itself with internal security, border defense, 
civic work, and other activities. Some observers viewed the GDF 
primarily as a partisan internal security force, noting in particular 
the deployment of its best units to the capital. Yet the military was 
also a deterrent to the genuine external threat resulting from the 
border disputes with Venezuela and Suriname (see fig. 7). 

In the 1960s, the GDF carried out military operations to coun- 
ter both external and internal threats. In 1969 the GDF quelled 
an insurrection in the interior led by ranchers who the government 
believed had been armed and aided by Venezuela. That same year 
the GDF expelled Surinamese soldiers from a disputed area in 
southeastern Guyana. 

The GDF maintained a high level of involvement in civic ac- 
tion and national development. Training and logistical support to 
the agriculture, mining, fishing, and construction sectors received 
the greatest emphasis. The GDF provided medical support to 
civilians as needed, and its telecommunications and aviation 
resources were used during emergencies and in relief operations. 

The armed forces were a single unified service comprising 
ground, naval, and air components. This structure gave the army 
operational control over the naval and air elements. The president 
of Guyana was commander in chief of the GDF. The GDF was 
organized into approximately twenty corps whose activities ranged 
from training to intelligence to catering and musical performance. 
Service in the GDF was voluntary, and its membership was over- 
whelmingly Afro-Guyanese. Women were accepted into the ser- 
vice but constituted only a small percentage of the total force. 

The land component of the GDF, by far the dominant service 
in size and importance, in 1990 had an active strength of approxi- 
mately 1,400. The principal combat units were two infantry bat- 
talions, one guard battalion, one Special Forces battalion, one 
support weapons battalion, one artillery battery, and one engineer 
company. The composition of the two infantry battalions was stan- 
dardized in 1980. Each of these two units consisted of a headquarters 
company, three rifles companies, and a support company. 

Army materiel included armored reconnaissance vehicles, ar- 
tillery, and surface-to-air missiles. The GDF generally used equip- 
ment of British, Soviet, or United States design (see table 9, 
Appendix A). 



136 



Guyana: National Security 



The air wing of the GDF was created in 1968. In 1970 it was 
redesignated the Air Command, GDF. The 200-member Air Com- 
mand was headquartered at Camp Ayanganna in Georgetown. In 
the early 1990s, its five aircraft and five helicopters operated from 
Georgetown's Timehri Airport. The command's primary missions 
were transportation, communications, and liaison. Secondary mis- 
sions included counternarcotics and maritime patrolling. All air- 
craft were civil registered. 

A naval section of the GDF was created in 1968 and consisted 
of four small patrol craft. During the 1970s and 1980s, the naval 
component gained additional vessels although it remained the 
smallest element of the GDF; it had four vessels in the early 1990s. 
Officially known as the Maritime Corps, the naval section num- 
bered 100 personnel in 1991 . Based in Georgetown and New Am- 
sterdam, the navy had no marine force or aircraft. 

Service in the GDF was voluntary, and the privileged treatment 
accorded the armed forces was the primary reason for joining the 
service. Quarters and food were good, and pay was often better 
than in the civilian sector. A military career offered the advantages 
of medical care for personnel and their families, a retirement plan, 
and survivor benefits. 

Uniforms were based on a British model. GDF dress for men 
consisted of tropical khaki shirts and trousers. Short canvas leg- 
gings were worn, and the standard headgear was a red beret deco- 
rated with the national arms. There was also a ceremonial uniform 
consisting of a white coat and dark blue trousers. Women had sever- 
al uniforms, including a khaki blouse and slacks worn with a fa- 
tigue hat and a light khaki blouse and skirt worn with a green beret 
(see fig. 8). 

Involvement in Political Affairs 

Until 1969 the GDF observed British military ethics, which held 
that the armed forces should be loyal to the "government of the 
day" and not otherwise be involved in politics. Beginning in 1973, 
the PNC regularly used the GDF to help it win every national elec- 
tion. Because of irregularities in previous elections, the opposition 
parties had argued that the ballots be counted in each electoral dis- 
trict for the 1973 general election. However, the PNC insisted that 
ballot boxes be taken to three designated counting centers. As oc- 
curred in the 1968 elections, opposition members were not allowed 
to accompany the ballot boxes to the counting centers. On July 
16, 1973, election day, GDF personnel shot and killed two PPP 
members as they protested the removal of ballot boxes from a polling 
station. Throughout the country, the GDF and police were quick 



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Guyana: National Security 



to resort to force when removing ballot boxes from the electoral 
districts. 

Once they were collected, large numbers of ballot boxes were 
quarantined at Camp Ayanganna for more than twenty-four hours 
with no reason given. The PNC apparently had expected to receive 
a large number of votes in its traditional Georgetown strongholds 
and initially had allowed a fair count in districts there. When ear- 
ly results showed a low voter turnout, the PNC called on the GDF 
to intervene. 

At the PNC's first biennial congress in 1974, the GDF was re- 
quired to pledge its allegiance to the PNC. During the 1970s and 
1980s, GDF soldiers routinely received political indoctrination. The 
GDF also scheduled marches to celebrate major PNC political 
events, such as party congresses. 

The PNC's increasing politicization and subordination of the 
GDF disturbed many members of the officer corps. When some 
expressed a desire for military neutrality, PNC informants in the 
armed forces alerted Burnham to the dissension within the GDF. 
In August 1979, Colonel Ulric Pilgrim, the operational force com- 
mander, and Colonel Carl Morgan, a battalion commander, were 
dismissed. Pilgrim and Morgan had been two of the most popular 
officers in the GDF. Burnham appointed a PNC loyalist, Colonel 
David Granger, commander of the GDF. To extend his influence 
further, Burnham also replaced the army chief of staff, Brigadier 
General Clarence Price, with a Burnham loyalist who had been 
a civilian police officer. The appointment of Norman McLean, a 
former traffic chief, shocked and enraged many GDF officers. The 
PNC government attempted to rebuild support by issuing a postage 
stamp in 1981 honoring the GDF. 

The general election of December 1980, the first since 1973, was 
severely criticized by international observers for its irregularities. 
The security forces were spared blame, except for the police de- 
tention on December 9 of Lord Avebury, head of the internation- 
al observer team. 

In preparation for the 1985 elections, the PNC regime reenact- 
ed Part II of the National Security Act. This act gave the security 
forces wide-ranging powers of detention, including the authority 
to prevent people "from acting in a manner likely to cause sub- 
version of democratic institutions in Guyana." The latitude autho- 
rized by the National Security Act intimidated the opposition 
parties. Reenactment of Part II was quickly followed by army chief 
of staff McLean's announcement that the army would secure and 
escort ballot boxes during the election. The PNC's victory was an- 
nounced on December 12, three days after the election. In response, 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

several civic groups, including the Guyana Bar Association and 
the Guyana Council of Churches, released a joint communique 
condemning, among other things, "violence and collusion by police 
and army personnel." 

The Security Forces 
Mission and Organization 

Paramilitary Forces and Special Units 

In 1973 a paramilitary organization, the Guyana National Service 
(GNS), was created. Generally used as a manpower source for pub- 
lic works and services, it also had a limited military potential. The 
government envisioned the GNS as an organization that would 
produce "cadres" sufficiently skilled to depart the populated coast 
and relocate to the underdeveloped interior. According to the GNS's 
enabling document, the Guyana National Service State Paper, this 
program would prepare Guyanese to use their time and energies 
profitably and productively; it would equip them with the knowledge 
and experience to open up, develop, and live on the rich lands avail- 
able in the hinterland. It would mobilize and motivate support for 
the Guyanese people's effort to "feed, clothe, and house" them- 
selves; inculcate the skills and attitudes necessary for nation-building 
and national development; and transform individuals accustomed 
to depending upon external aid into self-reliant and productive 
citizens. The GNS was to encourage the physical and mental dis- 
cipline necessary for development and to ensure cohesion and unity 
among the various ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups 
in Guyana. 

The 1 ,500-person GNS was divided into various corps for young 
people from ages eight to twenty-five and was integrated into public 
education. Associated with the Afro-Guyanese-dominated PNC, 
it was almost exclusively composed of young Afro-Guyanese. The 
program evolved from an earlier voluntary service group called 
the Guyana Youth Corps. This organization, whose mission had 
been to populate the hinterland, failed because of a lack of public 
support. 

The government requirement that University of Guyana stu- 
dents and government scholarship students perform one year of 
service with the GNS in the republic's interior posed problems for 
young Indo-Guyanese women. It is customary in Guyana for sin- 
gle women of all ethnic groups to live at home with their parents. 
When away from home, single women live with relatives or board 
with families. The Indo-Guyanese were particularly concerned that 
the GNS program was a scheme to foster interracial relationships. 



140 



Guyana: National Security 



Many women refused to enter the GNS and, as a result, did not 
graduate from the university. It became common practice among 
Indo-Guyanese to attend college overseas to avoid the GNS program. 

GNS teaching was highly ideological. Although membership was 
optional at the elementary and secondary levels, students who did 
not participate were not provided the results of their high-school 
placement examinations. Elementary school students who did par- 
ticipate were organized into "Young Brigades" and taught to march 
and chant party slogans. Later, as high-school juniors, students 
were encouraged to join the Guyana National Service Cadet Corps. 
The corps was similar to Cuba's Young Pioneers, with the 
Guyanese cadets going to field camps for political indoctrination. 

The People's Militia was created in 1976 during a period of 
heightened tension along the Guyana- Venezuela border. Proposed 
by opposition leader Cheddi Jagan, the militia was envisioned as 
a more ethnically diverse force than the GDF, which it would 
replace. Jagan saw the militia as a popular organization that would 
have branches on every city block and in every village. The govern- 
ment agreed to form the People's Militia, but only as a supplemental 
security force. Militia members were to engage in their normal oc- 
cupation until war broke out, at which point they would defend 
their communities and assist the regular forces. 

The government intended the militia units to be autonomous 
and flexible enough to be self-supporting during emergencies. The 
militia's force level was set at 2,000. The government's stated goal 
was to make the militia a broad-based volunteer force. It was ini- 
tially well received, and both Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese 
volunteered. However, preferential treatment of Afro-Guyanese 
led to an exodus of Indo-Guyanese volunteers. Heavy recruitment 
in PNC strongholds and sustained political indoctrination ensured 
that the People's Militia would be loyal to the PNC. 

Training in the People's Militia consisted of foot drills for two 
hours twice a week, plus two Sundays every month. The militia 
was organized into nine districts, and training was carried out in 
each of the districts. Uniforms consisted of tan shirts, brown pants, 
boots, and berets. Members of the militia wore uniforms only dur- 
ing training or during combat. In times of emergency, the militia 
would be integrated into the GDF. 

In 1980 the government created the National Guard Service 
(NGS) to protect government personnel and state property from 
theft and subversive activity. The NGS included both security per- 
sonnel already employed at government facilities and retired police 
officers and others. The NGS maintained a strength of 2,000 
members. 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The Young Socialist Movement (YSM) was the youth arm of 
the PNC, with members throughout Guyana. The YSM main- 
tained a military component with an estimated strength of 2,000. 
The GDF, GNS, and People's Militia provided its training. Mem- 
bers of the military component usually paraded in military uni- 
forms but without weapons. 

Police 

In 1891 a paramilitary police force was established in British Gui- 
ana. This force became the British Guiana Police Force in June 
1939 and after independence, the Guyana Police Force. Headed 
by a commissioner of police, the force had limited paramilitary capa- 
bilities. The 5,000-member force had three major elements: a 
Mounted Branch trained in riot control, a Rural Constabulary, 
and a Special Constabulary that served as the police reserve. Ad- 
ditionally, a number of constables were employed by the govern- 
ment and private businesses to guard property. 

Informal Paramilitary Groups 

House of Israel 

During the 1970s and 1980s, a religious group known as the 
House of Israel became an informal part of the PNC's security appa- 
ratus and engaged in actions such as strikebreaking, progovernment 
demonstrations, political intimidation, and murder (see Cults, ch. 
2). The House of Israel was led by an ardent PNC supporter, David 
Hill, locally known as Rabbi Washington. Hill was an American 
fugitive wanted for blackmail, larceny, and tax evasion. Despite 
its name, the House of Israel was neither Israeli nor Jewish-oriented. 
It was, instead, a black supremacist cult that claimed that Afro- 
Guyanese were the original Hebrews. Cult adherents further be- 
lieved that modern-day Jews were, in fact, descendants of other 
non-Jewish biblical peoples and were in Israel illegally. Serving as a 
paramilitary force for the PNC, the House of Israel had 8,000 mem- 
bers, including a 300-member guard force known as the "royal 
cadets." 

A 1979 incident illustrates the House of Israel's close relation- 
ship with the Burnham administration. A member of the cult, Bilal 
Ato, murdered a reporter working for an opposition newspaper 
on July 14, 1979. The reporter had been taking photographs of 
an antigovernment demonstration when he was stabbed to death. 
Although the entire incident was filmed by other journalists, the 
government took three years to bring the case to trial. A former 



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Guyana: National Security 



state prosecutor defended Ato. The judge reduced Ato's charge 
to manslaughter and sentenced him to eight years in prison. 

Later in 1979, as well as during the early and mid-1980s, the 
government used the House of Israel to break strikes and to dis- 
rupt public meetings of any group that the government felt might 
oppose its policies. Observers claimed that House of Israel mem- 
bers were accompanied by police and sometimes wore police uni- 
forms during these incidents. In 1985 House of Israel members 
allegedly prevented delegates from entering the annual general 
meeting of the Guyana Council of Churches in Georgetown. 

When President Hugh Desmond Hoyte took power in 1985, the 
House of Israel fell out of government favor. In July 1986, Rabbi 
Washington and other key House of Israel leaders were arrested 
and charged with murder. Washington pleaded guilty to man- 
slaughter and received a fifteen-year sentence. 

Organized Gangs 

From 1980 until mid- 1985, organized gangs of Afro-Guyanese 
terrorized Indo-Guyanese communities. The groups' trademark 
method of entry led them to be called kick-down-the-door gangs. 
The gangs were fully armed and used military tactics and tech- 
niques. Gang crimes against the Indo-Guyanese included robbery 
and occasionally rape or murder. 

Police response to the gangs caused a civic outcry. The police 
routinely arrived at victims' homes hours after a crime had oc- 
curred, even if notified when the crime was in progress. The half- 
hearted police response encouraged the growth of the gangs, which 
became so bold that they began to undertake daylight operations. 
Fear so paralyzed Indo-Guyanese communities that women in rural 
areas congregated most of the day by public roads, seeking safety 
in numbers. 

Many analysts believed that the PNC sponsored, or at least toler- 
ated, the kick-down-the-door gangs. Despite stringent gun control 
laws, gang members carried automatic weapons. One observer 
called the gangs "policemen by day and bandits by night." The 
gangs used tactics the PNC had employed against opposition par- 
ties, only on a larger scale and with even greater brutality. After 
Burnham's death in 1985, the gangs disappeared. 

Human Rights Violations 

Arbitrary detention of civilians, physical abuse of prisoners, and 
summary executions became standard police behavior during Lin- 
den Forbes Burnham's regime (1964-85). During the period, the 
government routinely refused to conduct public inquiries into 



143 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

killings, even into those in which it was not implicated. In 1973 
a University of Guyana lecturer was severely wounded in what 
many people believed to be an attempted assassination. In 1976 
noted PPP member Isahak Basir was severely wounded by police. 
In 1979 political activist Ohena Koama was shot and killed in 
Georgetown by police. In October 1979, government minister Vin- 
cent Teekah was murdered. In all these cases, no inquest was held. 
The most infamous murder was the 1980 killing of internationally 
respected historian and political activist Walter Rodney. The United 
States Department of State believed the government was implicated 
in the murder, which occurred when a small radio transmitter in 
Rodney's possession exploded. 

The Guyana Human Rights Association determined that from 
January 1980 to June 1981 at least twenty- two people were killed 
by police, and no inquests were ever held. The police stated that 
all the victims either had attacked police officers or were killed trying 
to escape. 

Another common government practice was to deny opposition 
groups permission to demonstrate peaceably. On September 17, 
1981, the Working People's Alliance organized a demonstration 
without government permission. The crowd, which numbered fewer 
than 100, called for higher wages, affirmed Guyana's territorial 
integrity, and criticized South Africa's apartheid regime. Police 
intervened in the protest, arrested political leaders Moses Bhag- 
wan and Eusi Kwayana, and beat those demonstrators who would 
not disperse. 

Under the administration of Hugh Desmond Hoyte, who be- 
came president in 1985, respect for human rights improved con- 
siderably. Although a United States government report stated that 
in 1991 police abuse of prisoners and electoral manipulation con- 
tinued, no politically motivated or government- sanctioned extraju- 
dicial killings were reported. No summary executions took place, 
and there were no reports of politically related disappearances. 

The Courts and the Penal System 

The Guyanese judicial system consisted of the Supreme Court, 
which encompassed a Court of Appeal and a High Court, and ten 
magistrates' courts (see Judiciary, ch. 4). The Court of Appeal, 
created in June 1966, consisted of a presiding chancellor, the chief 
justice, and the number of justices of appeal determined by the 
National Assembly. The High Court consisted of the chief justice 
as president and several subordinate judges. Its jurisdiction was 
both original and appellate, and included criminal cases brought 
before it on indictment. A person convicted by the High Court 



144 



Guyana: National Security 



had the option of resorting to the Court of Appeal. The High Court 
had unlimited jurisdiction over civil matters and exclusive juris- 
diction over probate and divorce. Magistrates had the authority 
to decide small claims in civil suits and had original jurisdiction 
in criminal cases. 

As a demonstration of PNC dominance over state institutions, 
the party's flag was flown over the Court of Appeal. This gesture 
undermined public confidence in the impartiality of the Guyanese 
judiciary. 

Under the constitution of 1980, anyone charged with a criminal 
offense has the right to a hearing by a court of law, and in the ear- 
ly 1990s this right apparently was being respected. Guyana had 
a bail system, and defendants were granted public trials. Arrest 
did not require a warrant issued by a court; the presumption of 
guilt by a police officer was sufficient. The National Security Act, 
which had been widely used to detain political dissidents, was 
repealed in 1991. Although capital punishment was still permit- 
ted, no execution had taken place since the 1970s. 

A report by the Guyana Human Rights Association indicated 
that in 1991 the country's three main prisons — at Georgetown, 
Mazaruni (near New Amsterdam), and New Amsterdam — were 
overcrowded and in deteriorating condition. Mandatory sentences 
for narcotics offenses had resulted in a large increase in the inmate 
population without a corresponding expansion of facilities. The 
Guyana Human Rights Association claimed that malnutrition and 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) were widespread 
in the nation's prisons. 

Border Disputes 

Guyana-Venezuela Dispute 

During the 1800s, Venezuela and British Guiana both laid claim 
to a large tract (five-eighths of present-day Guyana) between the 
Essequibo River and the mouth of the Orinoco River (see Origins 
of the Border Dispute with Venezuela, ch. 1). In 1899 a court of 
arbitration awarded more than 90 percent of the disputed area to 
British Guiana, and the matter appeared to be settled. In the early 
1960s, however, Venezuela reasserted its claim to the disputed ter- 
ritory (see Relations with Venezuela, ch. 4). In 1966 a commis- 
sion was established to negotiate a settlement, but border incidents 
repeatedly interrupted its work. On October 12, 1966, Guyana dis- 
covered that Venezuelan military and civilian personnel had oc- 
cupied the Guyanese half of Ankoko Island in the Cuyuni River. 



145 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The Venezuelans had begun developing an airfield and mining 
facilities on the island. Prime Minister Burnham protested the occu- 
pation and demanded Venezuela's complete withdrawal and the 
removal of the facilities. Dismissing the protest, Venezuela counter- 
charged that Ankoko Island had always been Venezuelan territory. 
Because Guyana was unable to force a Venezuelan withdrawal, 
Ankoko Island remained occupied, and Guyanese and Venezue- 
lan military outposts exchanged sporadic gunfire. 

The Ankoko Island incident was followed in July 1968 by 
Venezuela's extension of its territorial waters to twelve nautical 
miles off its coast, including the disputed region. Because Guyana 
claimed only a three-nautical-mile limit, Venezuela's decree in ef- 
fect established a claim over coastal waters from three to twelve 
nautical miles off Guyana's western coast. Guyana immediately 
condemned the Venezuelan decree, and Britain voiced its concern 
to the Venezuelan ambassador in London. Political sparring con- 
tinued for six months until the incident was overshadowed by new 
events. 

On January 4, 1969, Prime Minister Burnham reported that dis- 
turbances had occurred in the Rupununi region of southern 
Guyana. The historically independent-minded ranchers of the 
Rupununi Savannah had unsuccessfully attempted a secessionist 
revolt. The police station in Lethem, the major government post 
in the region, had been attacked on January 2. Four policemen 
and one civilian employee of the police had been killed. The in- 
surgents then seized and blocked most area airstrips. The airstrip 
at Manari, eight kilometers from Lethem, was left open, appar- 
ently for the insurgents' own use. Responding quickly, the 
Guyanese government flew police and GDF forces to Manari. Sur- 
prised by the rapid government action, the insurgents fled to 
Venezuela and order was restored. 

The Guyanese government charged that a captured insurgent 
claimed that the ranchers had developed a plan in December 1968 
to create a separate state with Venezuelan aid. Venezuela alleged- 
ly transported the insurgents to and from training camps in 
Venezuela. 

After Guyana put down the rebellion, the insurgents took refuge 
in Venezuelan border towns. Venezuela denied any wrongdoing 
and declared the insurgents Venezuelan citizens because they had 
inhabited land claimed by Venezuela. The new citizens were 
promised land and jobs by the Venezuelan government. Guyana 
bitterly protested the Venezuelan actions. 

The troubled peace along the border was again shattered in 
February 1970 when Guyanese and Venezuelan forces skirmished 



146 



Guyana: National Security 



for several days. Machine guns and mortars were used during the 
three days of fighting, which involved Venezuelan troops on Ankoko 
Island and Guyanese troops at a nearby outpost. On March 3, 
Venezuela closed the border. 

Throughout the troubled period, the border commission had con- 
tinued to meet. The commission's four-year term expired in early 
1970 with the dispute unresolved. Nonetheless, on June 18, 1970, 
the governments of Venezuela, Britain, and Guyana signed the 
Protocol of Port-of- Spain. This protocol, which supplemented the 
1899 agreement, placed a twelve-year moratorium on the border 
dispute. The protocol provided for continued discussions, a sus- 
pension of territorial claims, and automatic renewal of the protocol 
if it remained uncontested after the twelve years. In 1981 Venezuela 
announced that it would not renew the protocol. 

Relations between Guyana and Venezuela slowly improved 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In October 1990, the GDF and 
the Venezuelan Army signed a protocol establishing the framework 
for improved relations. The protocol covered cooperation in train- 
ing, sports, and culture, and would remain in force for an indefinite 
period. The document was a revision of a protocol signed in the 
1980s and created a context for future discussions. Protocol signa- 
tories were the GDF's acting chief of staff, Brigadier Joe Singh, 
and Venezuelan army commander Carlos Pefialoza. 

Guyana-Suriname Dispute 

Suriname reaffirmed a claim to an area in southeastern Guyana, 
the New River Triangle, after achieving independence from the 
Netherlands in November 1975. Despite renewed efforts by Guyana 
and Suriname to reach an agreement, border incidents occurred 
repeatedly in the late 1970s. In September 1977, Guyana seized 
a Surinamese trawler and charged it with fishing illegally in 
Guyana's 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Suriname 
retaliated in January 1978 when it withdrew licenses from Guyanese 
fisherman who worked the Courantyne River, which formed the 
border between the two nations. Allegations were made that Suri- 
name also used gunboats to harass Guyanese loggers on the river. 
Renewed talks in 1978 resolved the fishery dispute and led to the 
Surinamese trawler's return. 

In 1979 Guyana's prime minister, Linden Forbes Burnham, and 
Suriname 's prime minister, Henck Arron, signed an agreement 
establishing fishing rights and reopening the border. However, in 
1980 a military coup overthrew Arron 's government, and relations 
deteriorated. Although tensions between Guyana and Suriname 
improved slightly after Hugh Desmond Hoyte became Guyana's 



147 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

president in 1985, the border dispute remained unresolved in 
mid- 1991. 

In 1992 the GDF remained a small politicized force concerned 
primarily with internal security. As the border dispute with Vene- 
zuela edged closer to resolution, Guyana's principal external threat 
and the defensive role of the GDF diminished. The problems fac- 
ing the GDF in the 1990s were more internal organizational dilem- 
mas: to define a new mission in a world less ideologically divided 
and with less belligerent neighbors, and to deal with the legacy of 
ethnic polarization that two and a half decades of PNC rule had 
bequeathed to the GDF and to Guyana. 

* * * 

As of mid- 1991, scholarly literature on Guyana's armed forces 
and other aspects of national security remained limited. Two ex- 
cellent sources stand out: Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society, by 
Chaitram Singh, and Guyana: Politics, Economics, and Society, by Hen- 
ry B. Jeffrey and Colin Baber. Current order-of-battle informa- 
tion is available in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 
annual, The Military Balance. Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner's 
The Venezuela- Guyana Border Dispute is the definitive reference on 
Guyana's primary regional problem. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



148 




150 



Belize: Country Profile 



Country 

Formal Name: Belize. 

Short Form: Belize. 

Term for Citizens: Belizean(s). 

Capital: Belmopan. 

Date of Independence: September 21, 1981, from Britain. 

Geography 

Size: Approximately 22,960 square kilometers; land area 21,400 
square kilometers. 

Topography: Country divided into two main physiographic 
regions. Maya Mountains and associated basins and plateaus 
dominate southern half of country. Second region comprises north- 
ern lowlands and is drained by numerous rivers and streams. Coast- 
line flat and swampy and marked by many lagoons. 

Climate: Subtropical climate with pronounced wet and dry sea- 
sons; rainy season from approximately June to December, dry sea- 
son from about January to May. Temperatures vary with elevation 
and proximity to coast and show little seasonal variation. 

Society 

Population: Estimated at 191,000 in 1990. Rate of annual growth 
estimated at 3.0 percent during 1980s. 

Education and Literacy: Official literacy rate of 92 percent un- 
reliable, although more realistic figures still favorable by compari- 
son with neighboring countries. Considerable regional inequalities 
in provision and quality of schooling. Formal education managed 
by joint partnership of church and state. Compulsory education 
for youth between ages of five and fourteen years (primary only). 
Socioeconomic and academic barriers constrain access to secon- 
dary and postsecondary education. One university, the Universi- 
ty College of Belize, located in Belize City. 

NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



151 



Health and Welfare: Malaria and enteritis most serious diseases. 
Significant incidence of moderate to severe malnutrition, particu- 
larly among children in rural areas and recent immigrants. Medi- 
cal care for general population inadequate, especially in rural areas. 

Ethnic Groups: By official estimates in late 1980s, roughly 40 per- 
cent of population Creole (all or partly African descent), 33 per- 
cent Mestizo (Hispanics), 10 percent Maya, 7 percent Garifuna 
(Afro-Carib), and smaller communities of East Indians, Chinese, 
Arabs, and Europeans. Extensive migrations during 1980s, however, 
may have altered ethnic balance. 

Languages: English official language; local dialect of English — 
Belizean Creole — widely spoken by all population groups. Span- 
ish widely spoken outside of Belize City. Additional languages in 
use include Mayan dialects (Yucatecan, Mopan, and Kekchi), 
Garifuna, and Low German. 

Religion: Majority Roman Catholic, with significant Protestant 
minorities. Most Anglicans and Methodists reside in Belize City. 
Evangelical Protestant missionaries active and gaining adherents, 
especially in rural areas. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): US$373 million, or US$1,958 
per capita, in 1991. 

Agriculture: Although its relative importance to economy declined 
during the 1980s, agriculture remained one of largest sectors in 
economy, accounting for 15 percent of GDP in 1990. Three crops — 
sugar, citrus fruits, and bananas — predominated. 

Manufacturing: Small but growing segment of the economy, ac- 
counting for 12 percent of the GDP in 1989, consisted primarily 
of sugar refining and garment industry. 

Exports: US$108 million in 1990 (estimated). Major commodi- 
ties included sugar, clothing, shrimp, molasses, citrus, and bananas. 

Imports: US$194 million in 1990 (estimated). Major commodities: 
machinery, food, manufactured goods, fuel, chemicals, and phar- 
maceuticals. 

Foreign Debt: US$158 million (December 1990). 

Currency: Belizean dollar (Bz$) divided into 100 cents. In 1991 
US$1 =Bz$2 (fixed rate). 

Fiscal year: April 1 to March 31. 



152 



Transportation and Communications 

Railroads: None. 

Roads: Over 2,700 kilometers, of which about 500 kilometers 
paved, 1,600 gravel, and the rest earthen. 

Inland waterways: Over 800 kilometers of river usable by shallow- 
draught craft. 

Ports: Belize City, principal port. Facilities at Big Creek in south 
of Belize being expanded. 

Airports: Belize International (also known as Philip Goldson In- 
ternational) near Belize City is the country's major airport. 

Telecommunications: Adequate system. In 1991 over 8,600 tele- 
phones, or 4.6 per 100 inhabitants. Broadcast facilities included 
six amplitude modulation (AM) radio, five frequency modulation 
(FM) radio, and one television station. One satellite ground sta- 
tion used for international communications. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Under 1991 constitution, constitutional monarchy 
with parliamentary government based on British model. Govern- 
ment divided into three independent branches: executive, legisla- 
tive, and judicial. British monarch titular head of state, but 
represented by appointed governor general. Real political power 
held by prime minister, cabinet, and National Assembly composed 
of twenty-eight-member, elected House of Representatives and ap- 
pointed Senate, usually of eight members. Prime minister elected 
by House of Representatives from its own ranks; members of both 
House of Representatives and Senate may be appointed to cabi- 
net. Country divided into six districts; no corresponding district 
government. In Belize City and seven other towns, municipal coun- 
cils elected. The judiciary branch has three levels: Magistrates' 
courts, Supreme Court, and Court of Appeal. 

Politics: Two-party democratic system dominated even before start 
of internal self-rule in 1964 by People's United Party (PUP). Rival 
United Democratic Party (UDP) held power from 1984-89 and 
won again in July 1993. Following September 1989 election and 
subsequent defection of one UDP representative to PUP, the PUP 
held sixteen- to-twelve majority in House of Representatives. George 
Price, long-time leader of PUP, served as prime minister in 1991 . 
PUP and UDP both took centrist-to-conservative political stance, 
endorsing free-market economy and close relations with United 



153 



States. Price described PUP's orientation as Christian Democratic. 
The UDP considered to have probusiness outlook. 

International Organizations: Member of United Nations and its 
specialized agencies; Organization of American States; Common- 
wealth of Nations; Caribbean Community and Common Market; 
and Nonaligned Movement. 

National Security 

Army: Belize Defence Force (BDF) with total strength of approx- 
imately 700. About 1,500 British troops (one infantry battalion) 
stationed in Ladyville near Belize City. 

Navy: Small fifty-member maritime element with main base in 
Belize City. Ships of British Royal Navy made regular stops in Be- 
lize City. 

Air Force: Fifteen-member air wing operated out of Belize Inter- 
national Airport. One British Army Air Corps flight and one-half 
squadron of the Royal Air Force with fighters and ground-attack 
aircraft stationed in southern Belize. 

Military Equipment (1990): British equipment. Ground element 
of BDF equipped with light infantry weapons, maritime element 
used two 20-meter patrol boats, air wing operated two small air- 
craft, one of which armed. 

Defense Budget: Almost US$10 million in 1989, 14 percent of to- 
tal government expenditures. Additionally, Britain spent estimated 
US$18 million to maintain British forces in Belize. 

Internal Security Forces: Belize National Police, about 500 
members. 



154 



Chapter 6. Belize: Historical Setting 



Mayan god of the North Star 



TWO THEMES DOMINATE the history of Belize: the outward 
struggle to establish and maintain an English-speaking nation in 
an area dominated by Hispanic peoples and culture, and the in- 
ward interaction between groups of different races and cultural back- 
grounds. Understanding contemporary social relations and the 
politics of Belize depends on understanding these diverse groups 
and their interpretations of past events. 

The first English settlers arrived in the early 1600s in present- 
day Belize (known as the Settlement of Belize in the Bay of Hon- 
duras prior to 1862 and British Honduras from 1862-1973). Their 
arrival marked the beginning of a conflict with neighboring Span- 
ish settlers that lasted for centuries. For the first 200 years, this 
conflict was part of the larger rivalry between Britain and Spain. 
In the early 1800s, after most of the Spanish colonies in the New 
World became independent, the conflict in Belize evolved into a 
Guatemalan territorial claim on the area that continued into the 
1990s (see fig. 9). 

Like many nations that have recently emerged from colonial- 
ism, Belize has a population that is fragmented into many racial 
and cultural groups. The two largest groups are the Creoles (see 
Glossary), English-speaking or Creole-speaking blacks and people 
of mixed African and European heritage, and the Mestizos (see 
Glossary), Spanish-speaking people of mixed Mayan and Spanish 
background. Two other significant groups are the Garifuna (see 
Glossary), a group of African and Carib ancestry originally from 
the Lesser Antilles (see Glossary), and the Maya, descendants of 
the original inhabitants of Belize. 

These groups all have different interpretations of key events in 
Belize's history. The subjugation of the indigenous people, the rival- 
ry between Spain and Britain, slavery and the process of emanci- 
pation, the legacy of colonization, and the position of Belize in the 
modern world have all been subject to reinterpretation and debate. 
Despite the gradual emergence of a national identity, the differ- 
ences among ethnic groups and their divergent outlooks on the 
present and the past play an important role in Belize today. 

Ancient Mayan Civilization 

Perhaps as early as 35,000 years ago, nomadic people came from 
Asia to the Americas across the frozen Bering Strait. In the course 
of many millennia, their descendants settled in and adapted to 



157 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

different environments, creating many cultures in North America, 
Central America, and South America. The Mayan culture emerged 
in the lowland area of the Yucatan Peninsula and the highlands 
to the south, in what is now southeastern Mexico, Guatemala, 
western Honduras, and Belize. Many aspects of this culture persist 
in the area despite nearly half a millennium of European domina- 
tion. All evidence, whether from archaeology, history, ethnography, 
or linguistic studies, points to a cultural continuity in this region. 
The descendants of the first settlers in the area have lived there 
for at least three millennia. 

Prior to about 2500 B.C. , some hunting and foraging bands set- 
tled in small farming villages. Although hunting and foraging con- 
tinued to play a part in their subsistence, these farmers domesticated 
crops such as corn, beans, squash, and chili peppers — which are 
still the basic foods in Central America. A profusion of languages 
and subcultures developed within the Mayan core culture. Between 
about 2500 B.C. and A.D. 250, the basic institutions of Mayan 
civilization emerged. The peak of this civilization occurred dur- 
ing the classic period, which began about A.D. 250 and ended about 
700 years later. 

Farmers engaged in various types of agriculture, including labor- 
intensive irrigated and ridged-field systems and shifting slash- 
and-burn agriculture. Their products fed the civilization's craft 
specialists, merchants, warriors, and priest-astronomers, who coor- 
dinated agricultural and other seasonal activities with a cycle of 
rituals in ceremonial centers. These priests, who observed the move- 
ments of the sun, moon, planets, and stars, developed a complex 
mathematical and calendrical system to coordinate various cycles 
of time and to record specific events on carved stelae. 

Belize boasts important sites of the earliest Mayan settlements, 
majestic ruins of the classic period, and examples of late post- 
classic ceremonial construction (see fig. 10). About five kilome- 
ters west of Orange Walk, is Cuello, a site from perhaps as early 
as 2,500 B.C. Jars, bowls, and other dishes found there are among 
the oldest pottery unearthed in present-day Mexico and Central 
America. The site includes platforms of buildings arranged around 
a small plaza, indicating a distinctly Mayan community. The 
presence of shell, hematite, and jade shows that the Maya were 
trading over long distances as early as 1500 B.C. The Mayan econ- 
omy, however, was still basically subsistence, combining foraging 
and cultivation, hunting, and fishing. 

Cerros, a site on Chetumal Bay, was a flourishing trade and 
ceremonial center between about 300 B.C. and A.D. 100. It dis- 
plays some distinguishing features of early Mayan civilization. The 



158 



Belize: Historical Setting 



architecture of Mayan civilization included temples and palatial 
residences organized in groups around plazas. These structures were 
built of cut stone, covered with stucco, and elaborately decorated 
and painted. Stylized carvings and paintings of people, animals, 
and gods, along with sculptured stelae and geometric patterns on 
buildings, constitute a highly developed style of art. Impressive two- 
meter-high masks decorate the temple platform at Cerros. These 
masks, situated on either side of the central stairway, represent a 
serpent god. 

The Maya were skilled at making pottery, carving jade, knap- 
ping flint, and making elaborate costumes of feathers. One of the 
finest carved jade objects of Mayan civilization, the head of the 
sun god Kinich Ahau, was found in a tomb at the classic period 
site of Altun Ha, thirty kilometers northwest of present-day Belize 
City. Settled at least as early as 200 B.C., the Altun Ha area at 
its peak had an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. At the be- 
ginning of the second century A.D., the inhabitants built their first 
major structure, a temple. The visitor today sees a group of tem- 
ples, priests' residences, and other buildings around two adjacent 
plazas. In the vicinity, there are hundreds of other structures, most 
of which are still unexcavated. The Maya continued to rebuild some 
of the temples until almost the end of the ninth century. Excava- 
tions at Altun Ha have produced evidence suggesting that a revolt, 
perhaps of peasants against the priestly class, contributed to the 
downfall of the civilization. People may have continued to live at 
or to visit the site in the postclassic period, even though the 
ceremonial centers were left to decay. Some rubbish found at Al- 
tun Ha shows that people were at the site in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries, perhaps to reuse the old structures or under- 
take pilgrimages to the old religious center. 

Other Mayan centers located in Belize include Xunantunich and 
Baking Pot in Cayo District, Lubaantun and Nimli Punit in Tole- 
do District, and Lamanai on Hill Bank Lagoon in Orange Walk 
District. Xunantunich, meaning "Lady of the Rock," was occupied 
perhaps as early as 300 B.C., but most of the architecture there 
was constructed in the late classic period. As in all the lowland 
Mayan centers, the inhabitants continually constructed temples and 
residences over older buildings, enlarging and raising the platforms 
and structures in the process. The views are breathtaking from 
Xunantunich's "El Castillo," which, at thirty-nine meters, is the 
tallest man-made structure in Belize. Lamanai, less accessible to 
tourists than Altun Ha or Xunantunich, is an important site be- 
cause it provides archaeological evidence of the Mayan presence 
over many centuries, beginning around A.D. 150. Substantial 



159 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



ITZA 




Source: Based on information from Narda Dobson, A History of Belize, London, 1973, 35. 

Figure 10. Belize: Mayan Settlements, A.D. 700-1700 

populations were present throughout the classic and postclassic peri- 
ods. Indeed, people living in the area were still refacing some of 
the massive ceremonial buildings after the great centers, such as 
Tikal in neighboring Guatemala, had been virtually abandoned 
in the tenth century. 

In the late classic period, probably at least 400,000 people inhab- 
ited the Belize area. People settled almost every part of the country 



160 



Belize: Historical Setting 



worth cultivating, as well as the cay (see Glossary) and coastal 
swamp regions. But in the tenth century, Mayan society suffered 
a severe breakdown. Construction of public buildings ceased, the 
administrative centers lost power, and the population declined as 
social and economic systems lost their coherence. Some people con- 
tinued to occupy, or perhaps reoccupied, sites such as Altun Ha, 
Xunantunich, and Lamanai. Still, these sites ceased being splen- 
did ceremonial and civic centers. 

The decline of Mayan civilization is still not fully explained. 
Rather than identifying the collapse as the result of a single factor, 
many archaeologists now believe that the decline of the Maya was 
a result of many complex factors and that the decline occurred at 
different times in different regions. 

Increasing information about Mayan culture and society helps 
explain the development, achievements, and decline of their an- 
cient civilization and suggests more continuities in Mayan history 
than once had been considered possible. The excavation of sites, 
such as those at Cuello, Cerros, Altun Ha, Xunantunich, and 
Lamanai, has shown the extraordinary persistence of Mayan peo- 
ple in Belize over many centuries. 

Pre-Columbian Mayan Societies and the Conquest 

Colonially oriented historians have asserted that the Maya had 
left the area long before the arrival of British settlers. But many 
Maya were still in Belize when the Europeans came in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. Archaeological and ethnohistorical 
research confirms that several groups of Mayan peoples lived in 
the area now known as Belize in the sixteenth century. The politi- 
cal geography of that period does not coincide with present-day 
boundaries, so several Mayan provinces lay across the frontiers 
of modern Belize, Mexico, and Guatemala. The Mayan province 
of Chetumal, for example, consisted of the northern part of present- 
day Belize and the southern coast of the Mexican state Quintana 
Roo. In the south, spreading west over the present-day frontier 
between Belize and Guatemala, were the Mopan Maya, and still 
farther south, the Choi-speaking Manche groups. In central Be- 
lize lay the province of Dzuluinicob, meaning "land of foreign- 
ers" or "foreign people." This province stretched from the New 
River in the north to the Sittee River in the south, and from close 
to the present-day Guatemalan border in the west to the sea. The 
apparent political center of this province was Tipu, located east 
of modern Benque Viejo del Carmen. Lamanai, several towns on 
the New River and on the Belize River, and Xibun on the Sibun 
River, were included in this province. 



161 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Christopher Columbus traveled to the Gulf of Honduras dur- 
ing his fourth voyage in 1502. A few years later, two of his naviga- 
tors, Martm Pinzon and Juan De Solis, sailed northward along 
the coast of Belize to the Yucatan. In 1519 Hernan Cortes con- 
quered Mexico, and Pedro Arias Davila founded Panama City. 
Spain soon sent expeditions to Guatemala and Honduras, and the 
conquest of the Yucatan began in 1527. When Cortes passed 
through the southwestern corner of present-day Belize in 1525, there 
were settlements of Choi-speaking Manche in that area. When the 
Spanish "pacified" the region in the seventeenth century, they for- 
cibly displaced these settlements to the Guatemalan highlands. The 
Spanish launched their main incursions into the area from the Yu- 
catan, however, and encountered stiff resistance from the Mayan 
provinces of Chetumal and Dzuluinicob. The region became a place 
of refuge from the Spanish invasion, but the escaping Maya brought 
with them diseases that they had contracted from the Spanish. Sub- 
sequent epidemics of smallpox and yellow fever, along with endemic 
malaria, devastated the indigenous population and weakened its 
ability to resist conquest. 

In the seventeenth century, Spanish missionaries from the Yu- 
catan traveled up the New River and established churches in Mayan 
settlements with the intention of converting and controlling these 
people. One such settlement was Tipu, which was excavated in 
the 1980s. People occupied the site during preclassic, classic, and 
postclassic times, and through the conquest period until 1707. 
Although conquered by the Spanish in 1544, Tipu was too far from 
the colonial centers of power to be effectively controlled for long. 
Thousands of Maya fled south from the Yucatan in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, and the people of Tipu rebelled against 
Spanish authority. Although Tipu was too far south for the Span- 
ish of the Yucatan to control, it was apparently too important to 
ignore because of its proximity to the Itza of the Lago Peten Itza 
region of present-day Guatemala. In 1618 and 1619, two Francis- 
cans, attempting to convert the people, built a church in Tipu. In 
1638 a period of resistance began in Tipu, and by 1642, the entire 
province of Dzuluinicob was in a state of rebellion. The Maya aban- 
doned eight towns at this time, and some 300 families relocated 
in Tipu, the center of rebellion. In the 1640s, Tipu's population 
totaled more than 1,000. 

Piracy along the coast increased during this period. In 1642, and 
again in 1648, pirates sacked Salamanca de Bacalar, the seat of 
Spanish government in the southern Yucatan. The abandonment 
of Bacalar ended Spanish control over the Mayan provinces of 
Chetumal and Dzuluinicob. 



162 



Belize: Historical Setting 



Between 1638 and 1695, the Maya living in the area of Tipu 
enjoyed autonomy from Spanish rule. But in 1696, Spanish sol- 
diers used Tipu as a base from which they pacified the area and 
supported missionary activities. In 1697 the Spanish conquered the 
Itza, and in 1707, the Spanish forcibly resettled the inhabitants 
of Tipu to the area near Lago Peten Itza. The political center of 
the Mayan province of Dzuluinicob ceased to exist at the time that 
British colonists were becoming increasingly interested in settling 
the area. 

The Emergence of the British Settlement 
Colonial Rivalry Between Spain and Britain 

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain tried to main- 
tain a monopoly on trade and colonization in its New World colo- 
nies, but northern European powers were increasingly attracted 
to the region by the potential for trade and settlement. These powers 
resorted to smuggling, piracy, and war in their efforts to challenge 
and then destroy Spain's monopoly. Early in the seventeenth cen- 
tury, the Dutch, English, and French encroached in areas where 
Spain was weak: the small islands of the Lesser Antilles, the no- 
man's-land of the Guianas between the Spanish and Portuguese 
dominions, and the uncharted coasts of the Yucatan and Central 
America. Later in the seventeenth century, England effectively 
challenged Spain in the western Caribbean, capturing Jamaica in 
1655 and subsequently using this base to support settiements all 
along the Caribbean coast from the Yucatan to Nicaragua. 

Early in the seventeenth century, on the shores of the Bay of 
Campeche in southeastern Mexico and on the Yucatan Peninsu- 
la, English buccaneers began cutting logwood, which was used in 
the production of a dye needed by the woolen industry. According 
to legend, one of these buccaneers, Peter Wallace, called "Ballis" 
by the Spanish, settled near and gave his name to the Belize River 
as early as 1638. English buccaneers began using the tortuous coast- 
line of the area as a base from which to attack Spanish ships. Some 
of the buccaneers may have been refugees expelled by the Spanish 
in 1641-42 from settlements on islands off the coasts of Nicaragua 
and Honduras. Buccaneers stopped plundering Spanish logwood 
ships and started cutting their own wood in the 1650s and 1660s. 
Logwood extraction then became the main reason for the English 
settlement for more than a century. 

A 1667 treaty, in which the European powers agreed to suppress 
piracy, encouraged the shift from buccaneering to cutting logwood 
and led to more permanent settlement. The 1670 Godolphin Treaty 



163 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

between Spain and England confirmed English possession of coun- 
tries and islands in the Western Hemisphere that England already 
occupied. Unfortunately, those colonies were not named, and 
ownership of the coastal area between the Yucatan and Nicaragua 
remained unclear. Conflict continued between Britain and Spain, 
over the right of the British to cut logwood and to settle in the region. 
In 1717 Spain expelled British logwood cutters from the Bay of 
Campeche west of the Yucatan. This action had the unintended 
effect of enhancing the significance of the growing British settle- 
ment near the Belize River. 

The first British settlers lived a rough and disorderly life. Ac- 
cording to Captain Nathaniel Uring, who was shipwrecked and 
forced to live with the logwood cutters for several months in 1720, 
the British were "generally a rude drunken Crew, some of which 
have been Pirates." He said he had "but little Comfort living 
among these Crew of ungovernable Wretches, where was little else 
to be heard but Blasphemy, Cursing and Swearing." 

During the eighteenth century, the Spanish attacked the British 
settlers repeatedly. In 1717, 1730, 1754, and 1779, the Spanish 
forced the British to leave the area. The Spanish never settled in 
the region, however, and the British always returned to expand 
their trade and settlement. At the end of the Seven Years' War 
in 1763, the Treaty of Paris conceded to Britain the right to cut 
and export logwood but asserted Spanish sovereignty over the ter- 
ritory. Still, there was never an agreement on the precise area in 
which logwood cutters could operate. The Spanish frontier town 
of Bacalar in the Yucatan, refounded in 1730 after having been 
deserted for almost a century, became a base for operations against 
the British. When war broke out again in 1779, the commandant 
of Bacalar led a successful expedition against the British settlement, 
which was abandoned until the Treaty of Versailles in 1 783 allowed 
the British to cut logwood in the area between the Hondo and Be- 
lize rivers. By that time, however, the logwood trade had declined 
and mahogany had become the chief export, so the settlers peti- 
tioned for a new agreement. 

Beginnings of Self-Government and the Plantocracy 

The British were reluctant to set up any formal government for 
the settlement for fear of provoking the Spanish. On their own in- 
itiative and without recognition by the British government, the set- 
tlers had begun annual elections of magistrates to establish common 
law for the settlement as early as 1738. In 1765 Rear Admiral Sir 
William Burnaby, commander in chief of Jamaica, arrived in the 
settlement and codified and expanded their regulations into a 



164 




Lighthouse near Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

document known as Burnaby's Code (see Constitutional and Po- 
litical Structures Prior to Independence, ch. 9). When the settlers 
began returning to the area in 1784, the governor of Jamaica named 
Colonel Edward Marcus Despard as superintendent to oversee the 
Settlement of Belize in the Bay of Honduras. 

The Convention of London, signed in 1786, allowed the British 
settlers, known as Baymen, to cut and export logwood and ma- 
hogany from the Hondo River in the north southward to the Sibun 
River. The convention, however, did not allow the Baymen to build 
fortifications, establish any form of government, military or civil, 
or develop plantation agriculture. Spain retained sovereignty over 
the area and asserted the right to inspect the settlement twice a 
year. Britain also agreed to evacuate its settlement on the Mosquito 
Coast (Costa de Mosquitos) in eastern Nicaragua. Over 2,000 of 
these settlers and their slaves arrived in 1787 in the settlement of 
Belize, reinforcing the British presence. 

The last Spanish attack on the British settlement occurred two 
years after the outbreak of war in 1796. The governor general of 
the Yucatan commanded a Spanish flotilla of some thirty vessels 
with some 500 sailors and 2,000 troops and attacked the British 
colonists in 1798. During several brief engagements culminating in a 
two-and-a-half-hour batde on September 10, the British drove off the 



165 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Spanish. The attack marked Spain's last attempt to control the ter- 
ritory or dislodge the British. 

Despite treaties banning local government and plantation agricul- 
ture, both activities flourished. In the late eighteenth century, an 
oligarchy of relatively wealthy settlers controlled the political econ- 
omy of the British settlement. These settlers claimed about four- 
fifths of the land available under the Convention of London, through 
resolutions, called location laws, which they passed in the Public 
Meeting, the name given to the first legislature. These same men 
also owned about half of all the slaves in the settlement; controlled 
imports, exports, and the wholesale and retail trades; and deter- 
mined taxation. A group of magistrates, whom they elected from 
among themselves, had executive as well as judicial functions, 
despite a prohibition on executive action. 

The landowners resisted any challenge to their growing politi- 
cal power. Colonel Edward Marcus Despard, the first superinten- 
dent appointed by the governor of Jamaica in 1784, was suspended 
in 1789 when the wealthy cutters challenged his authority. When 
Superintendent George Arthur attacked what he called the "mo- 
nopoly on the part of the monied cutters" in 1816, he was only 
partially successful in breaking their monopoly on landholding. He 
proclaimed that all unclaimed land was henceforth crown land that 
could be granted only by the crown's representative but continued 
to allow the existing monopoly of landownership. 

Slavery in the Settlement, 1794-1838 

Cutting logwood was a simple, small-scale operation, but the 
settlers imported slaves to help with the work. Slavery in the set- 
tlement was associated with the extraction of timber, first logwood 
and then mahogany, as treaties forbade the production of planta- 
tion crops. This difference in economic function gave rise to vari- 
ations in the organization, conditions, and treatment of slaves. The 
earliest reference to African slaves in the British setdement appeared 
in a 1724 Spanish missionary's account, which stated that the British 
recently had been importing them from Jamaica and Bermuda. 
A century later, the total slave population numbered about 2,300. 
Most slaves, even if they were brought through West Indian mar- 
kets, were born in Africa, probably from around the Bight of Benin, 
the Congo, and Angola — the principal sources of British slaves in 
the late eighteenth century. The Eboe, or Ibo, seem to have been 
particularly numerous; one section of Belize Town was known 
as Eboe Town in the first half of the nineteenth century. At first, 
many slaves maintained African ethnic identifications and cultural 



166 



Belize: Historical Setting 



practices. Gradually, however, the process of assimilation was creat- 
ing a new, synthetic Creole culture. 

The whites, although a minority in the settlement, monopolized 
power and wealth by dominating the chief economic activities of 
trade and cutting timber. They also controlled the first legislature 
and the judicial and administrative institutions. As a result, the 
British settlers had a disproportionate influence on the develop- 
ment of the Creole culture. Anglican, Baptist, and Methodist mis- 
sionaries helped devalue and suppress African cultural heritage. 

Cutting wood was seasonal work that required workers to spend 
several months isolated in temporary makeshift camps in the forest, 
away from families in Belize Town. Settlers needed only one or 
two slaves to cut logwood, a small tree that grows in clumps near 
the coast. But as the trade shifted to mahogany in the last quarter 
of the eighteenth century, the settlers needed more money, land, 
and slaves for larger-scale operations. After 1770 about 80 percent 
of all male slaves aged ten years or more cut timber. Huntsmen 
found the trees, which were then cut, trimmed, and hauled to the 
riverside. During the rainy season, settlers and slaves floated rafts 
of untrimmed logs downriver, where the wood was processed for 
shipment. Huntsmen were highly skilled and valued slaves, as were 
the axmen who cut the trees while standing on a springy platform 
four to five meters high. Another group of slaves cared for the oxen 
that pulled the huge logs to the river. Others trimmed the trees 
and cleared the tracks. The use of small gangs of slaves for cutting 
wood reduced the need for close supervision; whip- wielding drivers, 
who were ubiquitous on large plantations elsewhere, were unknown 
in the settlement. 

The colonial masters used domestic slaves, mostly women and 
children, to clean their houses; sew, wash, and iron their clothes; 
prepare and serve their food; and raise their children. Some slaves 
cultivated provisions that would either be sold or used to save their 
owners some of the cost of importing food. Other slaves worked 
as sailors, blacksmiths, nurses, and bakers. Few slaves, however, 
held jobs requiring a high level of skill. Young people started work 
by waiting on their masters' tables, where they were taught to obey; 
then most of the young women continued in domestic work while 
the young men became woodcutters. This rigid division of labor 
and the narrow range of work experience of most slaves limited 
their opportunities after legal emancipation in 1838. 

The slaves' experience, although different from that on planta- 
tions in other colonies in the region, was nevertheless oppressive. 
They were frequently the objects of "extreme inhumanity," as a 
report published in 1820 stated. The settlement's chaplain reported 



167 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

"instances, many instances, of horrible barbarity" against the 
slaves. The slaves' own actions, including suicide, abortion, mur- 
der, escape, and revolt, suggest how they viewed their situation. 
Slaves who lived in small, scattered, and remote groups could es- 
cape with relative ease if they were willing to leave their families. 
In the eighteenth century, many escaped to the Yucatan, and in 
the early nineteenth century a steady flow of runaways went to 
Guatemala and down the coast to Honduras. Some runaways es- 
tablished communities, such as one near the Sibun River, that 
offered refuge to others. When freedom could be attained by slip- 
ping into the bush, revolt was not such a pressing option. Neverthe- 
less, numerous slave revolts took place. The last revolt in 1820, 
led by two black slaves, Will and Sharper, involved a considerable 
number of well-armed individuals who "had been treated with very 
unnecessary harshness by their Owner, and had certainly good 
grounds for complaint." 

One way the settler minority maintained its control was by divid- 
ing the slaves from the growing population of free Creole people, 
who were given limited privileges. Though some Creoles were le- 
gally free, they could neither hold commissions in the military nor 
act as jurors or magistrates, and their economic activities were re- 
stricted. They could vote in elections only if they had owned more 
property and lived in the area longer than whites. Privileges, 
however, led many free blacks to stress their loyalty and accultu- 
ration to British ways. When officials in other colonies of the Brit- 
ish West Indies (see Glossary) began giving free blacks expanded 
legal rights, the British Colonial Office threatened to dissolve the 
Baymen's Public Meeting unless it followed suit. The "Coloured 
Subjects of Free Condition" were granted civil rights on July 5, 
1831, a few years before the abolition of slavery was completed. 

The essence of society, a rigidly hierarchical system in which 
people were ranked according to race and class, was well estab- 
lished by the time of full emancipation in 1838. The act to abolish 
slavery throughout the British colonies, passed in 1833, was in- 
tended to avoid drastic social changes by effecting emancipation 
over a five-year transition period. The act included two generous 
measures for slave owners: a system of "apprenticeship" calculated 
to extend their control over the former slaves, who were to con- 
tinue to work for their masters without pay, and compensation for 
the former slave owners for their loss of property. These measures 
helped ensure that the majority of the population, even when it was 
legally freed after apprenticeship ended in 1838, depended on their 
former owners for work. These owners still monopolized the land. 
Before 1838, a handful of the inhabitants controlled the settlement 



168 



Belize: Historical Setting 



and owned most of the people. After 1838 the masters of the set- 
tlement, a tiny elite, continued to control the country for over a 
century by denying access to land and by promoting economic de- 
pendency of the freed slaves through a combination of wage ad- 
vances and company stores. 

Emigration of the Garifuna 

At the same time that the settlement was grappling with the 
ramifications of the end of slavery, a new ethnic group, the Garifu- 
na, appeared. In the early 1800s, the Garifuna, descendants of 
Carib peoples of the Lesser Antilles and of Africans who had es- 
caped from slavery, arrived in the settlement (see Ethnicity, ch. 
7). The Garifuna had resisted British and French colonialism in 
the Lesser Antilles until they were defeated by the British in 1796. 
After putting down a violent Garifuna rebellion on Saint Vincent, 
the British moved between 1 ,700 and 5,000 of the Garifuna across 
the Caribbean to the Bay Islands (present-day Islas de la Bahfa) 
off the north coast of Honduras. From there they migrated to the 
Caribbean coasts of Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and the 
southern part of present-day Belize. By 1802 about 150 Garifuna 
had settled in the Stann Creek (present-day Dangriga) area and 
were engaged in fishing and farming. 

Other Garifuna later came to the British settlement of Belize af- 
ter finding themselves on the wrong side in a civil war in Hon- 
duras in 1832. Many Garifuna men soon found wage work 
alongside slaves as mahogany cutters. In 1841 Dangriga, the Garifu- 
na' s largest settlement, was a flourishing village. The American 
traveler John Stephens described the Garifuna village of Punta Gor- 
da as having 500 inhabitants and producing a wide variety of fruits 
and vegetables. 

The British treated the Garifuna as squatters. In 1857 the Brit- 
ish told the Garifuna that they must obtain leases from the crown 
or risk losing their lands, dwellings, and other buildings. The 1872 
Crown Lands Ordinance established reservations for the Garifu- 
na as well as the Maya. The British prevented both groups from 
owning land and treated them as a source of valuable labor. 

The Early Colony 

Constitutional Developments, 1850-62 

In the 1850s, the power struggle between the superintendent and 
the planters coincided with events in international diplomacy to pro- 
duce major constitutional changes. In the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 



169 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

of 1850, Britain and the United States agreed to promote the con- 
struction of a canal across Central America and to refrain from 
colonizing any part of Central America. The British government 
interpreted the colonization clause as applying only to any future 
occupation. But the United States government claimed that Brit- 
ain was obliged to evacuate the area, particularly after 1853, when 
President Franklin Pierce's expansionist administration stressed the 
Monroe Doctrine. Britain yielded on the Bay Islands and the 
Mosquito Coast in eastern Nicaragua. But in 1854, Britain 
produced a formal constitution establishing a legislature for its pos- 
session of the settlement in present-day Belize. 

The Legislative Assembly of 1854 was to have eighteen elected 
members, each of whom was to have at least £2,400 sterling worth 
of property. The assembly was also to have three official members 
appointed by the superintendent. The fact that voters had to have 
property yielding an income of £27 a year or a salary of a £2,100 
a year reinforced the restrictive nature of this legislature. The su- 
perintendent could defer or dissolve the assembly at any time, 
originate legislation, and give or withhold consent to bills. This 
situation suggested that the legislature was more a chamber of de- 
bate than a place where decisions were made. The Colonial Office 
in London became, therefore, the real political-administrative power 
in the settlement. This shift in power was reinforced in 1862 when 
the Settlement of Belize in the Bay of Honduras was declared a 
British colony called British Honduras, and the crown's represen- 
tative was elevated to a lieutenant governor, subordinate to the 
governor of Jamaica. 

Mayan Emigration and Conflict 

As the British consolidated their settlement and pushed deeper 
into the interior in search of mahogany in the late eighteenth cen- 
tury, they encountered resistance from the Maya. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, however, a combination of events 
outside and inside the colony redefined the position of the Maya. 

During the Caste War in the Yucatan, a devastating struggle 
that halved the population of the area between 1847 and 1855, thou- 
sands of refugees fled to the British settlement. The Legislative As- 
sembly had given large landowners in the colony firm titles to their 
vast estates in 1855 but did not allow the Maya to own land. The 
Maya could only rent land or live on reservations. Nevertheless, 
most of the refugees were small farmers who, by 1857, were grow- 
ing considerable quantities of sugar, rice, corn, and vegetables in 
the Northern District (now Corozal and Orange Walk districts). In 
1857 the town of Corozal, then six years old, had 4,500 inhabitants, 



170 



Belize: Historical Setting 



second in population only to Belize Town, which had 7,000 in- 
habitants. Some Maya, who had fled the strife in the north but 
had no wish to become subjects of the British, settled in the re- 
mote area of the Yalbac Hills, just beyond the woodcutting frontier 
in the northwest. By 1862 about 1,000 Maya established themselves 
in ten villages in this area, with the center in San Pedro. One group 
of Maya, led by Marcos Canul, attacked a mahogany camp on 
the Bravo River in 1866, demanding ransom for their prisoners 
and rent for their land. A detachment of British troops sent to San 
Pedro was defeated by the Maya later that year. Early in 1867, 
more than 300 British troops marched into the Yalbac Hills and 
destroyed the Mayan villages, provision stores, and granaries in 
an attempt to drive them out of the district. The Maya returned, 
however, and in April 1870, Canul and his men marched into 
Corozal and occupied the town. 

Two years later, Canul and 150 men attacked the barracks at 
Orange Walk. After several hours of fighting, Canul 's group re- 
tired. Canul, mortally wounded, died on September 1, 1872. That 
battle was the last serious attack on the colony. 

In the 1880s and 1890s, Mopan and Kekchf Maya fled from 
forced labor in Guatemala and came to British Honduras. They 
settled in several villages in southern British Honduras, mainly 
around San Antonio in Toledo District. The Maya could use crown 
lands set aside as reservations, but they lacked communal rights. 
Under the policy of indirect rule, a system of elected alcaldes 
(mayors), adopted from Spanish local government, linked these 
Maya to the colonial administration. However, the remote area 
of British Honduras in which they settled, combined with their 
largely subsistence way of life, resulted in the Mopan and Kekchf 
Maya maintaining more of their traditional way of life and be- 
coming less assimilated into the colony than the Maya of the 
north. The Mopan and Kekchf Maya maintained their langua- 
ges and a strong sense of identity. But in the north, the distinction 
between Maya and Spanish was increasingly blurred, as a Mes- 
tizo culture emerged. In different ways and to different degrees, 
then, the Maya who returned to British Honduras in the nineteenth 
century became incorporated into the colony as poor and dispos- 
sessed ethnic minorities. By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
ethnic pattern that remained largely intact throughout the twen- 
tieth century was in place: Protestants largely of African descent, 
who spoke either English or Creole and lived in Belize Town; 
the Roman Catholic Maya and Mestizos, who spoke Spanish 
and lived chiefly in the north and west; and the Roman Catholic 



171 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Garifuna who spoke English, Spanish, or Garifuna and settled on 
the southern coast. 

Formal Establishment of the Colony, 1862-71 

Largely as a result of the costly military expeditions against the 
Maya, the expenses of administering the new colony of British Hon- 
duras increased at a time when the economy was severely depressed. 
Great landowners and merchants dominated the Legislative As- 
sembly, which controlled the colony's revenues and expenditures. 
Some of the landowners were also involved in commerce, but their 
interest differed from the other merchants of Belize Town. The 
former group resisted the taxation of land and favored an increase 
in import duties; the latter preferred the opposite. Moreover, the 
merchants in the town felt relatively secure from Mayan attacks 
and were unwilling to contribute toward the protection of mahogany 
camps, whereas the landowners felt that they should not be required 
to pay taxes on lands given inadequate protection. These conflict- 
ing interests produced a stalemate in the Legislative Assembly, 
which failed to authorize the raising of sufficient revenue. Unable 
to agree among themselves, the members of the Legislative As- 
sembly surrendered their political privileges and asked for estab- 
lishment of direct British rule in return for the greater security of 
crown colony (see Glossary) status. The new constitution was in- 
augurated in April 1871, and the new legislature became the Legis- 
lative Council. 

Under the new constitution of 1871 , the lieutenant governor and 
the Legislative Council, consisting of five ex officio or "official" 
and four appointed or "unofficial" members, governed British 
Honduras. This constitutional change confirmed and completed 
a change in the locus and form of power in the colony's political 
economy that had been evolving during the preceding half century. 
The change moved power from the old settler oligarchy to the 
boardrooms of British companies and to the Colonial Office in 
London. 

Colonial Stagnation and Crisis 

The Colonial Order, 1871-1931 

The forestry industry's control of land and its influence in colonial 
decision making retarded the development of agriculture and the 
diversification of the economy. In many parts of the Caribbean, 
large numbers of former slaves, some of whom had engaged in the 
cultivation and marketing of food crops, became landowners. British 
Honduras had vast areas of sparsely populated, unused land. 



172 



Belize: Historical Setting 



Nevertheless, landownership was controlled by a small European 
monopoly, thwarting the evolution of a Creole landowning class 
from the former slaves. Rather than the former slaves, it was the 
Garifuna, Maya, and Mestizos who pioneered agriculture in 
nineteenth-century British Honduras. These groups either rented 
land or lived as squatters. However, the domination of the land 
by forestry interests continued to stifle agriculture and kept much 
of the population dependent on imported foods. 

Landownership became even more consolidated during the eco- 
nomic depression of the mid-nineteenth century. Exports of ma- 
hogany peaked at over 4 million linear meters in 1846 but fell to 
about 1.6 million linear meters in 1859 and 8,000 linear meters 
in 1870, the lowest level since the beginning of the century. Ma- 
hogany and logwood continued to account for over 80 percent of 
the total value of exports, but the price of these goods was so low 
that the economy was in a state of prolonged depression after the 
1850s. Major results of this depression included the decline of the 
old settler class, the increasing consolidation of capital and the in- 
tensification of British landownership. The British Honduras Com- 
pany emerged as the predominant landowner of the crown colony. 
The firm originated in a partnership between one of the old settler 
families and a London merchant and was registered in 1859 as a 
limited company. The firm expanded, often at the expense of others 
who were forced to sell their land. In 1875 the firm became the 
Belize Estate and Produce Company, a London-based business that 
owned about half of all the privately held land in the colony. The 
new company was the chief force in British Honduras' s political 
economy for over a century. 

This concentration and centralization of capital meant that the 
direction of the colony's economy was henceforth determined largely 
in London. It also signaled the eclipse of the old settler elite. By 
about 1890, most commerce in British Honduras was in the hands 
of a clique of Scottish and German merchants, most of them new- 
comers. This clique encouraged consumption of imported goods 
and thus furthered British Honduras 's dependence on Britain. The 
European minority exercised great influence in the colony's polit- 
ics, partly because it was guaranteed representation on the wholly 
appointed Legislative Council. The manager of the Belize Estate 
and Produce Company, for example, was automatically a mem- 
ber of the council, while members of the emerging Creole elite were 
excluded from holding seats on the council. The Creoles requested 
in 1890 that some seats on the council be opened to election (as 
had occurred in Canada and New Zealand) in the hope of winning 
seats, but the Legislative Council refused. In 1892 the governor 



173 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

appointed several Creole members, but whites remained the majori- 
ty. In the 1920s, the Colonial Office supported agitation for an 
elective council as long as the governor had reserve powers to al- 
low him to push through any measures he considered essential 
without the council's assent. But the council rejected these provi- 
sos, and the issue of restoring elections was postponed. 

Despite the prevailing stagnation of the colony's economy and 
society during most of the century prior to the 1930s, seeds of change 
were being sown. The mahogany trade remained depressed, and 
efforts to develop plantation agriculture in several crops, includ- 
ing sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, cotton, bananas, and coconuts, failed. 
A brief revival in the forestry industry took place early in the twen- 
tieth century as new demands for forest products came from the 
United States. Exports of chicle, a gum taken from the sapodilla 
tree and used to make chewing gum, propped up the economy from 
the 1880s. Much of the gum was tapped in Mexican and Guatema- 
lan forests by Mayan chicleros who had been recruited by labor con- 
tractors in British Honduras. A short-lived boom in the mahogany 
trade occurred around 1900 in response to growing demand for 
the wood in the United States, but the ruthless exploitation of the 
forests without any conservation or reforestation depleted resources. 
The introduction of tractors and bulldozers opened up new areas 
in the west and south in the 1920s, but this development led again 
to only a temporary revival. At that time, mahogany, cedar, and 
chicle together accounted for 97 percent of forest production and 
82 percent of the total value of exports. The economy, which was 
increasingly oriented toward trade with the United States, remained 
dependent and underdeveloped. 

Creoles, who were well-connected with businesses in the Unit- 
ed States, challenged the traditional political-economic connection 
with Britain as trade with the United States intensified. Men such 
as Robert S. Turton, the Creole chicle buyer for Wrigley's of Chica- 
go, and Henry I. Melhado, whose merchant family dealt in illicit 
liquor during prohibition, became major political and economic 
figures. In 1927 Creole merchants and professionals replaced the 
representatives of British landowners (except for the manager of 
the Belize Estate and Produce Company) on the Legislative Council. 
The participation of this Creole elite in the political process was 
evidence of emerging social changes that were largely concealed 
by economic stagnation. These changes accelerated with such force 
in the 1930s that they ushered in a new era of modern politics. 

The Genesis of Modern Politics, 1931-54 

The Great Depression shattered the colony's economy, and 



174 



Baron Bliss Institute, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



unemployment increased rapidly. The Colonial Report for 1931 stated 
that "contracts for the purchase of mahogany and chicle, which 
form the mainstay of the Colony, practically ceased altogether, 
thereby throwing a large number of the woodcutters and chicle- 
gatherers out of work." On top of this economic disaster, the worst 
hurricane in the country's recent history demolished Belize Town 
on September 10, 1931, killing more than 1,000 people and de- 
stroying at least three-quarters of the housing. The British relief 
response was tardy and inadequate. The British government seized 
the opportunity to impose tighter control on the colony and en- 
dowed the governor with reserve powers, or the power to enact 
laws in emergency situations without the consent of the Legisla- 
tive Council. The Legislative Council resisted but eventually passed 
a resolution agreeing to give the governor reserve powers in order 
to obtain disaster aid. Meanwhile, people in the town were mak- 
ing shelters out of the wreckage of their houses. The economy con- 
tinued to decline in 1932 and 1933. The total value of imports and 
exports in the latter year was little more than one-fourth of what 
it had been in 1929. 

The Belize Estate and Produce Company survived the depres- 
sion years because of its special connections in British Honduras 
and London. Since 1875 various members of the Hoare family had 



175 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

been principal directors and maintained a controlling interest in 
the company. Samuel Hoare, a shareholder and former director, 
was a former British cabinet member and a friend of Leo Amery, 
the British secretary of state for the colonies. In 1931 when the com- 
pany was suffering from the aftereffects of the hurricane and the 
depression, family member Oliver V.G. Hoare contacted the 
Colonial Office to discuss the possibility of selling the company to 
buyers in the United States. The British government rescued the 
company by granting it an area of virgin mahogany forest and a 
loan of US$200,000 to erect a sawmill in Belize Town. When the 
government almost doubled the land tax, the large landowners re- 
fused to pay. The government accepted some virtually worthless 
land in lieu of taxes and in 1935 capitulated completely, reducing 
the tax to its former rate and annulling the landowners' arrears 
by making them retroactive to 1931. But small landowners paid 
their taxes, often at a higher rate. 

Robert Turton, the Creole millionaire who made his fortune from 
chicle exports, defeated C.H. Brown, the expatriate manager of 
the company, in the first elections for some of the Legislative Coun- 
cil seats in 1936. After the elections, the governor promptly ap- 
pointed Brown to the council, presumably to maintain the influence 
of what had for so long been the colony's chief business. But Brown's 
defeat by Turton, one of the company's chief local business rivals, 
marked the decline of old British enterprises in relation to the ris- 
ing Creole entrepreneurs with their United States commercial con- 
nections. 

Meanwhile, the Belize Estate and Produce Company drove 
Mayan villagers from their homes in San Jose and Yalbac in the 
northwest and treated workers in mahogany camps almost like 
slaves. Investigators of labor conditions in the 1930s were appalled 
to discover that workers received rations of inferior flour and mess 
pork and tickets to be exchanged at the commissaries, in lieu of 
cash wages. As a result, workers and their families suffered from 
malnutrition and were continually in debt to their employers. The 
law governing labor contracts, the Masters and Servants Act of 
1883, made it a criminal offense for a laborer to breach a contract. 
The offense was punishable by twenty-eight days of imprisonment 
with hard labor. In 1931 the governor, Sir John Burdon, rejected 
proposals to legalize trade unions and to introduce a minimum wage 
and sickness insurance. The conditions, aggravated by rising un- 
employment and the disastrous hurricane, were responsible for se- 
vere hardship among the poor. The poor responded in 1934 with 
a series of demonstrations, strikes, petitions, and riots that marked 
the beginning of modern politics and the independence movement. 



176 



Belize: Historical Setting 



Riots, strikes, and rebellions had occurred before, during and 
after the period of slavery, but the events of the 1930s were modern 
labor disturbances in the sense that they gave rise to organizations 
with articulate industrial and political goals. In 1894 mahogany 
workers rioted against a cut in their real wages caused by devalua- 
tion. In 1919 demobilized Creole servicemen protested British ra- 
cism. But British troops soon stopped these spontaneous protests, 
which were indicative of discontent but had little lasting effect. In 
contrast, a group calling itself the Unemployed Brigade marched 
through Belize Town on February 14, 1934, to present demands 
to the governor and started a broad movement. Poor people, in 
desperation, turned to the governor, who responded by creating 
a little relief work — stone-breaking for US$0. 10 a day. The governor 
also offered a daily ration of two kilograms of cooked rice at the 
prison gates. 

The unemployed, demanding a cash dole, turned to Antonio 
Soberanis Gomez (1897-1975), who denounced the Unemployed 
Brigade's leaders at a meeting on March 16, 1934, and took over 
the movement. For the next few weeks, Soberanis and his colleagues 
of the Labourers and Unemployed Association (LUA) attacked the 
governor and his officials, the rich merchants, and the Belize Es- 
tate and Produce Company at biweekly meetings attended by 600 
to 800 people. The workers demanded relief and a minimum wage. 
They couched their demands in broad moral and political terms 
that began to define and develop a new nationalistic and democratic 
political culture. 

Soberanis was jailed under a new sedition law in 1935. Still, the 
labor agitation achieved a great deal. Of most immediate impor- 
tance was the creation of relief work by a governor who saw it as 
a way to avoid civil disturbances. Workers built more than 300 
kilometers of roads. The governor also pressed for a semirepresen- 
tative government. But when the new constitution was passed in 
April 1935, it included the restrictive franchise demanded by the 
appointed majority of the Legislative Council, which had no in- 
terest in furthering democracy. High voter-eligibility standards for 
property and income limited the electorate to the wealthiest 2 per- 
cent of the population. Poor people, therefore, could not vote; they 
could only support members of the Creole middle classes that op- 
posed big-business candidates. The Citizens' Political Party and 
the LUA endorsed Robert Turton and Arthur Balderamos, a Creole 
lawyer, who formed the chief opposition in the new council of 1936. 
Working-class agitation continued, and in 1939 all six seats on the 
Belize Town Board (the voting requirements allowed for a more 



177 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

representative electorate) went to middle-class Creoles who appeared 
more sympathetic to labor. 

The greatest achievements of the agitation of the 1930s were the 
labor reforms passed between 1941 and 1943. Trade unions were 
legalized in 1941 , but the laws did not require employers to recog- 
nize these unions. Furthermore, the penal clauses of the old Masters 
and Servants Act rendered the new rights ineffectual. Employers 
among the unofficial members at the Legislative Council defeated 
a bill to repeal these penal clauses in August 1941, but the Em- 
ployers and Workers Bill, passed on April 27, 1943, finally removed 
breach-of-labor-contract from the criminal code and enabled Brit- 
ish Honduras 's infant trade unions to pursue the struggle for im- 
proving labor conditions. The General Workers' Union (GWU), 
registered in 1943, quickly expanded into a nationwide organiza- 
tion and provided crucial support for the nationalist movement that 
took off with the formation of the People's United Party (PUP) 
in 1950 (see Political Parties, ch. 9). The 1930s were therefore the 
crucible of modern Belizean politics. It was a decade during which 
the old phenomena of exploitative labor conditions and authoritarian 
colonial and industrial relations began to give way to new labor 
and political processes and institutions. 

The same period saw an expansion in voter eligibility. Between 
1939 and 1954, less than 2 percent of the population elected six 
members in the Legislative Council of thirteen members. In 1945 
only 822 voters were registered in a population of over 63,000. The 
proportion of voters increased slightly in 1945, partly because the 
minimum age for women voters was reduced from thirty to twenty- 
one years. The devaluation of the British Honduras dollar in 1949 
effectively reduced the property and income voter-eligibility stan- 
dards. Finally, in 1954 British Honduras achieved suffrage for all 
literate adults as a result of the emerging independence movement. 
This development was a prelude to the process of constitutional 
decolonization. 

The origins of the independence movement also lay in the 1930s 
and 1940s. Three groups played important roles in the colony's 
politics during this period. One group consisted of working-class 
individuals and emphasized labor issues. This group originated with 
Soberanis's LUA between 1934 and 1937 and continued through 
the GWU. The second group, a radical nationalist movement, 
emerged during World War II. Its leaders came from the LUA 
and the local branch of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improve- 
ment Association. The group called itself variously the British Hon- 
duras Independent Labour Party, the People's Republican Party, 
and the People's National Committee. The third group consisted 



178 




Prime Minister 
George Cadle Price 
Courtesy Belize Government 
Information Service 



of people who engaged in electoral politics within the narrow limits 
defined by the constitution and whose goals included a "Natives 
First" campaign and an extension of the franchise to elect a more 
representative government. 

In 1947 a group of graduates of the elite Saint John's College 
won control of the Belize City Council and started a newspaper, 
the Belize Billboard. One member of this group, George Cadle Price, 
topped the polls in the 1947 election when he opposed immigra- 
tion schemes and import controls and rode a wave of feeling against 
a British proposal for a federation of its colonies in the Caribbean. 
Price was an eclectic and pragmatic politician whose ideological 
position was often obscured under a cloak of religious values and 
quotations. He has remained the predominant politician in the 
country since the early 1950s. 

The event that precipitated Price's political career and the for- 
mation of the PUP was the devaluation of the British Honduras 
dollar on December 31, 1949. In September 1949, the British 
government devalued the British pound sterling. In spite of repeated 
denials by the governor that the British Honduras dollar would 
be devalued to maintain the old exchange rate with the British 
pound, devaluation was nevertheless effected by the governor, us- 
ing his reserve powers in defiance of the Legislative Council. The 
governor's action angered the nationalists because it reflected the 
limits of the legislature and revealed the extent of the colonial 



179 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

administration's power. The devaluation enraged labor because 
it protected the interests of the big transnationals, such as the Be- 
lize Estate and Produce Company, whose trade in British pounds 
would have suffered without devaluation. It subjected British Hon- 
duras 's middle class, already experiencing widespread unemploy- 
ment and poverty, to higher prices for goods — especially 
food — imported from the United States. Devaluation thus united 
labor, nationalists, and the Creole middle classes in opposition to 
the colonial administration. On the night that the governor declared 
the devaluation, the People's Committee was formed and the na- 
scent independence movement suddenly matured. 

Between 1950 and 1954, the PUP, formed upon the dissolution 
of the People's Committee on September 29, 1950, consolidated 
its organization, established its popular base, and articulated its 
primary demands. Belize Billboard editors Philip Goldson and Leigh 
Richardson were prominent members of the PUP. They gave the 
party their full support through anticolonial editorials. The PUP 
received the crucial support of the GWU, whose president, Clifford 
Betson, was one of the original members of the People's Commit- 
tee. Before the end of January 1950, the GWU and the People's 
Committee were holding joint public meetings and discussing is- 
sues such as devaluation, labor legislation, the proposed West In- 
dies Federation, and constitutional reform. Because the GWU was 
the only mass organization of working people, the early success 
of the PUP would have been impossible without the support of this 
union. On April 28, however, the middle-class members of the Peo- 
ple's Committee (formerly members of the Christian Social Ac- 
tion Group, to which the founders of the Belize Billboard belonged) 
took over the leadership of the union and gave Betson the dubious 
honorific title of "patriarch of the union." A year later, George 
Price, the secretary of the PUP, became vice president of the un- 
ion. The political leaders took control of the union to use its strength, 
but the union movement declined as it became increasingly de- 
pendent upon politicians in the 1950s. 

The PUP concentrated on agitating for constitutional reforms, 
including universal adult suffrage without a literacy test, an all- 
elected Legislative Council, an Executive Council chosen by the 
leader of the majority party in the legislature, the introduction of 
a ministerial system, and the abolition of the governor's reserve 
powers. In short, the PUP pushed for representative and respon- 
sible government. The colonial administration, alarmed by the 
growing support for the PUP, retaliated by attacking two of the 
party's chief public platforms. In July 1951, the governor dissolved 
the Belize City Council on the pretext that it had shown disloyalty by 



180 



Belize: Historical Setting 



refusing to display a picture of King George VI. Then, in October, 
the governor charged Belize Billboard publishers and owners, includ- 
ing Richardson and Goldson, with sedition. The governor jailed 
them for twelve months with hard labor. Soon after, PUP leader 
John Smith resigned because the party would not agree to fly the 
British flag at public meetings. The removal of three of four chief 
leaders was a blow to the party, but the events left Price in a power- 
ful position. In 1952 he comfortably topped the polls in Belize City 
Council elections. Within just two years, despite persecution and di- 
vision, the PUP had become a powerful political force, and George 
Price had clearly become the party's leader. 

The colonial administration and the National Party, which con- 
sisted of loyalist members of the Legislative Council, portrayed the 
PUP as pro-Guatemalan and even communist. The leaders of the 
PUP, however, perceived British Honduras as belonging to neither 
Britain nor Guatemala. The governor and the National Party failed 
in their attempts to discredit the PUP on the issue of its contacts 
with Guatemala, which was then ruled by the democratic, reform- 
ist government of President Jacobo Arbenz. When voters went to 
the polls on April 28, 1954, in the first election under universal 
literate adult suffrage, the main issue was clearly colonialism — a 
vote for the PUP was a vote in favor of self-government. Almost 
70 percent of the electorate voted. The PUP gained 66.3 percent 
of the vote and won eight of the nine elected seats in the new Legis- 
lative Assembly. Further constitutional reform was unequivocally 
on the agenda. 

Decolonization and the Border Dispute with Guatemala 

British Honduras faced two obstacles to independence: British 
reluctance until the early 1960s to allow citizens to govern them- 
selves, and Guatemala's complete intransigence over its long- 
standing claim to the entire territory (Guatemala had repeatedly 
threatened to use force to take over British Honduras). By 1961 
Britain was willing to let the colony become independent. From 
1964 Britain controlled only defense, foreign affairs, internal secu- 
rity, and the terms and conditions of the public service. On June 
1, 1973, the colony's name was changed to Belize in anticipation 
of independence. After 1975 Britain allowed the colonial govern- 
ment to internationalize its case for independence, so Belizeans par- 
ticipated in international diplomacy even before the area became 
a sovereign nation. The stalemate in the protracted negotiations 
between Britain and Guatemala over the future status of Belize 
led Belizeans to seek the international community's assistance in 
resolving issues associated with independence. Even after Belize 



181 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

became independent in 1981, however, the territorial dispute re- 
mained unsettled. 

The territorial dispute's origins lay in the eighteenth-century 
treaties in which Britain acceded to Spain's assertion of sovereignty 
while British settlers continued to occupy the sparsely settled and 
ill-defined area (see Colonial Rivalry Between Spain and Britain, 
this ch.). The 1786 Convention of London, which affirmed Span- 
ish sovereignty, was never renegotiated, but Spain never attempted 
to reclaim the area after 1798. Subsequent treaties between Brit- 
ain and Spain failed to mention the British settlement. By the time 
Spain lost control of Mexico and Central America in 1821, Brit- 
ain had extended its control over the area, albeit informally and 
unsystematically. By the 1830s, Britain regarded the entire terri- 
tory between the Hondo River and Sarstoon River as British. 

The independent republics that emerged from the disintegrat- 
ing Spanish Empire in the 1820s claimed that they had inherited 
Spain's sovereign rights in the area. Britain, however, never ac- 
cepted such a doctrine. Based on this doctrine of inheritance, Mex- 
ico and Guatemala asserted claims to Belize. Mexico once claimed 
the portion of British Honduras north of the Sibun River but 
dropped the claim in a treaty with Britain in 1893. Since then, Mex- 
ico has stated that it would revive the claim only if Guatemala were 
successful in obtaining all or part of the nation. Still, Mexico was 
the first nation to recognize Belize as an independent country. 

At the center of Guatemala's claim was the 1859 treaty between 
Britain and Guatemala. From Britain's viewpoint, this treaty merely 
settled the boundaries of an area already under British dominion. 
But Guatemala later developed the view that this agreement was 
a treaty of cession through which Guatemala would give up its ter- 
ritorial claims only under certain conditions, including the con- 
struction of a road from Guatemala to the Caribbean coast. 
Guatemala said it would repudiate the treaty in 1884 but never 
followed up on the threat. The dispute appeared to have been for- 
gotten until the 1930s, when the government of General Jorge Ubico 
claimed that the treaty was invalid because the road had not been 
constructed. Britain argued that because neither the short-lived Cen- 
tral American Federation (1821-39) nor Guatemala had ever ex- 
ercised any authority in the area or even protested the British 
presence in the nineteenth century, British Honduras was clearly 
under British sovereignty. In its constitution of 1945, however, 
Guatemala stated that British Honduras was the twenty-third 
department of Guatemala. Since 1954 a succession of military and 
right-wing governments in Guatemala frequently whipped up na- 
tionalist sentiment, generally to divert attention from domestic 



182 



Belize: Historical Setting 



problems. Guatemala periodically massed troops on the bor- 
der with Belize in a threatening posture. 

Negotiations between Britain and Guatemala began again in 
1961, but the elected representatives of British Honduras had no 
voice in these talks. George Price refused an invitation from 
Guatemalan President Ydfgoras Fuentes to make British Honduras 
an "associated state" of Guatemala. Price reiterated his goal of 
leading the colony to independence. In 1963 Guatemala broke off 
talks and ended diplomatic relations with Britain. In 1965 Britain 
and Guatemala agreed to have a United States lawyer, appointed 
by President Lyndon Johnson, mediate the dispute. The lawyer's 
draft treaty proposed giving Guatemala so much control over the 
newly independent country, including internal security, defense, 
and external affairs, that Belize would have become more depen- 
dent on Guatemala than it was already on Britain. The United 
States supported the proposals. All parties in British Honduras, 
however, denounced the proposals, and Price seized the initiative 
by demanding independence from Britain with appropriate defense 
guarantees. 

A series of meetings, begun in 1969, ended abrupdy in 1972 when 
Britain announced it was sending an aircraft carrier and 8,000 
troops to Belize to conduct amphibious exercises. Guatemala then 
massed troops on the border. Talks resumed between 1973 and 
1975 but again broke off as tensions flared. At this point, the 
Belizean and British governments, frustrated at dealing with the 
military-dominated regimes in Guatemala, agreed on a new strat- 
egy that would take the case for self-determination to various 
international forums. The Belize government felt that by gaining 
international support, it could strengthen its position, weaken 
Guatemala's claims, and make it harder for Britain to make any 
concessions. 

Belize argued that Guatemala frustrated the country's legitimate 
aspirations to independence and that Guatemala was pushing an 
irrelevant claim and disguising its own colonial ambitions by try- 
ing to present the dispute as an effort to recover territory lost to 
a colonial power. Between 1975 and 1981, Belizean leaders stated 
their case for self-determination at a meeting of the heads of Com- 
monwealth of Nations governments in Jamaica, the conference of 
ministers of the Nonaligned Movement in Peru, and at meetings 
of the United Nations (UN). The support of the Nonaligned Move- 
ment proved crucial and assured success at the UN. 

Latin American governments initially supported Guatemala. 
Cuba was the first Latin country, in December 1975, to support 



183 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Belize in a UN vote that affirmed Belize's right to self- 
determination, independence, and territorial integrity. The out- 
going Mexican president, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, indicated that 
Mexico would appeal to the Security Council to prevent Guatema- 
la's designs on Belize from threatening peace in the area. In 1976 
President Omar Torrijos of Panama began campaigning for Be- 
lize's cause, and in 1979 the Sandinista government in Nicaragua 
declared unequivocal support for an independent Belize. 

In each of the annual votes on this issue in the UN, the United 
States abstained, thereby giving the Guatemalan government some 
hope that it would retain United States backing. Finally, in Novem- 
ber 1980, with Guatemala completely isolated, the UN passed a 
resolution that demanded the independence of Belize, with all its 
territory intact, before the next session of the UN in 1981. The 
UN called on Britain to continue defending the new nation of Be- 
lize. It also called on all member countries to offer their assistance. 

A last attempt was made to reach an agreement with Guatema- 
la prior to the independence of Belize. The Belizean representa- 
tives to the talks made no concessions, and a proposal, called the 
Heads of Agreement, was initialed on March 11, 1981 . However, 
when ultraright political forces in Guatemala labeled the proposals 
a sellout, the Guatemalan government refused to ratify the agree- 
ment and withdrew from the negotiations. Meanwhile, the oppo- 
sition in Belize engaged in violent demonstrations against the Heads 
of Agreement. The demonstrations resulted in four deaths, many 
injuries, and damage to the property of PUP leaders and their fam- 
ilies. A state of emergency was declared. However, the opposition 
could offer no real alternatives. With the prospect of independence 
celebrations in the offing, the opposition's morale fell. Indepen- 
dence came to Belize on September 21 , 1981 , without reaching an 
agreement with Guatemala (see Relations with Guatemala, ch. 9). 

* * * 

A good general study of Belize that is historical in its perspec- 
tive is O. Nigel Bolland's Belize: A New Nation in Central America. 
Narda Dobson's A History of Belize is fairly comprehensive but rather 
dated. More specific studies, in terms of the period or topic covered, 
include Grant D. Jones's Maya Resistance to Spanish Rule: Time and 
History on a Colonial Frontier, R.A. Humphreys's The Diplomatic His- 
tory of British Honduras, 1638-1901, and Wayne M. Clegern's Brit- 
ish Honduras: Colonial Dead End, 1859-1900. Humphreys examines 
the relations between Britain and Spain in the settlement's early 



184 



Belize: Historical Setting 



years and between Britain and British Honduras 's neighbors in 
the nineteenth century; Clegern focuses on economic and political 
changes in the late nineteenth century and pays special attention 
to boundary questions. 

Three other books by Bolland analyze specific aspects of Belize's 
history: Land in Belize, 1765-1871, written with Assad Shoman, 
details the origins and development of the patterns of land use, 
the land laws, and the concentration of land ownership in the colo- 
ny's formative years and includes a chapter on the legacy of the 
plantation economy in the 1970s; The Formation of a Colonial Socie- 
ty: Belize from Conquest to Crown Colony studies the social and eco- 
nomic conditions of Belize in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, including slavery and emancipation, and the rise and 
decline of the settlers' political economy; and Colonialism and 
Resistance in Belize: Essays in Historical Sociology is a collection of es- 
says on various topics, including the social relations of the early 
British settlement, slavery, the emergence of Creole culture, the 
colonization of the Maya, labor conditions in the century after 
emancipation, the labor movement and the genesis of modern pol- 
itics, and the problems of creating nationalism in a multiethnic 
society. 

Cedric H. Grant's The Making of Modern Belize: Politics, Society, 
and British Colonialism in Central America examines in detail Belizean 
politics between 1950 and 1974, and Assad Shoman's Party Politics 
in Belize, 1950-1986 analyses the emergence and development of 
the electoral and party system. J. Ann Zammit's The Belize Issue 
summarizes the dispute with Guatemala prior to Belize's indepen- 
dence. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



185 



Chapter 7. Belize: 
The Society and Its Environment 



Ixchel, Mayan goddess of medicine and childbirth 



BELIZE IS A CULTURAL ANOMALY in Central America, 
with a society oriented more to Britain, the English-speaking Carib- 
bean countries, and North America than to neighboring Spanish- 
speaking republics. During the 1980s, efforts to forge a common 
national identity among a small, multiethnic population challenged 
the colonial orientations of Belizean society. Regional conflicts, 
migration, and intensified relationships with the United States also 
posed challenges. 

The deepening of social, economic, and political ties to the United 
States during the 1980s prompted critics in Belize and abroad to 
complain that the country merely exchanged one colonial master 
for another. In addition, emigration of Belizeans to the United 
States and of Central Americans to Belize further challenged Be- 
lizean society, which was already deeply divided by differences of 
ethnicity, race, and class. 

Geography 

Boundaries, Area, and Relative Size 

Belize is located on the Caribbean coast of northern Central 
America. It shares a border on the north with the Mexican state 
of Quintana Roo, on the west with the Guatemalan department 
of Peten, and on the south with the Guatemalan department of 
Izabal. To the east in the Caribbean Sea, the second-longest bar- 
rier reef in the world flanks much of the 386 kilometers of 
predominantly marshy coastline. Small cays (see Glossary) total- 
ing about 690 square kilometers dot the reef. The area of the country 
totals 22,960 square kilometers, an area slightly larger than El Sal- 
vador or Massachusetts. The abundance of lagoons along the coasts 
and in the northern interior reduces the actual land area to 21 ,400 
square kilometers (see fig. 11). 

Belize is shaped like a rectangle that extends about 280 kilome- 
ters north-south and about 100 kilometers east- west, with a total 
land boundary length of 516 kilometers. The undulating courses 
of two rivers, the Hondo and the Sarstoon, define much of the 
course of the country's northern and southern boundaries. The 
western border follows no natural features and runs north-south 
through lowland forest and highland plateau. 



189 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 




Figure 11. Belize: Topography and Drainage 



190 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

Geology 

Belizean geology consists largely of varieties of limestone, with 
the notable exception of the Maya Mountains, a large intrusive 
block of granite and other Paleozoic sediments running northeast 
to southwest across the south-central part of the country. Several 
major faults rive these highlands, but much of Belize lies outside 
the tectonically active zone that underlies most of Central Ameri- 
ca. During the Cretaceous period, what is now the western part 
of the Maya Mountains stood above sea level, creating the oldest 
land surface in Central America, the Mountain Pine Ridge plateau. 

The hilly regions surrounding the Maya Mountains are formed 
from Cretaceous limestone. These areas are characterized by a karst 
topography that is typified by numerous sinkholes, caverns, and 
underground streams. In contrast to the Mountain Pine Ridge, 
some of the soils in these regions are quite fertile and have been 
cultivated during at least the past 4,000 years. 

Much of the northern half of Belize lies on the Yucatan Plat- 
form, a tectonically stable region. Although mostly level, this part 
of the country also has occasional areas of hilly, karst terrain, such 
as the Yalbac Hills along the western border with Guatemala and 
the Manatee Hills between Belize City and Dangriga. Alluvial 
deposits of varying fertility cover the relatively flat landscapes of 
the coastal plains. 

Physical Features 

Topographical features divide the Belizean landscape into two 
main physiographic regions. The most visually striking of these 
regions is distinguished by the Maya Mountains and the associat- 
ed basins and plateaus that dominate all but the narrow coastal 
plain in the southern half of the country. The mountains rise to 
heights of about 1,100 meters, with the highest point being Vic- 
toria Peak (1,120 meters) in the Cockscomb Mountains. Covered 
with shallow, highly erodible soils of low fertility, these heavily 
forested highlands are very sparsely inhabited. 

The second region comprises the northern lowlands, along with 
the southern coastal plain. Eighteen major rivers and many peren- 
nial streams drain these low-lying areas. The coastline is flat and 
swampy, with many lagoons, especially in the northern and cen- 
tral parts of the country. Westward from the northern coastal areas, 
the terrain changes from mangrove swamp to tropical pine savan- 
nah and hardwood forest. 

The interlocking networks of rivers, creeks, and lagoons have 
played a key role in the historical geography of Belize. The largest 



191 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

and most historically important river is the Belize, which drains 
more than one-quarter of the country as it winds along the north- 
ern edge of the Maya Mountains across the center of the country 
to the sea near Belize City. Also known as the Old River, the Be- 
lize River is navigable up to the Guatemalan border and served 
as the main artery of commerce and communication between the 
interior and the coast until well into the twentieth century. Other 
historically important rivers include the Sibun, which drains the 
northeastern edge of the Maya Mountains, and the New River, 
which flows through the northern sugar-growing areas before emp- 
tying into Chetumal Bay. Both of these river valleys possess fertile 
alluvial soils and have supported considerable cultivation and hu- 
man settlement. 

Natural Resources 

Although a number of economically important minerals exist in 
Belize, none has been found in quantities large enough to warrant 
their mining (see Mining and Energy, ch. 8). These minerals in- 
clude dolomite, barite (source of barium), bauxite (source of alu- 
minum), cassite (source of tin), and gold. In 1990 limestone, used 
in roadbuilding, was the only mineral resource being exploited for 
either domestic or export use. 

The similarity of Belizean geology to that of oil-producing areas 
of Mexico and Guatemala prompted oil companies, principally from 
the United States, to explore for petroleum at both offshore and 
on-land sites in the early 1980s. Initial results were promising, but 
the pace of exploration slowed later in the decade, and production 
operations never commenced. As a result, Belize remains almost 
totally dependent on imported petroleum for its energy needs. 
However, the country does possess considerable potential for 
hydroelectric and other renewable energy resources, such as solar 
and biomass. In the mid-1980s, one Belizean businessman even 
proposed the construction of a wood-burning power station for the 
production of electricity, but the idea foundered in the wake of eco- 
logical concerns and economic constraints. 

Climate 

Belize has a tropical climate with pronounced wet and dry sea- 
sons, although there are significant variations in weather patterns 
by region. Temperatures vary according to elevation, proximity 
to the coast, and the moderating effects of the northeast trade winds 
off the Caribbean. Average temperatures in the coastal regions 
range from 24°C in January to 27°C in July. Temperatures are 
slightly higher inland, except for the southern highland plateaus, 



192 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

such as the Mountain Pine Ridge, where it is noticeably cooler year 
round. Overall, the seasons are marked more by differences in hu- 
midity and rainfall than in temperature. 

Average rainfall varies considerably, ranging from 1,350 mil- 
limeters in the north and west to over 4,500 millimeters in the ex- 
treme south. Seasonal differences in rainfall are greatest in the 
northern and central regions of the country where, between Janu- 
ary and April or May, fewer than 100 millimeters of rain fall per 
month. The dry season is shorter in the south, normally only last- 
ing from February to April. A shorter, less rainy period, known 
locally as the "little dry," usually occurs in late July or August, 
after the initial onset of the rainy season. 

Hurricanes have played key — and devastating — roles in Belize- 
an history. In 1931 an unnamed hurricane destroyed over two- 
thirds of the buildings in Belize City and killed more than 1,000 
people. In 1955 Hurricane Janet leveled the northern town of 
Corozal. Only six years later, Hurricane Hattie struck the central 
coastal area of the country, with winds in excess of 300 kilometers 
per hour and four-meter storm tides. The devastation of Belize City 
for the second time in thirty years prompted the relocation of the 
capital some eighty kilometers inland to the planned city of Bel- 
mopan. The most recent hurricane to devastate Belize was Hurri- 
cane Greta, which caused more than US$25 million in damages 
along the southern coast in 1978. 

Population and Settlement Patterns 
Size, Growth, and Distribution 

Perhaps the most pronounced feature of the Belizean popula- 
tion, aside from its ethnic heterogeneity, is its small size. In 1980 
the population was estimated at approximately 145,000. Slightly 
more than 50 percent of the people resided in eight urban areas, 
with more than 30 percent in Belize City. By 1990, the pattern of 
population distribution had changed, with 51.8 percent of the ap- 
proximately 191,000 Belizeans living in rural areas. The growth in 
the rural population during the 1980s stemmed primarily from the 
influx of Central American immigrants who had moved to Belize's 
countryside. Meanwhile, many urban Belizeans moved to the United 
States and elsewhere. Even with the increase in its overall popula- 
tion, Belize remained one of the least densely populated countries 
in the Americas, averaging 8.5 persons per square kilometer in 1991 . 

Belize is divided administratively into six districts: Corozal, 
Orange Walk, Belize, Cayo, Stann Creek, and Toledo (see fig. 9). 
In 1991, more than one in three Belizeans lived in Belize District 



193 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



AGE-GROUP 



85 and over 
80-84 
75-79 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 



12 



■ 2 



W7A 



wtrnzzzzi 



FEMALES 



Y//////////A 



Y////////////77771 



V//////////////////A 



1 



I 



Y/////////////////////A 



7////////////////////////A 



I 



F 



f 

15 10 5 5 10 

PERCENT TOTAL POPULATION 



15 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Belize, 1987, Wiesbaden, 1987, 17. 



Figure 12. Belize: Estimated Population by Age and Sex, 1986 

(including Belize City), which had a population density five times 
greater than the least populated district, Toledo (see table 10, Ap- 
pendix A). 

As in many other developing societies, the Belizean population 
was unevenly divided by age and gender (see fig. 12). The ratio 
of males and females in the population has varied considerably over 
the last century. In the 1980s, males outnumbered females in most 
age groups. Shifts in the gender ratio have generally been attributed 
to changing migration patterns. In the 1940s and 1950s, the emigra- 
tion stream was predominantly male, but in the 1980s women 
emigrants outnumbered men. 

Consistent with the demographic profile of most developing 
nations was the general youthfulness of the Belizean population. 
In 1990 some 46 percent of Belizeans were fourteen years of age 
or younger and some 58 percent were under the age of twenty. 



194 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

Regular declines in the death rate have steadily increased the 
proportion of the population sixty-five years of age and older, to 
4.6 percent in 1980. 

The average crude birthrate for Belize experienced slow but 
steady decline, from 44. 1 per 1 ,000 population in 1963 to 35.0 per 
1,000 in 1990. The average fertility rate also dropped from nearly 
7 children per woman in the late 1960s to 5.4 in 1985. Coupled 
with declining death and infant mortality rates, the high birthrate 
between 1970 and 1980 indicated a potential population increase 
of more than 3.0 percent for the decade. However, the actual in- 
crease between 1970 and 1980 was only 1.9 percent, indicating a 
very high rate of emigration, perhaps involving as many as one 
in every eight Belizeans. During the 1980s, the rate of natural popu- 
lation increase was about 3.0 percent for the decade. The differ- 
ence between projected and actual population increase for the period 
1980-90 was considerably less than in the 1970s, as the actual rate 
of increase was some 2.4 percent. The closer correspondence of 
these two figures reflected not so much a decline in emigration by 
Belizeans, as the scale and demographic impact of the immigra- 
tion from the surrounding Central American republics. 

Migration 

Continuous migration has made it difficult to determine accurate- 
ly the size and social composition of the Belizean population and 
to project future growth. Although small numbers of Belizeans have 
emigrated to Britain, Canada, and the West Indies (see Glossary), 
the principal destination of most Belizean emigrants has been the 
United States. Estimates of the Belizean population in the United 
States have varied between 30,000 and 100,000. The United States 
Embassy in Belize has estimated that in 1984, about 55,000 Beliz- 
eans were residing in the United States, with two of three living 
there illegally. Settling primarily in New York City, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Miami, and New Orleans, most of these emigrants were 
either Creole (see Glossary) or Garifuna (see Glossary). Their remit- 
tances, estimated at US$11 million in 1984, played an important 
role in the subsistence of many Belizean households, especially in 
Belize City and Dangriga. Later estimates were that as many as 
65,000 Belizeans were living in the United States by mid- 1988, 
with the majority ranging in age from twenty to thirty-four. 

Estimates of the immigrant population in Belize also varied wide- 
ly. According to the 1980 census, more than 10 percent of the popu- 
lation, or roughly 15,000 people, were born in other countries. 
One of two immigrants came from either Guatemala, Mexico, 
Honduras, or El Salvador. By the late 1980s, these figures were 



195 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

considerably higher because immigration continued, albeit on a 
lesser scale, over the course of the decade. The percentages of im- 
migrants who were from Mexico and Central America, the num- 
bers of foreign-born refugees, and the numbers of Belizeans who 
had been born in other countries all increased. The number of Sal- 
vadoran refugees living in Belize was estimated at between 2,000 
and 15,000 in the late 1980s, and recent studies claim that between 
25,000 and 31,000 citizens of neighboring republics had entered 
the country since 1977. 

The presence of these "aliens," as they were popularly known, 
was visible in Belize. As of 1991, Salvadoran and Guatemalan ven- 
dors lined the sidewalks of Belize City's main commercial street 
and were prominent in the marketplaces of Orange Walk, Dan- 
griga, and especially the capital, Belmopan. Belizeans derisively 
dubbed a recently developed satellite shantytown in Belmopan as 
"Salvapan." Along the remote Hummingbird and Southern high- 
ways, the fields of the new migrants cut dramatic swaths in the 
previously uninhabited forest. This situation raised environmen- 
talists' concerns about soil erosion. Although Central American 
immigrants have settled throughout the country, they have been 
most heavily concentrated in the rural areas of Cayo and Toledo 
districts. 

The emigration of English-speaking Creoles and Garifuna to the 
United States and the immigration of Spanish-speaking Mestizos 
(see Glossary) from Central America exacerbated ethnic tensions 
and challenged long-held assumptions regarding the character of 
Belizean culture, which has traditionally been oriented toward the 
English-speaking Caribbean. Although they comprised only 40 per- 
cent of the total population in 1980, Creoles long considered Be- 
lize "their" country — black, English-speaking, and Protestant. 
Moreover, Guatemala's persistent claim to Belize's territory caused 
many Belizeans, especially Creoles, to be antagonistic toward 
Hispanic culture. A key problem in the drive toward building the 
Belizean nation was the substitution of an ideology of cultural plural- 
ism for undisputed Creole cultural dominance. Neither educational 
efforts nor political rhetoric has been completely successful in this 
regard. Indeed, by the early 1990s, many Belizeans were appre- 
hensive of increasing ethnic tension. 

The Cultural Diversity of Belizean Society 
Ethnicity 

The most salient characteristic of Belizean society in the late 1980s 
was ethnic diversity. Ethnicity in Belize was not reduced to race, 



196 



Low-lying land and numerous canals have made Belize City 
vulnerable to flooding in hurricanes. 

Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



but instead referred to the collective identities formed through a 
complex interplay of racial, linguistic, and religious factors, as well 
as a sense of shared history and custom. 

The two largest ethnic groups together constituted almost three- 
quarters of the population (see table 11, Appendix A). The 1980 
census listed 39.7 percent of the population as Creole, a group usual- 
ly defined as English speakers descended wholly or in part from 
African slaves imported to work in the colonial mahogany indus- 
try. The 1980 census combined the previously separate "black" 
and "coloured" segments of the population into a single group. 
Consequently, there was considerable physical diversity among peo- 
ple listed as Creole. A folk system of racial classification further 
hierarchically divided Creoles on the basis of such physical features 
as skin shade, facial features, and hair texture. Despite political 
independence, the colonial social bias toward "clear," or light, skin 
and European features endured in contemporary Belizean society. 

The second largest group, comprising one-third of the popula- 
tion, was identified as Mestizos, or persons of mixed Hispanic- 
Amerindian origin. In the local Creole vernacular, the Mestizos 
were known as "Spanish." The physical appearance of the Mestizos 



197 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

varied, but not to the extent that it varied among Creoles. Most 
Belizean Mestizos were descended from refugees of the mid- 
nineteenth-century Caste War of Yucatan (see Mayan Emigration 
and Conflict, ch. 6). The majority of them settled in the northern 
districts of Corozal and Orange Walk, where they initiated the cul- 
tivation of sugarcane in Belize. 

Migration during the 1980s had a major impact on the demo- 
graphic balance between the two largest ethnic groups. As of 1991 , 
the government had not released figures on ethnic identity from 
the 1990 census, but census officials predicted that Mestizos would 
equal or outnumber Creoles. 

The third largest ethnic population comprised three distinct 
groups: the Yucatecan, Mopan, and Kekchi Maya. In 1980 one 
in ten Belizeans belonged to one of the three groups. Belizeans com- 
monly referred to the Yucatecan and Mopan peoples as Maya. Con- 
trary to the statements of colonial historians, some of these Mayan 
peoples were indeed descendants of the inhabitants of pre- 
Columbian Belize. Most Kekchi and Mopan, however, emigrat- 
ed from Guatemala in the late nineteenth century. 

The Garifuna, formerly known as the Black Carib, were Belize's 
fourth largest ethnic grouping, constituting 7 percent of the popu- 
lation in 1980. Descended from African slaves who intermarried 
with Amerindian inhabitants of the eastern Caribbean islands, the 
Garifuna were deported to the Gulf of Honduras by the British 
in the late eighteenth century (see Emigration of the Garifuna, ch. 
6). Some Garifuna migrated to the southern Belizean coast, where 
they established five major settlements. Initially fishermen and sub- 
sistence farmers, the Garifuna were gradually incorporated into 
wage labor in the mahogany industry as early as the 1820s, and 
later on in the banana and citrus plantations that developed in the 
Stann Creek Valley and elsewhere in the early twentieth century. 
Over the course of the twentieth century, an increasing number 
of Garifuna men became migrant workers, first along the Carib- 
bean coast of Central America, and later in the United States. 

Smaller ethnic groups — East Indians (whose forebears came from 
present-day India), Arabs, Chinese, and Euro- Americans, including 
a sizeable community of German- speaking Mennonites — made up 
the remaining 10 present of Belize's population. Of these groups, 
the East Indian population was the largest. The East Indians were 
largely descendants of nineteenth-century indentured laborers im- 
ported to work the sugar plantations of the Corozal and Toledo 
districts. By the late 1980s, they had intermarried extensively 
with other ethnic groups, and, for the most part, they no longer 



198 



Queen Street, Belize City, with main post office on right 

Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

possessed an identifiably East Indian culture. They lived in all of 
the country's six districts, but were concentrated in Toledo. 

There was a second, and much smaller, East Indian community 
in Belize, composed of Hindi- speaking traders who had immigrated 
to Belize from Bombay in the 1960s. Living primarily in Belize 
City and Orange Walk, they formed an aloof, close-knit commu- 
nity that, by the late 1980s, dominated Belize City retail trade and 
played a major role in currency exchange and speculation. 

The smallest ethnic groups — Arabs and Chinese— were also ex- 
clusively urban, mercantile populations. Known variously as Turks, 
Syrians, and Lebanese, many Belizean Arabs were actually Pales- 
tinian. Immigrating to Belize in the late nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries, they figured prominently as merchants in the Belize 
and Cayo districts. 

A significant number of Chinese were imported as contract 
laborers in the nineteenth century, but virtually all Chinese people 
living in Belize in the early 1990s came to the country in the twen- 
tieth century. Most resided in Belize City, but at least a few Chinese 
families lived in every major town. Some were merchants, but most 
worked in the restaurant and lottery industries. In the late 1980s, 
the Chinese population increased dramatically because of immigra- 
tion from Hong Kong and Taiwan. 



199 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Belize's small, German- speaking Mennonite population emigrat- 
ed from Mexico between 1958 and 1962. Numbering more than 
5,000, the Mennonites founded numerous settiements in the Orange 
Walk, Cayo, and Toledo districts. The government granted them 
complete autonomy over their communities. Nevertheless, they 
have been slowly integrated into the life of the nation, particularly 
into the economy. The more progressive Mennonites of Spanish 
Lookout (Cayo District) and Blue Creek (Orange Walk District) 
became important suppliers of poultry, eggs, dairy products, and 
furniture. Still, they remained exempt from military service and 
were not allowed to vote. 

Aside from the Mennonites, the majority of Belize's small white 
population were British and United States expatriates. Unlike some 
other Caribbean societies, Belize never supported a large Europe- 
an settler community during the colonial period. Since indepen- 
dence, a large, transient population of United States and British 
volunteers and international aid personnel has augmented the lo- 
cal European population. In 1986 the United States Peace Corps 
alone had more than 200 volunteers, the corps's highest volunteer- 
to-population ratio in the world. By 1991, however, the number 
of Peace Corps volunteers had dropped to less than 100. 

The distribution of officially recognized ethnic groups was highly 
skewed by region, and each district had its own characteristic cul- 
tural orientation. Creoles made up three-quarters of the popula- 
tion of Belize City and the surrounding area but no more than 
one-third of the population in the other five districts. Mestizos con- 
stituted two-thirds of the people in the northern sugar-producing 
districts of Orange Walk and Corozal, one-half the population of 
the predominantly agricultural Cayo district, but only about one- 
tenth of the population in Belize, Stann Creek, and Toledo. Garifu- 
na lived mostly along the coasts of the two southernmost districts 
of Stann Creek and Toledo; they made up fewer than 3 percent 
of the population in any of the other four districts. The majority 
of the country's diverse Mayan population resided mainly in the 
interior of Toledo (where they constituted some 57 percent of the 
district's people) and the rural areas of Stann Creek, Orange Walk, 
and Corozal. 

Language 

English was the only official language in Belize, but other lan- 
guages were commonplace. The 1980 census revealed that slight- 
ly more than one-half the population spoke English as their first 
language, and approximately one-third spoke Spanish. In the 
Corozal and Orange Walk districts, Spanish was the first language 



200 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

of 75 percent of the population, and fewer than 20 percent spoke 
English by preference. Smaller numbers spoke Mayan dialects, 
Garifuna, and Low German. The census also estimated that some 
62 percent of all Belizeans were bilingual or trilingual. As much 
as 80 percent of the population was able to speak some English. 

The census, however, failed to differentiate between standard 
English and the local vernacular, Belizean Creole. Some of the peo- 
ple considered to be English speakers could speak only Belizean 
Creole, or "Broad Creole," whereas others spoke standard En- 
glish as well. Language competency was largely related to social 
stratification. English speakers of higher socioeconomic status and 
education could switch with relative ease between standard English 
and Belizean Creole. The English-speaking urban and rural poor 
possessed more limited degrees of competency in standard English. 

Linguistic diversity among the English-speaking population 
reflected and perpetuated social inequality. In Belizean schools, 
for example, standard English was the sole language of instruc- 
tion. Studies have shown that students who came to school lack- 
ing proficiency in standard English suffered significant problems 
in comprehension and were often classified by teachers as slow, 
or problem learners. 

Religion 

Observers frequently note that Belizeans are a particularly reli- 
gious people, with almost all the population declaring a specific 
religious preference in 1980. Indeed, religious institutions were a 
ubiquitous presence in Belize, especially in the school system, which 
the Roman Catholic Church and the state managed together. Be- 
lize was no longer the intense battleground between competing mis- 
sionary denominations that it had been in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, numerous foreign mission- 
aries, mostly evangelical Protestants from the United States, worked 
in the country in the 1980s. 

Of the country's nine major religious groups, the Roman Catho- 
lics were the largest, with more than three in five Belizeans claim- 
ing to be followers (see table 12, Appendix A). Anglicans and 
Methodists comprised the two largest Protestant denominations, 
although they were steadily losing ground to fundamentalist and 
evangelical sects, such as the Pentecostalists and Seventh-Day Ad- 
ventists. 

Religion was strongly — but not exclusively — associated with eth- 
nicity and region. Catholicism unified most Mestizos, Maya, and 
Garifuna. Most Creoles were either Anglican or Methodist, but 
a significant number converted to Roman Catholicism, mainly 



201 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

because of proselytization in Roman Catholic schools. Roman 
Catholics made up at least 70 percent of the population of all dis- 
tricts, but in Belize City and environs, they made up only 43 per- 
cent of the population. In the last two decades, however, evangelical 
Protestant groups have been particularly successful in making in- 
roads among Creoles, Mestizos, and Maya in Corozal, Orange 
Walk, and Cayo districts. 

A wide range of smaller denominations also flourished in Be- 
lize. These groups included Mormons, fundamentalist Protestants, 
Hindus, and Bahais. Among the Creoles and the Garifuna, there 
were also small, but socially significant, Black Muslim and Rastafar- 
ian (see Glossary) communities. 

Official census categories, however, oversimplified religious iden- 
tity in Belize. Some syncretic beliefs and practices could not be 
easily categorized. Many Garifuna, for example, although nomi- 
nally Catholic, continued to uphold their traditional beliefs and 
practices, such as the dugu ritual, through which they honored their 
ancestors and perpetuated their distinctive cultural identity. The 
Catholicism of many Maya was similarly inflected with aspects of 
their own cultural traditions. Among Creoles, the belief in obeah, 
or witchcraft, endured, particularly among the older generations 
of the urban and rural poor. 

Cultural Pluralism and Ethnic Diversity 

Belize might appear to be the archetypical postcolonial "plural 
society, ' ' a mosaic of discrete cultural groups with their own value 
systems and institutional forms, joined together only by the forces 
of the marketplace and coercive authority. Indeed, a number of 
scholars have described Belize as split between two cultural 
complexes — one English-speaking, and Creole, and the other 
Spanish-speaking, and Mestizo. Belizean social and cultural diver- 
sity was, however, much more complex than this bipolar model 
suggests. Language and religion cut across ethnic and racial 
categories. Moreover, race was a complex and elusive concept. For 
example, both Creoles and Garifuna shared an African heritage, 
but they were culturally different and had a long-standing enmity 
toward each other. 

Ethnic boundaries in Belize were also notoriously fuzzy. Inter- 
marriage between members of different groups has historically been 
widespread. Identification of people of mixed ancestry varied con- 
siderably; one recent survey of secondary-school students found 
eight different permutations of Creole identity alone. This varia- 
bility was not limited to Creoles. Some urban, European-looking 
Spanish-speakers identified themselves as Maya; many Mestizos 



202 



Saint John's Cathedral 
(Anglican) 
Albert Street, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 




Kingdom Hall 
of Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Regent Street, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 




203 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

no longer spoke Spanish in the home or had become evangelical 
Protestants. 

Not all individuals of multiple ancestries felt comfortable iden- 
tifying with a particular ethnic group; in the words of one Belizean 
youth, many Belizeans were "all mix up." A small, but signifi- 
cant number of people eschewed potentially divisive ethnic 
categories and referred to themselves simply as "Belizeans." Eth- 
nicity competed with other identities, such as those based on sta- 
tus, occupation, and political affiliation, for primacy in social 
interaction. Belizean society was as divided by class differences as 
it was by race, language, religion, and ethnicity. 

Structure of Belizean Society 

Belizean society in the early 1990s was marked by enduring differ- 
ences in the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige. However, 
because of the small size of Belize's population and the intimate 
scale of social relations, the social distance between the rich and 
the poor, although significant, was nowhere as vast as in other 
Caribbean and Central American societies, such as Jamaica and 
El Salvador. Indeed, Belize lacked the violent class and racial conflict 
that has figured so prominently in the social life of its Central Ameri- 
can neighbors. 

Still, a decade after independence, political and economic pow- 
er remained vested in the hands of a relatively small local elite, 
most of whom were either white, light-skinned Creole, or Mesti- 
zo. The sizable middle group, however, was composed of peoples 
of different ethnic backgrounds. This middle group did not con- 
stitute a unified social class, but rather a number of middle- and 
working-class groups, loosely oriented around shared dispositions 
toward education, cultural respectability, and possibilities for up- 
ward social mobility. These beliefs, and the social practices they 
engendered, helped distinguish the middle group from the grass 
roots majority of the Belizean people. 

The Upper Sector 

In the late 1980s, the elite was a small, socially distinct group 
whose base of social power lay not in landownership, but in its 
control of the institutions that mediated relations between Belize 
and the outside world. The principal economic interests of the elite 
included commercial and financial enterprises, retail trade, local 
manufacturing, the state apparatus, and, to a much lesser extent, 
export agriculture. Foreign firms dominated Belize's agricultural 
export industry, which was the largest sector of the economy in the 
1980s. Foreigners, mostly United States citizens, held 90 percent 



204 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

of Belize's privately owned land, including most of the nation's 
prime agricultural areas and tourist facilities. 

The Belizean elite consisted of people of different status, pres- 
tige, and ethnicity. At the top of the power hierarchy were local 
whites and light-skinned descendants of the nineteenth-century Cre- 
ole elite. The next group consisted of Creole and Mestizo com- 
mercial and professional families whose ancestors first came to 
political and economic prominence during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Next in status were some of the Lebanese 
and Palestinian merchant families who had immigrated to Belize 
in the early twentieth century. 

The more recentiy arrived Chinese and Indian families comprised 
another elite group, distinguished from the remaining upper sec- 
tor by length of residence in the country and by cultural differ- 
ences. Groups within the elite socialized primarily among 
themselves. 

Shared economic interests and business dealings bonded the 
different segments of the elite. Other cultural factors also played 
a role. Intermarriage bound several of the elite families together, 
although usually without transgressing ethnic or religious bound- 
aries. Religion also served as a partial unifying force; a number 
of the oldest and most prominent Creole families shared the Catholi- 
cism of the Mestizo commercial elite. 

Because Belize City was the center of the nation's commercial 
life, the majority of elite families lived or maintained a residence 
there, although some prominent families were based in the district 
towns. In Belize City, elite families lived in the same ocean-front 
neighborhoods, belonged to the same social clubs, and enjoyed a 
similar lifestyle centered around the extravagant conspicuous con- 
sumption of imported goods. 

Education also served to unify the upper sector of society. A 
generation ago, religious affiliation largely determined which schools 
children attended. With the decline of the Anglican and Methodist 
school systems, most elite children, regardless of faith, attended 
two of Belize's premier Catholic institutions, which provided 
secondary and postsecondary education. Even after the expansion 
of secondary and postsecondary schooling in the districts, many 
of the elite district families continued to send their offspring to Be- 
lize City for higher education. 

Despite the establishment of a local institution of higher educa- 
tion in 1985, most elite youth attended universities abroad. Their 
choice of institutions reflected the changing dominant metropoli- 
tan cultural orientation of Belizean society. British universities at- 
tracted many of the college-bound members of the Belizean elite 



205 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

in the colonial period, but by 1990 the majority pursued their higher 
education in the United States or, to a lesser extent, in the West 
Indies. 

The Middle Sector 

The middle sector of Belizean society was considerably larger, 
more diverse, and less cohesive than the elite. People in this group 
lacked the jobs, social status, or economic assets that were typical 
of the elite, but they were still better off than the rest of society. 
Some families were "poor relations" of the elite class; others had 
acquired wealth and prestige over a few generations through higher 
education or economic success. This large group encompassed the 
traditional middle class as well as elements of the working classes: 
not only small businessmen, professionals, teachers, and mid-level 
civil servants, but also other government workers, smallholders, 
skilled manual workers, and commercial employees. 

The middle sector was stratified according to wealth, level of edu- 
cation, and the status difference between manual and nonmanual 
occupations. Still, a shared belief system that emphasized cultural 
respectability, upward social mobility, and the importance of edu- 
cation unified this group. Even more than middle-class families, 
some working-class families often made great sacrifices to ensure 
that their children received the best and most extensive education 
possible. 

The middle sector of Belizean society in the 1980s was largely 
the product of the massive expansion of educational opportunities 
and the corresponding growth of the "modern" sector of the econ- 
omy between 1950 and 1980. But as an increasing number of Be- 
lizeans earned degrees from education institutions and as the local 
job market became saturated, families in this group became more 
concerned in the 1970s and 1980s with maintaining their social po- 
sition than with upward social mobility. Faced with limited eco- 
nomic prospects in Belize, large numbers migrated to the United 
States. 

The middle sector was culturally diverse and included members 
of all Belizean ethnic groups, although not in proportion to their 
numbers in the general population. Relatively few Mayan or Kekchf 
families, for example, belonged to either the middle or upper work- 
ing classes. Historical correlations between occupation and ethnic 
identity endured in the 1980s despite social changes. Middle- sector 
Creoles were most likely to work in the professions, especially law 
and accounting, the civil service, and the skilled trades. Consider- 
able numbers of Mestizos were employed by the government, as 



206 




Typical house on stilts on low-lying Cay Caulker 
Pier and palms on offshore barrier reef island of Cay Caulker 

Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



207 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

well as in small business and farming. Garifuna were particularly 
well established in the teaching profession. 

Ethnic and religious sentiments divided the middle sector to a 
certain extent. The nationalist movement of the 1950s drew most 
of its leaders from the Catholic-educated Creole and Mestizo mid- 
dle class. The Protestant-educated Creole middle class, however, 
opposed the movement's anti-British, multicultural ethos and the 
projection of a Central American destiny for Belize. Still, political 
affiliation defied narrow ethnic or racial lines. 

British and North American ideas, particularly those of the Unit- 
ed States, largely shaped the beliefs and practices of the middle 
sector. These influences stemmed not only from the formal educa- 
tion system, but also from the popular culture of North America 
conveyed through the cinema, magazines, radio, television, and 
migration. These cultural ideas were as much African- American 
as Anglo-American. Beginning with the Black Power movement 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, middle- and working-class Cre- 
ole youth increasingly adopted an Afrocentric cultural conscious- 
ness that distinguished them both from their elders and other ethnic 
groups in Belizean society. 

The Lower Sector 

This sector comprised the bulk of the Belizean population and 
was popularly known as the grass roots or roots class. It, too, was 
stratified by occupation and ethnicity. The lower sector consisted 
of unskilled or semiskilled urban workers, subsistence farmers, 
agricultural laborers, and the unemployed. These people shared, 
in addition to poverty and generally poor living conditions, severely 
limited access to land, higher education, or any other opportunity 
to change their marginal status. Possibilities for mobility were a 
main dividing line between the middle and lower sectors of Beliz- 
ean society. 

The ethnic composition of the lower sector varied by region. Most 
of the country's urban poor lived in predominantly Creole Belize 
City. With a population four times the size of the next largest ur- 
ban area, Belize City was home to over half of all unemployed Be- 
lizeans in 1980. Many of the employed were engaged in ketch an 
kill jobs, temporary unskilled manual labor. No more than two- 
thirds of the employed population in 1980 had full-time work. 

Educational opportunities beyond the primary level were scarce 
for most poor urban families. Many children dropped out of school 
before completing their primary education. Children who finished 
school often lacked the grades or financial resources to attend second- 
ary school. Because the government generally awarded scholarships 



208 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

according to academic performance rather than financial need, most 
poor Belizean families continued to lack access to education be- 
yond the primary level. 

In further contrast to the upper and middle sectors, many lower- 
sector households in Belize City were headed by single parents, 
usually women. Female workers generally received lower incomes 
than their male counterparts, and women experienced an unem- 
ployment rate 250 percent higher than men. In numerous cases, 
migration of both parents resulted in children being raised by sib- 
lings, older relatives, or friends of the family. Some of the more 
privileged members of Belizean society perceived that increases in 
juvenile delinquency, crime, and drug use among Belizean urban 
youth were directly attributable to breakdowns in family structure. 

As with the population in general, a large percentage of the ur- 
ban poor were young. Nationwide, over 40 percent of out-of-school 
youths aged fifteen to twenty-four lacked work, and youth unem- 
ployment rates in Belize City were even higher. Many unemployed 
youths in Belize City congregated on street corners or met in 
storefronts known as "bases." These young people were known 
as baseboys and basegirls. More privileged members of Belizean 
society tended to categorize baseboys and basegirls as criminals 
and delinquents, although the only thing many were guilty of was 
lacking opportunities for education and meaningful work. 

Still, the lack of educational and employment prospects for the 
rural and urban poor in the 1980s did lead to dramatic increases 
in crime, especially in the drug trade. By the middle of the de- 
cade, Belize had become the fourth largest exporter (after Mexi- 
co, Colombia, and Jamaica) of marijuana to the United States. 
By 1987 crack cocaine and gangs had established a foothold among 
the youthful population of Belize City. By 1991 both gang mem- 
bership and gang warfare had escalated dramatically, moving off 
the street corners of the poorer neighborhoods into the schools and 
major public spaces of Belize City. Gangs, drugs, and violence were 
the dominant realities with which nearly all Belizean urban youth, 
especially the poor, had to deal. 

Extremely limited access to education and well-paying jobs 
characterized conditions for the poor in the district towns of Be- 
lize. But many people perceived the conditions in these towns as 
less severe than in Belize City. One exception was Orange Walk, 
which was known as Rambo Town, owing to the intensity of drug- 
related violence there in the mid-1980s. 

The most limited opportunities for education and economic ad- 
vancement were found in rural areas. Rural primary schools had 
much higher rates of absenteeism and attrition than urban schools, 



209 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

and all but three secondary schools were located in Belize City or 
the major district towns. Furthermore, the demands of agricultur- 
al work often prevented many children from attending school. 

The rural poor were mostly Mayan and Mestizo subsistence 
farmers and agricultural laborers, although some Creole and Garifu- 
na families were also included in this category. At the very bottom 
of both the rural and urban social hierarchies, however, were the 
Central American aliens who were employed in the lowest paid, 
least desirable occupations, such as unskilled labor in the sugar, 
citrus, banana, and marijuana industries. 

Social Dynamics 

Belize has adopted wholeheartedly, and with much popular sup- 
port, the rhetoric and practices of the ideologies of development 
and consumerism, twin hallmarks of a modernizing society. Far- 
reaching changes have occurred in Belizean society over the last 
thirty years. The growth of educational opportunities and govern- 
ment employment has facilitated the emergence of a sizable middle 
class with expanding horizons of consumption. The meaning of 
education has also changed. Once revered as a scarce privilege 
guaranteeing social advancement, education is now perceived as 
a birthright and an essential tool for entering the job market. 

Education, migration, and shifts in economic activity have en- 
hanced the power and influence of previously marginal social groups 
and regions, particularly the Mestizos who inhabited the northern 
districts. Intermarriage and political mobilization have helped at 
times to cut across ethnic boundaries and create a nascent sense 
of national identity. Satellite television, tourism, and emigration 
have strengthened an already close connection with North Ameri- 
ca, and immigration has anchored Belize more firmly within Cen- 
tral America and its culture. 

But not all of the changes have been positive. Many Belizeans 
of more than thirty years of age noted the breakdown of traditional 
notions of authority, respect, and propriety and the obsessive fasci- 
nation of Belizean youth with North American material culture. 
Others blamed mass emigration for the dissolution of the Belizean 
family and a subsequent rise in juvenile delinquency and crime. 

Ethnic tensions still regularly intruded into many areas of social 
interaction and indeed showed signs of intensifying. Possibilities 
for social mobility existed, but only for some individuals. The school 
system produced continuously growing numbers of graduates for 
whom jobs did not exist while it simultaneously excluded growing 
numbers of the poor from educational opportunity. Emigration to 
metropolitan countries often siphoned off people with the highest 



210 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

qualifications and the most ambitions, and immigration from neigh- 
boring republics promised to reshape the cultural orientation and, 
quite literally, the complexion of Belizean society. 

As Belize entered the 1990s, it faced a number of serious 
challenges, some of which were common to all postcolonial socie- 
ties and some of which were the product of the country's unique 
history and geography. Like other developing societies, Belize faced 
the challenge of meeting the expanding needs and desires of a rapid- 
ly growing population at a time when the country possessed limit- 
ed natural, financial, and human resources. 

Education 

Belize's strategy for social development in the 1980s focused on 
increasing investments in formal education. On the surface, the 
achievements have been impressive; opportunities for all levels of 
schooling have greatly increased in the last thirty years. The num- 
ber of schools grew, enrollment rates rose, and a record number 
of students graduated in 1990. 

These statistics, however, provided only a partial picture. As in 
many other areas of the Caribbean, enrollments have lagged be- 
hind population growth since at least the early 1980s. Large num- 
bers of the urban and rural poor continued to lack access to 
schooling or dropped out before completing their primary educa- 
tion. But even with high rates of attrition at the primary and second- 
ary levels, the number of graduates exceeded the number of jobs, 
contributing to "credential inflation," underemployment, and 
emigration. 

Most important, despite three decades of efforts to "decolonize" 
education, foreign influences in the structure and content of Be- 
lizean schooling remained significant during the 1980s. As in the 
colonial period, a joint partnership of church and state managed 
the school system, although the terms, nature, and balance of power 
within this partnership shifted significantly toward the national 
government, beginning in the 1960s. The Belizean state, however, 
continued to lack total control over all levels and aspects of school- 
ing. Belize relied heavily on foreign institutions for maintenance 
and expansion of formal education. These institutions provided 
financing, staffing, curriculum, planning, and higher education. 

The growth and transformation of Belizean education took place 
in a number of phases, each related to important changes within 
the political and economic history of the country. During the ini- 
tial phase, between 1816 and 1892, the church-state partnership 
became institutionalized. Religious initiative and control, extremely 
limited state intervention, and vigorous competition of religious 



211 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

denominations for the allegiance of the inhabitants characterized 
this phase. 

The intensification of denominational rivalry, the benign neglect 
of the colonial state, and the growing influence of United States 
Jesuit missionaries in education characterized the second phase, 
which lasted from 1893 to 1934. In 1934 the director of education 
in Jamaica made a thorough investigation of British Honduras's 
education system. Various reforms were proposed to increase spend- 
ing on the school system and improve the standard of education. 
Implementation of many of these reforms began in the late 1930s. 

During the next phase, from the late 1940s and early 1950s, the 
educational and social activities of the Jesuits influenced the rise 
of an anti-British, anticolonial nationalist movement. In the late 
1950s and early 1960s, Jesuits led efforts to redress the elitist, urban- 
centered biases of postprimary education that had perpetuated not 
only social inequality, but also the historical dominance of Belize 
City over its primarily rural hinterland. By the late 1950s, the Jesuits 
had emerged as the dominant influence at almost every level of 
formal education. 

With the advent of a large degree of self-rule in 1964, the govern- 
ment began to assert its control over schooling. Formal control over 
education policy and planning passed from British-born clerics and 
colonial administrators to British-trained Belizeans. Actual edu- 
cation practice, however, changed very little; the religious denomi- 
nations continued to determine the direction and pace of educational 
expansion. United States influence within Belizean schools inten- 
sified, not only through the adoption of certain Jesuit practices for 
systemwide use, but also through the arrival of Peace Corps and 
other United States volunteer teachers and agencies such as CARE 
and the Michigan Partners. 

As the demand for education outstripped the capacities of the 
churches — even the Jesuits — to provide it, interdenominational 
cooperation grew and the state assumed a more central role. By 
the 1970s, the Belizean government had assumed the leading role 
in establishing new schools, especially at the secondary and tertiary 
levels. The government conceived of education as an essential tool 
in the peaceful struggle for independence. But the expansion of edu- 
cational opportunities outstripped the state's resources, leading to an 
intensified reliance on external aid. Since 1981, the United States has 
provided the bulk of this aid. This situation caused many Belizeans to 
fear the rise of a new form of imperialist control over the country. 

Nowhere were fears of recolonization more realized than in higher 
education. In 1979 the ruling People's United Party (PUP) govern- 
ment established the Belize College of Arts, Science, and Technology 



212 



Students at Belmopan 
Infant School 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 




(Belcast) with the intention of breaking Belize's dependence on the 
outside world for university education. The PUP envisioned Bel- 
cast as a government- run institution, with no participation from 
the church. Funding was secured from the European Economic 
Community for the construction of a campus in Belmopan. 

The campus was never built because the PUP was swept out 
of office in a landslide victory for the rival United Democratic Party 
(UDP) in December 1984. The UDP revoked the Belcast ordinance 
and invited Ferris State College of Big Rapids, Michigan to es- 
tablish and manage a new institution, the University College of 
Belize (UCB). Control over the UCB program rested not with Be- 
lizeans, but with the administration of Ferris State College. The 
birth of UCB embodied Belizean nationalists' worst fears: the coun- 
try had lost sovereignty over an institution that symbolized Belize's 
first major effort to break from the country's colonial past in the 
education sector. The intense controversy arose again in 1991 when 
it was discovered that Ferris State College had failed to obtain proper 
accreditation for the UCB program, thus placing into question the 
value of the degrees UCB had granted since 1987. Following this 
controversy, the new PUP government revoked its agreement with 
Ferris State and assumed full control over the institution. 

School System 

The Belizean school system was a loose aggregate of education 



213 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

subsystems. The system was based on British education and was 
broken into three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Beliz- 
ean children began their eight years of primary education with two 
years of "infant" classes, followed by six "standards." Secondary 
education was divided into four "forms." Sixth form was a two- 
year postsecondary course, originally intended to prepare students 
for the Cambridge Advanced, or "A-Level," examinations. Since 
the early 1970s, sixth-form institutions have also bestowed Associ- 
ate of Arts degrees sanctioned by the United States Association of 
Junior Colleges (see table 13, Appendix A). 

In addition to UCB, other postsecondary institutions included 
Belize Teachers' College, the Belize School of Nursing, and the 
Belize College of Agriculture. Belize contributes to and participates 
in the multinational University of the West Indies. The Universi- 
ty of the West Indies also maintained a small extramural depart- 
ment in Belize City. 

Management of the system varied according to level. In the lat- 
ter half of the 1980s, religious denominations controlled the majority 
of primary schools, but the government or private, community- 
based boards of governors administered more than 50 percent of 
the secondary institutions. The preponderance of government in- 
stitutions at the secondary level was a relatively new development; 
as recently as 1980, the majority of secondary schools were under 
religious management. Still, denominational representatives re- 
tained considerable influence on the managing boards of private, 
ostensibly nondenominational, institutions. 

Secondary schools also differed according to curriculum and cul- 
tural orientation. Most private and denominational schools em- 
phasized academic and commercial studies, although some also 
offered technical-vocational programs. In contrast, the government 
directly managed nine schools, all of which offered a curriculum 
oriented to technical- vocational subjects. 

In terms of cultural orientation, educational practices, rituals, 
and valuative criteria spread to Belize's schools from Jesuit insti- 
tutions in the United States. Jesuit influence even affected such 
traditional bastions of British pedagogy as the Anglican and 
Methodist secondary schools and the government-run Belize Tech- 
nical College. Nearly thirty years of Peace Corps and other Unit- 
ed States volunteer teachers have also influenced Belizean 
educational culture. Technical- vocational education programs by 
the United States Agency for International Development promise 
to erode further British pedagogical legacies. 



214 




Students at Saint John's College (First Form), Belize City 

Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

Patterns of Access and Performance 

Studies conducted by the Belizean government and outside ob- 
servers in the late 1980s indicated that between one-quarter and 
one-third of students enrolled in primary education left school be- 
fore they reached fourteen, the minimum age at which a student 
could legally drop out. Dropout rates and absenteeism were higher 
in rural areas, largely because of the seasonal demand for agricul- 
tural labor and the perception that schooling beyond the basic lev- 
el offered no increased opportunities. 

In both rural and urban areas, students who dropped out of 
primary school (or, indeed, failed to attend) generally belonged 
to the poorest and least-empowered segments of Belizean society; 
they were the children of subsistence farmers, agricultural laborers, 
illegal aliens, and the inhabitants of the urban slums. Without 
primary school credentials, these individuals faced the continued 
prospect of lifelong underemployment or unemployment. 

Selectivity in the education system intensified at the secondary 
level. No more than 60 percent of the students who graduated from 
primary school, or less than 40 percent of all children in that age- 
group, made the transition to secondary institutions. Again, the 
percentage of students entering secondary schools was even lower 



215 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

in rural areas, where less than one-third of eligible youth pursued 
education beyond the primary level as of the early 1980s. Although 
the construction of new schools in the districts had helped to al- 
leviate this problem, the majority of rural youth still lacked a 
secondary education. 

Primary education was both free and compulsory; secondary 
schooling was neither. The combined burden of financial and aca- 
demic requirements excluded not only the poorest, but also the off- 
spring of many working-class parents and even some middle-class 
families. Government programs and private scholarships failed ade- 
quately to address the financial barrier to educational opportuni- 
ty. Exclusion from secondary schooling had serious consequences 
for the lives of these youth. A generation ago, a primary educa- 
tion was sufficient for many skilled and semiskilled jobs in the public 
and private sectors. But by the late 1980s, the value of these creden- 
tials had plummeted. 

Secondary school credentials, in the form of diplomas and pass- 
ing grades on exams, have become the minimum criteria for most 
types of skilled employment. These credentials, too, decreased in 
value as increasing numbers of students received them. Education 
in Belize, as elsewhere in the world, was largely synonymous with 
the earning of credentials. 

Attrition, as well as access, was a more serious problem in second- 
ary education than in primary education. Nationwide, only about 
one-half of the students who entered secondary school completed 
the course. During the early 1980s, the attrition rate reached higher 
than 70 percent in a number of city and district schools. The causes 
of attrition, or wastage, as it was known among administrators, 
varied but were largely related to socioeconomic factors, such as 
lack of money, discipline problems, or teenage pregnancy. 

Fewer than 1 5 percent of secondary school graduates made the 
transition to sixth form. Most graduates of the secondary schools 
came from only a handful of institutions. Two new secondary in- 
stitutions opened in the late 1980s, but the number of prospective 
applicants for the sixth form far exceeded available places. Observers 
believed that the gap would only grow as secondary schools con- 
tinued to produce increasing numbers of graduates hungry for more 
educational credentials. 

A university education was a rare opportunity for Belizean youth 
in the 1980s. Scholarships to foreign universities were extremely 
limited, although many Belizeans have benefitted from scholarships 
to Cuban universities. The full costs of university study abroad were 
beyond the means of all but elite families. Even after the opening 
of UCB, Belizean students overwhelmingly preferred the prospects 



216 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

of studying at universities in the United States to studying in Be- 
lize or at British, West Indian, Canadian, or Latin American in- 
stitutions. Since 1983, the availability of scholarships to United 
States universities has increased considerably. Many of these 
scholarships were the result of United States government programs, 
such as the Central American Peace Scholarships (CAPS). 

Standard of Living 

Differences in quality of life reflected and shaped patterns of so- 
cial inequality in Belize. Access to food, housing, health care, and 
other necessary or desired goods and services varied most markedly 
between rural and urban areas, as well as by socioeconomic sta- 
tus. In 1984 the average salary of an employee was Bz$6,000 (for 
value of the Belizean dollar — see Glossary). Almost two-thirds of 
the working population earned between Bz$3,000 and Bz$9,000; 
20 percent earned less than Bz$3,000. 

Despite these differences in wealth, virtually all Belizeans shared 
a penchant for foreign consumer products. In the 1980s, most Be- 
lizeans' aspirations for a high standard of living stemmed not only 
from the long period of colonial rule, but also from tales of emigrants 
to the United States and television images of the good life there. 

Food and Diet 

Despite an abundance of cultivable land, Belize depended on 
imports of food. Government figures indicated that the average 
household spent at least 29 percent of its budget on imported food 
during the 1980s. Urban and upper-income groups averaged higher 
percentages. Food imports included not only items such as dairy 
products, canned meats, and vegetables, but also staples such as 
rice and red kidney beans, which were also produced locally. Diet 
varied by culture as well as class, with Maya and rural Mestizos 
preferring large amounts of corn. Garifuna consumed large quan- 
tities of fish. The national dish, however, consisted of rice and beans. 

Available statistics indicated that at least 40 percent of infants 
nationwide suffered from at least moderate malnutrition and that 
61 percent of children under three years of age suffered some form 
of malnutrition. Because the government based this conclusion only 
on surveys of sick persons who visited health clinics, the actual in- 
cidence of malnutrition and anemia was probably higher, particu- 
larly among the most marginal and impoverished sectors of the 
population. Poor sanitation in rural areas also contributed to high 
incidence of intestinal parasites, especially among children. 

Nutrition and health were major targets of foreign assistance from 
sources including the United States Peace Corps, the Cooperative 



217 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), Project Hope, Project 
Concern, and a variety of international agencies, such as the Pan 
American Health Organization and the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF). At least twelve other organizations, including 
Canadian and a number of European governments, contributed 
to health and nutrition programs during the 1980s. Belize's Ministry 
of Health and other local governmental agencies played a supporting 
role to these programs. 

Health and Welfare 

The overall health of Belizeans during the 1980s improved 
markedly from the colonial period. By 1989 life expectancy at birth 
had risen to sixty-seven years for males and seventy-two years for 
females. The death rate dropped from 11.5 per 1 ,000 in the 1950s 
to 4.9 per 1,000 in 1980, and the published infant mortality rate 
declined from 93 per 1 ,000 in the 1950s to 24.8 per 1 ,000 in 1986. 
However, actual infant mortality was probably higher because peo- 
ple living in remote rural areas rarely reported infant deaths. Even 
so, the infant mortality rate for the largely rural Toledo district 
was more than double the national rate. 

The underreporting of infant deaths in rural areas led the World 
Health Organization to classify Belize's morbidity and mortality 
statistics as unreliable. Outside of Belize City, facilities for testing 
for cases of malaria and dengue fever were inadequate, so the in- 
cidence of these illnesses has probably been underestimated. The 
incidence of other diseases, such as acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), was also believed to be higher than reported. 

Despite a massive Anopheles mosquito-eradication campaign in 
the 1970s, malaria remained Belize's top health problem in the 
1980s. After increasing by an annual rate of 30 percent between 
1980 and 1983, the number of new cases has since slowed. A more 
resistant Plasmodium facilparum organism (instead of the usual Plas- 
modium vivax variety) caused many of the new cases of the disease. 
Malaria affected all areas of the country, except for Belize City 
and the cays, which lacked the Anopheles mosquito. 

Dengue fever, another disease transmitted by mosquitoes, ex- 
perienced a resurgence in the 1980s; the disease was thought to 
have been eradicated in the 1950s. Gastroenteritis and other in- 
testinal diseases also continued to pose major health problems for 
Belizeans, especially for the rural poor. Although the Latin Ameri- 
can cholera outbreak had not troubled Belize by the summer of 
1991, health officials expressed fear that it was only a matter of 
time before the disease reached the country. 



218 



Belize: The Society and Its Environment 

As elsewhere in the world, AIDS poses a serious and growing 
challenge to the Belizean health care system. Until 1990, Belize 
lacked facilities to test for the AIDS-causing human immunodefi- 
ciency virus (HIV). By August of 1990, ninety-four Belizeans had 
tested positive for HIV (up from an estimated three in 1986), and 
twenty-four persons had died of AIDS. Although every district of 
the country was affected, half of the people testing positive for HIV 
lived in Belize City. 

Rivers, streams, and creeks provide 70 percent of Belizean 
domestic water needs. Although the threat from industrial pollu- 
tion was still limited in 1990, the lack of effective sewage systems 
in most communities, along with the use of these same water sources 
for laundry and bathing, posed significant health risks. Pesticide 
and fertilizer run-off in agricultural areas also posed potential 
problems. 

Belmopan, a planned capital, was the only Belizean communi- 
ty to be served fully by a municipal sewer system in 1991. After 
more than ten years of financial and technical support from the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), a sewer sys- 
tem for Belize City was completed in the 1980s. However, as re- 
cently as 1991, most city households were still not connected to 
the system. 

Government health policy emphasized primary health care, par- 
ticularly for people most in need, such as children, pregnant women, 
and the poor. However, health care services were unevenly dis- 
tributed between rural and urban areas, and many people in need 
lacked regular access. The government directed most of its health 
budget in the 1980s toward operating the eight hospitals located 
in the capital and district towns. Many of these hospitals were old, 
overcrowded, and in need of equipment and supplies. A new hospi- 
tal, to be built with European funds, was planned for Belize City. 
Twenty-nine health centers served the remainder of the popula- 
tion, although less than 50 percent of the facilities were fully staffed. 
But even the fully staffed centers lacked a complete range of health 
care services. Only one facility specialized in caring for the dis- 
abled and only one in caring for the mentally ill. Both facilities 
were located in Belize District. 

A lack of personnel hindered the development of the Belizean 
health care system. Fewer than 100 physicians worked in the country 
in the late 1980s. The country had a school of nursing and a pro- 
gram for medical technicians but lacked a school of medicine. Many 
Belizeans who went overseas to study medicine never returned home 
to practice. Indeed, during the 1980s, two of every three govern- 
ment doctors and virtually all of the dentists were foreign citizens. 



219 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Legislation protecting the health of Belizean citizens, particu- 
larly in the workplace, was weak and poorly enforced. Belize did, 
however, have a social security system, designed with the help of 
the United Nations International Labour Organisation. In addi- 
tion to providing pensions for retired and injured workers, the sys- 
tem also provided short-term benefits for sickness and maternity 
leave. 

* * * 

There is a small but growing body of literature on Belizean so- 
ciety. O. Nigel Bolland has been one of the most prolific contribu- 
tors to this discourse. His Belize: A New Nation in Central America 
is the best general introduction to historical and contemporary so- 
cial conditions, and his Colonialism and Resistance in Belize provides 
in-depth treatment of more specific issues. Norman Ashcraft's 
Colonialism and Underdevelopment: Processes of Political Economic Change 
in British Honduras, although dated, still provides a useful overview 
of rural life. 

Most work on Belize, however, appears in the form of articles, 
conference papers, and unpublished dissertations. The journal Be- 
lizean Studies serves as a clearinghouse for much of this work. The 
Society for the Promotion of Education and Research in Belize City 
publishes collections of recent research, one of which is Belize: Eth- 
nicity and Development. (For further information and complete cita- 
tions, see Bibliography.) 



220 



Chapter 8. Belize: The Economy 



Mayan god of corn 



THE MAIN INFLUENCES on the economy of Belize have been 
the country's small size and its long history as a colony. As oc- 
curred elsewhere in the Caribbean, over the centuries the colony's 
administrators precariously based its economy on a succession of 
single raw commodities — logwood in the 1600s and 1700s, mahoga- 
ny in the 1800s, and then sugar in the mid-1900s. During the 1980s, 
the dangers of a single-crop economy became brutal realities for 
the many Caribbean countries that had grown heavily dependent 
on sugar exports. Sugar prices collapsed, and protectionist trade 
practices by industrialized countries exacerbated the producers' 
problem. Belize's experience was no exception. However, the com- 
modity crisis of the 1980s led to economic reform in Belize aimed 
at diversification and taking the economy definitively beyond the 
colonial period. 

Small economies, such as Belize's, tend to be less diverse and 
more dependent on exports than larger economies, a situation that 
makes them volatile and highly vulnerable to outside forces. A small 
work force and limited capital, dependence on foreign markets and 
investment funds, and high overhead costs are all factors that have 
hindered Belize's economic growth. Despite these problems, the 
economy has steadily improved since independence was achieved 
in 1981. The British legacy of stable representative government, 
respect for education, a relatively even distribution of income, and 
a comparatively high standard of living has attracted increasing 
amounts of foreign investment. In 1991 the economy was more 
diverse than ever, the export sector was strong, a growing tourism 
industry promised increased revenues, and the government had 
avoided dangerous levels of foreign debt. The outlook for Belize's 
economy for the remainder of the 1990s seemed bright. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

The Colonial Economy 

British Honduras officially became a British colony in 1862, af- 
ter more than two centuries of vague status (see Colonial Rivalry 
Between Spain and Britain, ch. 6). Early Spanish settlers based 
the colonial economy entirely on the export of logwood. British buc- 
caneers first settled in the early 1600s. Giving up their practice of 
capturing Spanish cargo ships laden with logwood, the erstwhile 



223 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

pirates began to cut the timber themselves. Logwood, a source of 
black dye, was in great demand in Europe at the time. However, 
by the end of the eighteenth century, dyes derived from logwood 
had been largely replaced by synthetic dyes. The decline of the log- 
wood industry during the 1760s and the 1770s was accompanied 
by fruitless efforts to compensate for lost value by increasing the 
rate of production and hence the rate of exports. Once they real- 
ized the inevitability of failure, the settlers began exploiting other 
forest products, mainly chicle and mahogany. The latter wood be- 
came the mainstay of the economy for most of the next two cen- 
turies. 

Although the logging of mahogany greatly enriched the coloni- 
al economy, particularly during the 1800s, it also seriously disrupted 
the indigenous Mayan culture. As the British pushed into the in- 
terior of the country, there were numerous violent confrontations 
with the Maya (see Mayan Emigration and Conflict, ch. 6). 

In the absence of a forestry policy, the country's mahogany 
reserves gradually ran low. This depletion, among other factors, 
led to the decline of the industry in the 1950s. By 1991 forestry 
accounted for less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP — 
see Glossary), and mahogany trees were so rare in Belize that one 
of them, in the center of Belize City, was labeled as if it were a 
museum piece. 

Sugar succeeded logwood and mahogany as the third main sta- 
ple of the colonial economy. The Maya had cultivated sugar since 
the mid- 1800s, but the modern history of British Honduran sugar 
production did not begin until 1937, when a small factory was 
opened at Pembroke Hall (later known as Libertad) in northern 
Belize. 

In 1964 the small mill at Libertad was bought by the large Brit- 
ish sugar conglomerate of Tate and Lyle. This event accompanied 
the beginning of nearly twenty years of great profit. Foreign in- 
vestment boosted production and productivity, and record prices 
fueled the growth of the sugar agro-industry. Sugar production in- 
creased from 17,000 tons in 1959 to 40,000 tons in 1963, to 70,170 
tons in 1973, and to 114,000 tons in 1983. Production decreased 
rapidly thereafter to 81,700 tons in 1988 and underwent a mild 
recovery in 1990, when it reached 100,000 tons. The result of 
drought, smut diseases, froghopper (spittlebug) infestation, occa- 
sional labor shortages, and fluctuating demands and prices, the 
swings in sugar production created severe dislocations in the Be- 
lizean economy. 

Belize's status as a former British colony has provided benefits 
that have translated directly or indirectly into economic advantages. 



224 



Belize: The Economy 



As in many of its former colonies, Britain left behind a well- 
established two-party political system based on the British model. 
Belize's democratic tradition made postcolonial stability more likely 
and appealed to many foreign investors. 

The British also left behind a network of education institutions 
that formed the basis for the country's 93-percent nominal litera- 
cy rate and high level of enrollment in secondary schools. As the 
1990s began, most of the schools at the primary level were church- 
administered. Education was compulsory until age fourteen. Health 
care, too, was better than what was available in most other Cen- 
tral American countries (see Health and Welfare, ch. 7). Belize 
had a higher daily calorie intake per capita, longer life expectan- 
cy, and higher literacy rates than El Salvador, Honduras, or 
Nicaragua, with quality-of-life statistics comparable to those of Costa 
Rica, Central America's most prosperous state, or the Bahamas, 
whose gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) per capita was 
seven times larger. Another regionally distinctive feature of Belize 
was its relatively even distribution of income. All these factors have 
contributed significantly to social stability and economic produc- 
tivity. 

The Small Economy 

Belize is roughly the same size as New Hampshire (see Bound- 
aries, Area, and Relative Size, ch. 7). Its population was about 
191,000 in 1990. Some 25 percent of the population lived in Be- 
lize City and the surrounding area. Almost 25 percent lived in in- 
corporated towns, among them the nation's capital, Belmopan, 
which had a population of about 4,000. The remaining half of the 
population was rural. Most rural residents lived in large villages 
in the north. Except for several towns, the central and southern 
parts of the country were sparsely inhabited. Among the 185 coun- 
tries and territories listed in the World Bank (see Glossary) World 
Atlas, only fifteen countries had smaller GNPs than that of Belize. 

Small developing economies have certain characteristics that re- 
strict their ability to achieve balanced, sustained economic growth. 
These constraints include limited supplies of land, labor, and domes- 
tic capital; high dependence on foreign capital; limited domestic 
markets; high unit costs of production for domestic markets; limited 
bargaining power; relatively high wages driven by preferential trade 
agreements; and high overhead costs of government services and 
administration. As a result of these constraints, economic growth 
in small countries is tied closely to the rate of export growth. 
Moreover, the open, export-oriented economies of small states tend 
to be less diverse than those of larger countries. The scarcity of 



225 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



labor and capital demands careful targeting of investments. Final- 
ly, limited domestic markets mean less potential for import- 
substitution industrialization (see Glossary). Hence, the economies 
of small countries are disproportionately exposed to external shocks 
that increase import costs or depress export prices for their primary 
commodities. 

The general limitations placed on small economies characterize 
the situation in Belize, with one exception: Belize is endowed with 
abundant arable land. Its population density of 8.5 persons per 
square kilometer in 1991 was one of the lowest in the world. In- 
deed, Belize depends on immigrant labor to sustain agricultural 
production, in part because many Belizeans are reluctant to work 
for the low wages offered in the agricultural sector. 

Economic History 

Culturally and economically, Belize is more closely linked to the 
Caribbean than to its Central American neighbors. However, Be- 
lize's participation in Caribbean economic integration has not come 
about easily. 

During the 1950s, British Honduras rejected repeated attempts 
by Britain to incorporate the colony into the proposed West In- 
dies Federation. There were several reasons behind this resistance. 
One was the fear of being locked into a Caribbean arrangement 
at the expense of ties with the rest of Central America. Moreover, 
because wages in British Honduras were higher than in most other 
British Caribbean territories, the British Hondurans feared that 
participation in the West Indies Federation might trigger an in- 
flux of immigrants from other member states. Indeed, Britain was 
planning on such an influx. 

In 1968 British Honduras began to see the merits of integration 
with the British Caribbean when the country's ongoing territorial 
dispute with Guatemala led to rejection of its application to join 
the Central American Common Market. In 1971 British Honduras 
joined the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta), which in 
1973 became the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(Caricom — see Appendix C). 

During the Great Depression of the 1930s, British grants were 
necessary to keep British Honduras economically viable. However, 
economic ties with Britain gradually were replaced by a growing 
trade relationship with the United States. This economic link to 
the United States was seriously weakened by the devaluation of 
the British pound sterling in September 1949. Respecting the wishes 
of the middle class, labor, and the colonial legislature, the gover- 
nor at first refused to devalue the British Honduras dollar and 



226 



Central Bank of Belize, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



instead kept it at par with the United States dollar. However, three 
months later, bowing to pressure from Britain and powerful eco- 
nomic interests in British Honduras, the governor overrode the 
Legislative Council and devalued the colony's currency (see The 
Genesis of Modern Politics, 1931-54, ch. 6). Imports from the Unit- 
ed States then decreased sharply, and imports from Britain rose 
until they amounted to 35 percent of the total during 1952-54, ex- 
ceeding the country's imports from the United States. Living costs 
increased dramatically as a result of the devaluation, and the colony 
was thrown into turmoil. Anti-British sentiment was widespread and 
fueled resistance to the British-sponsored West Indies Federation. 
Imports from the United States did not recover until the late 1950s. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, the colony's economy grew rapidly, 
thanks in large part to the extraordinary success of the sugar sec- 
tor. During the 1970s, sugar accounted for almost 70 percent of 
all export revenues. As a result of this high level of dependency, 
the Belizean economy, although prosperous, entered the 1980s in- 
sufficiently diversified and highly susceptible to external shocks. 

Growth During 1980-85 

In 1980 the average world price of raw sugar had been US$0. 13 
per kilogram. By 1984 that price had fallen to US$0.02. As sugar 



227 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



prices collapsed, Belize's terms of trade deteriorated, and from 1980 
to 1985 GDP grew an average of only 1.2 percent per year. The 
crisis was compounded in 1982 when, for the first time since 1974, 
the United States government implemented a sugar quota system. 
The result was a reduction in total sugar exports from about 5 mil- 
lion tons in 1980-81 to about 1 million tons by 1987. 

Also contributing to the worsening of Belize's balance of pay- 
ments was the sudden collapse of the country's reexport business. 
As a reexporter, Belize imports goods and then resells them in neigh- 
boring countries (primarily Mexico), or merely transports them, 
collecting fees for port and road facilities. The arrangement is at- 
tractive because of Belize's relatively low shipping costs. However, 
Mexico's economic payment crisis of 1982, which reduced Mexi- 
can imports, put a dent in Belize's foreign-exchange earnings as 
well. Reexports had amounted to 37 percent of export earnings 
in 1981 but fell to 16 percent in 1983, contributing to a 35-percent 
drop in total export earnings during that period. 

The economic crisis of the early 1980s brought with it escalat- 
ing trade deficits. In 1981 Belize's net international reserves had 
stood at US$1.1 million. By the end of 1984, the country had a 
trade deficit of US$13.6 million. 

The economic crisis was a factor in the defeat of the People's 
United Party government in 1984 (see Political Parties, ch. 9); it 
also led to implementation of a standby arrangement with the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glossary) in December of 
that year. The IMF agreement marked the beginning of the coun- 
try's adjustment process. The agreement provided access to 7.1 
million units of special drawing rights (SDRs — see Glossary) over 
a sixteen-month period and called for a reduction of the public- 
sector deficit and a tightening of the country's credit policy by means 
of higher reserve requirements and higher interest rates. Credit 
had expanded at an annual rate of 15 percent from 1981 to 1984 
because of escalating government debt. 

A small open economy is dependent on developments in exter- 
nal markets and generally experiences few domestically generated 
inflationary pressures. Belize's currency, the Belizean dollar (see 
Glossary), had been pegged to the United States dollar at a rate 
of US$1 = Bz$2 since 1976. Belize's rate of inflation, therefore, was 
likewise pegged to that of its major trading partner. Between 1980 
and 1983, consumer prices increased by 25 percent in Belize. Dur- 
ing the same period, they went up 21 percent in the United States. 
This modest inflation contrasted sharply with the hyperinflation 
that pushed prices up by more than 1 ,000 percent per year in many 
other countries in the region. Yet, the 4-percent difference between 



228 



Belize: The Economy 



United States and Belizean inflation during those years resulted 
in a real effective exchange-rate appreciation and, consequently, 
a worsening of Belize's relative position in the export sector. This 
trend was later reversed when the Belizean inflation rate fell slightly 
below that of the United States. 

Growth after 1985 

After 1986 the Belizean economy improved dramatically, in part 
because of the adjustment program implemented by the govern- 
ment. These adjustments cut public expenditures and created in- 
centives for diversification of the economy. The country's 
foreign-exchange receipts from banana and citrus exports multi- 
plied, and tourism became a major contributor to growth. Inter- 
nal reform coincided with the recovery of the world economy, in 
particular the revival of the sugar market. Between 1986 and 1990, 
the Belizean economy grew at an average annual rate of more than 
10 percent (see table 14, Appendix A). 

Inflation remained low from 1986 to 1990, averaging 2.8 per- 
cent and allowing for an effective depreciation of the Belizean dol- 
lar relative to the United States dollar. The positive effect of low 
inflation on Belize's exports was enhanced by the depreciation of 
the United States dollar during the second half of the 1980s. The 
more favorable exchange rate enjoyed by the Belizean dollar was 
central to the vigorous growth the country experienced during the 
period. 

In 1991 estimates showed growth slowing to an annual rate of 
less than 5 percent. This deceleration was the result of significant 
shortfalls in banana production following an outbreak of black 
sigatoka disease and a reduction in citrus production resulting from 
bad weather. As in most of the Caribbean, tourism was also af- 
fected by the recession in the United States and Britain. 

Peripheral Factors 

Two small but significant factors must be mentioned in any dis- 
cussion of Belize's economy: the role of British troops and the ille- 
gal drug trade. At independence, Belize and Britain agreed that 
the latter would maintain a garrison of 2,000 soldiers in Belize to 
deter possible aggression by Guatemala. As of 1991, Guatemala 
had established diplomatic relations with Belize but continued to 
claim an undefined part of its territory. The economic impact of 
the British garrison, then numbering about 1,500 troops, was sub- 
stantial in the early 1990s. Because of their relatively high incomes 
and the support services they required, the troops have had a signi- 
ficant impact on the level of employment and the Belizean economy 



229 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

in general. Some analysts have estimated that the British garrison 
directly or indirectly generated about 15 percent of Belize's GDP. 

The drug trade was not factored into the country's GDP statis- 
tics, and the impact of this illegal activity on the economy was 
difficult to measure. Belize played three roles in the drug trade in 
the early 1990s; the country served as a marijuana producer, as 
a transshipment route for other drugs, and as a money-laundering 
center. In the early 1980s, the United States Drug Enforcement 
Agency placed Belize on its list of leading marijuana producers. 
Aerial spraying of pesticides was begun in 1984, but was ended 
that same year because of Belizean concerns about the safety of 
spraying on legal crops and on the population. The United States 
government estimated that annual marijuana production in Be- 
lize subsequently rose from 35 tons to 850 tons, with an approxi- 
mate street value of US$120 million. Spraying was resumed in 1985 
with different chemicals, and marijuana production declined sub- 
stantially thereafter. 

Belize remained an important transshipment site for drugs other 
than marijuana in the early 1990s. For instance, in September 1990 
Mexican federal judicial police seized approximately 457 kilograms 
of cocaine, which they suspected had been smuggled into Mexico 
through the border area between Belize's Hondo River and Santa 
Teresa, Mexico. The shipment apparently was destined for the 
United States. 

Finally, concerns existed that Belize served as a center for money- 
laundering. The Central Bank of Belize had the authority to trace 
large transactions, as well as all foreign-currency transactions. 
However, the nation's investment law allowed offshore banking 
in Belize and specifically exempted such activity from the regula- 
tory oversight of the Central Bank. 

Government Policy 

Economic Diversification 

The narrow base of the national economy was recognized as a 
problem by the Belizean government after the sluggish growth of 
the early 1980s. In response, the government started a compre- 
hensive program during the second half of the decade focused 
primarily on eliminating export biases and creating a favorable en- 
vironment for investment, both foreign and domestic, especially 
in the nontraditional export sector. The creation of a favorable en- 
vironment for investment meant eliminating internal and exter- 
nal imbalances and upgrading infrastructures. This process was 



230 



Belize: The Economy 



facilitated by external incentives such as the United States Carib- 
bean Basin Initiative (CBI — see Appendix D). The private sector 
reacted positively to these changes, and economic growth took off. 

The Belizean economy was still insufficiently diversified at the 
beginning of the 1990s, but major changes in the composition of 
GDP and exports had provided a basis for sustained growth. The 
two major changes in the GDP took place in agriculture and 
tourism. Agriculture declined from a 20 percent share of GDP in 
1980 to a 15 percent share in 1990, whereas tourism expenditures 
increased from a 4 percent share to a 9 percent share (see fig. 13). 

The percentage share of each crop within the agricultural sector 
gave further evidence of how the composition of GDP was chang- 
ing. Sugar-export receipts had lost half their share of exports by 
1990, whereas tourism had tripled its portion, to the point where 
it nearly equaled receipts from sugar exports. Citrus products also 
had made remarkable progress, almost doubling their share of ex- 
ports by 1990. The share of GDP provided by bananas increased, 
although less steadily. 

Balance of Payments 

Balance of payments figures also improved in the mid-1980s. 
From 1980 to 1984, Belize incurred a balance of payments deficit. 
Effects of the government austerity plan coupled with a rise in ex- 
ports produced a balance of payments surplus from 1985-90. Be- 
tween 1988 and 1990, the deficit between exports and imports of 
goods and services widened again. However, this time the gap was 
caused by large increases in private-investment expenditures. At 
the same time, the public sector was accruing surpluses, so the over- 
all balance of payment still showed a surplus. 

Investments 

The heavy investment in Belize from 1988 to 1990 funded both 
private-sector and public-sector activity. Public-sector capital in- 
vestments that were domestically financed, for example, increased 
from US$3.4 million in 1986-87 to a planned US$38.8 million in 
1991-92. Although the domestically funded portion of capital ex- 
penditures was budgeted to decrease in 1992, an expected increase 
in funding from external sources was projected to cause a net gain 
in new capital expenditures. 

Private- sector investment increased from approximately US$17.7 
million in 1985 to US$63.7 in 1989, then declined in 1990. Help- 
ing make a high level of private- sector investment possible was the 
increased availability of domestic credit. Analysts estimate that net 



231 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



GDP 1989 = US$329 million 

OTHER 




TRANSPORTATION 

AND MANUFACTURING 
COMMUNICATIONS 12% 

10% 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Belize, Ba- 
hamas, Bermuda, 1989-90, London, 1990. 

Figure 13. Belize: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of Origin, 
1989 

domestic credit extended to the private sector increased 15.3 per- 
cent in 1989 and 17.8 percent in 1990. 

The improved health and apparent stability of the Belizean econ- 
omy also encouraged a surge in foreign direct investment. In 1984 
Belize had suffered an outflow of foreign direct investment in eq- 
uity capital of US$7 million. During the period 1988-90, annual 
foreign direct investments averaged US$17 million. Contributing 
to this development was the government's decision to eliminate 
export biases through various legislative measures. The 1990 Fis- 
cal Incentives Act provided tax holidays and duty exemptions for 
investments that would benefit the economy. The 1990 Income Tax 
Act granted tax relief to nontraditional exporters. The legislature 
in 1990 also approved the Export-Processing Zones Act, which 
exempted eligible firms from requirements concerning import 
licenses, quotas, import and export taxes, export licenses, price 
controls, and other regulatory mechanisms. The first export-pro- 
cessing zones (EPZs) were scheduled to become established in 1993. 
The concept required designation or development of a physical 



232 



Belize: The Economy 



facility (the zone) similar to an industrial park. As part of the ef- 
fort to provide a more favorable environment for investment, Prime 
Minister George Cadle Price also introduced legislation that would 
lower corporate taxes from 45 percent to 35 percent in fiscal year 
(FY— see Glossary) 1992. 

Fiscal Performance 

The consolidation of government finances was a crucial factor 
in the economic growth of the late 1980s. The first step was the 
reduction of total expenditures. Between 1981 and 1985, total 
government expenditures had stood at 34 percent of GDP. Between 
1986 and 1990, this proportion was reduced to 31 percent. More 
significant, however, was the decline of current expenditures as 
a portion of GDP, from 25 percent to 21 percent. This decline in- 
dicated that cuts in government spending were not being made at 
the expense of development expenditures. Development expendi- 
tures as a percentage of GDP actually increased from 7.4 percent 
between 1981 and 1985 to 8.7 percent between 1986 and 1990. 

Statistics for the period 1986-90 also showed an increase in 
government revenues over 1981-85. These revenues, which had 
amounted to 24 percent of GDP over the 1981-85 period, increased 
to 30 percent of GDP in 1986-90. Some of this increase was ac- 
counted for by the sale of government assets, which increased capital 
revenues. The remainder came mainly from higher tax revenues, 
which rose from 21 percent to 24 percent of GDP. 

Lower current expenditures and increased current revenues per- 
mitted the Belizean government to experience several years of high 
surpluses on its current account. In 1990 this surplus on the govern- 
ment's current account was 11 percent. This fiscal consolidation 
reduced government competition with the private sector in the 
domestic credit market. Consequentiy, increased lending to the pri- 
vate sector accelerated growth without increasing the money sup- 
ply and therefore without threatening currency stability. 

External Debt 

Improvements in the current and capital accounts facilitated an 
increase in the country's international reserves from US$5 million 
in 1984 to US$130 million in 1990. Belize's total external debt more 
than doubled from US$62.9 million in 1980 to US$158 million in 
1990. Despite its relatively low debt burden, Belize formally re- 
quested consideration by the United States government for debt 
reduction and payment of interest into a local environmental fund 
under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI — see 
Glossary). 



233 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Belize has been quite successful in attracting foreign aid. In 1983, 
two years after the nation became independent, the United States 
Agency for International Development opened an office in Belize. 
Between 1983 and 1989, Belize received US$94 million in develop- 
ment assistance. On a per capita basis, in 1991 Belize ranked among 
the top recipients of United States aid, a position that underscored 
the close relationship between the two countries. Britain remained 
Belize's other major benefactor. In 1991 Belize sought member- 
ship in the Inter- American Development Bank to assure the con- 
tinued flow of concessional loans. 

Labor 

In 1946 the Belizean labor force numbered approximately 20,100 
economically active individuals. This pool expanded to 27,000 in 
1960, to 33,000 in 1970, and to 46,000 in 1980. By 1990 the ac- 
tive labor force had increased to more than 60,000. Most startling 
was the increase in female participation. Although women made 
up only 18 percent of the labor force in 1960, they accounted for 
one-third in 1991 , when 44.5 percent of working-age women were 
actually economically active, as opposed to only 20.6 percent in 
1960. The reason for this relatively high level of female participa- 
tion was most likely the acute shortage of labor in a country where 
some 50 percent of the population was aged fifteen and under and 
also the fact that young women typically are employed in the new 
low- wage sectors, such as the garment assembly industry. 

The labor shortage was eased by the employment of large num- 
bers of migrant workers from Central America. However, rela- 
tively high wage rates have been necessary to attract these workers, 
which, in turn, make Belize a high-cost producer by developing 
countries' standards. The influx of large numbers of immigrants 
per year, which has changed the ethnic composition of the popu- 
lation, has also been a source of social tension. 

Although Belize has experienced labor shortages, it has also 
reported relatively high levels of unemployment — around 15 per- 
cent in the early 1990s. However, these figures were less a 
manifestation of job shortages than an indication of labor immo- 
bility. Also, many Belizeans chose to be unemployed because they 
received remittance payments from family abroad. For instance, 
between 30,000 and 100,000 Belizeans were estimated to reside 
in the United States. 

The members of five major unions accounted for about 15 per- 
cent of the labor force. In 1991 more than 1,000 teachers belonged 
to the Belize National Teachers' Union; the Public Service Union 
consisted of about the same number of public workers. The largest 



234 




Belize Tourist Board, Regent Street, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



union outside the public sector was the Christian Workers' Union, 
which had more than 2,000 members. The General Workers' Union 
was broad-based and affiliated with the International Confedera- 
tion of Free Trade Unions. The Democratic Independent Union 
counted more than 1,200 members in 1991. The National Trades 
Union Congress of Belize served as an umbrella group for all 
unions. None of the unions was associated with a political party. 

Foreign Economic Relations 

Small, open economies depend heavily on preferential trade 
agreements. Belize's economy benefited from a range of such agree- 
ments: the United States sugar quota; the Lome Convention (see 
Glossary) of the European Economic Community (EEC — in par- 
ticular, the Sugar Protocol and the Banana Protocol); the CBI; 
United States Tariff Schedule 807 program (see Glossary); the 
Multi-fibre Arrangement; and the EAI. 

Preferential trade agreements demonstrate the complexity of in- 
ternational trade relations and their effect on economic progress, 
especially in developing countries. Preferential trade agreements 
also provide a reminder that trade liberalization is a double-edged 
sword for all trade participants, developed and developing alike. 
For example, there were distinct advantages in the existing quota 



235 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

systems for the Belizean sugar industry in the early 1990s. Quotas 
guaranteed that Belizean sugar would have access to markets in 
the EEC and the United States at prices far above world market 
levels. At the same time, it was also clear that a quota system was 
a unilateral act, that it limited market access, and that quotas could 
be changed or eliminated by foreign powers at their will. 

Belize was a member of Caricom and benefited from preferen- 
tial market access to the markets of other member countries. 
However, Caricom' s success at integration was mixed. Between 
1984 and 1986, Belize's trade with Caricom members decreased 
sharply as a result of currency devaluations and a renewal of trade 
barriers by some member countries. In 1988 Caricom approved 
a common internal tariff, which was to reinvigorate intraregional 
trade. However, there were some exceptions to the common in- 
ternal tariff. Caricom' s much-delayed common external tariff was 
adopted by Belize at the end of 1991 . This common tariff changed 
Belize's duty rates but produced no effect on the budget. High duties 
on foodstuffs were dropped, and duties on machinery were reduced. 

Belizean trade patterns were heavily affected by the country's 
participation in various bilateral and multilateral trade arrange- 
ments. The United States and Britain remained the principal des- 
tinations of Belizean exports throughout the 1980s. In the second 
half of the 1980s, the two accounted for more than 80 percent of 
total exports in every year. Their respective shares fluctuated from 
year to year, but their combined total remained practically un- 
changed. Exports to Caricom countries, which had peaked in 1983 
at 14.5 percent of total Belizean exports, plunged to 1.9 percent 
in 1986, but recovered in 1990 to roughly half their 1983 level. 

Agriculture 

Sugar 

As the 1990s began, sugar was still the Belizean economy's sin- 
gle largest export earner (see table 15, Appendix A). Sugar produc- 
tion involved a unique hybrid of agricultural and industrial activity. 
Sugarcane cultivation, on the one hand, and the mechanical- 
chemical transformation of cane into sugar, on the other hand, made 
for this peculiarity. Both processes needed to be coordinated be- 
cause of the perishability of the crop. 

In Belize small farms in the north produce the bulk of the sugar- 
cane. In the early 1990s, the coordination of the agricultural aspects 
of sugar production and the organization of cane delivery were the 
responsibilities of the Cane Farmers' Association. The industrial 



236 



Belize: The Economy 



segment of the sugar-production process was controlled by Belize 
Sugar Industries Limited (BSIL). Overall coordination of the in- 
dustry was exercised by the Belize Sugar Board. 

Until 1985 Belize had two sugar mills: the Libertad factory in 
the Corozal District, opened in 1937, and the factory at Tower Hill 
near Orange Walk Town, opened in 1967. In July 1985, the Liber- 
tad factory was closed. By early 1989, Libertad had been reopened 
and leased to the Jamaican petroleum company Petrojam. Petro- 
jam was to use Libertad for the production of molasses, which was 
then to be refined in Jamaica into ethanol. Ethanol had duty-free 
access to the United States market under the CBI arrangement. 

The Belizean sugar industry, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, ex- 
perienced large production and export swings. In 1981 an estimated 
30 percent of farmland, formerly used for growing sugarcane, had 
been abandoned. Yet, at the end of the 1980s, the United States 
increased its quota for Belize at the expense of Guyana, which was 
not reaching its allotment, and in early 1990, BSIL reported its 
largest-ever bulk shipment (17,300 tons of raw sugar) to Canada. 

Citrus 

Citrus production, mainly oranges and grapefruit, occurs 
predominantly in Belize's Stann Creek District. The citrus trade 
began in the 1920s, but became significant only in the 1980s, when 
Belizean-produced citrus concentrate became exempt from Unit- 
ed States tariff duties under the terms of the CBI. Exports of fresh 
citrus fruit to the United States were restricted, however, because 
of infestation of the Mediterranean fruit fly. Citrus, much like su- 
gar, underwent sharp price and production fluctuations, although 
overall export receipts from citrus concentrate markedly increased 
during the 1980s because of high prices. 

In the early 1990s, citrus production was controlled by two 
processing companies. Founded by a Jamaican family, the Citrus 
Company of Belize had been controlled since 1984 by the Trinidad 
Citrus Association. Belize Food Products, the second processor, 
was owned by Nestle, the Swiss multinational, until it was sold 
to a local consortium in 1990. Both processing plants were located 
near Dangriga on the Caribbean coast. 

The future of citrus was uncertain. In 1990 only half of planted 
citrus hectarage was in production. There were indications that 
production could double within five years. There were worries, 
however, about the effect of competition from Mexico or Brazil 
through preferential access allowed to them via the proposed North 
American Free Trade Agreement or the EAI. 



237 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 
Bananas 

Commercial cultivation of bananas began in the late nineteenth 
century, when United States and British investors first established 
plantations. Although the banana trade between British Honduras 
and New Orleans at first seemed promising, commerce was wiped 
out in the 1920s by an outbreak of the Panama disease. Another 
attempt to cultivate bananas was begun by the British during the 
1960s, but the plantations were destroyed by hurricanes in 1975 
and 1978. The subsequent takeover of banana cultivation by the 
Banana Control Board, a public enterprise, had the effect of fur- 
ther inhibiting production. 

By mid- 1985, the Banana Control Board had accumulated debts 
of US$9 million. The government reacted to the plight of the board 
by selling the 880 hectares under cultivation to the private sector. 
Five years later, banana production had almost tripled, and the 
cultivated area had increased to more than 2,400 hectares. The 
Banana Control Board was reorganized and retained the respon- 
sibility for marketing and research. In 1991 responsibility for the 
board was passed to the Banana Growers' Association. 

Britain was the almost exclusive importer of Belizean bananas. 
Marketing of exports was handled by Fyffes International, a British 
subsidiary of the United States company, United Fruit. The special 
provisions of the Lome Convention's Banana Protocol allowed Brit- 
ain to guarantee artificially high prices for bananas to the benefici- 
aries of the protocol. These prices were above prices in the United 
States and Germany. The purpose of this special provision was to 
protect the central export crop of some of the islands of the Lesser 
Antilles (see Glossary), members of the Commonwealth of Nations, 
from ruinous competition from low-cost producers in Latin Ameri- 
ca (see The Commonwealth of Nations, Appendix B). 

The preferential access to EEC markets provided by the Lome 
Convention was under advisement in 1991 by the EEC in connec- 
tion with its single-European-market program. It appeared that 
Belize would be better prepared for a drop in prices than would 
the islands of the Lesser Antilles, as Belizean producers received 
far lower prices through the protocol than did their Caribbean 
neighbors. 

New port facilities at Big Creek in southern Stann Creek Dis- 
trict were expected to increase banana exports. Until 1990 Belize- 
an bananas had had to go through Puerto Cortes, Honduras, which 
added to overhead. Fyffes then financed the construction of Big 
Creek, Belize's only deep-water port. This port was designed to 
serve as the main shipment point for Belizean bananas. 



238 



«•«* 




Belize International Airport near Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

Between 1989 and 1991, banana production was hampered by 
cold weather and black sigatoka disease, but production was ex- 
pected to double in 1992 because of the new port, better disease 
control, and improved drainage and irrigation systems. The sus- 
ceptibility of bananas to disease and possible changes in Belize's 
preferential access to the British market were factors that could limit 
growth in this sector, however. 

Other Crops 

Crops other than sugar, citrus, and bananas played a very minor 
role in the Belizean economy in the early 1990s. Cultivation of non- 
traditional export crops was encouraged by the CBI as a way of 
lessening dependence on sugar and banana exports. Trade incen- 
tives were offered for nontraditional products, such as tropical fruits 
or winter fruits and vegetables. This strategy was only moderately 
successful, however. 

Examples of failed attempts at agricultural diversification included 
AID's sponsorship of the Belize Agri-Business Company, whose 
purpose was to decrease the dependency of northern farmers on 
sugarcane by replacing it with cucumbers, okra, and bell peppers 
for winter export to the United States. The effort failed because 
of the farmers' reluctance to change and because of poor marketing. 

239 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

In 1987 the failure of Caribe Farm Industries, the most promi- 
nent nontraditional agricultural exporter in the country produc- 
ing a variety of vegetables, added to the growing frustration with 
the diversification efforts. Difficulties were also experienced with 
tropical fruits. The Danish-owned Tropical Produce Company 
(TPC) had a 570-hectare mango farm in the Monkey River area 
of the Toledo District. Its produce was grown for the United States 
market, as well as for European importers, with whom TPC held 
a ten-year contract. But shipments were erratic because of Mediter- 
ranean fruit fly quarantines. For instance, from 1987 to 1990, there 
were no mango exports from the TPC farm to the United States. 

Most production of import-substitution crops resulted from the 
efforts of two groups, the Maya and the Mennonites. Small farm- 
ers, primarily of Mayan descent, grew corn and beans in sparsely 
populated areas for their own consumption. The immigrant Men- 
nonite community bought 40,000 hectares of forested land along 
the Hondo River in 1959, constructed a road to Orange Walk, and 
soon created a thriving business based on dairy products, vegeta- 
bles, beans, and poultry. Yet, overall production swung widely over 
the years, closely following price subsidies. The Belize Marketing 
Board, which supervised production of import-substitution crops, 
was scheduled to function exclusively as a price stabilization agen- 
cy by the end of 1992. 

Fishing and Forestry 

Four fishing cooperatives — Caribefia, the Northern, the Nation- 
al, and Placencia — dominated the fishing industry, which began 
to flourish in the 1960s. In 1990 fishing accounted for about 2 per- 
cent of GDP; 30 percent of the sector's output was for domestic 
consumption, and the remainder was exported. The primary catches 
were lobster, shrimp, conch, red snapper, and other fin fish. Over- 
fishing and out-of- season fishing were problems. Shrimp farming, 
begun with little initial success in the late 1970s, has recently con- 
tributed to a boost in shrimp exports (up 43 percent in 1989). 

Forestry lost its role as the biggest sector of the Belizean economy 
decades ago. Its contribution to GDP averaged 2.3 percent during 
1980-90. Production rose from 1987 to 1990 because of a high domes- 
tic demand for construction materials. Exports consisted primari- 
ly of sawn cedar wood. In 1990 volume dropped by 40 percent. 

Industry 

Mining and Energy 

Belize has negligible known mineral deposits, although hopes 



240 



Belize: The Economy 



persisted that large reserves of oil would be found. Extensive drill- 
ing, which began in 1981, primarily in the Corozal Basin, has been 
unsuccessful. Some of the nation's oil has been supplied at con- 
cessionary terms because Belize was a signatory in 1988 to the San 
Jose Pact with Mexico and Venezuela. This treaty obligated Mexico 
and Venezuela to offer concessionary credit for at least 20-25 per- 
cent of the purchase price of their oil exports to Central American 
beneficiaries. In August 1991, Venezuela and Mexico increased 
the oil supplies offered under this agreement. 

In the early 1990s, Belize had a limited capacity to generate elec- 
tricity. Several small diesel generators, mostly powered by oil im- 
ported from Mexico, had a total capacity of 34.7 megawatts. In 
1990 these plants produced 90 gigawatt-hours of electricity. Mex- 
ico agreed in 1990 to supply electricity to the Belize Electricity 
Board, but electricity remained costly and in short supply. 

Manufacturing 

The manufacturing sector has been dominated by agro-industries 
such as sugar-milling, citrus-processing, and processing of domestic 
foodstuffs. Belize also had a significant garment industry in the 
early 1990s. Nonagricultural industries that produced import sub- 
stitutes were highly protected. Their output was limited by the size 
of the domestic market. 

The garment industry was the only export-producing nonagricul- 
tural industry of note. As with the country's other major products, 
its level of exports fluctuated throughout the 1980s. In 1980 the gar- 
ment industry was Belize's second largest industry. By 1990 the in- 
dustry had dropped to fourth behind sugar, tourism, and citrus. 

Garment manufacturing in Belize was an offshore industry us- 
ing imported United States cloth. The finished product was then 
reexported, with the product exempt from United States duties for 
all but the portion of value added in Belize, per United States Tariff 
Schedule 807. Belize's garment exports have also benefited from 
the Multi-fibre Arrangement, which placed a United States im- 
port quota on garments from major exporters. Belize was not sub- 
ject to the United States quota because of its relatively small share 
of United States imports. 

Construction 

Beginning in 1985, the construction industry began to grow faster 
than other sectors of the economy. Growth was especially strong af- 
ter 1988, when investments in tourism and in the public sector accel- 
erated. The industry continued to benefit from major infrastructural 



241 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

projects, such as the renovation of the Hummingbird Highway (the 
road linking Belmopan and the coast), the construction of numer- 
ous schools and urban housing, and a 24-megawatt hydroelectric 
project. In 1990 construction accounted for almost 10 percent of 
GDP. 

Tourism 

Belize offers some of the most beautiful coral reefs in the Western 
Hemisphere, as well as more than 175 sandy cay (see Glossary) 
islands, various archeological sites, about 240 varieties of wild or- 
chids, and about 500 species of birds. Naturally, Belize would ap- 
pear to be a prime objective for United States tourists. However, 
a lack of infrastructure has kept the tourism industry relatively un- 
derdeveloped. 

Apart from making infrastructural improvements such as en- 
largement of Belize International Airport in 1989 and offering fis- 
cal incentives, the public sector has done little to promote tourism. 
The unhappy experience of the Colonial Development Corpora- 
tion (CDC) in the early 1950s may have contributed to the govern- 
ment's hesitancy. In 1953 the CDC opened the Fort George Hotel, 
realizing that the lack of hotel accommodations in the colony had 
been an obstacle to investment. The costs of this project were ex- 
cessive, however, and the architectural difficulties were overwhelm- 
ing because of the swampy ground on which the hotel was built. 
The hotel's operations proved to be difficult as well. As a result, 
CDC's capital in the project had to be written off. 

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the tourism sector, despite 
setbacks, developed into the second most important source of for- 
eign exchange for the Belizean economy. In 1980 tourism receipts 
had been about a tenth of sugar-export receipts. By 1990 the two 
sectors were almost equal in size. In 1991 hotel receipts were esti- 
mated to have grown by an additional 15 percent. Tourist arrivals 
almost tripled between 1985 and 1990. In 1990 the Fort George 
Hotel joined the Radisson chain and doubled its capacity to seventy- 
six rooms. In 1991 the Ramada Royal Reef Hotel opened with 
a capacity of 120 rooms. The total number of rooms had increased 
from 1,176 in 1980 to 2,763 in 1990. 

The Belizean Ministry of Tourism has encouraged controlled 
development of tourism without endangering the country's eco- 
logical balance. Although tourism had great potential for growth, 
the sector was still constrained by poor infrastructure, unsophisti- 
cated services, and a shortage of qualified labor. 



242 



Belize: The Economy 



Other Services 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Highways and aircraft were the principal means of transporta- 
tion in Belize; in 1991 the country had no railroads or significant 
inland waterways. The Belize River, however, was navigable up 
to the Guatemalan border, and shallow- draught craft were usable 
on some 800 kilometers of river. A road renovation program in 
the 1980s left the country with a much-improved road system. In 
1991 Belize had about 500 kilometers of paved highway extending 
from the Mexican and Guatemalan borders to Belize City, including 
the new Hummingbird Highway linking Belmopan with Dangriga 
(see fig. 14). Another 1,600 kilometers of gravel roads linked rural 
areas and localities in the south. The country's only international 
airport, Belize International (also called Philip Goldson Interna- 
tional), underwent modernization in 1989. Belize City was the main 
port, but Big Creek in the south was being expanded to accom- 
modate increased banana exports. 

The telecommunications network was adequate, with most of 
the population having access to broadcast facilities. In 1991 the 
country had 8,650 telephones, or 4.6 per 100 people. A satellite 
ground station coordinated with the International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean satellite 
provided international direct-dial telephone service and television 
transmission. There were six amplitude modulation (AM) radio 
stations (four run by Belizean commercial interests and two by the 
Voice of America), five frequency modulation (FM) stations, and 
one television transmitter in Belize City. 

The highly successful process of privatizing the Belize tele- 
communications network began in 1988 when the government 
incorporated Belize Telecommunications Limited (BTL). The 
government kept 49 percent of the shares of BTL, sold 25 percent 
to British Telecom, and allowed the rest to be acquired by Belize- 
an investors. Regulatory authority over telecommunications was 
retained by the government. Receipts from the sale amounted to 
almost 6 percent of GDP in 1988. The Belizean government also 
gained a substantial new source of revenue because of taxes, duties, 
and dividends paid to it by BTL. At the same time, consumers 
benefited from the increased efficiency of the new company, which 
more than doubled the number of existing telephone lines. At the 
beginning of 1992, the government sold all but 3 percent of its re- 
maining shares in BTL for approximately US$15 million. 



243 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 




Figure 14. Belize: Transportation System, 1991 

Banking and Finance 

In the early 1990s, financial institutions in Belize included a cen- 
tral bank, a development bank, commercial banks, and credit un- 
ions. The Central Bank of Belize was formed in 1982 as a successor 
to the Monetary Authority, which had been founded in 1976. The 
bank held the usual responsibilities of a central bank. The fully 
government-owned Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was 



244 



Belize: The Economy 



founded in 1963. Its main function was to channel foreign aid into 
development projects. Personal credit was provided by thirty-eight 
credit unions. Commercial credit was offered by four commercial 
banks: Barclays, Bank of Nova Scotia, Atlantic Bank (Honduras), 
and Banco Serfin (Mexico). These banks have been criticized for 
preferring short-term trade financing and for charging high interest 
rates for development loans. 

Economic Prospects 

The Belizean economy entered the 1990s in much better condi- 
tion than it had entered the 1980s. The economy was more diverse, 
export biases had been removed, private- sector incentives and 
privatization had been well received, private and public investments 
had reached record levels, the tourism sector had grown and was 
positioned to become an engine of further growth, and, most im- 
portant of all, the government had successfully completed a process 
of fiscal consolidation. All of these gains were financed mainly by 
direct foreign investment and concessionary funding and accom- 
plished with comparatively low external debt ratios. 

Negotiations on trade matters that posed challenges were under- 
way as Belize entered the 1990s. As in most small economies, much 
of Belize's growth was based on export performance, which de- 
pended on preferential trade arrangements. Prices for Belizean 
sugar exports were 45 percent above world market prices in 1990, 
and the price of bananas exported to Britain was 30 percent above 
world market prices. The results of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT — see Glossary) 
negotiations, the creation of the single European market by 1993, 
the implementation of action programs under the EAI, and the pros- 
pect of a North American Free Trade Agreement would eliminate 
some of these trade preferences and decrease Belize's exports. 

Economic growth could also be affected by a withdrawal of British 
troops. In 1991 British prime minister John Major gave assurances 
that the troops would remain despite the diplomatic recognition 
accorded Belize by Guatemala in September of 1991 . But constraints 
on the British budget might change that position and affect Be- 
lize's growth in the future. 

The consolidation of government finances was central to the 
progress made in the second half of the 1980s. Capital expendi- 
tures rose sharply in order to cover the cost of providing the phys- 
ical infrastructure necessary to continued growth. Future increments 
would have to keep pace with the nation's rate of economic growth. 
The prospect that Belize would continue on its path to economic 



245 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

development and social progress was good, but the economy 
nevertheless faced new tests as the century drew to a close. 

* * * 

Economic literature on Belize is mostly outdated and usually not 
very comprehensive. The economic chapter in O. Nigel Bolland's 
book Belize: A New Nation in Central America discusses the economic 
structure of the country in the context of Belize's historical ex- 
perience. The last chapter in William David Setzekorn's book, For- 
merly British Honduras: A Profile of the New Nation of Belize provides 
a good understanding of the various sectors of the Belizean econo- 
my and their prospects. 

The best sources of up-to-date information are the country reports 
and profiles of the Economist Intelligence Unit and World Bank 
data. Two relatively recent country guides that also contain eco- 
nomics chapters are Tom Barry's Belize: A Country Guide and his 
Inside Belize. 

Finally, as a small developing country Belize faces many special 
constraints. As an aid to understanding these constraints and put- 
ting them in the Caribbean context, the most relevant standard 
piece written on the subject is William G. Demas's The 'Economics 
of Development in Small Countries. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



246 



Chapter 9. Belize: Government and Politics 



Mayan sun god 



BELIZE'S CONSTITUTIONAL and political institutions have 
roots in the country's origins as a settlement of British subjects, 
who carried with them the rights and immunities they had enjoyed 
in the mother country. British common law included the tradition 
of recognizing the executive power of the crown in settlements over- 
seas, but the Settlement of Belize in the Bay of Honduras (renamed 
British Honduras in 1862 and Belize in 1973) enjoyed its own legis- 
lative competence. In 1871, however, it surrendered its legacy of 
self- governance and abolished its elected legislature in order to ob- 
tain greater economic and political security as a crown colony (see 
Glossary). 

The colony soon regretted the loss of self-rule and thus began 
a long campaign to regain an elected legislature that led to inter- 
nal self-rule in 1964 and culminated in the colony's independence 
in 1981. From 1950 on, the People's United Party (PUP) spearhead- 
ed this campaign under the leadership of George Cadle Price. Price 
and the PUP have largely defined the nationalist agenda in Be- 
lize, and the PUP has won all but one national election in Belize 
since 1954. Although internal self-rule was achieved in 1964, full 
independence was delayed because of territorial claims against Belize 
by Guatemala. These claims were still unresolved in 1991, but Brit- 
ish defense guarantees paved the way for Belizean independence 
on September 21, 1981. 

According to its constitution, Belize is a constitutional monar- 
chy, whose titular sovereign, the British monarch, is represented 
in Belize by a governor general. Actual political power, however, 
resides in elected representatives in the National Assembly and the 
cabinet headed by the prime minister. Belize has a political sys- 
tem dominated by two parties, the PUP and the United Democratic 
Party (UDP). The constitution establishes an independent judiciary 
and guarantees fundamental human, civil, and political rights. 

Constitutional Background 

Constitutional and Political Structures prior to Independence 

Constitutional and political development in Belize prior to in- 
dependence in 1981 can be divided into seven stages. The British 
settlement enjoyed its own legislature, called the Public Meeting, 
while the crown held executive authority and thus the right to 



249 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

appoint governors. Social, political, and economic factors, however, 
led British Honduras to surrender its elected legislature, then called 
the Legislative Assembly, and the legacy of self- governance in order 
to obtain greater security and economic stability as a crown colo- 
ny in 1871. The arrangement did not grant the crown, however, 
the right to revoke or amend the colony's constitution, a right which 
the monarch held in some colonies. The Parliament of Britain con- 
tinued to exercise its power to amend British Honduras 's consti- 
tution in conjunction with relevant legislative bodies in the colony. 
The rise of trade unions in the 1930s and 1940s and the emergence 
of a mass political party in the 1950s led to the establishment of 
institutions that would chart British Honduras 's steady course 
toward internal self-rule and independence. 

The Public Meeting and the Superintendent, pre-1854 

The ambiguous status of British loggers who settled in Spanish 
territory hindered the early development of government institu- 
tions in the area. Informal meetings to address common security 
concerns, however, evolved into a rudimentary form of adminis- 
tration, the Public Meeting. Participation in the Public Meetings 
depended on race, wealth, and length of residency. In 1765 Rear 
Admiral Sir William Burnaby, commander in chief of Jamaica, 
compiled the settlement's common law in the Ancient Usages and 
Customs of the Settlement, or " Burnaby' s Code." Burnaby also 
recommended to the British government that a superintendent be 
appointed to oversee the settlement. Opposition from the settlers 
prevented the office of superintendent from being permanently es- 
tablished until 1796. The changing political, economic, and social 
climate of Central America and the Caribbean, including the eman- 
cipation of slaves throughout the British Empire in the 1830s, con- 
tributed to a desire to regularize the status of the settlement. As 
early as 1840, British law displaced Burnaby' s Code as the settle- 
ment's basic law, and in 1854 a Public Meeting and the British 
Parliament adopted a new constitution, which created institutions 
more like those of other British possessions (see Constitutional De- 
velopments, 1850-62, ch. 6). The Public Meeting thus ceased to 
operate. 

Elected Legislative Assembly, 1854-70 

The new constitution replaced the Public Meeting with a Legis- 
lative Assembly with eighteen elected members. In addition, the 
superintendent appointed three subordinate colonial officials, who 
served in the assembly as ex officio, or "official," members. The 
elected members had to be British-born or naturalized subjects and 



250 



Belize: Government and Politics 



own property worth £2400 sterling. The superintendent, who was 
appointed by the British government, chaired the assembly and 
could dissolve it at will. In 1862, when the Settlement of Belize 
in the Bay of Honduras was officially declared a British colony 
known as British Honduras, a lieutenant governor subordinate to 
the governor of Jamaica replaced the superintendent. Later, a 
governor replaced the lieutenant governor. At the end of the de- 
cade, however, the Legislative Assembly petitioned for status as 
a crown colony, hoping that the crown would thereby shoulder more 
of the costs of defense. In order to accommodate such status, the 
Legislative Assembly voted in 1870 to replace itself with an ap- 
pointed Legislative Council. 

Crown Colony, 1871-1935 

The governor and his appointed council governed British Hon- 
duras after it was declared a crown colony in 1871 . The exact com- 
position of the council varied over the years, but its membership 
until 1936 was always restricted to official members, who held key 
appointive positions in the colonial administration, and unofficial 
members, who were appointed by the governor. In drafting a new 
constitution, the old Legislative Assembly withheld a power from 
the new governor. Unlike the governors of other crown colonies, 
the governor of British Honduras lacked reserve powers, the right 
to enact laws in emergency situations without the consent of the 
Legislative Council. In 1932, however, the Legislative Council 
agreed to grant reserve powers to the British Honduran governor 
in exchange for urgently needed British financial assistance in the 
wake of a devastating hurricane the previous year. 

The Return to Elected Government, 1936-53 

Resenting the pressure that had been brought to bear upon them 
to grant reserve powers, the unofficial members of the Legislative 
Council successfully lobbied for the inclusion of elected members, 
as had been offered when the council agreed to grant the governor 
reserve powers. In 1936 five of the seven unofficial posts of the 
twelve-member council became elected ones. In 1939 the council 
expanded to thirteen, the new member being an elected one. The 
mix of official and appointed members was shuffled several times 
before the council was replaced in 1954. 

The institution of elections for council members, however, did 
not bring mass political participation. Property requirements for 
voters and candidates effectively excluded nonwhite people from 
government. And until 1945, women could not vote before the age 
of thirty; men could vote when they turned twenty-one. In the 1936 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

election, only 1,035 voters — 1.8 percent of the population — cast 
ballots. Even as late as 1948, only 2.8 percent of the population 
voted. After World War II, the cause of self-rule in British Hon- 
duras benefited from the growing pressure for self-government and 
decolonization throughout the British Empire. The labor move- 
ment and the PUP, which was founded in 1950, called for greater 
political participation. In 1947 the Legislative Council appointed 
a commission of enquiry to make recommendations for constitu- 
tional reforms. The commission issued its report in 1952 and recom- 
mended moving slowly ahead with reforms, paving the way for 
an opening of the political system to greater popular participation. 

Constitution of 1954 and Extension of Suffrage, 1954-60 

The constitution of 1954 extended suffrage to all literate British 
subjects over the age of twenty-one. The new constitution also 
replaced the Legislative Council with a Legislative Assembly that 
had nine elected, three official, and three appointed members and 
established an Executive Council chaired by the governor. The nine 
members of the council were drawn from the Legislative Assem- 
bly and included the three official members, two of the appointed 
members, and four of the elected members chosen by the assem- 
bly. Although the governor was required to abide by the advice 
of the Executive Council, he still held reserve powers and controlled 
the introduction of financial measures into the legislature. In 1955 
a quasi-ministerial government was established when three of the 
elected members of the Executive Council were given responsibil- 
ity for overseeing three government ministries. 

The 1960 Constitution 

In 1959 British Honduras undertook another constitutional 
review, headed by Sir Hillary Blood. Blood's report served as the 
basis for a constitutional conference in London in 1960 and for 
reforms that took effect in March 1961. As a result of the review, 
the composition of the Legislative Assembly and Executive Coun- 
cil changed. In the twenty-five-member assembly, eighteen mem- 
bers were now to be elected from single-member districts, five were 
to be appointed by the governor (three of these after consultation 
with the majority and minority party leaders), and two were to 
be official members. Assembly members served a term of four years. 

The eight-member Executive Council included the assembly's 
majority-party leader, whom the governor appointed as first 
minister. Two council members were to be official members, and 
five unofficial members were to be elected by the assembly. Five 
ministerial posts, including that of first minister, carried portfolios. 



252 



Belize: Government and Politics 



Internal Self-Rule, 1964-81 

Because the political parties contesting the March 1961 elections 
had declared their intent to seek full independence, another con- 
stitutional conference was held in London in 1963. The confer- 
ence led to the establishment of full internal self-government under 
a constitution that took force on January 1, 1964. 

The changes introduced by this constitution significantly reduced 
the powers of the governor, transformed the Executive Council into 
a cabinet headed by a premier, and established a bicameral Na- 
tional Assembly composed of a House of Representatives and a 
Senate. The House of Representatives had eighteen members, all 
of whom were elected. The Senate had eight members, all appointed 
by the governor after consultation with majority and minority party 
leaders and other "suitable persons." The Senate's powers were 
limited to ratifying bills passed by the House or delaying, for up 
to six months, bills with which it disagreed (but for only one month 
on financial bills). General elections had to be held at least every 
five years on a date determined by the prime minister. The gover- 
nor was still appointed by the crown but in executive matters was 
now bound by the recommendations of the cabinet. The leader of 
the majority party in the House of Representatives was to be ap- 
pointed premier by the governor. Members of both the House and 
the Senate were eligible for appointment to the cabinet. 

The constitution of 1964 established internal self-rule, and Brit- 
ain had conceded the readiness of the colony for independence as 
early as 1961. But Guatemalan territorial claims against Belize 
delayed full independence until 1981 (see Decolonization and the 
Border Dispute with Guatemela, ch. 6). 

Constitution of 1981 

Preparation of the Independence Constitution 

In the general election of November 1979, the PUP ran on a 
platform endorsing independence. The PUP's opponent, the UDP, 
favored delaying independence until the territorial dispute with 
Guatemala was resolved. Although the PUP won only 52 percent 
of the vote, it carried thirteen of the eighteen seats in the House 
of Representatives and thus received a mandate for the prepara- 
tion of an independence constitution. On January 31, 1981, the 
government issued the White Paper on the Proposed Terms for 
the Independence of Belize. The National Assembly appointed a 
joint select committee to consider the proposed terms and solicit 
input from all organizations in the country. The committee reported 
widespread support for a monarchical form of government based 



253 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

on the British parliamentary system but also suggested a number 
of amendments to the proposal. The House of Representatives 
adopted the committee's report on March 27, 1981. 

The Belize Constitutional Conference was then held at Marl- 
borough House, London, between April 6 and April 14, 1981. 
Although invited to participate, the leader of the opposition in the 
House of Representatives and other representatives of the UDP 
declined to attend. Participating in the meeting at Marlborough 
House were only the Belizean delegation, headed by C.L.B. Rogers, 
deputy premier of Belize, and the British delegation headed by 
Nicholas Ridley, secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth 
affairs, along with their respective experts. The report issued by 
the Belize Constitutional Conference set out the structure and con- 
tent for the independence constitution. 

The British Parliament legislated for the final steps leading to 
Belizean independence in the Belize Act 1981 , which received royal 
assent on July 28, 1981. The act granted Queen Elizabeth II the 
power to provide Belize an independence constitution and to set 
a date for Belizean independence by an Order in Council. The act 
also recognized Belize's self-governing status with provisions for 
its right to amend the so-called Constitution Order. The queen is- 
sued the order on July 31 . In Belize the National Assembly passed 
the new constitution, the governor gave his assent on September 
20, 1981, and Belize became independent the following day. 

Structure of the Constitution of 1981 

The constitution of 1981 contains twelve chapters and 142 sec- 
tions. The first five chapters, which cover the sovereignty and ter- 
ritory of Belize, fundamental rights, citizenship, the powers of the 
governor general, and the executive, were essentially new. Chap- 
ters six through ten, which deal with the legislature, the judiciary, 
the civil service, finances, and miscellaneous details relating primar- 
ily to national symbols and government procedures, are based upon 
the constitution of 1963. Chapters eleven and twelve deal with the 
transition to independence and the date of the document's com- 
mencement. 

Procedure for Amending the Constitution 

Chapter Six gives the National Assembly the power to amend 
the constitution, with some sections and articles subject to a more 
stringent procedure than others. The more stringent procedure ap- 
plies to changing any of the fundamental rights and freedoms 
enumerated in Chapter Two; any change in the form of the Na- 
tional Assembly; the establishment of election districts and the 



254 



Belize: Government and Politics 



conduct of elections; any change relating to the judiciary; and pro- 
visions relating to the granting of pardons and commutations, the 
Belize Advisory Council, the director of public prosecutions, the 
auditor general, and the public service. Schedule Two and Sec- 
tion Sixty-nine, which detail the amendment process, are also sub- 
ject to the more stringent procedures. In order for a bill amending 
any of the above provisions to be presented to the governor gener- 
al for assent, at least ninety days must pass between the introduc- 
tion of the bill into the House of Representatives and the start of 
House proceedings on the second reading (or floor debate) of the 
bill, and the bill must receive not less than a three-quarters majority 
vote of all the members of the House of Representatives upon fi- 
nal reading, or passage, of the bill. Bills to amend other sections 
of the constitution require a vote of not less than a two- thirds majori- 
ty of all the members of the House for passage upon final reading. 
Laws amending the constitution were adopted in 1984, 1985, and 
1988. These constitutional amendments mainly revised sections 
defining citizenship and detailing procedures for the appointment 
and removal of certain government officials and for dividing the 
country into election districts for the House of Representatives. 

Government Institutions 

Belize is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form 
of government based on the British model. The British monarch, 
Queen Elizabeth II, is the titular head of state and is represented 
in Belize by a governor general, a position held since independence 
by Minita Gordon. The governor general has a largely ceremoni- 
al role and is expected to be politically neutral. The constitution 
gives real political power to those who are responsible to the 
democratically elected House of Representatives, principally the 
cabinet and the prime minister. The constitution divides the govern- 
ment into three branches — the executive, the legislature, and the 
judiciary (see fig. 15). Additionally, the civil, or "public," ser- 
vice is overseen by an independent Public Service Commission. 

Executive 

According to the constitution, executive authority is vested in 
the British monarch. The governor general and other subordinate 
officers, however, exercise executive authority on the monarch's 
behalf. The governor general must be a citizen of Belize, and he 
or she serves at the pleasure of the queen, not subject to a fixed 
term of office. The governor general is appointed on the recom- 
mendation of the prime minister. The constitution sharply limits 
the executive authority of the governor general by stating that the 



255 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



BELIZE 
ADVISORY 
COUNCIL 



■ 

I MONARCH j 



GOVERNOR 
GENERAL 



NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY 


SENATE 


HOUSE 




OF 




REPRESENTATIVES 


I 


LOCATED IN LONDON 



I CABINET 



PRIME 
MINISTER 



JUDICIAL 
COMMITTEE 
OF THE 
PRIVY COUNCIL 



COURT OF 




APPEAL 





SUPREME 
COURT 



MAGISTRATES' 


COURTS 


SUMMARY 


DISTRICT 


JURISDICTION 


COURTS 


COURTS 





Figure 15. Belize: Organization of the Government, 1991 



governor general "shall act in accordance with the advice of the 
Cabinet or a Minister acting under the general authority of the 
Cabinet" except in cases in which the constitution or law states 
otherwise. On some matters, the governor general must consult 
with other government officials or authorities, but is not bound 
to act in accordance with their advice. 

When appointing a prime minister, the governor general is to 
appoint "a member of the House of Representatives who is the 
leader of the political party which commands the support of the 
majority of the members of that House. " If no party has a majori- 
ty, the governor general is directed to appoint that member "who 
appears to him likely to command the support of the majority of 
the members," someone able to assemble a viable coalition govern- 
ment. The constitution empowers the governor general to remove 
the prime minister from office if a resolution of no confidence is 
passed by the House of Representatives and the prime minister 
fails within seven days to resign or advise the governor general to 
dissolve the National Assembly. If, for example, a party loses its 
majority in the House through the defection of its members to the 
opposition party during the life of a National Assembly, the gover- 
nor general can inform the prime minister that he or she no longer 



256 



Belize: Government and Politics 



commands a majority in the House, and the governor general is 
free to appoint a new prime minister. 

The cabinet is composed of the prime minister and all other 
ministers of government. Except for the prime minister and the 
minister of finance, who must be members of the House of 
Representatives, cabinet members may come from either the House 
or the Senate. Neither the speaker of the House nor the president 
of the Senate, however, may be appointed to the cabinet. The gover- 
nor general formally appoints the ministers and assigns them their 
portfolios within the cabinet, but must do so in accordance with 
the advice of the prime minister. The National Assembly has the 
power to create ministerial positions not specifically enumerated 
in the constitution or to delegate this power to the governor gener- 
al acting on the advice of the prime minister. 

The constitution guarantees the executive supremacy of the prime 
minister and the cabinet. It states: 

The Cabinet shall be the principal executive instrument of 
policy with general direction and control of the Government 
and shall be collectively responsible to the National Assem- 
bly for any advice given to the Governor General by or un- 
der the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things done 
by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution 
of his office. 

The governor general appoints as leader of the opposition a mem- 
ber of the House who commands the majority support of the op- 
position members, except in cases where there are no members of 
the House of Representatives who do not support the govern- 
ment. The leader of the opposition has the right to be consulted 
by the prime minister or to give binding advice to the governor 
general in the matter of some appointive government offices. 

The Belize Advisory Council is an executive organ that serves 
as an independent body assisting the governor general. Its primary 
function is to give binding advice regarding the granting of pardons, 
commutations, stays of execution, and the removal of justices of 
appeal who are considered unable to carry out their duties or who 
have misbehaved in office. The council must have at least seven 
members including a chairman. The governor general appoints 
council members in accordance with the advice of the prime 
minister, who must consult with the leader of the opposition for 
all appointments and secure his or her concurrence in at least two 
of the appointments. The chairman must hold, have held, or be 
qualified to hold the office of judge of a superior court of record. 



257 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

In addition, at least two members must hold, or have held, high 
office within the government, and at least one must be a member 
of a recognized profession in Belize. 

Legislature 

Belize's National Assembly is a bicameral legislature composed 
of an elected House of Representatives and an appointed Senate. 
Chapter Six of the constitution charges the National Assembly with 
making "laws for the peace, order and good government of Be- 
lize." Following national elections, the National Assembly has a 
life of five years, unless the governor general dissolves it sooner. 
It must hold at least one session a year. In the event of war, the 
life of the National Assembly may be extended for one year at a 
time for up to two years. The governor general almost always ex- 
ercises his power to dissolve the National Assembly in accordance 
with the advice of the prime minister, who generally seeks to dis- 
solve the National Assembly at a time when he perceives the rul- 
ing party as likely to receive a new mandate from the electorate. 
Under certain circumstances, however, the governor general may 
act on his or her own judgment. The governor general may, for 
example, refuse to dissolve the National Assembly if he or she does 
not believe dissolution to be in the best interest of the country. A 
general election must be held within three months after the Na- 
tional Assembly has been dissolved, and senators are to be appointed 
as soon as practical after the election. 

Qualifications for representatives and senators are similar. To 
be eligible for either chamber, a person must be a citizen of Be- 
lize, be at least eighteen years old, and have resided in Belize for 
at least one year immediately prior to his or her nomination (to 
the House) or appointment (to the Senate). Members of the armed 
forces or the police force are barred from serving in either cham- 
ber. People holding government office or appointment are barred 
from membership in the House of Representatives; they are barred 
from membership in the Senate only if the position is connected 
with the conduct of elections or compilation of the electoral register. 
People who are party to any contract with the government or the 
public service must declare publicly the nature of their contract 
before the election in order to qualify for election to the House. 
Potential appointees to the Senate must make such a disclosure to 
the governor general before their appointment. Sitting members 
of the National Assembly are also barred from holding government 
contracts unless the House (or the governor general in the case of 
senators) waives the ban. 



258 




National Assembly building, Belmopan 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

The members of the House of Representatives and the Senate 
elect their presiding officers, the Speaker of the House and the Presi- 
dent of the Senate, respectively. Each chamber may choose one 
of its own members who is not a government minister, or it may 
choose some other Belizean citizen who is not a member of either 
the House or the Senate. A speaker elected from outside the House 
has no vote within the House of Representatives, but such a presi- 
dent of the Senate does. Both the speaker and the president must 
be at least thirty years old. 

According to the constitution as amended in 1988, the country 
is to have no fewer than twenty-eight electoral districts, or divi- 
sions, each with a nearly equal number of eligible voters and the 
right to elect one House member. The constitution charges the Elec- 
tions and Boundaries Commission with making recommendations 
to the National Assembly when it believes additional electoral di- 
visions are needed. The National Assembly may then enact laws 
establishing the new divisions. When the constitution took effect 
in 1981, it mandated that the House would have eighteen elected 
members; the current number of electoral divisions, and hence elect- 
ed representatives, was set at twenty-eight in October 1984. Not 
counting the presiding officer, a quorum of at least seven mem- 
bers is necessary for a sitting of the House of Representatives. 



259 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The Senate has eight members (nine, if the Senate elects its 
presiding officer from outside its membership) who are appointed 
by the governor general according to the following provisions: five 
are appointed in accordance with the advice of the prime minister; 
two with the advice of the leader of the opposition; and one with 
the advice of the Belize Advisory Council. Not counting the presid- 
ing officer, a quorum of three senators is necessary for a sitting 
of the Senate. 

The House of Representatives or the Senate may introduce bills, 
except ones involving money. Passing a bill requires a simple 
majority among members who are present and voting. A bill that 
has been passed by both houses is presented to the governor general, 
who assents to the bill and publishes the measure in the official 
Government Gazette as law. The governor general's assent is purely 
pro forma, since he or she acts in accordance with the advice of 
the cabinet. 

The Senate can normally be expected to pass a measure adopted 
by the House, since a majority of its members are appointed on 
the advice of the prime minister. Should the Senate, however, reject 
a measure or amend it in a manner unacceptable to the House, 
the House still has the power to enact the bill, as long as the Senate 
received the House's bill at least one month before the end of the 
session. To enact the bill, the House must pass the measure again 
at least six months later and in the next session of the National 
Assembly and send it to the Senate at least one month before the 
end of the session. Even if the bill is again rejected by the Senate, 
it still can be presented to the governor general for assent. 

Bills involving money are handled under a more restricted proce- 
dure and with less opportunity for the Senate to delay them. Only 
the House of Representatives may introduce these bills. Laws relat- 
ed to taxes may be introduced by the House only with the recom- 
mendation or consent of the cabinet. Moreover, if the Senate fails 
to pass a finance bill without amendments within one month of 
receiving it from the House, and if the Senate received it at least 
one month before the end of the session, the bill is presented to 
the governor general for his or her assent despite the lack of Senate 
approval. 

Laws that are introduced as a result of cabinet decisions are vir- 
tually guaranteed passage because the cabinet represents the majority 
party in the House. Moreover, PUP governments have commonly 
given all or nearly all PUP House members a cabinet position. The 
PUP cabinets have consequentiy constituted a majority of the House 
membership. Under these circumstances, once the cabinet has 
agreed on a course of action, debate on the floor of the House is 



260 



Belize: Government and Politics 



largely irrelevant, since the constitutionally mandated collective 
responsibility of the cabinet obliges its members to support cabi- 
net decisions on the floor or resign from the cabinet. In contrast, 
when the UDP won twenty-one seats in the twenty-eight-member 
House elected in 1984, Prime Minister Manuel Esquivel governed 
until 1989 with only an eleven-member cabinet, leaving ten other 
UDP members to be "backbenchers." Political analysts saw this 
introduction of the backbencher system (an element of the British 
parliamentary model), as strengthening the House as an institu- 
tion vis-a-vis the cabinet. 

Judiciary 

In the Belizean legal system, the judiciary is an independent 
branch of government. Among the basic legal protections afford- 
ed by the constitution to criminal defendants are a presumption 
of innocence until proven guilty; the rights to be informed of the 
nature and particulars of the charges, to defend oneself before an 
independent and impartial court within a reasonable amount of 
time, and to have the hearings and trial conducted in public; and 
guarantees against self-incrimination and double jeopardy. In more 
serious criminal cases, the defendant also has a right to a trial by 
jury. 

Each of the six districts has a Summary Jurisdiction Court, which 
hears criminal cases, and a District Court, which hears civil cases. 
Both types of court of first instance are referred to as magistrates' 
courts because their presiding official is a magistrate. These courts 
have jurisdiction in less serious civil and criminal cases, but must 
refer to the Supreme Court more serious criminal cases, as well 
as any substantive legal questions. Magistrates' courts may im- 
pose fines and prison sentences of up to six months. Finding suita- 
ble magistrates has proven difficult, even though magistrates need 
not be trained lawyers. Vacancies have contributed to a backlog 
of cases and many prolonged acting appointments, a situation that, 
critics charge, has opened the courts to political manipulation. Law 
students returning to Belize for summer vacation or retired civil 
servants often fill the vacancies. 

The Supreme Court has unlimited original jurisdiction in both 
civil and criminal proceedings. In addition to the more serious 
criminal and civil cases, the Supreme Court hears appeals from 
the magistrates' courts. The governor general appoints the head 
of the Supreme Court, the chief justice, "in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Lead- 
er of the Opposition." The governor general appoints the other 
justices, called puisne judges (of which there were two in 1989), 



261 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

"in accordance with the advice of the judicial and legal services 
section of the Public Service Commission and with the concurrence 
of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Leader of 
the Opposition." Justices may serve until they reach sixty-two, the 
normal, mandatory retirement age, which may be extended up to 
the age of seventy. Justices may be removed only for failing to per- 
form their duties or for misbehavior. 

The Court of Appeal hears appeals from the Supreme Court. 
A president heads the Court of Appeal. The governor general ap- 
points the president and the two other justices serving on the court 
"in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister given after 
consultation with the Leader of the Opposition." The constitution 
sets no fixed term of office for these justices but provides that their 
terms of office be fixed in their instruments of appointment. 

In cases involving the interpretation of the constitution, both 
criminal and civil cases may be appealed by right beyond the Court 
of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lon- 
don. The Court of Appeal may also grant permission for such ap- 
peals in cases having general or public importance. The crown may 
grant permission for an appeal of any decision — criminal or civil — of 
the Court of Appeal. 

Public Service 

The independent Public Services Commission oversees the public 
service, which includes the Belize Defence Force (BDF). The Com- 
mission consists of a chairman and eighteen other members, in- 
cluding nine ex officio members ranging from the chief justice to 
the commissioner of police. The governor general appoints the 
chairman and unofficial members "acting in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister given after consultation with the Lead- 
er of the Opposition." Members of the National Assembly and 
holders of any public office (except ex officio members) may not 
be appointed to the commission until being out of office for at least 
two years. The normal term of office is three years, but the instru- 
ment of appointment may specify a shorter period, which must be 
at least two years. The Public Services Commission has the power 
to appoint people to public service positions and to discipline em- 
ployees. The Public Services Commission also has responsibility 
for setting the code of conduct, fixing salaries, and generally manag- 
ing the public service. 

Under the British model of parliamentary government, public 
service employees are expected to execute the policies of the cabi- 
net ministers who head the various executive ministries regardless 



262 



Belize: Government and Politics 



of the ministers' political affiliations. In turn, public service em- 
ployees are to be insulated from overt political pressure. 

Local Government 

The country is divided into six political districts, or subdivisions: 
Belize, Cayo, Corozal, Orange Walk, Stann Creek, and Toledo 
(see fig. 9). No administrative institutions exist at the district lev- 
el, however, and there is no regional government between the na- 
tional government and the municipal and village councils. 

Laws enacted by the National Assembly govern the municipal 
councils, which have limited authority to enact local laws. The 
primary role of the councils is to oversee sanitation, streets, sew- 
ers, parks, and other amenities, and to control markets and slaugh- 
terhouses, building codes, and land use. Their revenues come from 
property and other taxes set by the national government, as well 
as from grants from the national government. The largest of the 
eight municipal councils is the one for Belize City, which has a 
nine-member city council. The other seven municipal governments 
are the seven-member town boards in Benque Viejo del Carmen, 
Corozal, Dangriga, Orange Walk, Punta Gorda, San Ignacio, and 
San Pedro (on Ambergris Cay, off Corozal). Each municipal council 
elects a mayor from among its members, and elections for the 
municipal councils are held every three years. The PUP and UDP 
dominate the municipal elections, and candidates, often recruited 
on short notice, are highly dependent on their party. The use of 
at-large elections frequently results in one party winning all of the 
seats on a council, and this situation tends to make the local elec- 
tions a popular referendum on the performance of the party in pow- 
er at the national level. Aliens who have resided for three or more 
years in a given municipality may register to vote in the municipal 
elections. 

Village councils are a more informal kind of local government. 
They are not created by law and thus are not vested with any legal 
powers or functions. Nevertheless, most villages have councils, 
which operate as community organizations promoting village de- 
velopment and educational, sporting, and civic activities. The 
village councils have seven members and are chosen every two years 
in elections overseen by the Ministry of Social Services and Com- 
munity Development. These elections commonly take place in 
public meetings, often without voter registration lists or secret bal- 
lot. Their informality does not prevent the village councils from 
becoming politicized, however, and they are often a base of sup- 
port for or opposition to the local representative in the House of 
Representatives . 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

A third form of local government, the alcalde (mayor) system, 
exists in a few Kekchf and Mopan Indian villages. Derived from 
the Spanish system of local government imposed on the Maya, the 
alcalde system is the only government institution in Belize that is 
not Anglo-Saxon in origin. Laws enacted in 1854 and 1884 gave 
the system a legal foundation. Since then, however, the system has 
declined, largely as the result of a delimitation and regularization 
of its authority in 1952, the growth of the cash economy, and the 
diminished importance of subsistence farming and communal labor. 
Coordination of communal labor had been a key function of the 
alcalde. Annual elections are held to select a first alcalde, a second 
alcalde, a secretary, and a village policeman. The alcalde has the 
right to judge disputes over land and crop damage. In minor cases, 
the alcalde has the authority to try and punish offenders. Decision 
making in the village is generally by consensus after village elders 
direct open discussion. Women do not participate in these public 
meetings. 

In addition to these forms of local government, Belize grants cer- 
tain exemptions and rights to three Mennonite communities that 
immigrated to Belize in the late 1950s and early 1960s. An agree- 
ment, or Privilegium (signed in December 1957 between the 
government and each community), spells out the exemptions, rights, 
and responsibilities of the Mennonite communities. Under the 
Privilegium, the Mennonite communities have the right to run their 
own churches and schools using the Low German language, and 
their members are exempt from military service, any social secu- 
rity or compulsory insurance system, and the swearing of oaths. 
In return, the Privilegium commits the Mennonites to invest in 
the country, be self-supporting, produce food for both the local and 
export markets, conduct themselves as good citizens, and pay all 
normal duties and taxes established by law. The Mennonite com- 
munities tax themselves in order to make lump-sum property tax 
payments to the government and to finance schools, and public 
works, and other internal operations. The communities legally 
register their land in the name of the community and restrict in- 
dividual ownership of community land to members in good stand- 
ing with the Mennonite Church. Other Mennonites also live in 
Belize with no special arrangements with the government. 

Political Dynamics 

Electoral Procedures 

In contrast to most Central American nations, elections in Belize 
are notable for their regularity, adherence to democratic principles, 



264 



Government House, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 



and an absence of violence. The Representation of the People Or- 
dinance and the constitution regulate electoral procedures. The con- 
stitution established an independent Elections and Boundaries 
Commission and charged it with the registration of voters, the con- 
duct of elections, establishment of election districts, and all other 
related matters. The five members of the commission serve five- 
year terms of office. The governor general appoints all five mem- 
bers in accordance with the advice of the prime minister, who 
consults with the leader of the opposition before nominating the 
members. National Assembly members and others who hold pub- 
lic office are barred from appointment. 

The constitution guarantees the right to vote to every citizen over 
the age of eighteen who meets the provisions of the Representa- 
tion of the People Ordinance. Voting is not compulsory. Employ- 
ers are required to give their employees time to vote and to pay 
them for the time they are away at the polls. Polls are open from 
7:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. on election day, but anyone in line by 
6:00 P.M. may vote, no matter how long it may take. The sale 
of liquor is barred while the polls are open. Certain forms of polit- 
ical campaigning, including television advertisements, political 
speeches, and the distribution of political buttons, posters, ban- 
ners, or flags are also prohibited. Canvassing of voters is permitted, 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

except within a 100-meter zone around each polling station. Within 
this zone, voters may not be disturbed, voter- to- voter conversa- 
tion is barred, and only election officials may answer questions. 
The constitution mandates that "votes be cast in a secret ballot." 

The Elections and Boundaries Commission maintains a regis- 
try of voters and publishes this list for public inspection at its offices 
and at polling stations. For the September 1989 general election, 
there were 82,556 registered voters, a 28 percent increase over regis- 
tration levels for the previous general election in 1984. Of the 
registered voters in 1989, 72 percent actually voted, a slight decrease 
from 1984, when 75 percent of the electorate cast ballots. Municipal 
elections attract a lower turnout. For example, less than 48 per- 
cent of the electorate cast ballots in the Belize City municipal elec- 
tions in 1989. 

The right forefinger of voters is marked with indelible ink to help 
prevent multiple voting. No provision is made for absentee vot- 
ing, although certain people (for example, members of the BDF, 
police officers on duty outside their voting district, and persons 
employed in essential services) may vote by proxy. 

Candidates for the House of Representatives are elected from 
single-member districts. The candidate with the largest number 
of votes wins the election; in the event of a tie, a new election is 
held in that district within three months. This type of electoral sys- 
tem usually strengthens the hand of the winning party in relation 
to its strength at the polls because a party winning narrow victo- 
ries in a number of districts may obtain a larger majority in the 
House of Representatives than its share of the popular vote. In 
1979, for example, the PUP and the UDP split the vote 52 per- 
cent to 47 percent, but the PUP carried thirteen of the eighteen 
House seats. Similarly, in the 1984 election, the vote was split 53.3 
percent to 43.3 percent between the UDP and the PUP, but the 
UDP won twenty-one of the twenty-eight House seats. 

Electoral Process since Independence 

Transitional provisions of the 1981 constitution permitted mem- 
bers of the preindependence National Assembly to continue in office 
until new elections were set. In 1984 Prime Minister George Price 
called for elections. The PUP under the leadership of George Price 
held thirteen of the twenty-one seats in the House of Representa- 
tives in the years immediately before and after independence. The 
PUP was beginning to show signs of weakness, however, after hav- 
ing dominated national politics for thirty years. This weakness was 
evident as early as 1974, when the UDP polled 49 percent of the 



266 



Belize: Government and Politics 



vote but won only six of eighteen seats. In 1977 the PUP failed 
to capture a single seat on the Belize City Council. It was not until 
the general election on December 14, 1984, that the PUP suffered 
its first defeat at the national level. The UDP under Manuel Es- 
quivel won twenty-one of the twenty-eight seats in the newly en- 
larged House of Representatives. The PUP won only seven seats; 
one PUP member defected and later created the Belize Popular 
Party in 1985. The UDP confirmed its strength when it dominat- 
ed the municipal elections in March 1985 and won control of five 
of the eight municipal councils. 

A ten-year effort to harness opposition to the PUP culminated 
in the UDP's victory in the 1984 general election. The UDP cam- 
paign focused on economic issues because the PUP had a poor eco- 
nomic record for the 1981-84 period. The UDP stressed its 
conservative, free-enterprise, and pro-United States approach, but 
of equal importance in the PUP's defeat was simply the country's 
readiness for a change. George Price had risen to national promi- 
nence in the 1950s, and the PUP had been the ruling party ever 
since 1964, when internal self-rule was instituted. Price tried to 
hold the middle ground while the PUP split into left and right 
camps. Meanwhile, the track record of the UDP at the local level 
made it a credible alternative to the PUP. Moreover, the leader- 
ship of Manuel Esquivel probably enhanced the appeal of the UDP. 
Esquivel, like George Price, is both Mestizo (see Glossary) and Cre- 
ole (see Glossary) in origin and thus able to bridge the main eth- 
nic division in the country. 

Buoyed by the country's strong economic growth in 1989, Prime 
Minister Esquivel in July of that year called an election for Sep- 
tember 4, several months sooner than necessary. The PUP, how- 
ever, won the election by a small margin, carrying 50.3 percent 
of the vote and capturing fifteen seats in the House of Representa- 
tives. The UDP won 48.4 percent of vote and thirteen seats. The 
PUP's fifteen-to-thirteen-seat majority grew to sixteen-to-twelve 
when a UDP member switched parties in December 1989. 

Two issues, the economy and Belizean citizenship, dominated 
the election. The UDP had overseen an International Monetary 
Fund (IMF — see Glossary) economic stabilization plan inherited 
from the previous PUP government and stressed the country's eco- 
nomic progress. The PUP, however, focused on the high unem- 
ployment rate, the large trade deficit, and large national debt. It 
also attacked the government's policy of selling Belizean citizen- 
ship to Hong Kong Chinese and accused the UDP of excessive reli- 
ance on foreign investment to the detriment of Belizeans. The PUP 
stated its preference for a mixed economic model under Belizean 



267 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

national control and effectively used the slogan "Belizeans First." 
The PUP also accused the UDP of political repression and harass- 
ment through the control and censorship of the media and the cre- 
ation of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS). 

Other factors beyond the issues, however, help to explain the 
UDP's defeat. Having assumed responsibility for governing the 
country, the UDP neglected its party organization and was plagued 
by internal divisions before and after the election. The party's 
newspaper acknowledged that the bitterness of the nominating con- 
vention had hurt the UDP. And after the PUP won every seat on 
the Belize City Council in municipal elections in December 1989, 
the paper charged that prominent UDP figures had failed to cam- 
paign for the party. Meanwhile, the PUP entered the election as 
a unified, centrist party, which shed its right and left wings. 

Personality is an important factor in Belizean politics, and per- 
sonal vilification is a standard campaign strategy. Many people 
perceived Esquivel and other UDP ministers as arrogant and snob- 
bish. In contrast, Price was considered a populist, whose personal 
religiosity and moral austerity always won him — and indirectly the 
PUP — support from the religious vote. 

Despite the diversity of Belizean society, ethnic and religious 
differences rarely entered overtly into national politics. Parties based 
on ethnic identity never formed, and no single ethnic group domi- 
nated the PUP or the UDP. Nevertheless, ethnic political tension 
focused on the balance of power between Creoles and others, es- 
pecially the Mestizos. The Creole middle class of Belize City adopt- 
ed British culture, language, and religion. This group, the bulwark 
of British colonialism in Belize, gave Belize City an anti-Central 
American outlook. Other parts of the country, however, tended 
to share an ethnic and religious identity with the peoples of Cen- 
tral America. Recent Central American immigration has threa- 
tened the balance between Creole and non-Creole, and the UDP 
attempted to tap resentment toward the refugees in the 1984 elec- 
tion. Although the influx of refugees slowed in the late 1980s, Cen- 
tral American refugees may have accounted for as much as 17 
percent of the population in 1989. Most were peasants who were 
readily absorbed into the agricultural sector, but these Spanish- 
speaking immigrants may be carrying the seeds of future political 
tensions by contributing to changes in the ethnic makeup of the 
country. 

George Price and the PUP have long championed Belize's Cen- 
tral American identity. In the late 1950s, Price opposed Belize's 
inclusion in a proposed West Indies Federation that would have 
united Belize with the English-speaking Caribbean islands. Joining 



268 



Belize: Government and Politics 



the federation would have raised the specter of immigration from 
the islands, which are populated mostly by Creoles and Protestants. 
This long-standing support for strong ties with Central America 
undoubtedly contributed to the PUP's strong performance among 
Spanish-speaking voters in the western and southern parts of the 
country in the 1989 election. But the PUP by no means had a mo- 
nopoly on Mestizo voters. Moreover, the PUP's failure to include 
more Creoles in its top leadership might hurt the party in the fu- 
ture. In fact, the PUP cabinet that was appointed after the 1989 
election included only one member that most Belizeans would iden- 
tify as a Creole. Opponents have charged Price with attempting 
to "latinize" the country and with selling Belize short in negotia- 
tions with Guatemala. 

Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the number of ethnic as- 
sociations and councils grew. These associations were dedicated 
to promoting cultural pride and cohesion, self-reliance, and com- 
munity participation and action. Although generally seen in a posi- 
tive light, they were criticized by some observers, who expressed 
the fear that the revival of ethnic consciousness after several de- 
cades of integration was likely to lead Belize into escalating ethnic 
conflict. 

Political Parties 

Belize has a functioning two-party political system revolving 
around the PUP and the UDP. Dissident members of these par- 
ties periodically struck out on their own and founded new parties, 
but they have usually foundered after a few years. In early 1991, 
no parties besides the PUP and the UDP were active. 

People's United Party 

Almost since its founding in 1950, the People's United Party 
(PUP) has been the dominant force in Belizean politics. With the 
exception of the 1984 election, the PUP has won every national 
election between 1954 and 1989. The party grew out of a circle 
of alumni from Saint John's College, a Jesuit-run secondary school. 
Roman Catholic social-justice theory, derived from such sources 
as the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum and the work of the French 
neo-Thomistic philosopher Jacques Maritain, had a strong influence 
on these alumni. The group included many men who later became 
important political figures, such as George Price, Herbert Fuller, 
and Philip Goldson. The group won municipal elections in Belize 
City in the 1940s by addressing national issues and criticizing the 
colonial regime. Members were then poised to exploit the popular 
discontent that resulted from the unilateral decision of the governor 



269 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

to devalue the currency in late 1949. The group founded the Peo- 
ple's Committee in response to the devaluation, and in Septem- 
ber 1950 the People's Committee was reconstituted as the PUP. 

The party tapped the organizational strength of the labor move- 
ment by piggybacking onto the General Workers' Union (GWU), 
which had established branches throughout the country during the 
1940s. The PUP quickly surpassed the GWU in importance, largely 
because the overlapping leadership of the GWU and the PUP subor- 
dinated the interests of the union to those of the party. The PUP 
swept the 1954 election, the first one to be held after the introduc- 
tion of full literate adult suffrage, easily defeating the National Party, 
a rival sponsored by the colonial government. 

The PUP's success, however, set the stage for a split in 1956 
over the questions of how far the party should cooperate with the 
colonial regime and whether to endorse the British initiative for 
a West Indies Federation. Members favoring cooperation constitut- 
ed a majority of the PUP's Central Party Council and the party's 
representatives in the legislature. George Price, however, had the 
support of the rank and file for his intransigent approach. Follow- 
ing the resignation of the dissident leaders, Price enjoyed undisputed 
control of the PUP. 

Price has been a preeminent politician over the years for sever- 
al reasons. First, he has been recognized as the ablest and most 
charismatic politician among the PUP founders, and he has been 
seen as the spokesman for the anticolonial movement. Second, the 
party's split in 1956 saw the departure of the PUP's other top lead- 
ers, enabling Price to begin building a political machine in which 
local leaders were personally loyal to him. Third, when the PUP 
assumed control of the internal government in 1964, the locus of 
power shifted from the party to the cabinet, which Price was able 
to choose. Internal party mechanisms and structures began to 
atrophy, and party conventions served mainly to ratify decisions 
already made by a small group that Price headed. 

The concentration of decision-making power in the hands of a 
small circle of leaders headed by Price helped the PUP organize 
across ethnic, class, and rural-urban lines under a common ban- 
ner of anticolonial nationalism. But by discouraging broad partic- 
ipation in setting party policy, the power arrangement also hindered 
the rise of younger leaders. 

Young members of the PUP's left wing, including Said Musa, 
V.H. Courtenay, and Assad Shoman, pushed through a new party 
constitution in 1975 designed to encourage greater participation 
by the rank and file and to counter declining popular support for 
the party. The party's older leadership, however, resisted the 



270 



Belize: Government and Politics 



reformed constitution and effectively blocked its implementation. 
Observers of Belizean politics have often cited an aging leadership 
lacking fresh ideas and out of contact with the people, especially 
with younger voters, as a reason for the PUP's defeat in 1984. 

The relatively small leadership circle, however, failed to prevent 
the rise of factions within the PUP. Although Price has always held 
a centrist position, the PUP has often been torn by strife between 
its left and right wings because of conflicting personalities and agen- 
das within the leadership. Observers have also cited party disuni- 
ty as a factor in the 1984 defeat. In the wake of that defeat, leaders 
from both the right and left wings abandoned or were expelled from 
the party. The PUP thus entered the 1989 election more ideologi- 
cally unified than it had been for many years. 

The centrist ideology of the PUP seems to reflect the personal 
outlook of George Price, who has consistently called the orienta- 
tion of the party "Christian Democratic," endorsed "wise capital- 
ism," and rejected both "atheistic communism" and "unbridled 
capitalism." 

The primary thrust and ideological appeal of the PUP, however, 
remained its nationalism and anticolonialism. In the 1989 election, 
for example, the PUP accused the UDP of having pandered to for- 
eign speculators whose investments did little to help Belizeans. The 
1989 PUP platform called for restricting the sale of Belizean prop- 
erty to foreigners, halting the sale of Belizean passports, reducing 
the role of the United States Agency for International Develop- 
ment (AID) in the country, and nationalizing the University Col- 
lege of Belize, which the UDP government had developed under 
an agreement with Michigan's Ferris State College. Party docu- 
ments commit the PUP to "economic democracy," and the party's 
leaders have endorsed a "mixed economic model with Belizean na- 
tional control." Still, the PUP has sought investment by foreign 
firms, including ones from the United States, and the party's differ- 
ences with the UDP on these matters were often based more on 
style and rhetoric than on substance. 

United Democratic Party 

The colonial establishment responded to the political challenge 
of the PUP by founding the National Party (NP) in 1951. But 
despite official encouragement, the NP enjoyed little popular sup- 
port. Ex-PUP members, headed by Philip Goldson, founded the 
Honduran Independence Party (HIP) after the 1956 split in the 
PUP. After their defeat by the PUP in elections in 1957, the NP 
and the HIP parties merged in 1958 to form the National Indepen- 
dence Party (NIP). In 1961 Goldson became party leader but was 



271 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

unable to mount an effective challenge to the PUP. An unsuccess- 
ful leadership challenge to Goldson in 1969 led to the formation 
of the People's Development Movement (PDM), headed by Dean 
Lindo. Lindo did not try to organize the PDM on a national basis. 
But in 1969, he formed a coalition with the NIP and ran in a snap 
election. Suffering a near total defeat, both parties became largely 
inactive. Probusiness forces within the NIP organized the Liberal 
Party, probably to strengthen their voice in the anticipated negoti- 
ations for a new party. In September 1973, the NIP, the PDM, 
and the Liberal Party merged to form the United Democratic Party. 

With the formation of the UDP in 1973, the outlook for people 
who opposed the PUP began to brighten. The UDP won 31.8 per- 
cent of the vote in 1974 and 46.8 percent in 1979. The PUP, 
however, still held majorities in the House of Representatives. In 
the 1979 election, the UDP had expected to receive a boost from 
the recent enfranchisement of eighteen-year-olds. However, dur- 
ing an election that became a referendum on independence, the 
party was hurt by its call to delay independence for at least another 
ten years. Moreover, the party still had to overcome the divisions 
among its constituencies. Lindo, who had become party leader af- 
ter the 1974 election, was defeated in his district in 1979. Theo- 
dore Aranda, a Garifuna (see Glossary), succeeded Lindo as party 
leader. After charges and countercharges of racism and incompe- 
tence, Aranda resigned from the UDP in 1982 and later formed 
a Christian Democratic Party (CDP) that merged with the PUP 
in 1988. Changes in the UDP's constitution enabled Manuel Es- 
quivel, a UDP senator, to be elected the new party leader. Esquivel, 
who came to the UDP via the Liberal Party, led the party to victory 
in 1984. 

Beyond the weakness of the PUP in 1984, several factors con- 
tributed to the UDP's victory. First, Esquivel went beyond sim- 
ply opposing the PUP and presented a self-assured image for the 
UDP. Personal initiative and his platform, which emphasized 
change, played well in the face of the country's poor economic per- 
formance in the early 1980s. Second, victories in local elections 
had made the UDP a more credible party; the UDP had swept 
Belize City municipal elections in 1983 (Esquivel was a former 
mayor of Belize City). Finally, Esquivel's mixed Creole and Mes- 
tizo heritage probably helped the party make inroads among Mes- 
tizo voters. Earlier party leaders, such as Philip Goldson, had long 
been associated with opposition to what they considered Price's 
latinization of Belize. 

Esquivel was also able to counter PUP criticism of the UDP's 
economic policy. He noted that the UDP was merely implementing 



272 



People's United Party headquarters, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

an economic policy initiated by the PUP in agreement with the 
IMF. Esquivel pointed out that many issues criticized by the 
PUP — the increased presence of AID advisers and Peace Corps 
volunteers, the construction of radio towers by Voice of America, 
and the sale of Belizean citizenship — had all begun in the previous 
PUP government. The UDP distinguished itself from the PUP by 
highlighting its economic expertise and willingness to implement 
painful, but necessary, reforms. 

Factionalism and disarray emerged in the UDP after its defeat 
in the September 1989 general election and after postelection 
recriminations and increased public attention to the private busi- 
ness affairs of many UDP figures. Nevertheless, the party retained 
its strong political base as the only viable opposition to the PUP. 
In February 1990, the UDP Executive Council confirmed Esquivel 
as party leader and Dean Barrow as deputy party leader. 

Other Parties 

Factionalism within the PUP and the UDP sometimes led to the 
establishment of new parties. But the track record of these parties 
was poor. In 1985, for example, expelled right-wing members of 
the PUP founded the Belizean Popular Party, which received less 
than 1 percent of the vote in the 1986 Belize City Council elections. 



273 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

By 1988 the party was apparently defunct. Theodore Aranda found- 
ed the CDP following his resignation from the UDP in 1982, but 
his constituency did not follow him. The CDP won neither of the 
two seats that it contested in the 1984 general election. The CDP 
merged with the PUP in 1988, and Aranda was elected to the House 
in 1989 as a member of the PUP. Cyril Davis, a former UDP sen- 
ator, resigned from the UDP after the 1989 election with the in- 
tention of forming a labor party, but he ended up joining the PUP. 

Interest Groups 

Organized Labor 

Although organized labor was instrumental in the rise of the PUP, 
its political importance has diminished significantly since the 1950s. 
In early 1991, organized labor was fragmented, weak, and politi- 
cally unimportant. In the late 1980s, total union membership was 
estimated at about 6,000. Membership was divided among some 
eighteen trade unions. The country's six major trade unions made 
up the National Trade Union Congress of Belize (NTUCB), which 
was affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU), the Inter- American Regional Organization of 
Workers (Organization Regional Interamericana de Trabaj adores — 
ORIT), and the Caribbean Congress of Labor. These organiza- 
tions were philosophically and financially tied to labor organiztions 
in the United States. The formal ties that once existed with politi- 
cal parties disappeared, and the PUP and the UDP effectively 
absorbed or neutralized the political voice of the unions once affi- 
liated with them. 

The modern labor movement in Belize began in 1934, when An- 
tonio Soberanis Gomez founded the Labourers and Unemployed 
Association (LUA). Vestiges of the repressive labor laws inherited 
from the nineteenth-century colonial era were not abolished until 
1959, but changes in 1941 and 1943 enabled the British Honduras 
Workers and Tradesmen's Union (founded by Soberanis in 1939) 
to register legally as a trade union in 1943. Shortly thereafter, the 
union changed its name to the General Workers' Union (GWU). 
Because the GWU's strikes and organizing activities targeted the 
agricultural and forestry sectors, especially the Belize Estate and 
Produce Company, its organizational structure in rural areas made 
it a particularly desirable partner for the PUP in the anticolonial 
struggle of the 1950s. 

Membership in the GWU grew from 350 in 1943 to over 3,000 
in the late 1940s and peaked in 1955 at about 12,000. In 1956 mem- 
bership fell to 700. The union's explosive growth and then rapid 



274 



Belize: Government and Politics 



decline must be seen in light of its role in the anticolonial move- 
ment and the loss of that role to the PUP. 

Cooperation in the late 1940s between the GWU and the People's 
Committee, the forerunner of the PUP, eventually led to the PUP's 
control of the union through interlocking leadership. Although the 
PUP drew on the GWU's organizational structure, it abandoned 
the GWU's socialist ideology in order to attract support from all 
segments of Belizean society. Having lost its distinct political voice, 
the GWU ceased playing a key role in the anticolonial movement 
after the PUP's 1956 internal split, which left the union in the hands 
of dissident party members. Price's associates founded a rival labor 
movement, the Christian Workers' Union, hastening the decline 
of the GWU and lending support to the PUP. The PUP by then 
had established its own organization throughout the country and 
no longer needed to rely on outside organizational support. 

With its role in the anticolonial movement usurped by the PUP, 
the labor movement was dormant as a political force during the 
1960s and 1970s. The labor movement instead focused its ener- 
gies on collective bargaining and job-related issues. In the late 1970s, 
however, a new generation of union activists attempted to reestab- 
lish labor's independent political voice through the United General 
Workers Union (UGWU). This union was formed by the amal- 
gamation of the Belize General Development Workers' Union and 
the Southern Christian Union in 1979. 

Most of the Belizean press, the leadership of both the PUP and 
UDP, and organized labor (including the Corozal branch of the 
UGWU, whose leadership had strong ties to the PUP, and the in- 
fluential Public Services Union, which had close ties to the UDP), 
were hostile to the UGWU. The hostility stemmed not only from 
the UGWU's efforts to encroach on what the politicians and their 
union supporters thought to be their turf, but also from the ideo- 
logical orientation of the union. Some critics accused the UGWU 
of being communist because of the union's ties to trade union fed- 
erations affiliated with the Soviet-controlled World Federation of 
Trade Unions, its sending of members to study in Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, its open support for revolutionary movements in Cen- 
tral America, and because of the ideological stance of Gombay, a 
magazine edited by UGWU leaders. 

The UGWU (and its rivals) grew rapidly in the late 1970s as 
it organized banana, citrus, and sugar workers, as well as employees 
of the Belize Electricity Board and the Development Finance Cor- 
poration. Nevertheless, the union's failure to support strikes of other 
unions severely crippled the UGWU and removed it from the na- 
tional political scene. These strikes were called to oppose the Heads 



275 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

of Agreement in 1981 and the formation that same year by the 
Corozal branch of the UGWU of a new union, which overwhelm- 
ingly defeated the UGWU in an election to choose a bargaining 
agent for the sugar workers. 

Business Community 

The PUP and the UDP depended on the business community 
for financial support during elections. At one time, the PUP could 
count on the support of small businessmen, whose interests were 
negatively affected by the policies of the colonial government. Simi- 
larly, big business usually supported the groups that opposed the 
PUP. By the 1980s, however, this breakdown in support by the 
business community was no longer generally true. In the election 
of 1984, for example, the UDP's strong support for free enterprise 
drew support from small and large business interests. Differences 
between the economic policies of the two parties were small enough 
that members of the business community were likely to back 
whichever party they perceived as the likely winner of any given 
election. Sometimes, however, they hedged their bets by contribut- 
ing to both parties. 

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry was the leading voice 
of the business community in Belize and was widely perceived as 
holding an influential voice in government. It officially endorsed 
neither political party and sought a good working relationship with 
the government of the day. It actively lobbied the government and 
monitored legislation on a variety of issues, such as mercantile poli- 
cy, economic development, and policies on education and drugs. 
In its constitution, the chamber states that its objectives include 
fostering economic growth through the free-enterprise system, 
strengthening the public-private partnership, and enhancing the 
investment climate for Belizean and foreign investors. Members 
of the chamber included supporters of both the PUP and the UDP . 

Churches and Religious Institutions 

The interaction of churches and religious organizations with the 
government and political system was informal, but nonetheless 
powerful. The schools were a key element in this influence. Church- 
run schools had been the norm in Belize since the early colonial 
era, and both major political parties continued to endorse the 
church- state partnership in education. This partnership placed most 
primary and secondary schools under church control. Thus, the 
various Christian churches and denominations in Belize did not 
generally adopt a high political profile, but their schools served as 
a key adjunct to religious services and their gatherings as a locus 



276 



Belize: Government and Politics 

for church influence. The most prominent example of such influence 
was the role that the Jesuit-run secondary school, Saint John's Col- 
lege, played in preparing the leaders of the nationalist movement 
in the 1940s. Religious influence, especially traditional Roman 
Catholic social thought, continued to affect Belizean political life 
in 1991. 

Some also attribute the PUP's early anti-British and pro-United 
States outlook and its predisposition toward the Roman Catholic 
countries of Central America, rather than toward the predominantly 
Protestant English-speaking islands of the West Indies (see Glos- 
sary), to the influence of the Jesuits and the Roman Catholic 
Church. Whereas the mainline Protestant churches, such as the 
Anglican and Methodist churches, were institutionally tied to Brit- 
ain and the English-speaking West Indies, the Roman Catholic 
Church in Belize was once a vicariate of the Missouri Province 
of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). Jesuits from the United States 
staffed key positions in the Belizean church. Foreign influence in 
the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and schools in Belize 
had been much criticized. In recent decades, however, Belizeans 
have increasingly come to occupy leadership positions. By 1990 
the top leadership of the country's Roman Catholic Church was 
Belizean, and a Belizean Jesuit was president of Saint John's 
College. 

No political party or movement in Belize organized itself on the 
basis of religious affiliation, but Roman Catholics historically were 
considered to lean more toward the PUP. Protestants, allegedly 
being more pro-British, leaned more toward the PUP's opposition. 
Nonetheless, the top leadership of the UDP included many Roman 
Catholics, including Philip Goldson and Manuel Esquivel. Indeed, 
the UDP's 1984 victory would not have been possible without strong 
support from the country's Roman Catholic population. 

The existence of a "Roman Catholic vote" in Belize is open to 
question. Still, politicians avoided taking positions that overtly con- 
tradicted Roman Catholic teachings because they feared a reac- 
tion from both the hierarchy and the laity. Thus, the presumption 
of the religious community's opposition to abortion kept the issue 
of legalizing abortion out of the political debate even through the 
Roman Catholic Church never sponsored an antiabortion cam- 
paign. Furthermore, no politician called for fundamental changes 
in the church-state partnership in education, which enjoyed strong 
support across the religious spectrum. 

As of the early 1990s, liberal political movements, such as libera- 
tion theology, had not taken root in Belize, and the Roman Catholic 
Church avoided the split between the so-called "traditional" and 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

"popular" churches that divided Roman Catholics in other Cen- 
tral American countries. Moreover, politicians probably overesti- 
mated the ability of the Roman Catholic Church to respond as a 
monolithic institution, and their perception of so-called "Roman 
Catholic" positions often lacked an awareness of current Roman 
Catholic thought and practice. The generally conservative outlook 
of the Belizean Protestant churches, which shared the traditional 
Roman Catholic position on many moral and social issues, perhaps 
reinforced politicians' consciousness of religious interests. 

Since the 1970s, missionary activities by evangelical and fun- 
damentalist denominations and sects, including the Mormons, 
Seventh-Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses, have been 
changing the religious composition of Belizean society. Although 
these groups, unlike the mainline Protestant churches, generally 
had strong ties to mother organizations in the United States and 
were often considered to be politically conservative, their political 
impact was negligible at the national level. At the local level, 
however, the proliferation of denominations and sects, many of 
which were hostile to one another and to the Roman Catholic 
Church, could be undermining the sense of common identity within 
communities. The alcalde system of village government, for exam- 
ple, has been disrupted in some Kekchi villages, when the village's 
Protestant members (who were opposed to the close ties of the tradi- 
tional leadership with the Roman Catholic Church) have refused 
to participate in elections or abide by village court decisions. 

Consciousness -Raising Organizations 

Nongovernmental organizations focusing on charitable and ser- 
vice activities and private enterprise projects have been active for 
many years in Belize. These groups include Cooperative for Ameri- 
can Relief Everywhere (CARE), Project Hope, and Volunteers in 
Technical Assistance (VITA). But a different type of nongovern- 
mental organization became increasingly common in the 1980s. 
These organizations had no formal ties to political parties, but they 
exercised political influence through their efforts to raise the political 
consciousness or to develop a group identity among their consti- 
tuencies. These organizations included ethnic-based associations, 
such as the Toledo Maya Cultural Council, the National Garifuna 
Council, and the Isaiah Morter Harambe Association; women's 
groups, such as the Belize Organization for Women and Develop- 
ment (Bowand), Women Against Violence (WAV), and the Belize 
Rural Women's Association (BRWA); and other groups, such as 
the Society for the Promotion of Education and Research (SPEAR), 
whose mission encompassed social and economic analysis, popular 



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Belize: Government and Politics 



education and training, advocacy campaigns to promote social and 
economic justice, and research, seminars, and publications about 
Belize. Many of these organizations depended on grants from for- 
eign government development agencies and nongovernment or- 
ganizations to supplement locally raised funds. The long-term 
viability of these organizations remained unclear because these 
grants were often provided only as short-term "seed money." 

Mass Communications 

The Belizean constitution guarantees freedom of thought and 
expression. Nevertheless, the constitution permits the enactment 
of laws to make "reasonable provision" for limiting freedom of 
expression in the interests of defense, public safety, order, morali- 
ty, health, and protection of reputations, rights, and freedoms of 
other persons. Despite the constitution's guarantees, there have 
been a number of controversies over access to broadcast media for 
political campaigns and over charges that the former UDP govern- 
ment used the libel laws to intimidate the PUP. 

No daily newspapers were published in Belize. Several weeklies 
were published, but most of these were closely linked to political 
parties. As of early 1991, Amandala was the newspaper with the 
largest circulation: about 8,500. The paper's editorial line reflected 
the involvement of its owner and editor, Evan X. Hyde, in the 
Creole and black consciousness movement in Belize. The Belize 
Times, controlled by George Price, functioned as the official organ 
of the PUP. Published since 1956, the newspaper had a circula- 
tion of about 7,000 as of early 1991. The official UDP newspaper 
was the People's Pulse. Owned outright by the UDP, it began pub- 
lication in 1988 and had a circulation of 5,000 by early 1991. The 
pro-business Reporter, with a circulation of 5,000 in early 1991 , was 
once an organ of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry but was 
later bought by a group of businessmen and became an indepen- 
dent publication. The government published a weekly, the Govern- 
ment Gazette. Other publications included Belize Today, published 
monthly by the Belize Information Service; the Chamber Update, 
published monthly by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry; 
monthly newspapers published by the Anglican and the Roman 
Catholic churches; the quarterly National Newsmagazine; and Spear- 
head, a quarterly published by SPEAR. 

A second, and older, pro-UPD paper, Beacon, suspended publi- 
cation following the UDP's defeat in September 1989. Beacon, which 
had a circulation of 4,200 in 1989, was not controlled directly by 
the UDP, but by Dean Lindo, a minister in the Esquivel govern- 
ment. A PUP-affiliated paper, Disweek, ceased publication after the 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

PUP's 1984 electoral defeat. The fate of Disweek and Beacon points 
to the dependence of Belizean newspapers on revenue from 
government-linked advertising. Opposition papers, therefore, could 
not count on this type of advertising revenue. 

Foreign Relations 

Relations with the United States 

Belize had close and cordial relations with the United States, 
which was a leading trading partner and principal source of for- 
eign investment and economic assistance. As early as the 1940s, 
leaders of the anticolonial movement sought close ties with the 
United States, not only to pressure and embarrass Britain, but also 
to try to eliminate the colonial government's pro-British trade and 
economic policies, which were detrimental to many Belizeans. 

Since independence, Price and the PUP have charted a foreign 
policy that proclaimed Belize's nonalignment and affirmed the coun- 
try's special relationship with the United States. The PUP's favor- 
able attitude toward the United States (when nationalist opinion 
elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean has often been 
strongly anti-United States and sometimes pro-Cuban) probably 
reflects the country's colonial experience, which cast Britain, rather 
than the United States, as the main obstacle to national sovereignty. 
Additionally, the influential role of Christian Democratic thought 
on the early nationalist leaders, especially Price, undoubtedly helped 
steer Belizean political dialogue away from the Marxist influences 
that have helped shape anti-United States feelings elsewhere in Latin 
America. Because the PUP and the UDP were in broad agreement 
on the country's relationship with the United States, the PUP's 
defeat in 1984 did not upset ties between the United States and 
Belize. On the contrary, the business-oriented UDP was highly 
favorable to the ideological oudook of the United States in the 1980s, 
and the Esquivel government was eager to implement free-market 
policies to attract United States investment. 

United States foreign policy objectives in Belize included the pro- 
motion of economic development and political stability under 
democratic institutions, the promotion of United States commer- 
cial interests, the suppression of narcotics trafficking, and the con- 
tinuation of the marijuana eradication program. Although 
recognizing Britain as Belize's primary supplier of military aid, 
the United States sought cooperative military relations with Be- 
lize and the development of an apolitical professional military capa- 
ble of performing defense and counternarcotics functions. AID's 
plans for the 1991-95 period focused on the agricultural and tourism 



280 



Belize: Government and Politics 



sectors and were aimed at helping Belize achieve sustainable private- 
sector-led growth. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, United States foreign assistance 
to Belize totaled between US$9.3 million and US$10.7 million a 
year, a sharp decline from 1985, when it totaled US$25.7 million. 
Development Assistance and Peace Corps programs accounted for 
the bulk of the aid. In 1990 Development Assistance totaled US$6.5 
million, and Peace Corps programs totaled US$2.5 million. Be- 
lize received no food aid from the United States in the 1980s or 
early 1990s. Although Belize received a total of US$32.0 million 
in Economic Support Funds (ESF) from 1983 through 1987, it 
received no funds from this program in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. Belize was a beneficiary of the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI), under which the United States permits duty-free access to 
United States markets for imports from most Caribbean Basin coun- 
tries (see Appendix D). 

Military aid made up only a small percentage of United States 
assistance to Belize. From 1982 through 1990, Belize received over 
US$3 million in military assistance from the United States. In 1990 
military aid totaled about US$615,000. 

The PUP and the UDP governments both welcomed assistance 
from the United States, but this assistance was sometimes the subject 
of criticism. In the mid-1980s, for example, the presence of Peace 
Corps volunteers in government offices, the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, and secondary schools raised concerns that jobs were 
being taken away from Belizeans. People also complained that the 
volunteers interfered unduly in internal government affairs. In 
response to this criticism, the Peace Corps reduced the number 
of volunteers in Belize from more than 200 to fewer than 100 by 
early 1991 . The role of AID consultants in preparing government 
development plans under the UDP government and the strings at- 
tached to aid from the United States have also been subjects of criti- 
cism. Belizean officials echoed this criticism because they did not 
believe that the restrictions (regarding trade and economic liber- 
alizations) on the aid took into account local conditions. Although 
the Belizean government and business community felt positively 
about the CBI, they were concerned that the trade-liberalization 
component of President George Bush's Enterprise for the Ameri- 
cas Initiative (see Glossary) and negotiations for a North Ameri- 
can free-trade zone with Mexico might make it impossible for the 
small countries of the Caribbean to compete with countries such 
as Mexico and Brazil in the absence of special provisions to preserve 
existing preferential trade arrangements. 



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Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Relations with Guatemala 

Guatemala's long-standing territorial claim against Belize delayed 
normalization of relations between the two countries until Septem- 
ber 1991 . Guatemala claimed it inherited Spanish sovereignty over 
the British settlement following Guatemala's independence from 
Spain, and Spanish sovereignty over the territory had been recog- 
nized by Britain in the Convention of London signed in 1786. Brit- 
ain rejected Guatemala's claim, however, because Guatemala had 
never effectively occupied present-day Belize's territory. Britain's 
own occupation of the area and its 1859 treaty with Guatemala, 
which set boundaries for what soon became British Honduras, 
paved the way for a British assertion of full sovereignty over the 
colony in 1862. 

The 1859 treaty, however, included a provision for Britain to 
assist in the construction of a road from Guatemala City to the 
Caribbean coast. Guatemala has consistently claimed that this pro- 
vision was a condition for ceding the territory to Britain. Guatemala 
claims the treaty was never fulfilled because the road was never 
built, so the country nullified the cession of territory. Britain, which 
had offered financial contributions toward the road construction 
at various times, rejected Guatemala's interpretation of the treaty. 
Britain believed that Guatemala was not in a position to cede the 
territory because it never possessed sovereignty over British Hon- 
duras. Between 1945 and 1985, Guatemalan constitutions claimed 
British Honduras as part of its national territory. A provision in 
the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) reflected 
Latin American support for Guatemala's claim. The provision ef- 
fectively barred membership to an independent Belize without a 
resolution of Guatemala's claim. Latin American support was also 
reflected in a provision in the treaty that established the Central 
American Common Market calling for the integration of Belize 
into Guatemala. 

Subsequent negotiations, including United States mediation in 
1965, produced recommendations viewed as highly favorable to 
Guatemala but failed to produce a settlement acceptable to all par- 
ties. At various points in the 1960s and 1970s, Guatemala threa- 
tened to invade if British Honduras became independent without 
resolution of its claim. The British military presence in British Hon- 
duras forestalled any invasion. To win Guatemalan acceptance of 
Belizean independence, however, Britain opposed in the 1970s any 
postindependence security guarantees to Belize and apparently 
favored ceding a small strip of territory between the Moho and 



282 



Belize: Government and Politics 



Sarstoon rivers in southern Belize. Territorial concessions were 
highly unpopular among Belizeans. 

With full independence blocked by the inability to reach agree- 
ment with Guatemala and by the unwillingness of Britain to make 
security guarantees, Belize launched a foreign relations campaign 
in the mid-1970s to win the support of the world community. Build- 
ing on support within the Nonaligned Movement, Belize gradually 
won broad support in the General Assembly of the United Nations 
(UN). The Latin American community began to shift its support 
from Guatemala to Belize. Cuba consistently supportly Belize's right 
to self-determination, Panama and Mexico voiced support for Be- 
lize in 1976 and 1977, respectively, and they were joined by 
Nicaragua in 1979. The United States, however, abstained from 
voting on Belizean independence resolutions introduced annually 
in the General Assembly. Then in 1980, with Guatemala refusing 
to vote and seven countries abstaining, 139 countries, including 
the United States, voted for a UN resolution calling for Belizean 
independence with territorial integrity by the end of 1981. The OAS 
subsequently endorsed this resolution. 

Given the international support for this timetable, Belize, Brit- 
ain, and Guatemala again sought a negotiated settlement. On 
March 11, 1981, the three parties signed an agreement known as 
the Heads of Agreements. The agreement laid out sixteen subjects, 
or heads, that were to be agreed to in a formal treaty at a later 
date. Popular reaction to the Heads of Agreement was overwhelm- 
ingly negative in Belize, and rioting ensued to protest what were 
perceived to be "unwarranted and dangerous" concessions to 
Guatemala. Furthermore, Guatemala rejected details of the set- 
tlement process and withdrew from the negotiations. The British 
decision to make security guarantees to Belize, however, enabled 
Belizean independence to go forward. 

Subsequent negotiations with Guatemala in the early 1980s were 
unsuccessful. In 1985, however, Guatemala promulgated a new 
constitution that did not include the earlier claims to Belize. Rather, 
the new constitution treats the Belize question in its transitory pro- 
visions, giving the executive the power to take measures to resolve 
the territorial dispute in accordance with the national interests, but 
requiring any definitive agreement to be submitted to a popular 
referendum. The article in the provisions also calls for the govern- 
ment of Guatemala to "promote social, economic, and cultural re- 
lations with the population of Belize." After on-and-off negotiations 
in the late 1980s, including the appointment of a permanent joint 
commission in 1988, substantial progress was made in 1990, follow- 
ing a meeting between Prime Minister George Price and President 



283 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala. In October 1990, Belize's minister 
of foreign affairs, Said Musa, stated that the preliminary talks on 
the drafting of a treaty (that would be submitted to popular referen- 
da in both countries) had moved beyond territorial claims to ques- 
tions of economic cooperation. 

On August 14, 1991, Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano Elfas 
acknowledged that Belize was recognized internationally, recog- 
nized the right of the Belizean people to self-determination, and 
stated his willingness to settle the dispute, all without dropping 
Guatemala's territorial claim. On August 16, 1991, Said Musa in- 
troduced a bill to extend Belize's maritime territorial limits to twelve 
nautical miles, in accord with current international law. The bill 
stipulated, however, that an exception would be made in the south 
allowing Guatemala access to international waters from its Carib- 
bean coast in the same way that Mexico has access from its port 
of Chetumal. Minister Musa has said that the concession to 
Guatemala was made as a sign of good faith to promote settlement 
of Guatemala's territorial claim. In a further sign of improving 
affairs, Guatemala and Belize established full diplomatic relations 
in September 1991. 

Relations with Other Latin American and Caribbean Countries 

Maintaining the international support for its independence that 
Belize won in the 1970s and 1980s remained a main element of 
the country's foreign policy. Participation in the various regional 
organizations was seen as both a means toward an end and an 
objective of this policy. Although George Price and the PUP suc- 
cessfully campaigned against British Honduran participation in 
the proposed West Indies Federation in the late 1950s, Belize saw 
itself as a bridge between the English-speaking Caribbean and 
Central America. The nation had been a member since 1971 of 
the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta), which later be- 
came the Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom — 
see Appendix C). Increasingly active on the political level within 
that organization, Belize supported an outward-looking strategy 
for the Caricom countries that would ensure international com- 
petitiveness, closer economic cooperation between Caricom and 
other Caribbean countries, and a common Caricom effort to 
preserve its limited preferential market access in the face of the grow- 
ing importance of major trade and economic blocs in Europe and 
North America. 

In November 1989, the OAS— with Guatemalan support — 
granted Belize permanent observer status and approved full mem- 
bership for the country in January 1991 . This event capped a long 



284 



Belize: Government and Politics 



effort to overcome obstacles to membership in various regional or- 
ganizations that had been erected by Guatemala in past years. The 
OAS charter had effectively barred membership to Belize and 
Guyana until their territorial disputes with OAS member coun- 
tries were peacefully resolved. In 1985, however, OAS members 
modified the charter so that the bar to membership requests from 
Belize or Guyana expired on December 10, 1990. In February 1991, 
the Central American heads of government invited Belize to at- 
tend their December 1991 summit, the first such invitation received 
by the country. 

During the 1980s, Belize remained on the fringes of the diplo- 
matic initiatives and United States-coordinated military activities 
in Central America. This situation was due both to Guatemala's 
presumed opposition to Belize's participation and its fear of being 
drawn into the regional conflicts of Central America (by 1989 these 
conflicts had pushed some 30,000 refugees into Belize). Belize has 
steadfastly supported peaceful resolution of the region's disputes, 
political pluralism, and noninterference in the internal affairs of 
other nations. In the late 1980s, Belize stressed its support for the 
right of both Nicaragua and Panama, which were then under diplo- 
matic, economic, and military pressure from the United States, 
to choose their own leaders and political systems. 

Belize enjoyed warm relations with Mexico, its neighbor to the 
north. As early as 1958, Mexico stated its desire for a resolution 
of Belize's territorial problems that would respect the freedom and 
independence of the Belizean people. Mexico also provided criti- 
cal support in favor of Belizean independence and territorial in- 
tegrity in 1977. Although Mexico claimed parts of Belize during 
the nineteenth century, it signed treaties with both Britain and 
Guatemala in the course of that century to set the border defini- 
tively between Mexico and Belize. As part of its agreement with 
Britain, Mexico was guaranteed in perpetuity transit rights through 
Belizean waters connecting the Mexican port of Chetumal with the 
open seas. 

Relations with Britain 

Britain maintained approximately 1,500 troops in Belize to 
guarantee Belizean independence in the face of the Guatemalan 
territorial claims. The presence of the troops represented an ex- 
ception to the long-standing British policy of not making military 
commitments to former colonies. Although the prospects for an 
agreement with Guatemala looked good in 1991 , Minister of For- 
eign Affairs Said Musa emphasized that the presence of the Brit- 
ish troops and an agreement with Guatemala were two separate 



285 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

issues. British officials have stated that the troops would remain 
even if an agreement were reached. Reasons cited for a continued 
British military presence in Belize included training the Belize 
Defence Force, providing British troops with an opportunity to train 
in a tropical environment, deterring leftist guerrillas from using 
Belize as a conduit for arms, and balancing the United States mili- 
tary presence in the region with a British presence. Britain spent 
an estimated US$18 million more per year to maintain its garri- 
son troops in Belize rather than in Britain. 

Britain provided Belize with military assistance in the form of 
training and equipment. Britain also provided interest-free loans 
totaling US$13.5 million under its multilateral capital aid program 
for the 1989-94 period. It also provided grants totaling US$1 .4 mil- 
lion a year in the early 1990s through the technical cooperation 
program. 

Relations with Other Countries 

Depending on international support to guarantee its independence 
and seeking foreign investment, Belize has sought to expand its diplo- 
matic and economic ties with other nations. It was a member of 
the UN, the Nonaligned Movement, and the Commonwealth of 
Nations (see Appendix B). In 1990 Belize appointed a roving am- 
bassador to the European Economic Community. Belize established 
relations with China in 1987. Then in October 1989, Belize an- 
nounced a "Two-China" policy and established full diplomatic re- 
lations with Taiwan. China swiftly rejected Belize's policy and 
suspended relations. The switch in relations was apparently moti- 
vated by the failure of China to follow through on Belize's expecta- 
tion of economic assistance, which Taiwan seemed eager to supply. 

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Belize sup- 
ported the UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic and 
trade sanctions against Iraq and authorizing the use of force to liber- 
ate Kuwait. In supporting the UN resolutions, Belize stressed its 
own interest in seeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small, 
vulnerable states protected. Although it favored peaceful, diplomatic, 
and political solutions to the crisis, it regarded the use of force by 
the United States-led coalition to be consistent with those resolu- 
tions. Said Musa also called for a comprehensive Middle East peace 
conference to resolve the long-standing problems of the region, es- 
pecially of the rights of the Palestinian people, and for the United 
States and its allies to secure Israeli compliance with relevant UN 
resolutions. Although Belize did not contribute troops to the coali- 
tion forces, an undetermined number of Belizean nationals serving 
in the United States military saw action in the Persian Gulf War. 



286 



Belize: Government and Politics 
* * * 

Tom Barry's Belize: A Country Guide, Julio A. Fernandez's Be- 
lize: Case Study for Democracy in Central America, and O. Nigel Hol- 
land's Belize: A New Nation in Central America all deal with Belizean 
politics and government in the postindependence era and are recom- 
mended. Assad Shoman's Party Politics in Belize is interesting be- 
cause of the perspective given by a participant in Belizean politics, 
but it is not as readily available as the above-named works. For 
an in-depth treatment of the preindependence history, Narda Dob- 
son's A History of Belize is an excellent source. (For further infor- 
mation and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



287 



Chapter 10. Belize: National Security 



Mayan god of war 



SINCE INDEPENDENCE IN 1981, the major threat to Belize's 
external security has come from Guatemala. Guatemala continued 
to voice claims on Belize's territory, and various Guatemalan 
governments have expressed interest in annexing the country's 
eastern neighbor. As of mid- 1991 , Belize's dispute with Guatemala 
had not erupted into hostilities and appeared close to resolution. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of conflict with Belize's much larger 
neighbor continued to form the central strategic concern for the 
country's defense planners. The Belize Defence Force (BDF) helped 
secure national defense, but the country's sovereignty was essen- 
tially guaranteed by Britain, which maintained troops and aircraft 
in the nation. 

The small BDF had a strength of approximately 700. It was prin- 
cipally a lightly armed ground force, but it also had small air and 
maritime elements. The force assisted the approximately 1,500 Brit- 
ish troops and played an aggressive role in counter-narcotics oper- 
ations. British forces in Belize comprised one infantry battalion, 
one Army Air Corps flight, and one-half squadron of the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) equipped with fighter and ground-attack aircraft. 

The nation was internally stable; there have been only a few dis- 
turbances of public order since independence. These disturbances 
consisted chiefly of isolated and short-lived public demonstrations 
or labor activities, and violence rarely erupted in any of the ac- 
tions. The Belize National Police was responsible for internal secu- 
rity. Civilian authorities controlled the police force, which was 
generally capable of maintaining public order without resorting to 
extraordinary means or excessive violence. 

Crime associated with international drug trafficking posed the 
principal challenge to peaceful daily life. The government devot- 
ed considerable resources to combating trade in narcotics. Still, 
Belizeans and foreigners participated in the drug trade because of 
the opportunity for quick profits and because it was relatively easy 
to move drugs through this sparsely populated country, where re- 
mote areas were difficult to patrol. As a result, the nation continued 
to be a producer of marijuana and a conduit for cocaine traffick- 
ing to the United States. 

The central government was responsible for administering crimi- 
nal justice. The criminal justice system and national penal law were 
both based on British models. The Supreme Court had jurisdic- 
tion over serious criminal offenses. The attorney general and the 



291 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

director of public prosecutions were the top legal officers represent- 
ing the state in criminal and other issues. The system routinely 
honored constitutional guarantees regarding fundamental rights 
and freedoms and the right to a fair trial. 

Belize's Military History and Strategic Setting 

From the early seventeenth century, the area now known as Be- 
lize has had a troubled and disorderly history. The British Settle- 
ment of Belize in the Bay of Honduras served as a base for privateers 
who carried out raids against Spanish vessels transporting gold and 
silver to Europe. The coral reefs and sand bars of the coast provided 
hiding places from which to surprise intended targets; these same 
features offered a place to flee from pursuing warships and other 
deep-draft vessels unable to navigate the area's shallow passages. 
By the time piracy had been suppressed, toward the end of the cen- 
tury, settlers — mostly British — had moved into the area's interior 
to develop lucrative logwood resources (see Colonial Rivalry Be- 
tween Spain and Britain, ch. 6). 

The small British settlement became a target for attacks from 
neighboring Spanish settlements as the rivalry between the Span- 
ish and British intensified. The first attack took place in 1717 when 
Spanish and Mayan soldiers entered the area from what is now 
Guatemala. In the years that followed, Spain made several raids 
and incursions into various parts of the settlement. British war- 
ships were commonly dispatched to the area in response. In times 
of threat, the settlers at first formed an irregular militia, which was 
occasionally bolstered by Indians brought in from the Mosquito 
Coast of what is now Nicaragua and by African slaves from Jamai- 
ca. When the threat subsided, the militia disbanded, and residents 
returned to their usual pursuits, rebuilding what had been de- 
stroyed. 

After beating back yet another attack in 1754, settlers agreed 
to build a fort overlooking the harbor near Belize Town and to 
station a full-time force there. After Spain recognized Britain's right 
to use the area, the fort was demolished (even though Spain main- 
tained its claim to sovereignty over the area). Hostilities resumed 
in 1779, however, when local residents fled from Spanish raiders 
who had kidnapped a number of settlers. This exodus was short- 
lived; the limits of the British settlement were defined in the Treaty 
of Versailles in 1783, and British settlers again returned. In 1784 
the British governor of Jamaica appointed a superintendent for the 
settlement (see Beginnings of Self Government and the Plantocra- 
cy, ch. 6). Britain also gave the title of commander in chief to the 
superintendent to enable him, as well as later governors, to organize 



292 



Belize: National Security 



defense forces. Early the next year, the superintendent established 
a small garrison. 

Spain's last attempt to dislodge the settlers by force took place 
in 1798 when the Spanish fleet from Yucatan launched an attack 
on the settlement. Although poorly armed and badly outnumbered, 
local settlers resisted. Three companies of the British West India 
Regiment and slaves from Jamaica who had volunteered to serve 
in exchange for their freedom backed the settlers. The final skir- 
mish involved a sea battle off Saint George's Cay in which local 
forces, supported by the British sloop H.M.S. Merlin, forced a final 
Spanish retreat. 

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
settlement's defense forces were essentially temporary militia. Eu- 
ropean settlers routinely led the militia, but in times of hostilities, 
military commissions were opened to all groups, including freed 
blacks and slaves who sought manumission through enlistment. 
Although these arrangements appeared to work satisfactorily dur- 
ing times of external threat, the fear of slave rebellions during the 
mid- 1820s prompted concerns regarding the loyalties of black 
troops, and the local government sent for three or four companies 
of British troops from Jamaica. 

The settlement's chief strategic threat in the nineteenth century 
came from Spanish colonies that began to receive their indepen- 
dence. The principal and most long-lasting threat came from 
Guatemala, which did not accept British territorial claims in the 
area. In 1827 a Guatemalan gunboat threatened local residents, 
but for the most part, the two sides aired their differences in the 
diplomatic arena. In 1862, when Britain declared British Honduras 
a colony, the borders with both Mexico and Guatemala were still 
undefined. The border with Mexico was finally established in 1893, 
but uncertainty over the Guatemalan claim continued to affect the 
strategic outlook of the crown colony (see Glossary) throughout the 
twentieth century and was responsible for the continued presence 
of British troops in the territory well after Belize became an in- 
dependent state. 

The most significant threat to public peace in the nineteenth cen- 
tury resulted from clashes with the Maya. At first British forces 
countered the Mayan raids. Approximately thirty civil police backed 
the forces, which were stationed in Belize Town. But as clashes 
grew more serious, it became necessary to impose a land tax to 
finance armed troops and to call in British regulars from Jamaica. 
The last battle with Mayan raiding parties took place in 1872, af- 
ter which many Maya were forced to retire to reservations in the 
Yucatan (see Mayan Emigration and Conflict, ch. 6). 



293 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Another threat to peace throughout the late nineteenth and the 
early twentieth centuries came from isolated internal disturbances 
that generally resulted from economic or social tension. In 1894, 
for instance, mahogany workers rioted after their wages fell as a 
result of a currency devaluation. Local police and British troops 
on a warship in the harbor easily subdued the rioters. In 1919 
demobilized Creole (see Glossary) soldiers rioted, after returning 
from service with the British West India Regiment during World 
War I, in protest against unemployment, homelessness, and high 
prices. Order was restored only after martial law was proclaimed. 
Such disturbances did not seriously threaten public peace, but limit- 
ed outbreaks of public disorder erupted during the 1930s and 1940s, 
chiefly as a result of harsh economic circumstances, which had con- 
tributed to increasing labor militancy (see Interest Groups, ch. 9). 
By and large, however, British Honduras escaped much of the civil 
disorder suffered in most of the West Indies (see Glossary) during 
the period. 

During the 1950s, the issue of independence for the colony be- 
came a topic of local concern, and by the early 1960s, Britain was 
willing to support independence. Britain granted the colony in- 
ternal self-government in 1964 but retained responsibility for 
defense, internal security, and external relations. Fears arising from 
Guatemala's continued territorial claims, however, slowed prog- 
ress toward independence. Between 1962 and 1972, talks between 
Britain and Guatemala occurred regularly, but even these were 
abandoned in 1972, after Britain announced it was sending 8,000 
servicemen to conduct amphibious exercises in Belize and other 
parts of the Caribbean. Guatemala responded by massing troops 
on the border. Although no violence resulted, Britain thereafter 
increased the size of its regular garrison to act as a deterrent to 
Guatemalan adventurism. Talks resumed in 1973 but broke off 
two years later when Guatemala threatened invasion, first in 
November 1975 and again in July 1977. Britain responded each 
time by sending in troops and aircraft. Britain kept a battalion of 
troops, a flight of fighter aircraft, and one-half of a squadron of 
RAF fighters and ground-attack aircraft in Belize after 1975. In 
all, the British contingent grew from some 750 personnel in 1970 
to about 1 ,500 in the mid-1970s. By this time, people living in the 
colony generally agreed that a continued British military presence 
would be necessary to guarantee security for an independent Belize. 

In March 1981 , Britain and Guatemala appeared to reach agree- 
ment that would clear the way for independence, with Guatemala 
accepting Belize's independence in return for specified concessions 
(see Relations with Guatemala, ch. 9). Violent demonstrations in 



294 



British military vehicle, Royal Electrical Mechanical 

Engineers 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

Belize followed this agreement in April 1981. The government 
proclaimed a state of emergency to deal with protesters who argued 
that the legitimate security interests of Belize had not been pro- 
tected. The agreement on independence collapsed in July 1981 as 
a result of Guatemala's renewed territorial claims on Belize and 
the violent reaction to the proposed agreement in Belize. 

Nevertheless, Belize achieved independence as scheduled on Sep- 
tember 21 , 1981 , and Britain agreed to continue to garrison troops 
in Belize and to train the new nation's defense force. Guatemala 
closed the borders with Belize in protest for several months. In 1984 
Britain renewed its assurances to keep British troops on hand until 
the territorial dispute with Guatemala was resolved. Talks between 
Britain and Guatemala resumed in 1985, and all three countries 
began the work to draft a treaty to deal with outstanding economic, 
political, and territorial issues. Progress was interrupted in Novem- 
ber 1988 when a Guatemalan gunboat fired on an unarmed Brit- 
ish naval vessel in the disputed Gulf of Honduras. Britain dispatched 
two Royal Air Force Harrier jets to Belize in response, but the in- 
cident was quickly resolved after Guatemala indicated it had only 
fired warning shots at the vessel, which it claimed had strayed into 
Guatemalan waters. 



295 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The Belize Defence Force 

As part of moves to develop a local defense force and initiate 
an independent defense capability, the colony formed the Belize 
Defence Force (BDF) on January 1, 1978. The BDF drew its 
strength from the Belize Volunteer Guard, which had formerly acted 
as a police reserve, and from the paramilitary Belize Police Spe- 
cial Defence Force, which the BDF replaced. The Defence Or- 
dinance of 1977, which formed the legal basis for the creation of 
a regular force, as well as for volunteer and reserve forces, estab- 
lished the BDF. 

In 1978 the new force comprised three active-duty elements, con- 
sisting of one rifle, one headquarters, and one training company. 
Three additional rifle companies and a band made up the volun- 
teer element. The BDF was expanded in 1982, when a second ri- 
fle company was added. In 1984 very small air and maritime wings 
were formed. A third rifle company was added in 1987. 

The BDF is charged with the defense of the nation, with sup- 
port of the civil authority in maintaining order, and with "other 
duties as defined by the Governor." During its short history, the 
force has manned border defense posts in conjunction with British 
forces and provided interpreters and trackers for British patrols. 
The BDF has also conducted search-and-rescue and other opera- 
tions in support of the police, customs, immigration, and fisheries 
departments. As part of its mission to assist the police, the BDF 
has helped in drug eradication and other antidrug operations. The 
maritime wing and the air wing have manned emergency frequen- 
cies and have launched rescue missions nationwide. The BDF has 
also provided assistance in times of natural disaster. In 1986 the 
force took responsibility for coordination of antidrug operations, 
and in the early 1990s performed an active counter-narcotics role. 

Personnel and Training 

As of 1991, the BDF had approximately 700 active-duty per- 
sonnel. An additional 500 Belizeans served in the Volunteer Guard. 
The law allows for the establishment of obligatory national service 
whenever normal recruitment falls, but applicants have regularly 
exceeded openings by at least three-to-one, and enlistment has been 
entirely voluntary throughout the force's existence. The prospect 
of a steady job in a country having relatively high unemployment 
attracted the recruits. Service salaries, which were at least equal 
to those generally available in the private sector, also contributed 
to the abundance of recruits. The BDF, moreover, offered several 
training programs that imparted skills useful in civilian life. 



296 




Belize Defence Force naval vessels 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

The BDF drew recruits from all races and all areas of the coun- 
try. The size of the defense force was about 0.3 percent of the total 
population and therefore did not drain the country's available work 
force. As of 1991, an estimated 24,000 men and 23,000 women 
were of eligible age for active duty. As of 1989, there were twenty- 
five women soldiers, with spaces for ten more. 

The 1977 Defence Ordinance set forth terms of service. The mini- 
mum age for enlistment was eighteen. Enlistments were for vari- 
ous terms and included both a period of active service and a 
subsequent reserve obligation. Under law, service was not to ex- 
ceed twenty- two years of active duty. Enlistment in the Volunteer 
Guard was for four-year terms; in a state of emergency, volun- 
teers could be called to permanent service, as could reserve forces. 
The governor general awarded officer commissions. 

Up until 1990, a British loan service officer held the position 
of commander of the BDF. In June 1990, the first Belizean officer, 
a lieutenant colonel, assumed command. At the same time, the 
government created the position of BDF chief of staff, which was 
also filled by a Belizean officer. Both of the nation's top officers 
had received training in British military schools. 

297 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Recruits underwent a fourteen-week training program focusing 
on basic weapons skills, marching drills, military tactics, and phys- 
ical education. Since independence, the BDF's training unit has 
offered an average of four basic training courses per year. Most 
training was done at Price Barracks in Ladyville, near Belize City, 
but additional facilities were available at Camp Oakley, Moun- 
tain Pine Ridge, and Hill Bank. Officers, senior noncommissioned 
officers, and specialists were trained in Britain, Canada, or the 
United States. 

Organization and Equipment 

Under the constitution, the governor general serves as com- 
mander in chief of the armed forces and exercises administrative 
control over the three services through the Ministry of National 
Defence. Since independence, the defense portfolio has usually been 
held by the prime minister, who has exercised his authority through 
the permanent secretary for defense. In practice, operational con- 
trol passed through the BDF commander, assisted by the chief of 
staff. 

In the early 1990s, the BDF was primarily a ground force, con- 
sisting essentially of a light infantry battalion made up of three rifle 
companies and a support company that performed administrative, 
training, and logistical functions. Its main base was located at Price 
Barracks, where the majority of personnel were stationed. Opera- 
tionally, one rifle company was rotated every three months through 
Belizario Camp near San Ignacio, east of the border with Guatema- 
la. One rifle platoon was also rotated on a monthly basis through 
Punta Gorda, and BDF personnel manned several observation posts 
jointly with British forces in Toledo and Cayo districts. 

The BDF ground element was equipped with light infantry 
weapons of British origin (see table 16, Appendix A). These 
weapons included the L1A1 SLR 7.62mm rifle, the Sterling L2A3 
9mm submachine gun, the Bren L4A1 7.62mm light machine gun, 
and six 81mm mortars. 

The BDF had a small maritime arm whose main base was lo- 
cated in the harbor of Belize City. A forward operating base, lo- 
cated in Placentia near Big Creek, enhanced policing and patrolling 
of the nation's southernmost waters. Operations at Placentia cen- 
tered mainly on patrolling against drug trafficking and illegal fish- 
ing. The maritime arm had fifty personnel, eight of whom were 
officers. A major commanded this arm, which operated two 20- 
meter patrol craft. These craft had too great a draft to operate in 
the shallow waters frequented by smugglers but were effective in 
search-and- rescue operations and in monitoring illegal immigration. 



298 




The BDF's maritime arm shared facilities with British forces that 
also patrolled the nation's waters. 

The BDF also had a very small air wing, which consisted of fifteen 
personnel and was commanded by a captain. The air wing flew 
two Britten Norman BN-2B Defenders, one of which was armed. 
These aircraft usually transported passengers and freight but were 
also capable of use in parachute resupply, coastal patrol, and search- 
and-rescue operations. The air wing also had one D027A crop 
sprayer to combat drug cultivation. The air wing's main base was 
the Belize International Airport, but it also used a small airstrip 
at Punta Gorda. 

As of 1991, there were approximately 350 personnel in the reserve 
force. This force was organized into three rifle companies located 
at Corozal in the north, at Belize City, and at Dangriga in the south. 
There was also a small Volunteer Guard with detachments at Be- 
lize City, San Ignacio, Orange Walk, Corozal, Dangriga, and Pun- 
ta Gorda. 

Defense Spending 

According to the government's 1991 figures, the defense bud- 
get for 1989 was Bz$19.9 million (for value of Belizean dollar — 
see Glossary), or almost US$10 million. The budget total for 1989 
amounted to approximately 1 4 percent of total central government 
expenditures, up from approximately 4 percent at independence. 

299 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

The growth of the defense budget mirrored the development and 
growth of the BDF, although the defense budget was so small that 
the purchase of even a modest amount of equipment during any 
single year produced a significant jump in spending. 

Compared with other Latin American countries, Belize spent 
a slightly larger portion of the national budget on defense. The 
military's portion of the gross domestic product (GDP — see Glos- 
sary) was about 3.4 percent in 1988. 

Britain formed the largest and most significant element of the 
country's external defense (see Relations with Britain, ch. 9). 
Although figures on such assistance were not publicly available, 
the British government spent an estimated US$18 million annual- 
ly to maintain British forces in Belize, an amount almost double 
the Belize defense budget. The British also funded various train- 
ing programs for BDF officers and other personnel. Observers have 
estimated that the maintenance of the British garrison in Belize 
contributed about 15 percent to the nation's GDP. 

United States military assistance augmented the Belize defense 
budget. Assistance to Belize from 1982 through 1990 included ap- 
proximately US$2.5 million in Foreign Military Sales agreements 
that went to provide equipment, mostly for counter-narcotics oper- 
ations. During the same period, the United States also spent ap- 
proximately US$660,000 on the education of a small number of 
BDF personnel at United States facilities under the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. IMET as- 
sistance in fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1991 totaled US$1 15,000. 
The FY 1992 request totaled US$125,000. 

Foreign Military Relations 

Belize's closest military relations were with Britain. The BDF's 
rank structure, uniforms, equipment, and organization followed 
British models, and British regular forces in the nation provided 
much of the BDF's training. 

BDF personnel also trained regularly in Canadian and United 
States facilities. On occasion, members of the BDF have served 
abroad in Mexico, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Colombia, usually 
as observers. 

British forces in Belize were headquartered at Ladyville Barracks 
near Belize City. One battalion represented the bulk of the forces. 
The battalion was rotated through Belize at regular intervals, usually 
of six months, and was then replaced by another battalion. Other 
British military units rounded out this contingent; they included 
one armored reconnaissance troop, one field artillery battery, and 
one engineer squadron. British air units consisted of one Army Air 



300 



Belize: National Security 

Corps flight and one-half of a squadron of the Royal Air Force, 
which provided airfield defense. Ships of the Royal Navy, some- 
times with Royal Marines embarked, made regular stops at Be- 
lize, and in times of tension Britain has shown a willingness to 
reinforce local forces with aircraft and other units as necessary. 

In the early 1990s, Belize had bilateral defense treaties with Brit- 
ain, the United States and Canada. All of these treaties concerned 
the provision of military training. Belize was not a signatory to 
any multilateral defense treaties as of 1991. 

Public Order and Internal Security 

Public order was well established in the nation. There had been 
no serious threats to internal stability since independence, and as 
of 1991 , the country was free of insurgencies. Elections were held 
on a regular basis, and political competition was open. All politi- 
cal parties operated freely and without government or other inter- 
ference. Organizers of public meetings were required to obtain a 
permit at least thirty-six hours before the gathering, but such per- 
mits were almost always granted and were never denied for politi- 
cal reasons. The government respected constitutionally protected 
rights and freedoms, which were generally enjoyed by all citizens. 
Among these protections were the right to free speech, assembly, 
association, and movement. Unions freely exercised the right to 
organize and to form confederations (see Labor, ch. 8). The con- 
stitution allows unions to strike but permits unions representing 
essential services to strike only after giving twenty-one days notice 
to the government ministry concerned. There were no strikes in 
1990. " 

In 1987 the government, then led by the United Democratic Party 
(UDP), passed a law establishing the Security and Intelligence Ser- 
vice (see Electoral Process since Independence, ch. 9). The new ser- 
vice was intended to protect the nation from espionage, sabotage, 
subversion, and terrorism. The law charged the service with col- 
lecting and evaluating intelligence related to Belize's security and 
with providing security assessments of certain public servants to 
various departments of government. These assessments were 
designed to determine the public servants' loyalty and allegiance 
to the nation. The opposition People's United Party (PUP) came 
out firmly against the new service, charging that the government 
was trying to stifle political opposition and intended to use the ser- 
vice to harass the church, press, judiciary, and civil service. The 
government never actually formed the new security service, but 
tensions nevertheless flared between the two political parties over 
the role of such a service. In January 1988, the political dispute 



301 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

between the two parties evolved into short-lived demonstrations 
and minor violence after a suspicious fire broke out at the home 
of the deputy prime minister. Elections in September 1989 resulted 
in a new PUP government, which, within a few weeks, led a suc- 
cessful effort to repeal the 1987 Security and Intelligence Service 
Act, abolishing the new service. 

Crime 

As of 1991, official statistics on the incidence of crime during 
the 1980s were not available. Still, according to some observers, 
Belize suffered from relatively high rates of crime. Drug traffick- 
ing, in particular, spawned violent crimes of all kinds. The prin- 
cipal trafficking threat came from Colombian organizations that 
transshipped cocaine through Central America. The extensive 
domestic cultivation of marijuana posed a significant problem. 
Growers and traffickers of marijuana were also blamed for much 
of the country's crime. Most of the cocaine and marijuana was des- 
tined for markets in the United States. Some, however, was diverted 
to local markets. Studies in the mid-1980s revealed that drug abuse 
was on the rise among Belizeans, especially among teenagers. 

During the late 1980s, local law enforcement, backed by the BDF, 
enjoyed only limited success in combating cocaine traffickers. Dur- 
ing the early 1990s, the nation had to rely on foreign assistance, 
principally from the United States and Britain, to maintain an- 
titrafficking operations. The government's efforts to eradicate 
marijuana were more effective, however, and the local press car- 
ried regular reports on confiscation of the drug or eradication of 
it through crop spraying. Despite the destruction of large quanti- 
ties of marijuana, observers estimated that enough marijuana sur- 
vived herbicidal crop spraying to provide a significant income. Most 
observers agreed that drug trafficking seemed unlikely to decrease 
as long as the potential for profit remained high and no alternate 
crops could net comparable profits for local farmers. 

Crime associated with illegal immigration posed another seri- 
ous challenge for law enforcement. Traditionally, illegal aliens posed 
problems from an economic and regulatory standpoint. But in the 
1980s, some illegal immigrants posed problems from a social stand- 
point. During the mid-1980s, aliens, who had been hardened by 
the civil strife and the resulting social chaos in their own countries, 
were implicated in a number of kidnappings for ransom in north- 
ern Belize and for various other violent crimes nationwide. Efforts 
to address these problems culminated in 1987, when the govern- 
ment stiffened laws to penalize employers who hired illegal aliens. 
The new legislation also provided for the expeditious expulsion of 



302 



Belize police headquarters, Belmopan 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

illegal immigrants. Such laws notwithstanding, the government, 
working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees, planned and implemented a variety of assistance programs 
aimed at Belizeans and aliens in an attempt to defuse resentment 
against the latter. During 1990 Belize did not force or pressure any 
refugees to return to their countries of origin. 

As a reflection of the growing incidence of crime, tourists in the 
late 1980s began to complain about being openly harassed, partic- 
ularly on the streets of Belize City. Theft and assault were the two 
offenses most commonly reported. The government was particu- 
larly concerned about publicity surrounding such crime because 
national economic planning focused on expanding tourism. One 
response to the problem was imprisonment of "veteran muggers" 
convicted of repeat offenses. 

The Belize National Police 

The Belize National Police is descended from the British Hon- 
duras Constabulary, which was established in 1886. Constabulary 
personnel initially numbered 141 and were recruited in Barbados 
because local men showed no interest in enlisting. The government 
assigned the early police the task of preserving law and order in 



303 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

the colony. The Constabulary was at first a paramilitary force, but 
in 1902 it was made into a civil police force. 

The constabulary was reorganized after World War I, when sol- 
diers returning from service abroad joined the force. The force was 
reorganized again in 1957, when its first commissioner of police 
instituted modernizing reforms that resulted in the force's present 
form. During the colonial period, expatriate officers filled all senior 
posts in the police. But with self-government and then indepen- 
dence, more Belizeans assumed positions of authority. The offi- 
cial name of the force was changed to the Belize National Police 
in 1973, and by the early 1990s the commissioner and all senior 
police officers were Belizeans. 

As of 1991, the force, which was part of the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, was the sole organization responsible for policing the coun- 
try and for managing regular immigration matters. A commissioner 
of police headed the force. The governor general appointed the com- 
missioner with the concurrence of the prime minister after consul- 
tation with the leader of the opposition. The commissioner exercised 
operational and disciplinary control over the police force. 

The police force had an authorized strength of approximately 
500, a ratio of about three police to every 1 ,000 inhabitants. Police 
operations were divided into three territorial divisions: Eastern, 
which included Belmopan and Belize City; Central; and Western. 
The force had a small maritime element that operated six shallow- 
draft motorboats capable of patrolling coastal waters frequented 
by smugglers. 

The force was also divided into three operational branches: 
General Duties, Crime Investigation, and Tactical Service. The 
Tactical Service, formed in 1978, assumed the nonmilitary respon- 
sibilities of its predecessor, the Police Special Force, which was in- 
corporated into the BDF. 

The police underwent training at the Police Training School in 
Belmopan. In sixteen- week programs, recruits studied general police 
duties and procedures, criminal law, evidence, traffic management, 
and firearms. Senior police officers attended a ten- week command 
course run by the British police in Britain. Police performed their 
regular duties unarmed, although arms were issued for special duties 
or in cases of extreme necessity. There were a small number of 
women police in the force; the first appoinment of a woman to the 
rank of inspector came in 1989. All personnel were subject to trans- 
fer anywhere in the country. 

Officers' uniforms resembled those of British police forces. Ser- 
geants and lower ranks wore khaki shirts, blue serge trousers with 



304 



Local police headquarters, Belize City 
Courtesy Steven R. Harper 

a green seam on both sides, and dark blue peaked caps. Some police 
investigators were not required to wear uniforms. 

During the 1980s, the large increase in drug trafficking greatly 
challenged the police. Unfortunately, some personnel proved vul- 
nerable to corruption by traffickers, and public confidence in the 
police suffered from charges of official collusion in the drug trade. 
Public perceptions of the police also suffered from charges that police 
sometimes resorted to unnecessary force in their efforts to deal with 
escalating violent crime. During the late 1980s, police leadership 
began to focus on both problems, expressing a willingness to pursue 
every allegation of malpractice and to rid the police of unworthy per- 
sonnel. Penalties for official violators of criminal statutes also in- 
creased. The success of these efforts was unclear as of mid- 1991. 

The Criminal Justice System 

The constitution assigns judicial power to the Supreme Court, 
whose chief justice is appointed on the advice of the prime minister 
after consultation with the leader of the opposition (see Judiciary, 
ch. 9). Two other justices also served on the Supreme Court; they 
were also appointed by the governor general on the advice of the 
judicial and legal services section of the Public Services Commis- 
sion. Immediately below the Supreme Court was the Summary 



305 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Jurisdiction Court, which was responsible for criminal matters, and 
the District Court, which heard civil cases. The Summary Juris- 
diction Court and the District Court were established in each of 
the nation's six district capitals: Belize, San Ignacio, Corozal, 
Orange Walk, Dangriga, and Punta Gorda. Magistrates presided 
over these courts, which had wide jurisdiction in summary offenses 
and limited jurisdiction in more serious offenses. Juvenile offenders 
were tried in district family courts established by the Family Courts 
Act of 1988. 

Magistrates referred serious criminal cases to the Supreme Court, 
where a jury system was in operation. Appeals from Summary Juris- 
diction Court were referred to the Supreme Court; appeals from 
the Supreme Court were referred to a Court of Appeal, which met 
on an average of four times a year. Final appeals were made to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London in cases 
involving interpretation of the constitution. 

The principal source of the nation's criminal law was the crimi- 
nal code of 1980. The code had two sections. The first section de- 
fined general legal principles and set forth standards of criminal 
liability, addressing such issues as intent, negligence, conspiracy, 
and justifiable force. The second section defined crimes and their 
punishments. 

The criminal code provided for the death penalty for persons 
convicted of criminal homicide. Under the constitution, the death 
penalty could be adjudged only after the judge of record submit- 
ted a report to the Belize Advisory Council, which in turn advised 
the attorney general as to the appropriateness of the sentence. 

The government amended the criminal code in April 1987 to 
provide stiffer penalties for rape, kidnapping, blackmail, and rob- 
bery. At the same time, the government raised the penalties for 
offenses subject to summary jurisdiction. 

Several other statutes also covered criminal offenses. The most 
important of these was the Misuse of Drugs Act of 1990, which 
was the nation's principal drug legislation. This act repealed and 
replaced the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1980, which was deemed in- 
adequate to meet the challenges of the explosive growth in the drug 
trade during the 1980s. The 1990 legislation provided for the es- 
tablishment of a National Drug Abuse Control Council, which was 
to review the current state of Belize's illegal narcotics trade and 
advise the prime minister on measures to restrict availability, pro- 
vide for treatment and rehabilitation, educate the public, and ad- 
vise farmers on alternate crops. The act called for fines of up to 
Bz$25,000 and imprisonment of five to ten years for less serious 
cases of drug trafficking. Persons convicted of more serious offenses 



306 



Belize: National Security 



by the Supreme Court were liable to fines of not less than 
Bz$ 100,000 — or three times the street value of the illegal commodi- 
ties seized — or were subject to seven to fourteen years of imprison- 
ment, or both. Penalties for public officials and members of the 
National Assembly, the judiciary, the police, and the BDF were 
more severe. The 1990 law also provided for forfeitures of all air- 
craft, vessels, and vehicles used in illegal trafficking and for forfei- 
ture of all proceeds derived from this activity. 

Criminal procedure followed British models. Officials working 
under the Directorate of Public Prosecutions handled cases. The 
constitution protects citizens from arbitrary search or seizure, and 
the justice system regularly observed these protections. Criminal 
offenders were also accorded numerous protections. These protec- 
tions included the right to a public trial and protection against dou- 
ble jeopardy and self-incrimination. All persons were presumed 
innocent and were entitled to equal protection under the law. 

The law required informing detainees of the cause of their ar- 
rest within forty-eight hours, and detainees were entitled to com- 
municate with a lawyer. The law also required informing the 
accused of his or her rights, which included the right to judicial 
review of the validity of the detention. If arrested, the accused had 
to be brought before a judge or magistrate within seventy- two hours. 
The defendant was entitled to be present at all trials, to cross- 
examine witnesses for the prosecution, and to call witnesses for the 
defense. The defendant had the right to trial by jury in serious crimi- 
nal cases. The law guaranteed defendants the right to appeal any 
decision to the next higher court. 

At the end of 1991, the small Belizean defense establishment, 
including the BDF, existed to maintain internal order and to de- 
ter Guatemalan aggression. Actual defense of the country was ul- 
timately in Britain's hands. The 700-member BDF was no match 
for larger Guatemalan forces but would act merely as a tripwire 
for British intervention 

As of mid- 1991, no definitive studies that dealt comprehensive- 
ly with national security matters in contemporary Belize had been 
published. For information on the development of the Belize 
Defence Force, the reader must search through issues of Belize To- 
day, published in Belize City; the Latin America Report by the Joint 
Publications Research Service; and the Daily Report: Latin America 
put out by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Current 
order-of-battle information is available in the International Institute 



307 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



for Strategic Studies' excellent annual, The Military Balance. The 
best overview of conditions of public order is contained in the sec- 
tions on Belize in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, a report 
submitted annually by the United States Department of State to 
the United States Congress. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



308 



Appendix A 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Guyana: Ethnic Groups, 1960, 1970, and 1980 

3 Guyana: Population Statistics by District, 1970 

4 Guyana: Religious Affiliation, 1960 and 1990 

5 Guyana: Student Enrollment, Selected Years, 1969-70 to 

1979-80 

6 Guyana: Selected Economic Indicators, 1986-90 

7 Guyana: Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-88 

8 Guyana: Parliamentary Seats in Elections, 1968-85 

9 Guyana: Major Military Equipment, 1991 

10 Belize: Population Statistics by District, 1985 

11 Belize: Ethnic Groups, 1975 and 1980 

12 Belize: Religious Affiliation, 1980 

13 Belize: Student Enrollment, Selected Years, 1970-71 to 

1985-86 

14 Belize: Selected Economic Indicators, 1985-90 

15 Belize: Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 

1984-88 

16 Belize: Major Military Equipment, 1991 



309 



Appendix A 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



Table 2. Guyana: Ethnic Groups, 1960, 1970, and 1980 
(in percentages) 



Ethnic Group 1960 1970 1980 



Indo-Guyanese 47 52 51 

Afro-Guyanese 45 42 42 

Amerindian 4 4 4 

European 3 2 — 

Asian 1 — 2 — 



TOTAL 100 100 100 



1 In the 1980 census, Europeans and Asians were grouped together as "other" and were 3 percent 
of the population. 

2 Less than 1 percent. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Guyana, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 19. 



311 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Table 3. Guyana: Population Statistics by District, 1970 



District in 1970 
(District in 1991) 



Percentage of 
Total Total 
Population Population 



East Demerara 338,000 48.3 

(Demerara-Mahaica) 

East Berbice 132,500 18.9 

(East Berbice-Corentyne) 
Essequibo and Essequibo Islands 2 57,200 8.2 

(Pomeroon-Supenaam and Essequibo 

Islands-West Demerara) 
Mazaruni-Potaro 12,700 1.8 

(Cuyuni-Mazaruni) 

Northwest District 16,200 2.3 

(Barima-Waini) 

Rupununi 14,200 2.0 

(Potaro-Siparuni and Upper Takutu-Upper 
Essequibo) 

West Demerara 78,300 11.2 

West Berbice 50,800 7.3 

( Mahaica- Berbice) 

TOTAL 699,900 100.0 

1 Boundaries for districts in 1991 only approximate those in 1970. The new district of Upper Demerara- 
Berbice was created from parts of West Demerara and East Berbice. The old district of West Demerara 
was divided into Essequibo Islands-West Demerara, Demerara-Mahaica, and Upper Demerara- 
Berbice. 

2 The 1970 census combined Essequibo and Essequibo Islands. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Guyana, 1987, Wiesbaden, 1987, 18. 



Table 4. Guyana: Religious Affiliation, 1960 and 1990 
(in percentages) 



Religion 1960 1990 

Christian 57 52 

Hindu 34 34 

Other * 9 14 

TOTAL 100 100 



* Predominantly Muslim. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Guyana, 1987, Wiesbaden, 1987, 19. 



312 



Appendix A 



Table 5. Guyana: Student Enrollment, Selected Years, 
1969-70 to 1979-80 



Level/Type 1969-70 1975-76 1977-78 1979-80 



Primary 163,100 196,300 * 166,200 * 164,800 

Secondary 18,100 46,600 

Trade school 2,000 3,000 3,800 3,600 

Teachers' college 500 600 1,000 1,100 

University of Guyana .. 1,100 1,752 1,536 1,889 



* Combined primary and secondary school enrollment. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Guyana, 1987, Wiesbaden, 1987, 23. 



Table 6. Guyana: Selected Economic Indicators, 1986-90 
(in millions of United States dollars unless otherwise indicated) 



Indicator 


1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 


Real GDP 1 


300 


303 


295 


285 


275 


Real GDP growth 2 


-0.9 


0.9 


-2.6 


-3.3 


-2.5 


Real GDP per capita 3 


400 


403 


392 


380 


369 


Real GDP per capita growth 2 . 


-1.0 


0.8 


-2.7 


-3.4 


-2.6 


Inflation 2 


7.9 


28.7 


39.9 


89.7 


63.6 


Trade balance 


-50 


-21 


-1 


-8 


-46 


Overall balance of payments . . . 


. -140 


-137 


-106 


-181 


-194 


External debt 


1,618 


1,719 


1,722 


1,862 


1,960 



1 GDP — gross domestic product, in constant 1988 United States dollars. 

2 In percentages. 

3 In United States dollars. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Agency for International Development, 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic Data, Washington, 1992, 112. 



Table 7. Guyana: Production of Selected Commodities, 1984-88 

Commodity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Agricultural 

Rice (thousands of tons) 184 156 183 146 130 

Sugar (thousands of tons) 242 243 245 221 168 

Mining 

Bauxite (thousands of tons) ... 1,556 1,599 1,504 1,378 1,300 
Diamonds (thousands of 

carats) * 6.0 11.6 9.1 7.3 4.2 

Gold (kilograms) * 345 321 437 666 584 

* Quantities include only the amounts channeled through the official economy. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Guyana, 
Barbados, Windward and Leeward Islands, 1989-90, London, 1989, 15, 17. 



313 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Table 8. Guyana: Parliamentary Seats 
in Elections, 1968-85 



Party 


1968 


1973 


1980 


1985 


People's National Congress (PNC) 


30 


37 


53 


54 


People's Progressive Party (PPP) 


19 


14 


10 


8 


United Force (UF) 


4 


2 1 


2 


2 


Working People's Alliance (WPA) 


2 


2 





1 


TOTAL 


53 


53 


65 


65 



1 Seats originally won by the Liberator Party (LP) but assumed by the UF when the LP boycotted 
the National Assembly. 

2 Party not established until after 1973 elections. 



Table 9. Guyana: Major Military Equipment, 1991 

Country of Number in 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Ground forces 
Armored vehicles 

Shoreland Britain 3 

Artillery 

M-46, 130mm Soviet Union 6 

Mortars 

LI 6, 81mm Britain 12 

M-43, 120mm Soviet Union 18 

Surface-to-air launchers 

SA-7 -do- n.a. 

Maritime Corps 

Patrol craft North Korea 4 

Air Command 
Light transports 

BN-2A Islander Britain 4 

B-200 Super King United States 1 

Helicopters 

Bell 206 -do- 1 

Bell 212 -do- 1 

Bell 412 -do- 1 

Mi-8 Soviet Union 2 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 180. 



314 



Appendix A 



Table 10. Belize: Population Statistics by District, 1985 



Total Population 
District Population Density * 



Belize 54,500 13.0 

Cayo 27,400 5.1 

Corozal 28,000 15.1 

Orange Walk 26,600 5.6 

Stann Creek 16,500 7.6 

Toledo 13,400 2.9 



TOTAL 166,400 7.8 



* Persons per square kilometer. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Belize, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 18. 



Table 11. Belize: Ethnic Groups, 1975 and 1980 
(in percentages) 



Ethnic Group 1975 1980 



Creole 52 40 

Mestizo 22 33 

Maya 13 10 

Garifuna 6 7 

European 2 4 

Other 5 6 



TOTAL 100 100 



Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Belize, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 19. 



Table 12. Belize: Religious Affiliation, 1980 



Denomination 


Total 
Membership 


Percentage of 
Population 




89,683 


61.7 


Anglican 


16,152 


11.8 




8,721 


6.0 




5,669 


3.9 




4,361 


3.0 


Other 


19,767 


13.6 


TOTAL 


144,353 


100.0 


Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Ldnderbericht Belize, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 20. 



315 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Table 13. Belize: Student Enrollment, Selected Years, 
1970-71 to 1985-86 



Level/Type 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 



Primary 31,629 33,444 34,615 39,211 

Secondary 4,212 5,008 5,435 6,676 

Trade school n.a. 369 672 n.a. 

Teachers' college 75 129 144 n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Federal Republic of Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, 
Landerbericht Belize, 1989, Wiesbaden, 1989, 25. 



Table 14. Belize: Selected Economic Indicators, 1985-90 
(in millions of United States dollars unless otherwise indicated) 



Indicator 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 



Real GDP 1 201 211 243 265 286 336 

Real GDP growth 2 2.2 4.8 14.3 9.7 13.3 12.1 

Real GDP per capita 3 ... 1,210 1,233 1,376 1,494 1,633 1,762 
Real GDP per capita 

growth 2 -0.6 1.9 11.6 7.5 10.4 7.9 

Inflation 2 -0.6 2.4 2.0 3.3 2.1 4.0 

Trade balance -44.2 -35.9 -41.3 -61.8 -94.6 -85.6 

Overall balance of 

payments 10.0 10.8 9.8 18.8 11.4 10.5 

External debt 118 121 137 139 143 158 



1 GDP — gross domestic product; in constant 1984 United States dollars. 

2 In percentages. 

3 In United States dollars. 

Source: Based on information from United States, Agency for International Development, 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Selected Economic Data, Washington, 1992, 92. 



Table 15. Belize: Production of Selected Agricultural 
Commodities, 1984-88 
(in thousands of tons) 



Commodity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 



Bananas 12 12 15 25 29 

Corn 18 22 20 26 26 

Grapefruit 13 19 26 36 34 

Molasses 32 28 30 24 23 

Oranges 51 47 57 81 60 

Rice 6 6 5 5 6 

Sugar 102 102 93 82 82 



Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Belize, 
Bahamas, Bermuda, 1989-90, London, 1989, 16. 



316 



Appendix A 

Table 16. Belize: Major Military Equipment, 1991 

Country of Number in 

Type and Description Origin Inventory 

Ground forces 
Mortars 

81mm Britain 6 

Machine guns 

7.62mm L4A1 Bren -do- n.a. 

Submachine guns 

9mm L2A3 Sterling -do- n.a. 

Rifles 

7.62mm L1A1 SLR -do- n.a. 

Maritime wing 
Patrol craft 

20-meter Wasp -do- 6 

Air wing 

Light transports 

BN-2B Defender -do- 2 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1991-1992, London, 1991, 169. 



317 



Appendix B 



The Commonwealth of Nations 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, more commonly 
known simply as the Commonwealth, is a voluntary association 
of independent sovereign states, including Britain and former British 
territories and existing territories of Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand. Any former British territory may seek Commonwealth 
membership, which is granted by unanimous consent of the mem- 
bers (see table A, this Appendix). 

Table A. Members of the Commonwealth of Nations, 1991 



Independent Members 



Antigua and Barbuda 


Malta 


Australia 


Mauritius 


Bahamas 


Namibia 


Bangladesh 


Nauru 


Barbados 


New Zealand 


Belize 


Nigeria 


Botswana 


Pakistan 


Britain 


Papua New Guinea 


Brunei 


Saint Christopher and Nevis 


Canada 


Saint Lucia 


Cyprus 


Saint Vincent and the 


Dominica 


Grenadines 


Gambia 


Seychelles 


Ghana 


Sierra Leone 


Grenada 


Singapore 


Guyana 


Solomon Islands 


India 


Sri Lanka 


Jamaica 


Swaziland 


Kenya 


Tanzania 


Kiribati 


Tonga 


Lesotho 


Trinidad and Tobago 


Malawi 


Tuvalu 


Malaysia 


Uganda 


Maldives 


Vanuatu 



319 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 
Table A. — Continued 



Western Somoa 

Zambia 

Zimbabwe 



Dependencies and Associated States of Britain 



Anguilla 
Bermuda 

British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Channel Islands 
Falkland Islands 



Gibraltar 
Hong Kong 
Isle of Man 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Islands 
Saint Helena 
Turks and Caicos 



Islands 



Dependencies and Associated States of Australia 



Dependencies and Associated States of New Zealand 



Source: Based on information from The Europa Year Book 1987, 1, London, 1987, 114; South 
America, Central America, and the Caribbean, 1993, London, 1992, 668-69; and United 
States, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1991, Washington, 1991. 

Commonwealth member countries recognize the British monarch 
as the symbolic head of the association. In member nations in which 
the British monarch serves as the head of state, she or he is 
represented by an appointed governor general, who is indepen- 
dent of the British government. In other Commonwealth nations, 
the monarch is represented by a high commissioner, who has the 
status of an ambassador. Member states meet regularly to discuss 
issues, coordinate mutual economic and technical assistance, and 
formulate proposals regarding international economic affairs. 



Australian Antarctic Territory 
Christmas Island 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands 
Coral Sea Islands Territory 



Heard and McDonald 

Islands 
Norfolk Island 



Cook Islands 
Niue 



Ross Dependency 
Tokelau 



320 



Appendix B 



History 

The Commonwealth of Nations is a twentieth-century creation, 
but its origins go back to events in 1867. In that year, the British 
Parliament passed the British North American Act, creating the 
self-governing Dominion of Canada. Canada was the first British 
colony to gain self-government, and from that time on Britain be- 
gan to redefine its relationship with its colonies. Australia became 
a dominion in 1900, New Zealand in 1907, and the Union of South 
Africa in 1910. 

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa 
dispatched troops to aid in the British war effort in World War 
I. They also participated in the postwar peace conference and in 
the creation of the League of Nations. Such actions led Britain to 
acknowledge these countries more as equals than as former colonies. 

In 1926 an Imperial Conference of Commonwealth members 
adopted the Balfour Formula on the status of the dominions. The 
conference defined the dominions and Britain as "autonomous com- 
munities with the Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate 
to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, 
though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely 
associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." 
The formula continued, "Every self-governing member of the Em- 
pire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, 
it is subject to no compulsion whatsoever." 

The British government codified these basic principles of equal 
status and free association in 1931 in the Statute of Westminster, 
which has been characterized as the "Magna Carta of the Com- 
monwealth." The statute also recognized the full legislative au- 
tonomy of the dominions and offered all former colonies the right 
to secede from the Commonwealth. 

The Ottawa Imperial Conference of 1932 added an economic 
dimension to the Commonwealth by creating the Commonwealth 
Preference, a system of preferential tariffs that applied to trade be- 
tween Britain and the other Commonwealth members. Under this 
system, Britain imported goods from other Commonwealth coun- 
tries without imposing any tariffs. Commonwealth members were 
encouraged to negotiate similar trade agreements with one another. 
For the next decade and a half, the Commonwealth in essence func- 
tioned as an economic bloc vis-a-vis the rest of the world. However, 
following World War II, as world and British trade policies were 
liberalized, the bloc gradually disintegrated. The Commonwealth 
Preference was finally terminated in 1977 as a condition of Brit- 
ain's entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC). 



321 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Nevertheless, Commonwealth nations have been linked to the EEC 
through the Lome Convention (see Glossary), which offers former 
colonies of EEC members in Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean 
preferential access to EEC markets and economic assistance. The 
Lome Convention is updated every five years. 

A new Commonwealth gradually emerged after World War II, 
reflecting the progress of decolonization and the needs of new mem- 
bers. In the process, the Commonwealth became both more de- 
centralized and more concerned with economic and social needs. 
In 1947 Britain granted complete independence to India and 
Pakistan, and in 1948 Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) and Burma (now 
Myanmar) gained independence. Burma did not join the Com- 
monwealth, but the other three became independent Common- 
wealth members. In deference to India, a self-declared republic, 
the Commonwealth dropped the requirement of formal allegiance 
to the crown. In 1949 the Irish Republic seceded. In 1961 South 
Africa left the Commonwealth because its racial policies differed 
from the values of all other Commonwealth members. 

During the 1960s and 1970s, a large number of British colonies 
achieved independence and joined the expanded Commonwealth, 
including most ex-colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, 
and the Pacific. Some former British colonies did not join, however; 
these included Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan), British Somaliland 
(now part of Somalia), Southern Cameroons (now part of Camer- 
oon), and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (now part 
of Yemen). Pakistan left in 1972, after Britain and other members 
recognized the independence of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, 
but in 1987 Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth (see table A, this 
Appendix). 

Principles and Politics 

Although the Statute of Westminster affirms the principles of 
free association and equal status, the contemporary Commonwealth 
has no written charter or formal treaty. Instead, its governing fea- 
tures are found in a few basic procedures, its periodic declarations 
of principle, and an organization designed for consultations and 
mutual assistance. This framework is both flexible and adaptable, 
and a major reason why the Commonwealth has survived major 
changes in membership and member interests. 

Two central procedures govern the Commonwealth — its process 
of making decisions by consensus and its biennial meeting of heads 
of government. The latter is held in odd-numbered years and in 
different cities and regions within the Commonwealth. In alternate 



322 



Appendix B 



years, senior officials hold policy- review meetings. Finance ministers 
meet annually; other meetings are held as appropriate. 

Over time the Commonwealth has become more oriented toward 
its less-developed members. Major declarations of principle reflect 
this trend. The Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, adopted 
at the 1971 Singapore meeting, affirmed the members' belief "in 
the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens regard- 
less of race, color, creed, or political belief, and in their inaliena- 
ble right to participate by means of free and democratic processes 
in framing the society in which they live." The declaration also 
opposed all forms of colonial domination and racial oppression. 

The 1977 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, issued an Agreement 
on Apartheid in Sport, reaffirming opposition to apartheid, but 
allowing each member to decide whether to participate in sport- 
ing events with South Africa. The 1979 conference in Lusaka, Zam- 
bia, issued both an important framework for a peaceful settlement 
of Southern Rhodesia's transition to an independent Zimbabwe 
under black majority rule and a strong Commonwealth declara- 
tion condemning racism. Members also adopted the 1981 Mel- 
bourne Declaration on relations between the developed and 
developing nations; the 1983 New Delhi Statement on Economic 
Action; and the 1983 Goa Declaration on International Security. 

The October 1985 meeting in Nassau, the Bahamas, passed reso- 
lutions calling for cooperation in fighting international terrorism 
and drug trafficking, bans on nuclear testing, and prohibition of 
the use of chemical weapons. As part of the Commonwealth's con- 
tinuing condemnation of South Africa's racial policies, it also ap- 
pointed a Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons (Comgep). 
The Comgep was tasked to encourage dialogue to end apartheid 
in South Africa. 

Despite a broad consensus among members condemning apart- 
heid, issues concerning South Africa have led to the most serious 
divisions within the Commonwealth. In 1982 the Commonwealth 
Games Federation held its first extraordinary meeting to discuss 
a tour of New Zealand by South African rugby teams. In 1986 
over half of the member states pulled their teams out of the Com- 
monwealth Games, held that year in Britain, in protest over South 
African participation. Conspicuously absent were the predominantiy 
black Caribbean and African states. 

Organization and Activities 

The central organization for consultation and cooperation is the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, established in 1965. The Secretariat, 
located in London, is headed by a secretary general, elected by 



323 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

the heads of government for a five-year term. It organizes confer- 
ences and meetings, coordinates a broad range of activities, and 
disseminates information. Since World War II, member heads of 
state have attended the biennial meetings. Meetings are also held 
periodically on specific issues of foreign affairs, defense, finance, 
and international debt. For example, the national finance ministers 
routinely meet immediately before the annual meetings of the World 
Bank (see Glossary) and the International Monetary Fund (see Glos- 
sary) to discuss international monetary and economic issues. The 
Secretariat's departments deal with administration, applied studies 
in government, economic affairs, education, export market develop- 
ment, food production and rural development, information, in- 
ternational affairs, legal matters, medical affairs, youth, finance, 
and personnel. 

Two permanent directorates are within the Secretariat, the Com- 
monwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and the Indus- 
trial Development Unit. The CFTC was established in April 1971 
to provide technical assistance for economic and social develop- 
ment in Commonwealth developing countries. The fund is financed 
by all Commonwealth nations on a voluntary basis; the CFTC's 
governing body includes representatives of all its contributors. The 
Industrial Development Unit promotes the establishment and 
modernization of industries in member countries. 

The Commonwealth Secretariat is funded by member payments, 
determined individually on the basis of per capita income. Britain 
pays 30 percent of the Secretariat's budget. 

In addition to the Secretariat, a number of Commonwealth com- 
ponents are noteworthy. Government and private funds are sent 
to less-developed members through the Commonwealth Develop- 
ment Corporation. Specialized organizations include the Common- 
wealth Agricultural Bureau, the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, the Association of Commonwealth Universities, and var- 
ious Commonwealth groups for communications, health, the law, 
the professions, and science and technology. The Commonwealth 
Games Federation, based in London, has held games every four 
years since 1930. The Commonwealth also maintains close links 
with other international organizations, including the United Na- 
tions (UN). In October 1976, the UN General Assembly granted 
the Commonwealth official observer status. 

Regional Groupings 

Aside from its general departments and specialized organizations, 
the Commonwealth also has four "regional groupings." One is the 
Colombo Plan for Cooperative, Economic, and Social Development 



324 



Appendix B 



in Asia and the Pacific, founded in 1951 (originally under a slightly 
different name) and headquartered in Colombo, Sri Lanka; it is 
designed to promote economic and social development in Asia and 
the Pacific. Economic assistance is provided to Commonwealth and 
non-Commonwealth countries in the region by Australia, Britain, 
Canada, Japan, and the United States. A related program, the Con- 
ference of Heads of Government of Asian and Pacific Common- 
wealth Member States, began in 1978 and exists to encourage 
cooperation for regional development. 

The other two regional groupings deal with the Caribbean: the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) and the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), an associate 
institution of Caricom (see Appendix C). Encompassing Antigua 
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Christopher 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
the OECS aims at coordinating member states' development, for- 
eign policy, defense, and relations with international institutions. 
It also has responsibility for the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Authority and the Eastern Caribbean States Supreme Court. 



325 



Appendix C 



The Caribbean Community and Common Market 

IN 1992 THIRTEEN NATIONS located in or bordering on the 
Caribbean Sea were members of the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom — see table B, this appendix). Observers 
included Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Domin- 
ican Republic, Haiti, the Netherlands Antilles, and Suriname. In 
1992 the British Virgin Islands, the Dominican Republic, and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands were being considered for full member- 
ship. The members faced problems typical of many developing so- 
cieties: high birth rates, unemployment and an unskilled labor force, 
inadequate infrastructure, balance of payments constraints, and 
insufficient domestic savings to achieve development goals. In ad- 
dition, Caricom nations lacked diversified economies and were in- 
capable of producing most capital goods and some basic consumer 
goods necessary for productive expansion. The Caricom nations, 
therefore, were forced to rely heavily on imports of essential goods. 
As a result, development goals were subordinated because of the 
need to raise foreign exchange to pay for the imports. 

Table B. Members of the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom), 1992 



Antigua and Barbuda Jamaica 

Bahamas Montserrat 

Barbados Saint Christopher and Nevis 

Belize Saint Lucia 

Dominica Saint Vincent and the 

Grenada Grenadines 

Guyana Trinidad and Tobago 



Source: Based on information from South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, 1993, 
London, 1992, 663-65. 



Since 1981 the ability of Caricom nations to raise the needed 
capital via export expansion has been severely limited by the lack 
of export diversification and reliance on primary products and 
tourism services, which are extremely vulnerable to changing forces 
of demand, supply, and price in the international political economy. 



327 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

In 1992 intraregional cooperation was urgently needed to create 
an atmosphere conducive to overcoming the handicaps of small mar- 
ket size, economic fragmentation, and external dependence. 

Caricom's goal of regional integration was designed to serve as 
a catalyst for sustained growth in the short or medium term by 
allowing for market expansion, harmonization of production strate- 
gies, and development of economies of scale. Integration was also 
expected to promote industrial growth by eliminating excess ca- 
pacity in the manufacturing sector and by stimulating investment 
in new sectors of the expanded market. The long-term hope was 
for balanced growth, minimal unemployment, a higher standard 
of living, and optimal use of available human and natural resources. 

Background and Objectives 

Following the example of the European Economic Community 
(EEC), many nations have organized themselves into regional in- 
tegration schemes, such as Latin America's Central American Com- 
mon Market, the Latin America Integration Association, and the 
Andean Pact. The Commonwealth Caribbean archipelago made 
a serious move toward establishing a unit of integration by form- 
ing the West Indies Federation (WIF) in April 1958. The federa- 
tion, formed under the auspices of the British, was doomed from 
the start by nationalistic tendencies and the lack of taxation 
privileges and failed when Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago at- 
tained independence and withdrew in 1962. Nevertheless, a few 
institutions, such as the University of the West Indies (UWI) and 
the Regional Shipping Council, were established under the short- 
lived federation and continue today. After the demise of the WIF, 
economist Arthur Lewis attempted to organize a smaller body 
among the Eastern Caribbean islands; however, his efforts yielded 
little success, and most of the islands reverted to British colonial 
status. 

The next call for a regional Caribbean community was made in 
a January 1962 speech by Eric Williams, former prime minister and 
first head of state of the independent Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, it was not until the late 1960s that advocates of a new 
federation focused their attention on the issue of regional integra- 
tion. In July 1965, the contemporary nations of Antigua and Bar- 
buda, Barbados, and Guyana signed the Treaty of Dickenson Bay, 
which established the Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta). 
Under the terms of the 1968 Treaty of Saint John's, Carifta was 
widened to include Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint 
Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Montserrat, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Although a free-trade 



328 



Appendix C 



area was established, Carifta did not provide for the free move- 
ment of labor and capital or the coordination of agricultural, in- 
dustrial, defense, and foreign policies. Thus, over the next five 
years, little progress was made toward creating a regionally inte- 
grated unit. In 1970 the prospect of Britain's joining the EEC alerted 
the islands to their vulnerability to any disruption in their preferen- 
tial trading ties with Britain. In the same year, economists at the 
UWI issued a report contending that the creation of a free-trade 
area alone was not sufficient to procure full gains from regional 
integration. These events led to the development of the present Car- 
icom structure. 

In 1973 the Carifta nations signed the Treaty of Chaguaramas, 
replacing the ineffective Carifta structure with Caricom. Caricom 
has three essential components: economic integration based on a re- 
gional common market; functional cooperation in such areas as cul- 
ture, education, health, labor relations, tourism, and transporta- 
tion; and coordination of foreign and defense policies. Although 
the regional common market is an integral part of the broader- 
based community arrangements, it has a completely separate iden- 
tity juridically. Thus, it was possible for the Bahamas to become 
a member of the community in 1983, without joining the Common 
Market. In 1981 the seven Eastern Caribbean island nations — 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Christopher and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines — established an associate entity, the Organisation of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), which replaced the West In- 
dies States Association (WIS A) as the islands' major administra- 
tive body. The OECS coordinates development strategies among 
the member nations and provides for cooperation in economic, for- 
eign policy, and defense matters. The OECS was created after 
studies indicated that most of the benefits derived from integra- 
tion were flowing to the larger nations of Caricom (especially Jamai- 
ca and Trinidad and Tobago) at the expense of the smaller nations. 

Institutional Structure 

The institutional structure of Caricom consists of the Heads of 
Government Conference, Common Market Council of Ministers, 
Caribbean Community Secretariat, and other special bodies (see 
fig. A, this Appendix). Unlike in the EEC, these bodies are not 
supranational; each member has a right of veto and thus retains 
much of its national sovereignty. Decision making in Caricom, 
although centralized at some levels, is quite decentralized at others. 

The Heads of Government Conference is the supreme decision- 
making body. Each member state has one vote, and a unanimous 



329 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



STANDING COMMITTEES 
OF MINISTERS 



AGRICULTURE 
EDUCATION 
ENERGY 
FINANCE* 

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
DEFENSE POLICY 

HEALTH 

INDUSTRY 

LABOR 

LEGAL AFFAIRS 

MINES AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

TOURISM 

TRANSPORT 



HEADS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
CONFERENCE 



COMMON MARKET 
COUNCIL 
OF MINISTERS 



CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY 
SECRETARIAT 



JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUPS AND 
INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATE INSTITUTIONS 



CARIBBEAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 

CARIBBEAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL 

CARIBBEAN FOOD CORPORATION 

CARIBBEAN MARKETING ENTERPRISE 

CARIBBEAN METEOROLOGICAL ORGANISATION 

CARIBBEAN TOURISM RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT CENTRE 

CARIBBEAN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM 

COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 

DISASTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE AGENCY 

REGIONAL SHIPPING COUNCIL 

UNIVERSITY OF GUYANA 

UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES 



In consultation with members' central banks and monetary authorities. 



INDICATES FLOW OF AUTHORITY 

INDICATES CONSULTATION AND TWO-WAY FLOW OF INFORMATION 
INDICATES RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSOCIATE INSTITUTION 



Source: Based on information from Sidney E. Chernick, The Commonwealth Carribean: The 
Integration Experience. Baltimore, 1978, 1 1 ; and South America, Central America, and the 
Caribbean, 1993, London, 1992, 668-69. 



Figure A. Organization of the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(Caricom), 1992 

vote is required to legislate decisions or to make policy recommen- 
dations. The conference determines the policies to be pursued by 
Caricom 's related institutions. This conference also is responsible 
for concluding all treaties, making financial disbursements, and 
maintaining relations with other international organizations. 

The Common Market Council of Ministers is the second principal 
body of Caricom and the principal body of the regional Common 
Market. The Common Market Council consists of one ministerial 



330 



Appendix C 



representative from each nation. Decisions are also made by unani- 
mous vote, with minor exceptions. This council resolves problems 
and makes proposals to the Heads of Government Conference to 
achieve efficient development and operation of the regional com- 
mon market. 

The Caribbean Community Secretariat is Caricom's principal 
administrative component. The Secretariat operates to serve the 
interests of the region rather than those of each government. 
Although the Secretariat has no decision-making power, its dis- 
cussions, studies, and projects have made it a dynamic element 
in the integration process. 

Other offices responsible for specific sectoral aspects of regional 
integration are the thirteen Standing Committees of Ministers 
(health, education, labor, foreign affairs and defense policy, finance, 
agriculture, mines and natural resources, industry, transport, legal 
affairs, energy, science and technology, and tourism). In addition, 
independent associate institutions include the Caribbean Agricul- 
tural Research and Development Institute, the Caribbean Develop- 
ment Bank (CDB), the Caribbean Examinations Council, the 
Caribbean Tourism Research and Development Centre, the Coun- 
cil of Legal Education, the University of Guyana, the UWI, the 
Disaster Emergency Response Agency, the Caribbean Meteoro- 
logical Organisation, the Caribbean Food Corporation, the Agricul- 
tural Research and Development Institute, the Regional Shipping 
Council, the Caribbean Trade Information System, and the Carib- 
bean Marketing Enterprise. Finally, the Joint Consultative Group, 
comprising business, consumer, and trade groups, meets to review 
the integration process and ensure interest group participation in 
Caricom activities. 

Market Integration Mechanisms 

Caricom seeks to achieve economic integration through market 
forces. The Common Market was established to promote in- 
traregional trade through: trade liberalization by removing duties, 
licensing arrangements, quotas, and other tariff and nontariff bar- 
riers to trade; Rules of Origin; a Common External Tariff (CET) 
and a Common Protective Policy (CPP); and trade arrangements 
such as the Agricultural Marketing Protocol and the Oils and Fats 
Agreement. 

The Common Market contains a number of important mecha- 
nisms for liberalizing trade. These include eliminating extraregional 
export duties, removing quantitative restrictions on regional ex- 
ports, permitting free transit for products of member nations, and 



331 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

eliminating quantitative restrictions on imported goods. Article 28 
of the Treaty of Chaguaramas permits the application of quantita- 
tive restrictions if the nation has severe balance of payments 
problems. At the 1987 annual conference, Caricom agreed to abol- 
ish all obstacles to trade by October 1988. Seventeen products, 
however, were allowed an additional three years of protection with 
all tariffs on them to be removed by 1991. 

The Rules of Origin establish the conditions of eligibility of 
regional products so that they may be considered of Common Mar- 
ket origin and thus qualified for preferential treatment. In 1986 
a new set of Rules of Origin was adopted to increase the use of 
regional products and promote employment, investment, and sav- 
ings of foreign exchange. 

The Treaty of Chaguaramas mandates gradually implementing 
a CET and CPP. The CET stimulates local production by imposing 
low tariffs on capital goods and industrial raw materials and higher 
tariffs on value-added (finished) products. The CPP standardizes 
quantitative restrictions to protect specific regional industrial sec- 
tors. Together, the CET and CPP, coupled with intraregional trade 
liberalization, were expected to stimulate reciprocal investment and 
trade among member countries. 

The final market integration mechanism aims at providing 
guaranteed markets and prices for Caricom exports to overcome 
the volatile trade in primary commodities. The Agricultural Mar- 
keting Protocol and the Oils and Fats Agreement regulate in- 
traregional trade via certain buy-and-sell accords at fixed prices 
resulting from shortages or surpluses within Caricom. Caricom also 
has a Guaranteed Market Scheme whereby in certain circumstances 
Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago will purchase fixed 
quantities of agroproducts from the other member nations. 

Mechanisms of Cooperation in Marketing and 
Production 

Joint regional action in production and marketing activities is 
viewed by Caricom as a means of coordinating and controlling each 
member nation's output to avoid injury to other members or to 
the entire region. Coordinating policies is also intended to encourage 
specialization and complementary production. One important 
mechanism in this regard is regional industrial programming aimed 
at promoting specialization and economic diversification and avoid- 
ing duplication of investment. Although industrial programming 
was first considered in 1973, concrete actions did not begin until 
1985. In 1988 members agreed to fully implement the Industrial 



332 



Appendix C 



Programming Scheme by 1993, but progress toward realizing the 
plan was slow. The most-cited example of industrial cooperation 
and integration was a regional alumina refinery that was to use 
bauxite from Jamaica and Guyana and oil from Trinidad and 
Tobago. Although the project was thoroughly discussed during the 
1970s, it remained doubtful in 1992 that such a project would ever 
be realized. In addition, there were agricultural programs that 
represented joint efforts to provide extension, marketing, and 
research and development services to reduce unit costs, increase 
quality and yield, and slash imports of basic foodstuffs. 

The Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy is the main instru- 
ment for Caricom's agricultural development, and it establishes 
a framework and identifies priorities for a regional approach to 
agricultural self-sufficiency. The Caribbean Food Corporation, 
founded in 1976, is the main mechanism for planning and im- 
plementing the strategy's objectives. Also, a Food and Nutrition 
Institute was established at the UWI in Mona, Kingston, Jamaica. 

Transportation is indispensable for effective trade, export pro- 
motion, and other integration objectives. Cooperation in maritime 
transportation was envisioned through the West Indies Ship- 
ping Corporation (WISCO), which was established in 1961 and 
restructured in 1975. WISCO theoretically provides services to all 
Caricom nations. In early 1987, however, Belize, Dominica, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines withdrew from WISCO, claim- 
ing they had received few benefits from the service. WISCO went 
bankrupt in 1992 and was replaced by the Regional Shipping Coun- 
cil. In 1992 air transportation remained inadequate because of the 
lack of coordination among the existing airlines. Standardizing air 
transport by coordinating and planning routes and fares, as well 
as mergers, was necessary to improve service and reduce costs. A 
proposal was made in 1991 to restructure and coordinate regional 
air service. 

Tourism is important to the region, providing foreign exchange, 
increasing employment, encouraging the production of tourist- 
oriented products and services, and stimulating the construction 
of basic infrastructure. Some regional cooperation in tourism has 
been carried out by the Caribbean Tourism Association, the Carib- 
bean Tourism Research and Development Centre (located in Bar- 
bados), and at the UWI Hotel Training School in the Bahamas. 
Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, further cooperation was needed 
to link the tourism sector to the rest of the economy and to estab- 
lish regional tourism enterprises. 



333 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

Mechanisms of Financial Cooperation 

Financial cooperation is intended to fulfill the objectives of eco- 
nomic integration by facilitating payments for intraregional trade 
and by mobilizing investment funds to productive sectors of the econ- 
omy. The principal vehicle for financial cooperation is Caricom's 
Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF), established in 1977 by the 
central banks and other financial entities of Caricom's members. 
The facility's objectives are to reduce the use of foreign exchange 
and expedite intraregional payments through credit and other finan- 
cial arrangements. Other related mechanisms include harmo- 
nizing exchange rates by pegging the six existing currencies to the 
United States dollar and by issuing regional traveler's checks through 
the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. Finally, the CDB con- 
tributes to the equitable development of the region by providing low- 
interest loans for projects and related integration plans. 

Functional Cooperation 

The Treaty of Chaguaramas also envisioned coordinating efforts 
in many noneconomic areas. The Caricom structure has formal- 
ized and expanded this type of cooperation to include meteorolog- 
ical services and hurricane insurance; health and nutrition services; 
technical assistance; public utilities; education and job training; 
broadcasting, printed media, and information; culture and lan- 
guage; social security, labor, and industrial relations; science and 
technology; and harmonizing the laws and legal systems within Car- 
icom. This cooperation has been successful in improving services 
to the member nations (especially the smaller ones) and lowering 
costs of activities through joint ventures. The regional university 
and health and nutrition systems are examples of successful func- 
tional cooperation. 

Coordination of Defense and Foreign Policies 

The Heads of Government Conference and the Standing Com- 
mittee of Foreign Ministers of Caricom are responsible for coor- 
dinating the defense and foreign policies of member nations to 
increase their international bargaining power. Caricom has been 
able to present a regional foreign policy position in defense of the 
principles of regional security and nonintervention, support of the 
territorial integrity of Guyana and Belize in their border disputes; 
and various negotiations for the Lome Convention (see Glossary), 
by which many less developed nations have gained preferential ac- 
cess to EEC markets and economic assistance. The Lome Con- 
vention is updated every five years. 



334 



Appendix C 



Caricom: A Brief Evaluation of the Integration Effort 

One method of evaluating Caricom 's integration efforts is to look 
at three of its principal goals: defense and foreign policy coordina- 
tion, functional cooperation, and economic and trade cooperation. 
In 1992 some positive results had been achieved in defense and 
foreign policy coordination. Caribbean expressions of solidarity on 
issues of regional security and territorial integrity focused inter- 
national attention on the region and strengthened Caricom 's bar- 
gaining position in negotiations with regional and extraregional 
nations and in international forums. Ultimately, however, national 
concerns have always overshadowed regional interests. The ideo- 
logical pluralism of the region and the often drastic changes in 
government orientation have hurt the coordination process through 
bilateralism and polarization of interests. 



335 



Appendix D 



Caribbean Basin Initiative 

THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE (CBI), enacted by the 
United States Congress in 1982-83 and modified and expanded 
in 1990, represented one of the major United States foreign eco- 
nomic policies toward Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
1980s and 1990s. Mainly a trade promotion program, the initia- 
tive provided duty-free access to the United States market for about 
3,000 products; it expanded bilateral economic assistance; and it 
allowed some limited tax breaks for new United States investors 
in the region. A number of United States agencies contributed to 
the formulation and implementation of the policy. Whereas the CBI 
had improved the region's prosperity only slightly by 1992, it had 
served nonetheless as a catalyst toward economic diversification 
in a number of Caribbean Basin countries. 

The Reagan Administration's Proposal and 
Congressional Amendments 

On February 24, 1982, in a speech before the Organization of 
American States, President Ronald Reagan unveiled a new proposal 
for the economic recovery of Central America and the Caribbean. 
The Reagan plan expanded duty-free entry of Caribbean Basin 
exports for up to twelve years and increased economic assistance 
and tax incentives for new United States investment in the region. 
The administration's proposal arose in the political context of a 
successful revolution in Nicaragua, active insurgencies in El Sal- 
vador and Guatemala, and leftist coups in Grenada and Suriname. 
Dramatic political change, coupled with an international economic 
crisis characterized by high oil prices, unprecedented interest rates, 
and declining commodity prices, rekindled the interest of United 
States policy makers in the region. 

In September 1982, the 97th Congress passed the foreign aid por- 
tion of the president's plan in the form of Public Law 97-257, after 
scaling back some portions of the proposal, most notably the amount 
of aid earmarked for El Salvador. Even with congressional amend- 
ments, the overwhelming share of the US$350 million in supple- 
mental assistance under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery 
Act, the bill's official name, went toward the most strategically 



337 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

important nations in the region: El Salvador, Costa Rica, Jamaica, 
the Dominican Republic, and Honduras. Impoverished Haiti, for 
example, received only US$10 million in supplementary aid. As 
a result of opposition from domestic labor and industrial interests, 
the 98th Congress did not pass the trade provisions of the act (as 
Public Law 98-67) until July 1983. The bill's final version, however, 
excluded the following items from duty-free coverage: petroleum 
and petroleum products, sugar, canned tuna, luggage, handbags, 
certain other leather goods, flat goods, rubber and plastic gloves, 
footwear, textiles and apparel subject to the Multi-fibre Arrange- 
ment, and watches or watch parts manufactured in communist 
countries. Critics of the initiative argued that with or without these 
exclusions, it represented more a political policy than a develop- 
mental one because new duty-free provisions would provide only 
limited economic benefits. Congressional sentiment ran against the 
investment tax exemptions originally included in the bill, and these 
measures were never approved. Some tax breaks were extended, 
however, to companies holding business meetings in certain 
countries. 

Section 212 of the act provided the president with the authority 
to designate beneficiary countries. To qualify, countries had to have 
a noncommunist government, had to meet specific requirements 
concerning the expropriation of United States property, had to 
cooperate in regional antinarcotics efforts, had to recognize arbitral 
awards to United States citizens, could not provide preferential 
treatment to the products of developing countries in such a man- 
ner as to adversely affect United States trade, had to abstain from 
the illegal broadcast of United States-copyrighted material, and had 
to maintain an extradition treaty with the United States. In addi- 
tion, the act authorized the president to consider eleven discretion- 
ary criteria to qualify potential beneficiaries. These included such 
considerations as the use of subsidies, acceptance of the rules of 
international trade, and guarantees of workers' rights. President 
Reagan initially announced twenty-one beneficiary nations or ter- 
ritories from the Caribbean, Central America, and the northern 
coast of South America. Countries excluded from the list included 
Cuba, Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, Anguilla, the Cayman Is- 
lands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, none of which applied 
for designation. The Bahamas became a beneficiary nation in 
March 1985; Aruba became one in January 1986 and Guyana, 
in November 1988. In March 1988, President Reagan suspended 
Panama's eligibility because of reported links between that coun- 
try's government and international narcotics traffickers. Panama's 



338 



Appendix D 



suspension was lifted in 1990 after the United States intervention. 
The 1991 United States embargo against Haiti after that nation's 
coup effectively curtailed the CBI's program for Haitian exports 
(see table C, this Appendix). 



Table C. Potential Beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 1992 



/\nguiiid 


nam 


Antimia o n ri rs a T-rn 1 r\ q 
.zYIllJ.gU.Ct dllU Udl UUUd 


T-T nnrsic 
JT1.UI1LI.LII di> 


A riinct 
AI UUd 


1 dllldlLd 


Bahamas 


Montserrat 


Barbados 


Netherlands Antilles 


Belize 


Nicaragua 


British Virgin Islands 


Panama 


Cayman Islands 


Saint Christopher and Nevis 


Costa Rica 


Saint Lucia 


Dominica 


Saint Vincent and the 


Dominican Republic 


Grenadines 


El Salvador 


Suriname 


Grenada 


Trinidad and Tobago 


Guatemala 


Turks and Caicos Islands 


Guyana 


United States Virgin Islands 



Source: Based on information from United States, International Trade Commission, An- 
nual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act on U. S. Industries 
and Consumers: First Report, 1984-85, Washington, September 1986, 1-8. 



The CBI legislation also encompassed other important provi- 
sions. Section 213 stipulated the basic product eligibility rule that 
at least 35 percent of the value-added of the imported product had 
to originate in a beneficiary country for that country to qualify for 
duty-free treatment. This section also empowered the president to 
with-draw duty-free treatment in case of injury to domestic indus- 
tries resulting from CBI imports. As a result of complaints from 
Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands that the CBI ex- 
tended benefits previously reserved for United States overseas ter- 
ritories, section 214 set forth special benefits under the law. These 
included an increase in beneficiary country content for product 
eligibility of up to 70 percent, as well as other more technical ex- 
emptions. Section 221 also transferred all rum tax proceeds to the 
treasuries of the two United States possessions. Puerto Rico also 
benefited from the twin plant plan (see Glossary) which encouraged 



339 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

United States investors to operate complementary factories in Puerto 
Rico and in other beneficiary countries. This framework enabled 
investors to tap funds accumulated under section 936 of the United 
States Internal Revenue Service Code, known as 936 funds (see 
Glossary), in order to develop complementary operations if the 
recipient country had signed a Tax Information Exchange Agree- 
ment (TIEA) with the United States. Finally, section 222 permit- 
ted tax deductions for business conventions in the region if the 
country had signed a TIEA. 

The CBI Network 

The United States Department of State played a central role in 
designing and implementing the initiative, but many other execu- 
tive-branch agencies contributed extensively to the policy. The United 
States Agency for International Development (AID) administered 
most economic assistance flows, concentrating its efforts on the pri- 
vate sector. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the 
Peace Corps, the Department of Transportation, the Export-Import 
Bank, and the Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury 
all enhanced and complemented AID's endeavors. The Depart- 
ment of Commerce, through its Caribbean Basin Information 
Center and its normal regional offices, provided information pack- 
ages, investment climate statements, economic trend reports, spe- 
cial product advice, investment missions, a monthly networking 
newsletter, and other information and services for potential inves- 
tors. The Department of Agriculture similarly promoted the CBI 
through frequent agribusiness-marketing workshops and techni- 
cal assistance missions, and by supplying important regulatory in- 
formation on United States import standards. The International 
Trade Commission and the Department of Labor took part by is- 
suing in-depth annual reports on the progress of the CBI and its 
impact on the United States. The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative oversaw bilateral investment and textile agreements; 
and, beginning in 1987, that office hired an ombudsman to direct 
the CBI Operations Committee, an interagency task force dedi- 
cated to the policy's success. Finally, public and private monies 
helped to create a strong private business and advocacy network 
to further the aims of the CBI. 

The United States government also generated a certain amount 
of multilateral and bilateral support for the initiative. Mexico, 
Venezuela, Colombia, and the European Economic Community 
supported the CBI in a limited way, mainly through the extension 
of existing programs. Japan increased its aid to the region, as did 
Canada; on February 17, 1986, the Canadian government offered 



340 



Appendix D 



its own import preference program for the region, a package it 
dubbed Caribcan. Multilateral such as the Inter- American De- 
velopment Bank, the World Bank (see Glossary), and the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (see Glossary) also cooperated with the 
initiative through a variety of programs, particularly policy reform 
efforts coordinated with AID. 

Expansion of CBI Benefits and Programs 

Visiting the island of Grenada on February 20, 1986, President 
Reagan announced increased access to the United States market 
for apparel assembled in the Caribbean Basin in an effort to en- 
large the impact of the CBI. Guaranteed access levels for CBI 
beneficiary countries were provided through import quota negoti- 
ations based on previous exports and expected growth under the 
Tarriff Schedule 807 program (see Glossary). The proposal was 
the direct result of regional discontent with the limited benefits of 
the initiative and the expressed fears of regional leaders with regard 
to mounting protectionist sentiment in the United States. A group 
of leaders of the English-speaking Caribbean had expressed their 
dissatisfaction through a detailed letter to President Reagan in late 
1985. Regional leaders generally welcomed the small improvement 
made through the 807 program because of the extraordinary growth 
in textile production since the inauguration of the CBI. 

After a series of regional and Washington-based hearings, in 1987 
members of Congress introduced legislation to improve further the 
benefits of the initiative. By mid- 1989, a number of proposals had 
been combined under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery 
Expansion Act of 1989 (H.R. 1233), which became law on Au- 
gust 20, 1990. Stating that "the existing program has not fully 
achieved the positive results that were intended," the Expansion 
Act, dubbed CBI II, proposed an indefinite time extension for duty- 
free entry of CBI-covered products (previously scheduled to 
expire September 30, 1995) and the addition of several specific gar- 
ments and fabrics to be provided reduced or exempted duties. It 
also guaranteed market access for textiles and footwear via bilateral 
agreements with all beneficiary nations; potential increases for 
beneficiary countries in their sugar quotas, through reallocations 
from other countries that did not reach their allotted share; increased 
duty-free allowances for United States tourists visiting the region; 
more flexible criteria for ethanol imports; increased postsecondary 
scholarships for study in the United States; greater promotion of 
tourist development; and the trial establishment of preinspection 
customs facilities to expedite exports. CBI II also sought special 
measures to enable the Eastern Caribbean and Belize to reap greater 



341 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

benefits from the program, as well as the application of new rules 
of origin for determining the content of duty-free imports, the em- 
ployment of internationally recognized workers' rights criteria in 
evaluating the compliance of beneficiary countries, and a require- 
ment that the president report to Congress every three years on 
the progress of the initiative. 

An Assessment of Progress 

One of the major aims of the plan was to increase economic as- 
sistance in order to foster sustained economic growth through stimu- 
lation of the private sector and the expansion of exports. Beneficiary 
nations sought increased aid to cushion the impact of the reces- 
sion of the early 1980s and to provide support during the difficult 
economic adjustment period of the mid-1980s. The US$350 mil- 
lion in assistance to the region, provided under the auspices of the 
CBI as a supplement to annual allocations, contributed to a dra- 
matic increase in United States assistance to Central America and 
the Caribbean, from US$300 million in 1981 to nearly US$1 .5 bil- 
lion in 1985. A large portion of this assistance, however, was moti- 
vated by United States strategic concerns rather than developmental 
ones. For example, El Salvador, engaged in a war against leftist 
insurgents, received nearly one-third of all assistance throughout 
this period. Similarly, some strategic countries received allocations 
in excess of their absorptive capacities while other countries pur- 
sued additional United States support. Increased assistance gave 
the United States significant leverage in encouraging recipient coun- 
tries to reform their economic policies in such areas as exchange 
rates, the promotion of increased and diversified exports, the ex- 
pansion of light manufacturing, reductions in import controls, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, the balancing of fiscal ac- 
counts, promotion of small business development, and the upgrad- 
ing of infrastructure. Evidence of the impact of these reforms 
continued to be inconclusive at the close of the decade, but several 
countries had begun to open and to diversify their economies, there- 
by setting the stage, it was hoped, for sustained future growth. 

The promotion of increased foreign investment, although not 
part of the final CBI legislation, continued to be one of the overall 
goals of the initiative. In 1988 the United States Department of 
Commerce surveyed Caribbean investment trends in a compre- 
hensive manner, after a previously unsuccessful attempt to quan- 
tify CBI-related ventures in 1986. The 1988 survey revealed that 
significant new investment had taken place in the region during 
the 1984-88 period, despite the lack of tax credits for United States 
companies. The 642 United States companies participating in the 



342 



Appendix D 



study accounted for US$1 .6 billion in new investment in CBI coun- 
tries (excluding Panama) and for 116,000 new jobs. Only 150 of 
these firms (23 percent), however, exported CBI-eligible products; 
therefore, the CBI was directly related to the creation of only 15 
percent of the new jobs. Furthermore, the new investment was 
highly concentrated; five countries accounted for 67 percent of all 
new investment. By 1988 the Dominican Republic had surpassed 
Jamaica as the prime investment location, and it received one-fifth 
of all the Caribbean Basin's new investment because of the vibrant 
growth of its industrial free zones. By contrast, Haiti suffered dis- 
investment because of political unrest, high nonwage costs, and 
increased regional competition for investment in labor-intensive 
industry. More than half of all foreign investment was from the 
United States, followed by the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
Canada, and Hong Kong. Although new CBI-related and other 
foreign investment helped the balance of payments positions of 
several countries and provided badly needed jobs in manufactur- 
ing and tourism, foreign exchange remained scarce in early 1992 
and unemployment continued to hover at dangerously high levels 
in most countries. 

The centerpiece of the initiative, however, was neither aid nor 
investment, but one-way duty-free trade with the United States. 
An assessment of CBI trade data demonstrated both negative and 
positive trends. On the negative side, the value of total Caribbean 
Basin exports generally declined throughout the 1980s because of 
dwindling prices for the region's traditional exports, such as petro- 
leum, sugar, and bauxite. Except in the case of sugar, this poor 
performance was attributable almost solely to the vagaries of 
primary product prices. United States policy clearly damaged sugar 
exports, however, through the reimposition of sugar quotas in 1981 
and through the 75 percent reduction in Caribbean and Central 
America quotas from 1981 to 1987, a trend that offset export growth 
among CBI-exempted products. Not only did the region's total ex- 
ports drop by US$1.8 billion from 1984 to 1990, but its share of 
the United States market weakened, dropping from 6.5 percent 
of United States imports in 1980 to 1.6 percent by 1987. As was 
true of investment, only a small percentage (less than 20 percent) 
of the growth in nontraditional exports resulted from duty-free entry 
extended through the CBI. Furthermore, only ten items accounted 
for the great majority of products that entered the United States 
market duty-free. Moreover, exports, like investments, were con- 
centrated; only a handful of countries generated the overwhelm- 
ing share of CBI 806.3 and 807 exports, while some countries 
suffered substantial declines in exports. Overall, despite import 



343 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

exemptions in the United States market, the United States ran a 
trade surplus with the region from 1987 to 1989. After years of 
pursuing the goal of "trade, not aid," United States policy through 
the CBI continued to provide fewer economic benefits from trade 
than from aid. 

Despite some negative trends, Caribbean Basin countries ex- 
perienced substantial growth in nontraditional exports during the 
1980s. For example, although the area's total exports lagged be- 
hind other regions, growth in manufactures and other nontradi- 
tional exports far surpassed that of other regions. In fact, some 
Caribbean Basin countries outperformed even the newly industri- 
alized countries of Asia. The composition of trade shifted markedly 
away from agricultural commodities and raw materials in favor 
of nontraditional exports, textiles, and apparel. In 1983 the region's 
exports broke down as being 78 percent traditional commodities, 
17 percent nontraditional ones, and 4 percent textiles and apparel; 
by 1988, however, traditional exports represented only 37 percent 
of total exports, compared with 44 percent for nontraditionals, and 
19 percent for textiles and apparel. This shift was particularly true 
of United States imports covered under the 807 provisions; the value 
of these imports more than doubled from 1983 to 1988. Judging 
by these statistics, it appeared that although the CBI directly stimu- 
lated only limited export growth, its emphasis on nontraditional 
exports contributed to the restructuring of much of the region's 
external trade. Such restructuring was especially found among 
Caribbean countries because of the larger share of depressed 
primary products in their export baskets relative to those of Cen- 
tral America. 

After an initial lag period, CBI trade statistics improved markedly 
in 1988, and observers expected continued growth in trade and 
investment. Although many of the structural obstacles to develop- 
ment in the region continued, the broadening of the productive 
and export base improved long-term prospects for economic growth. 



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for More Reliable Data on Business Activity Resulting from the Initia- 
tive. (No. GAO/NSIAD-86-201BR.) Washington: GPO, 1986. 

. White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Fact Sheets on 

the Initiative in President Reagan 's Speech at Queens Park, St. George's, 
Grenada. Washington: February 20, 1986. 



368 



Bibliography 



Van Grasstek, Craig. "The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Update," 

Policy Focus, No. 3, 1985. 
World Bank. The Caribbean: Export Preferences and Performance. 

Washington: 1988. 
Wylie, Scott. "CBI: One Year Later," Business America, January 

7, 1985, 2-4. 

Zegaris, Bruce. "The Caribbean Basin Initiative," Tax Notes, 28, 
August 26, 1985, 1021-25. 



369 



Glossary 



Belizean dollar (Bz$) — Belizean monetary unit, divided into 100 
cents. The official fixed exchange rate of US$1 = Bz$2 was es- 
tablished in 1976 and remained in effect in 1991. 

cay — In Belize a low island or reef of sand or coral. The customary 
spelling in the United States, key, is not used in Belize. 

Creole — In Belize a term used for an English-speaking person of 
African or mixed African and European ancestry. 

crown colony — A system of British colonial administration under 
which Britain retained control over defense, foreign affairs, in- 
ternal security, and various administrative and budget matters. 
Crown colonies were governed internally by a British-appointed 
governor and a locally elected assembly. Prior to the Morant 
Bay Rebellion in Jamaica in 1865, crown colony government 
was limited to Trinidad and St. Lucia. In 1871 in Belize and 
in 1928 in Guyana, the representative assemblies were dissolved, 
and the colonies were governed directly by the Colonial Office 
in London and by a British-appointed governor who was as- 
sisted by a local council, most of whose members were appoin- 
ted by the governor. In time, however, an increasing number 
of officials were locally elected rather than appointed. Follow- 
ing the report of the Moyne Commission in 1938, the crown 
colony system was modified to make local councils even more 
representative and to give local officials more administrative 
responsibility. Nevertheless, defense, foreign affairs, and inter- 
nal security remained the prerogatives of the crown. 

Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) — A plan announced 
by President George H.W. Bush on June 27, 1990, calling 
for the United States to negotiate agreements with selected 
Latin American countries to reduce their official debt to the 
United States and make funds available through this restruc- 
turing for environmental programs; to stimulate private invest- 
ment; and to take steps to promote extensive trade liberalization 
with the goal of establishing free trade throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. 

fiscal year (FY) — Guyana's fiscal year is the calendar year. Belize's 
fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31. 

Garifuna — An ethnic group descended from the Carib of the 
Eastern Caribbean and from Africans who had escaped from 
slavery. The Garifuna resisted the British and the French in 
the Windward Islands until they were defeated by the British 



371 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

in 1796. After putting down a violent Garifuna rebellion on 
Saint Vincent, the British moved the Garifuna across the Carib- 
bean to the Bay Islands (present-day Islas de la Bahfa) in the 
Gulf of Honduras. From there they migrated to the Caribbe- 
an coasts of Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and southern 
British Honduras. Garifuna also refers to their language. 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — An inter- 
governmental agency related to the United Nations and head- 
quartered in Geneva, GATT was established in 1948 as a 
multilateral treaty with the aim of liberalizing and stabilizing 
world trade. GATT's fundamental principles include non- 
discriminatory trade among members, protection of domestic 
trade through the customs tariff, and agreement on tariff lev- 
els through negotiations among the contracting parties. The 
Uruguay Round of major multilateral trade negotiations, the 
eighth such round of negotiations, began at Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, in September 1986 and was still underway at the end 
of 1991. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A measure of the total value of 
goods and services produced by the domestic economy during 
a given period, usually one year. GDP is obtained by adding 
the value contributed by each sector of the economy in the form 
of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (con- 
sumption of capital). Only domestic production is included, 
not income arising from investments and possessions owned 
abroad, hence the use of the word domestic to distinguish GDP 
from gross national product (q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP) — The total market value of all final 
goods and services produced by an economy during a year. 
GNP is obtained by adding the gross domestic product (q. v. ) 
and the income received from abroad by residents less pay- 
ments remitted abroad to nonresidents. 

Guyanese dollar (G$) — Guyanese monetary unit, divided into 100 
cents. The Guyanese dollar was repeatedly devalued in the 
1980s, the official exchange rate dropping from US$1 = G$4.25 
in 1985 to US$1 =G$10 in 1987. In April 1989, the govern- 
ment changed the official exchange rate to US$1 = G$33. The 
unofficial (market) exchange rate at that time was reportedly 
US$1 =G$60. In February 1991, the exchange rate was de- 
valued further to align the official rate with the market rate, 
and the official exchange rate was adjusted weekly to keep this 
parity. As of June 1991, the official rate was US$1 =G$125. 

import-substitution industrialization — An economic development 
strategy that emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often 



372 



Glossary 



by import protection using tariff and nontariff measures. Propo- 
nents favor the export of industrial goods over primary 
products. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for 
stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The 
main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its mem- 
bers when they experience balance-of-payments difficulties. 
These loans often carry conditions that require substantial in- 
ternal economic adjustments by the recipients. 

Lesser Antilles — The easternmost islands of the West Indies (q. v.) 
extending from the Virgin Islands through Trinidad and in- 
cluding the small islands off the north coast of South America. 
Some of these islands are divided further into two subgroups: 
the Leeward Islands consisting of the northern part of the Lesser 
Antilles from the Virgin Islands through Dominica and includ- 
ing Anguilla, Saint Christopher (Saint Kitts), Nevis, Barbu- 
da, Antigua, and Guadeloupe; and the Windward Islands 
stretching from Martinique through Saint Lucia and Saint Vin- 
cent to Grenada. Trinidad, Tobago, Barbados, and the islands 
off the north coast of South America do not belong to either 
subgroup. The names Leeward and Windward refer to their 
sheltered (leeward) or exposed (windward) position relative to 
the prevailing northeasterly trade winds. 

Lome Convention — A series of agreements between the Europe- 
an Economic Community (EEC) and a group of African, Carib- 
bean, and Pacific (ACP) states, mainly former European 
colonies, providing duty-free or preferential access to the EEC 
market for almost all ACP exports. The Stabilization of Ex- 
port Earnings Scheme, a mechanism set up by the Lome Con- 
vention, provides compensation for ACP export earnings lost 
through fluctuations in the world prices of agricultural com- 
modities. The Lome Convention also provides for limited EEC 
development aid and investment funds to be disbursed to ACP 
recipients through the European Development Fund and the 
European Investment Bank. The Lome Convention is updated 
every five years. Lome I took effect on April 1, 1976; Lome 
II, on January 1, 1981; Lome III, on March 1, 1985; Lome 
IV, on March 1, 1990. 

Mestizo — In Belize a term used for a Spanish-speaking person of 
mixed European and Mayan ancestry. 

936 funds — Funds deposited by United States-based corporations 
in the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico in order 



373 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 

to take advantage of Section 936 of the United States Internal 
Revenue Service Code, under which income derived from 
sources in Puerto Rico is exempted from United States income 
taxes. The funds may be used to help finance twin-plant (q. v. ) 
ventures with countries that have signed a bilateral tax infor- 
mation exchange agreement with the United States. 

Rastafarian(ism) — An Afro-Christian revivalist cult formed in 
Jamaica in the early 1920s. The so-called Rastafarian Brethren 
emphasized rejection of both Jamaican and European culture 
in favor of eventual repatriation to Africa. Identifying Africa 
with Ethiopia, Rastafarians viewed then Emperor Haile Selassie 
of Ethiopia as God incarnate. As hope of returning to Africa 
dwindled, Rastafarianism became more of a religious than a 
political movement. Rastafarians developed a system of beliefs 
compatible with their poverty and aloofness from society and 
similar to mystical experiences found in other protest religions. 
Rastas (as they are known in common parlance) have come 
to symbolize the movement away from white domination and 
toward a heightened black identity and pride. Rasta thought, 
reggae music, dance, and literature have been popularized 
throughout West Indian culture. 

special drawing rights (SDRs) — Monetary unit of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (q. v. ) based on a basket of internation- 
al currencies consisting of the United States dollar, the Ger- 
man deutsche mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound 
sterling, and the French franc. 

Sunni (from sunna, meaning "custom," in Arabic, giving conno- 
tation of orthodoxy in theory and practice) — A member of the 
larger of the great divisions of Islam. 

Tariff Schedule 807 program — Refers to items 806.3 and 807 of 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States that allow the duty- 
free entry of goods whose final product contains a certain por- 
tion of raw material or labor value added in the Caribbean 
Basin. 

twin plant — Productive arrangements whereby two or more 
producers in separate countries complementarily share the 
production of a good or service. Under the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), such arrangements with the government of 
Puerto Rico potentially benefited from special investment or 
936 funds (q.v.). The operations of twin plant ventures typi- 
cally entailed the delegation of assembly or other labor-intensive 
production stages to plants in a CBI-designated country, from 
which these semi-finished products would then be shipped duty- 
free to Puerto Rico for final processing. 



374 



Glossary 



West Indies — Term for islands in or bordering the Caribbean Sea, 
including the small islands off the north coast of South America 
and the Bahama Islands. The West Indies are commonly divid- 
ed into three groups: the Bahamas, which include the Com- 
monwealth of the Bahamas and the British crown colony (q. v. ) 
of the Turks and Caicos; the Greater Antilles, which consist 
of the four largest islands of Cuba, Hispaniola (the Domini- 
can Republic and Haiti), Jamaica, and Puerto Rico; and the 
Lesser Antilles {q. v. ), which consist of the smaller easternmost 
islands stretching from the Virgin Islands through Trinidad 
and the small islands off the coast of South America. 

World Bank — The informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the 
primary purpose of providing loans at market-related rates of 
interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of de- 
velopment. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but ad- 
ministered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much eas- 
ier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, 
founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD 
through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage 
the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed 
countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private for- 
eign investment in developing countries against various non- 
commercial risks. The president and certain officers of the 
IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institu- 
tions are owned by the governments of the countries that sub- 
scribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, 
member states must first belong to the International Mone- 
tary Fund (q.v.). 



375 



Index 



Acarai Mountains, 33 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
(AIDS) 

Belize: 218, 219 

Guyana: 60-61; among prisoners, 
145 

Act for the Abolition of Slavery Through- 
out the British Colonies (1833), 69 
administration: employment in, 82 
Adult Education Association, 58 
Africans: as slaves, 40; stereotypes of, 44 
African slave descendants, 171, 208 
Afro-Guyanese culture, 14, 31; education 
in, 58; effect of slavery on, 44; family 
patterns in, 44-46; marriage in, 46; in 
military, 133, 136; religion in, 47, 50; 
weddings in, 46; women in, 46 
Afro-Guyanese people, 3, 40-41; aban- 
donment of People's Progressive Party 
by, 20; acculturation of, 43; British 
values of, 44; conflicts of, with Indo- 
Guyanese, 3, 70; cooperation of, with 
other ethnic groups, 12; in elite class, 
13; farming by, 70; gangs of, 143; 
geographic distribution of, 43; in 
Guyana National Service, 140; in lower 
class, 42; in middle class, 12, 24; oc- 
cupations of, xviii, 14; in peasant class, 
9; as percentage of population, xx, 37; 
pressure from, for reform, 12; in profes- 
sional class, 41; reaction of, to Burn- 
ham, 24; religion of, 47; sense of 
superiority among, 40; social distribu- 
tion of, 43; social stratification among, 
17; suffrage for, 12; as teachers, 55; in 
urban areas, 38, 40 
Agreement on Apartheid in Sport, 323 
agricultural: diversification, 85, 239; 

laborers, 210, 275; production, 102 
Agricultural Marketing Protocol, 331, 
332 

agricultural products (see also under in- 
dividual crops) 

Belize: import of, 173; nontradi- 

tional, 239 
Guyana: 84; for export, 84, 97; 
processing of, 93 
Agricultural Research and Development 



Institute, 331 
agriculture 

Belize: 236-240; development of, 
172, 173; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 231 

Guyana: 84-88; employment in, 82, 
226; foreign firms in, 204; impor- 
tance of, 6; Indo-Guyanese em- 
ployed in, 70; in Mayan civiliza- 
tion, 158; military support for, 
136; as percentage of gross do- 
mestic product, 74; ridged-field, 
158; slash-and-burn, 158; subsi- 
stence, 70 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air service (Guyana), 96; foreign invest- 
ment encouraged in, 102 
Akawaio tribe, 42 

alcalde system, 264, 278; disruption of, 278 
Alcan. See Aluminum Company of 
Canada 

Altun Ha, 159, 161; excavation of, 161 
aluminum (see also bauxite), 89-91; prices, 

89; production, 89; reserves, 89 
Aluminum Company of Canada (Alcan), 

71, 91 
Amandala, 279 

Amazon Caribbean Guyana Limited, 102 
Amerindians, 31, 42; acculturation of, 42; 
attempts to enslave, 40; coastal, 42; fes- 
tivals of, 49; intermarriage by, 42; 
language of, 42; in militia, 292; as per- 
centage of population, xx, 37; popula- 
tion of, 6; rebellion by, 23-24, 125; 
religion of 42, 50; subjugation of, 157 
Amery, Leo, 176 

Ancient Usages and Customs of the Set- 
tlement, 164-65, 250 
Andean Pact, 328 

Anglican Church, 48; membership in, 48, 
201; missionaries of, 167; publications 
of, 280; role of, 51; schools of, 214 

Ankoko Island: seized by Venezuela, 23, 
145-46 

Anna Regina, 117 



377 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



anticolonial movement, 83 

Antigua and Barbuda, 128, 325, 328 

apan jhaat, 22 

Arabs, 198, 199; in elite class, 205 

Aranda, Theodore, 272, 274 

Arawak people, xvii, 3, 42; geographic 

distribution of, 4; killed by disease, 3; 

origins of, 4 
Arbenz, Jacobo, 181 
Arekuna tribe, 42 

Argentina: invasion of Falklands by, 126, 
128; investment from, 93 

Arias Davila, Pedro, 162 

armed forces. See Belize Defence Force; 
Guyana Defence Force 

army. See Belize Defence Force; Guyana 
Defence Force 

Aroaima, 90 

Arron, Henck, 147 

Arthur, George, 166 

Aryan Society. See Arya Samaj movement 

Arya Samaj movement, 49 

Asians: acculturation of, 43; descendants 
of, in population, xx, 37 

Association of Commonwealth Universi- 
ties, 324 

Atlantic Bank (Honduras), 245 

Atlantic Ocean, 34 

Ato, Bilal, 142-43 

attorney general, 116, 291 

Australia: in Commonwealth of Nations, 
321, 325; investment of, in mining, 89, 
92; petroleum exploration by, 103 

Avebury, Lord, 27, 139 



Bahais, 202 
Baking Pot, 159 
balance of payments 
Belize: 228, 231 

Guyana: 101; overall, 80; as percent- 
age of gross domestic product, 
101; shortfall in, 80, 101 
balance of trade, 81 
Balderamos, Arthur, 177 
Balfour Formula, 321 
Banana Control Board, 238 
Banana Growers' Association, 238 
Banana Protocol, 235, 238 
bananas, xxv, 238-39; attempts to culti- 
vate, 238; exports of, 229, 231, 245; 
production of, 229, 239 



Banco Serfm (Mexico), 245 

Bank for International Settlements, 81 

banking 

Belize: 244-45 

Guyana: 94-96; foreign investment 
encouraged in, 102 
Bank of Baroda, 94 
Bank of Guyana, 94, 96; foreign curren- 
cy held by, 78 
Bank of Nova Scotia, 94, 245 
banks, 94 

Baptist Church, 48; missionaries of, 167 
Barama River Carib tribe, 42 
Barbados, 128, 328; debt to, 99 
Barclays Bank, 94, 245 
barite, 192 
Barrow, Dean, 273 
Bartica, 117 
Basir, Isahak, 144 
bauxite (see also aluminum) 
Belize: 192 

Guyana: 38, 89-91, 97; calcined, 71, 
90; decline in demand for, 73; 
decline in exports of, 14; decline 
in production of, 67, 73, 74; 
demand for, 15; exports of, 74, 97, 
98, 99, 100, 129; foreign invest- 
ment in, 102; in Great Depres- 
sion, 14; location of, xix, 33; min- 
ing of, xviii, 70, 90; prices of, 72; 
processing, 75, 93; production, 
73, 74; reserves, 89 
bauxite industry: development of, 70; 
energy for, 93; foreign investment in, 
70; nationalization of, 124; privatiza- 
tion of, 80 
Baymen. See British settlers 
BDF. See Belize Defence Force 
Beacon, 279-80 
Beecham company, 93 
Belizario Camp, 298 
Belize: etymology of, 163; name change 

to, 181; national identity of, 210 
Belize Advisory Council, 257-58, 306; 

members of, 257-58; role of, 257 
Belize Agri-Business Company, 239 
Belizean citizenship, selling of, 267, 272, 
273 

Belizean Creole, 201 
Belizean Popular Party, 273 
Belize Billboard, 179, 180 
Belize City: Chinese in, 199; city council 
of, 263; courts in, 306; Creoles in, 200; 



378 



Index 



East Indians in, 199; elite in, 205; 
population in, 193, 225; port at, 243 

Belize City Council: dissolved, 180; elec- 
tions, 181 

Belize College of Agriculture, 214 

Belize College of Arts, Science, and Tech- 
nology, 212-13; established, 212; fund- 
ing for, 213 

Belize Constitutional Conference, 254; 
report issued by, 254 

Belize Defence Force (BDF), 262, 
296-301; active-duty elements, 296; air 
wing, 299; chain of command in, 298; 
chief of staff, 297; commander in chief 
of, 298; commander of, 297; deploy- 
ment of, 298; enlistment, 296; equip- 
ment of, 298-99; foreign service of, 
300; formed, 296; maritime arm, 
298-99; missions of, 291, 296, 298-99, 
302; organization of, 298-99; as per- 
cent of population, 297; personnel, 

296- 97; reserves, 299; salaries, 296; 
terms of service in, 297; troop strength 
of, 291, 296; training, 286, 296, 

297- 98; women in, 297 

Belize District, 193, 263; Arabs in, 199; 
Mestizos in, 200; percentage of popu- 
lation in, 193; population density in, 
194 

Belize Electricity Board, 241, 275 
Belize Estate and Produce Company, 173, 

180; in Great Depression, 175; labor 

conditions in, 176, 274; Maya displaced 

by, 176 
Belize Food Products, 237 
Belize General Development Workers' 

Union, 275 
Belize Information Service: publications 

of, 280 

Belize International Airport, 242, 243, 
299 

Belize Marketing Board, 240 
Belize Ministry of Health, 218 
Belize Ministry of Home Affairs, 304 
Belize Ministry of Social Services and 

Community Development, 263 
Belize Ministry of Tourism, 242 
Belize National Police, 303-5; commis- 
sioner of, 304; corruption in, 305; es- 
tablished, 303; mission, 303-4; number 
of, 304; recruitment, 303; role of, in 
drug eradication, 302; territorial divi- 
sion of, 304; training of, 304; uniforms, 



304-5; women in, 304 

Belize National Teachers' Union, 234 

Belize Organization for Women and De- 
velopment (Bowand), 278 

Belize Police Special Defence Force, 296 

Belize Popular Party, 267 

Belize River (Old River), 192; named, 
163 

Belize Rural Women's Association, 278 
Belize School of Nursing, 214 
Belize Sugar Board, 237 
Belize Sugar Industries Limited (BSIL), 
237 

Belize Teachers' College, 214 

Belize Technical College, 214 

Belize Telecommunications Limited, 243 

Belize Times, 279 

Belize Today, 289 

Belize Town, 171, 293; population of, 171 

Belize Town Board: elections for, 177-78 

Belize Volunteer Guard, 296 

Belmopan: population in, 225; sewer sys- 
tem in, 219; street vendors in, 196 

Benque Viejo del Carmen, 263 

Berbice: British takeover of, 8; occupied 
by Britain, 8; settled, 6 

Berbice River, 38, 96 

Betson, Clifford, 180 

Bhagwan, Moses, 144 

Big Creek port, 243 

Big Six currency traders, 76 

birth control, 36-37; use of, 37 

Bishop's High School, 54 

Black Friday, 13 

Black Muslims, 202 

Blood, Hillary, 252 

Booker company, 85-86 

Booker McConnell company, 71, 72 

border disputes 

Belize and Guatemala: 157, 181-84, 
226, 249, 334; as obstacle to inde- 
pendence, xxiv, 181, 294-95; ori- 
gins of, xxiv, 182 
Guyana and Suriname: 123, 147-48, 

334; military role in, 133 
Guyana and Venezuela: 10-11, 112, 
123, 145-47, 334; arbitration of, 
10-11, 125; commission on, 147; 
decision of, 11; military role in, 
xx, 133; resurgence of, 23, 125- 
26, 145, 146-47 

Bouterse, Desi, 127 

Bowand. See Belize Organization for 



379 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Women and Development 

Brazil: financial aid from, 127; invest- 
ment from, 102; investment of, in min- 
ing, 89, 92, 102; military assistance 
from, 127; relations with, 127 

Britain: aid from, 234, 286, 325; border 
disputes settled by, 125; control of Be- 
lize by, 182; dependence on, 173; in 
Donor Support Group, 100; economic 
ties of, with Belize, 226; education in, 
205, 217; emigration to, 38; exports to, 
94, 97, 98; French war with, 8; imports 
from, 227; influence of, on Belize, xxv, 
208, 286; investment from, 71, 92, 93, 
102; materiel from, 286; migration of 
Belizeans to, 195; military aid from, 
280, 302; military training in, 297, 298, 
300; negotiations of, with Guatemala, 
183, 282, 294-95; occupation of Dutch 
colonies by, 8; petroleum exploration 
by, 103; relations of, with Belize, 
285-86; relations of, with Guyana, 128; 
relations of, with Venezuela, 10; rivalry 
of, with Spain, 157, 163-64, 165, 292; 
settlers from, 69; trade with, 236; war 
of, with Netherlands, 8 

British Airways, 96 

British Colonial Office, 168 

British culture, 44; acculturation to, xvii, 
43, 168, 269; superiority of, 44 

British Guiana: as crown colony, 14 

British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU): 
founded, 13, 82, 121 

British Guiana Mining Company, 10 

British Guiana Police Force, 142 

British Honduras, 157; constitution of, 
172; established, 170, 172, 251 

British Honduras Company: as landown- 
er, 173 

British Honduras Constabulary, 303-4 
British Honduras Independent Labour 

Party, 178 
British Honduras Workers and Trades- 
men's Union, 274 
British immigrants, 7, 200 
British North American Act (1867), 321 
British rule 

Belize: 249-55; legacy of, 224-25; le- 
gal system under, 250; Mayan re- 
sistance to, 170 
Guyana: education under, 52; elec- 
tions under, 17; political parties 
under, 17-18; social organization 



under, 9; transition to, 7-9 

British settlers, xviii; arrival of, in Belize, 
xxiii, 157; dissipation of, 164; govern- 
ment of, xxiii, 164, 166; logging by, 
165; Spanish attacks on, xxiii, 164, 
165-66, 292, 293 

British settlements, 163; Mayan attacks 
on, 171 

British Telecom, 243 

British troops, 280, 285-86, 295; head- 
quarters of, 300; influence of, on Be- 
lizean economy, 229-30, 245, 286, 300; 
need for, 294; organization of, 291, 
300-301; origins of, 293; as protection 
against invasion by Guatemala, xxiv, 
282; withdrawal of, xxvi 

British West India Regiment, 293, 294 

British West Indies, 168 

Broken Hill Proprietary, 103 

Brown, C.H., 176 

BSIL. See Belize Sugar Industries Limited 
budget deficit, 80; reduced, 68 
Bulgaria: relations with, 129 
Burdon, John, 176 

Burma: withdrawal from Commonwealth 

of Nations, 322 
Burnaby, William, 164, 250 
Burnaby's Code, 164-65, 250 
Burnham, Linden Forbes, xviii, xix, 3, 
147; background of, 17; conflict of, with 
Jagan, 15-16, 18-19; consolidation of 
power by, xx, 25, 112, 113; death of, 
xxi, 27, 67; as minister of defense, 134; 
People's National Congress under, 119; 
as prime minister, 22-27, 111; racial 
conflict provoked by, 20; support for, 
20, 24 

Burnham administration {see also cooper- 
ative republic) (1964-85), 22-27; au- 
thoritarian policies of, 109; conflict of, 
with Guyana Council of Churches, 51- 
52; criticism of, xx, 51; economic poli- 
cies of, 22-23; economy under, 100; 
election fraud under, 24; House of Is- 
rael under, 50, 51; human rights abuses 
under, 143-44; leftist policies of, 24; 
opposition of, to intervention in Grena- 
da, 124, 128, schools controlled by, 51; 
view of People's Temple of Christ, 26; 
violence by, xx 

Burnham Agricultural Institute, 58 

Burrowes School of Art, 58 

Bush, George, 281 



380 



Index 



business community, 276; political role of, 
276 



cabinet (Belize): laws introduced by, 

260-61; members of, 257 
Cambridge Advanced examinations, 214 
Camp Oakley, 298 

Canada: assistance from, 81, 104, 325, 
340-41 ; in Commonwealth of Nations, 
321, 325; in Donor Support Group, 
100; education in, 217; emigration to, 
38, 195; exports to, 97, 98-99, 237; in- 
fluence of, on Belize, 208, 210; invest- 
ment from, 70, 92, 97, 102, 343; 
investment of, in mining, 89; military 
training in, 298, 300 

Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), 219 

Cane Farmers' Association, 236 

Canul, Marcos, 171 

capital goods, 99 

CARE, 212, 218, 279 

Caribbean Agricultural Research and De- 
velopment Institute, 331 

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery 
Act. See Caribbean Basin Initiative 

Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Ex- 
pansion Act (1989), 341 

Caribbean Basin Initiative, 85, 98, 104, 
124, 231, 235, 239, 281, 337-44; 
amendments to, 337; amount of as- 
sistance, 342; beneficiary countries, 
338; criticisms of, 338; expansion of 
benefits and programs, 341; exports in, 
343-44; goals of, 342; impact of, 342; 
imports in, 344; motivations for, 342; 
multilateral support, 340; network, 
340-1; Operations Committee, 340; 
proposal for, 337; provisions of, 337; 
requirements for assistance, 338; 
sources of investment, 342; special 
benefits under, 339; targets of as- 
sistance, 337-38; trade provisions, 338; 
twin plant plan, 339-40 

Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (Caricom), 105, 124, 128, 325, 
327-35; common tariff in, 236; com- 
ponents of, 329; customs union creat- 
ed by, 105; defense policy coordination, 
334; effectiveness of, 335; financial 
cooperation, 334; foreign exchange 



needs, 327; foreign policy coordination, 
334; functional cooperation, 334; goals 
of, 328; imports by, 327; industrial 
programming, 332-33; institutional 
structure of, 329-31; market integra- 
tion mechanisms, 331-32; mechanisms 
for liberalizing trade, 331-32; mem- 
bership in, 284; members of, 327; ob- 
servers in, 327; problems of, 105; 
production and marketing cooperation, 
332-33; regional integration by, 328, 
335; tourism cooperation, 333; trade 
with, 236; transportation cooperation, 
333 

Caribbean Community Secretariat, 331 
Caribbean Congress of Labor, 274 
Caribbean countries (see also regional in- 
tegration): economic assistance to, 342; 
economic problems of, 327-28; emigra- 
tion to, 38; exports from, 343-44; for- 
eign exchange needed by, 327, 343; 
foreign investment in, 343; imports by, 
327, 344; relations with, 128; tourism 
in, 333; unemployment in, 343 
Caribbean Development Bank, 81, 331; 

created, 105; debt to, 99, 100 
Caribbean Examinations Council, 56, 
331 

Caribbean Food Corporation, 331, 333 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carif- 
ta), 226; formed, 104, 328; member- 
ship in, 23, 104-5, 128, 226, 284, 328; 
replaced, 329 
Caribbean Marketing Enterprise, 331 
Caribbean Meteorological Organisation, 
331 

Caribbean Tourism Association, 333 
Caribbean Tourism Research and De- 
velopment Centre, 331, 333 
Caribbean Trade Information System, 
331 

Caribcan, 341 

Caribe Farm Industries, 240 

Carib people, xvii, 3, 42; geographic dis- 
tribution of, 4; killed by disease, 3; 
Lesser Antilles settled by, 4; origins of, 
4 

Caricom. See Caribbean Community and 

Common Market 
Caricom's Multilateral Clearing Facility, 

334 

Carifta. See Caribbean Free Trade As- 
sociation 



381 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Carnegie School of Home Economics, 58 
Carter, Jimmy, xxii, 124 
Carter Center, xxi 
cassite, 192 

caste, 41, 46; breakdown of, 48 
Caste War, 170, 198 
Castro Ruz, Fidel, 20, 129 
Catholic Standard, 50, 51, 122 
cays, 161, 189, 242 

Cayo District, 193, 263; Arabs in, 199; 
Central American immigrants in, 196; 
Mennonites in, 200; Mestizos in, 200; 
religion of, 202 

CDC. See Colonial Development Corpo- 
ration 

cedar, 174 

Central America: immigrants to Belize 
from, xxv, xxvi, 189, 193, 196, 210, 
285; influence of, on Belize, 210; 
migrant laborers from, 234; orientation 
of Belize toward, 268-69, 277, 285 

Central American Common Market, 226, 
328; support by, for Guatemala's claim 
to Belize, 282 

Central American Federation, 182 

Central Bank of Belize, 230, 244 

Cerezo, Vinicio, 284 

Cerros, 158-59; excavation of, 161 

CFTC. See Commonwealth Fund for 
Technical Cooperation 

Chamber of Commerce and Industry: 
Peace Corps volunteers in, 281 ; politi- 
cal role of, 276; publications of, 280 

Chamber Update, 279 

Charles, Eugenia, 128 

Chase, Ashton, 17 

Chase Manhattan Bank, 94 

Chetumal Bay, 192 

Chetumal province, 162 

chicle: exports of, 174, 175, 224; produc- 
tion, 174 

child labor, 83-84 

China, 90; indentured servants recruit- 
ed from, 40; relations with, 129, 286; 
trade with, 129 
Chinese people 

Belize: 198, 199; in elite class, 205 
Guyana: 41-42; acculturation of, 
41-42, 43; intermarriage by, 42; 
as percentage of population, 37; 
as sugar plantation workers, xviii, 
10, 70; in urban areas, 42 
Choi language, 162 



Christian Democratic Party, 272, 274 
Christianity {see also under individual denomi- 
nations), 47-48; Hindu conversions to, 
48; percentage of followers in popula- 
tion, xx, 47; politics and, 52; role of, 
47; status of, 48; syncretic, 47 
Christian missions. See missions; mis- 
sionaries 

Christian Social Action Group, 180 
Christian Workers' Union, 235, 275 
Chung, Arthur, 111 
churches 

Belize: involvement of, in education, 
276-77; political role of, 276-78 
Guyana: opposition of, to govern- 
ment, 122; opposition of, to po- 
litical parties, 122 
CIDA. See Canadian International De- 
velopment Agency 
Citizens' Political Party, 177 
citrus, xxv, 237; exports of, 229, 231, 237; 

production of, 229, 237 
Citrus Company of Belize, 237 
civil service, 118; loyalty in, 118 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850), 169-70 
Cleveland, Grover, 11 
climate 

Belize: 192-93; rainfall, 193; sea- 
sons, 192, 193; temperatures, 
192-93 

Guyana: 34-35; humidity, 34; rain- 
fall, 34, 35; temperature, 34-35 

clothing: exports of, 98 

coastal plain, xix, 31-33; as percentage 
of land area, 84; rainfall in, 35 

cocaine, 209, 291, 302 

Cockscomb Mountains, 191 

College of Electors, 11; abolished, 12 

Colombia, 340; Belize Defence Force 
deployed to, 300 

Colombo Plan for Cooperative, Econom- 
ic, and Social Development in Asia and 
the Pacific, 324-25 

Colonial Development Corporation 
(CDC), 242 

Colonial Life Insurance Company, 102 

Colonial Report for 1931, 175 

Columbus, Christopher, xvii, xxiii, 3, 4, 
6, 162 

Combined Court, 12, 14; abolished, 14; 

members of, 11; responsibilities of, 1 1 
Comgep. See Commonwealth Group of 

Eminent Persons 



382 



Index 



commercial sector 
Belize: 166 
Guyana: 41, 42 
commodity crisis, 223 
Common External Tariff, 331, 332 
Common Market Council of Ministers, 
330-31 

Common Protective Policy, 331, 332 
Commonwealth Advisory Group, 94 
Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau, 324 
Commonwealth Development Corpora- 
tion, 324 

Commonwealth Fund for Technical 

Cooperation (CFTC), 324 
Commonwealth Games Federation, 323, 

324 

Commonwealth Group of Eminent Per- 
sons (Comgep), 323 

Commonwealth of Nations: activities of, 
324; Belize as member of, 286; Belize's 
case for independence presented to, 
xxiv 183; benefits of, 111; history of, 
321-22; meetings of, 322-23; mem- 
bers of, 320; membership in, 111-12, 
128, 319; monarch in, 320; organiza- 
tion of, 324; origins of, 321; politics 
of, 322-23; principles of, 322-23; 
procedures of, 322-23; purpose of, 319; 
regional groupings in, 324-25; status 
of dominions in, 321; trade with, 238 

Commonwealth Preference, 321 

Commonwealth Secretariat, 323-24 

communications 

Belize: 243, 279-80 
Guyana: 97; foreign investment in, 
97, 102; need for investment in, 
77, 97 

communism, 120; church opposition to, 

122; fall of, 129 
communist countries: Guyana's relations 

with, 129 
Concept Plan of Redress, 8, 109 
Conference of Foreign Ministers of 

Nonaligned Countries, 24 
Conference of Heads of Government of 

Asian and Pacific Commonwealth 

Member States, 325 
Congregationalist Church, 48 
conjugal relationships: Afro-Guyanese, 

46; Indo-Guyanese, 47 
constitution 
Belize: 

constitution of 1854, 250 



constitution of 1954, 252 
constitution of 1960, 252 
constitution of 1981, 253-55; elec- 
tions under, 265; freedom of ex- 
pression under, 279; preparation 
of, 253-54; procedure of amend- 
ing, 254-55; right under, 301; 
structure of, 254 
Guyana: 

constitution of 1792, 109 
constitution of 1871, 172 
constitution of 1928, 14, 18 
constitution of 1953, 110 
constitution of 1957, xix 
constitution of 1961, 21, 110, 

111- 12; amendments to, 22, 24, 
111; legislature under, 21; prime 
minister under, 21 

constitution of 1980, xx, 112-13; 
distribution of power under, 113; 
elections under, 118; executive 
under, xx, 26; guarantees under, 

112- 113; judicial system under, 
145; promulgated, 26 

constitutional conference (Guyana) 

(1964), 23 
constitutional reform 

Belize: agitation for, 180; recom- 
mendations for, 252 
Guyana: 12; agitation for, 12; re- 
sistance to, 12 
constitutional structure (Belize); prein- 

dependence, 249-55 
construction 

Belize: 241-42; growth of, 241; as 
percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 242 

Guyana: 241; employment in, 82; 
foreign investment encouraged in, 
102; military support for, 136; as 
percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 74 

consumer goods: import of, 99, 217 
consumerism, 210 
contraception. See birth control 
Convention of London (1786), 165, 182, 
282 

Cooperative for American Relief Every- 
where. See CARE 

Cooperative Republic of Guyana, 24-27, 
109; attributes of, 112; declared, xx, 24, 
72, 111, 124 

Corozal: courts in, 306; Maya in, 200; 



383 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Mestizos in, 200; municipal govern- 
ment of, 263; population of, 170 
Corozal Basin, 241 

Corozal District, 193, 263; Mestizos in, 
198; religion of, 202; Spanish language 
in, 200-201 

Corriverton, 117 

Cortes, Hernan, 162 

Council of Legal Education, 331 

Courantyne River, 38 

Courtenay, V.H., 270 

Court of Appeal 
Belize: 262 

Guyana: 115, 144-45; jurisdiction 
of, 116; political loyalty in, 145 
Court of Policy (Dutch), 110; 
abolished, 14; altered, 12; func- 
tions of, 11; membership of, 8, 
11; replaced, 110 
courts of justice (Dutch): functions of, 11; 

membership of, 8, 11 
court system 

Belize: 261-62 

Guyana: 115-16, 144-45; subser- 
vience of, to People's National 
Congress, 145 

Costa de Mosquitos. See Mosquito Coast 

credit, 232 

credit unions, 245 

Creole language, 171 

Creole people, xxiv, xxv, 157, 267; ac- 
culturation of, 168, 269; antagonism of, 
to Hispanic culture, 196; in Belize city, 
200; culture of, 167; in elite class, 205; 
emigration of, 195, 196; identification 
as, 202; legal rights of, 168; on Legis- 
lative Council, 174; occupations of, 
206; percentage of, in population, 197; 
physical features of, 197; protests by, 
177; religion of, 201, 202, 208; suppres- 
sion of culture, 167 

crime 

Belize: 209, 210, 291, 302-3 
Guyana: 133 
criminal code of 1980 (Belize), 306 
criminal justice system 

Belize: 291, 3057; defendants' rights 
in, 261, 307; procedure, 307; pun- 
ishment in, 306 
Guyana: punishment in, 145 
Critchlow, Hubert Nathaniel, 13, 82, 121 
crown colony of Belize, 250; petition for 
status as, 251 



Crown Lands Ordinance (1872), 169 

Cuba: equipment to Guyana from, 21; 
loans to Guyana from, 21; physicians 
to Guyana from, 62; relations of, with 
Guyana, 22, 123, 129; support by, for 
Belize's independence, 183-84, 283; 
university scholarships in, 216 

Cuello, 158; excavation of, 161 

Cuffy, 7 

Cuffy Ideological Institute, 58 
currency 

Belize: devaluations of, 178, 179-80, 
227, 229, 270, 294; pegged to 
U.S. dollar, 228 

Guyana: devaluations of, 67, 79; ex- 
change rates, 75-76; instability 
of, 75; trading, 75 
current accounts 

Belize: 233 

Guyana: 80-81 
Cyril Potter College of Education, 58 



dairy products, 85 
dams, 31, 84 

Dangerous Drugs Act (1980), 306 
Dangriga, 169; courts in, 306; municipal 

government of, 263; street vendors in, 

196 

Davis, Cyril, 274 
Davson, Henry K., 12 
death: causes of, 60-61 
debt, external 

Belize: 233-34; amount of, 233; ra- 
tio, 245 

Guyana: xx, 67, 99-101; amount of, 
68, 73-74, 99, 100; forgiveness, 
101; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 74, 99; refinancing, 
104 

debt payments arrears, 67, 68, 74, 100; 

elimination of, 81; as percentage of 

gross domestic product, 81 
debt service, 101; refusal to pay, 100 
Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, 

323 

Defence Ordinance of 1977, 296, 297 
defense spending, 299-300; external aid 
for, 300; as percentage of federal spend- 
ing, 299; as percentage of gross domes- 
tic product, 300 
Demba. See Demerara Bauxite Company 
Demerara: courts in, 8; economic growth 



384 



Index 



in, 7; occupied by Britain, 8; settled, 
6, 7 

Demerara Bauxite Company (Demba), 
71, 72 

Demerara Distillers Limited, 94 
Demerara River, 7, 34, 38, 96 
Democratic Independent Union, 235 
Democratic Labour Movement, 120 
demonstrations, xix, 302; forbidden, 144; 

labor, 176 
Denny, Kenneth, 121 
dentists, 219 
De Soh's, Juan, 162 

Despard, Edward Marcus, 165; suspend- 
ed, 166 

development expenditures, 233 

Development Finance Corporation, 
244-45, 275 

diamonds, 92; location of, xix, 33; min- 
ing of, 75; processing, 93; production 
of, 92; reserves of, 89; smuggling of, 
75, 76, 92 

diet 

Belize: 225 

Guyana: 60 
dikes, xviii, 3, 7, 31, 34, 69, 84 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions, 292, 
307 

Disaster Emergency Response Agency, 
331 

disease, 60-61, 218; intestinal, 218; na- 
tive Americans killed by, 3, 162 
District Court, 261, 306 
Disweek, 279-80 
Divali, 49 

Donor Support Group, 81, 94, 100 
drainage, 38; canals, xviii, 3, 34, 69, 86 
drought, 85, 86 
drug abuse, 302 

drug trafficking, 77, 209, 230, 291, 302; 
and Belize's economy, 229, 230; for- 
eign assistance in fighting, 302; role of 
Belize Defence Force in fighting, 291, 
296, 298; role of Belize National Police 
in fighting, 302, 304-5 

Dutch rule {see also Netherlands), 3, 6; at- 
traction of immigrants under, 7; 
judiciary under, 8; recognized, 6 

Dutch settlements, xvii, 6, 163 

Dutch West India Company, 6, 69; poor 
administration of, 8; problems of, 7-8 

Dzuluinicob province, 161, 162; rebellion 
in, 162 



EAI. See Enterprise for the Americas In- 
itiative 

Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority, 
325 

Eastern Caribbean States Supreme 

Court, 325 
East Indians {see also Indians) 

Belize: 198-99; in elite class, 205 
Guyana: culture of, 31; as inden- 
tured servants, 10, 13, 43, 70; 
as rice farmers, 70; stereotypes 
of, 44; as sugar plantation work- 
ers, 10 

East Montgomery North Mine, 90 
Eboe. See Ibo 

Echeverria Alvarez, Luis, 184 
economic: activity, constraints on, 92; 
crisis, 27, 38; diversification, xxv, 230- 
31; problems, 327-28; structure, 74-75 
economic growth 

Belize: 225, 227-29, 229-30; factors 

hindering, 223 
Guyana: in Demerara, 7; in Esse- 
quibo, 7; restoration of, 78-79 
economic policies: under Burnham, 22- 

23; under Hoyte, 28 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) 
(Guyana), 68, 74, 78-82, 97, 100; ef- 
fect of, on workers, 83; manufacturing 
under, 93; results of, 81-82 
economic reform 
Belize: 223 

Guyana: under Hoyte, xxi, 67-68; 
objectives of, 78; obstacles to, 68 
economic stabilization plan (Belize), 268 
economy 

Belize: British influence on, 173, 
229; colonial, 223-25; constraints 
on, 225-26; growth of, 227; his- 
tory of, 226-27; peripheral factors 
in, 229-30 
Guyana: closed, dismantling of, 67; 
Dutch influence on, 69; free-mar- 
ket, 27; government control of, 
72, 75; under Hoyte, xxi, 78 
economy, parallel, (Guyana), 27, 74, 
75-77, 79; absorption of, 79; foreign 
exchange in, 73; government response 
to, 77; illegal imports in, 73; problems 
caused by, 75; services provided by, 75; 
size of, 75; state enterprises in, 77 
education (see also schools) 

Belize: 211-17; access to, 209, 210, 



385 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



211, 212, 215-17; aid for, 212; 
attrition rates, 211, 215, 216; Brit- 
ish influence on, 225; church 
control of, 211-12, 214, 276-78; 
demand for, 212, 216, 223; of 
elite, 205; foreign influences on, 
211; government control of, 214; 
investment in, 211; of lower class, 
208; of middle class, 206; over- 
seas, 205, 216-17; primary, 214, 
216; secondary, 214, 216; tech- 
nical, 214; university, 216; value 
of, 216 

Guyana: 52-60; accessibility to, 54; 
adult, 58; attitudes toward, 58-60; 
under British rule, 52-54, 59; de- 
cline in, 54; demand for, 59-60; 
development of, 52; of elite, 52- 
54; government emphasis on, 
54; government spending on, 54; 
importance of, 52, 58; of Indo- 
Guyanese, 58-59, 141; of middle 
class, 52-54; overseas, 141; post- 
secondary, 56-58, 141; primary, 
54; reform, 52; restrictions on, 
52-54; right to, 112; secondary, 
52-54 

EEC. See European Economic Com- 
munity 

election fraud, xx, 24, 27, 118, 137, 
139-40; ballot box tampering, 118, 
137-40; gerrymandering, 118; voting 
by expatriates, 118 

elections 

Belize: of Belize City Council, 181; 
among British setders, 164; cam- 
paign strategies in, 268; under 
constitution of 1964, 253; under 
constitution of 1984, 265; local, 
263; of National Assembly, 258; 
of 1936, 176, 252; of 1939, 
177-78; of 1948, 252; of 1954, 
181, 270; of 1979, 253; of 1984, 
213, 267; of 1989, 267-68, 302; 
of 1993, xxvi-xxvii 

Guyana: under constitution of 1980, 
118; institution of, 110; of 1950, 
17; of 1953, xviii, 18, 110; of 
1957, xix, 19-20, 110; of 1961, 
xix, 21, 111; of 1964, xix, 22; 
of 1968, xx, 24; of 1973, xx, 24; 
of 1978, 25; of 1980, 27, 139-40; 
of 1985, xxi, 27; of 1986, 27; of 



1992, xxi-xxii; postponement of, 
xxi, 113, 118; reform of, xxi, 118 
Elections Assistance Board, xxi 
Elections and Boundaries Commission, 

259, 265; voter register of, 266 
electoral districts, 259, 263 
electoral process 
Belize: 264-66 
Guyana: 118 
electric power 

Belize: 192; generation, 241; short- 
ages, 241 
Guyana: blackouts, 92; demand for, 
92; facilities, 92; foreign invest- 
ment encouraged in, 102; gen- 
eration problems, 88; need for 
investment in, 77, 92; private 
production of, 93; shortages, xxi, 
27, 67, 77-78, 92 
elite class 

Belize: 204-6; base of social power, 
204; in Belize City, 205; under 
British rule, 173; control by, 169; 
economic interests of, 204; educa- 
tion of, 205-6; ethnic groups in, 
205; lifestyle of, 205; marriage 
in, 205 

Guyana: 31; Afro-Guyanese in, 13, 
17; education of, 52-54 
Elizabeth II (queen), 255 
El Salvador: Belize Defence Force de- 
ployed to, 300; immigrants to Belize 
from, 195 
emigration 

Belize: 194; causes of, 210; of Gari- 
funa, 169; of parents, 209; rate of, 
195; to United States, 189, 193, 
206 

Guyana: 38-40; annual, 38, 40; 
causes of, 38, 78, 92; destinations 
of, 38; of managers, 73, 84; of pro- 
fessionals, 67; of skilled workers, 
67 

Employers and Workers Bill (1943), 178 
energy resources 

Belize: 192, 241 

Guyana: 92-93 
English language 

Belize: xvii, 171, 172, 200, 201 

Guyana: xvii, 42, 43 
Enmore shootings, 17 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 
101, 233, 235, 237, 281 



386 



Index 



EPZ. See export-processing zones 
ERP. See Economic Recovery Program 
Esquivel, Manuel, 261, 277; ethnicity of, 

267, 272; as leader of UDP, xxvi, 267, 

272, 273; as prime minister, xxvii 
Essequibo: courts in, 8; economic growth 

in, 7; occupied by Britain, 8; settled, 6 
Essequibo River, 6, 34, 94 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church, 48 
ethnic: associations, 269, 278; cleavage, 

19, 31; diversity, xx, xxv, 196, 202-4 
ethnic groups {see also under individual 

groups) 

Belize: cultural patterns in, 171-72; 
distribution of, 198, 200; impact 
of immigration on, 198; marriage 
among, 202; in middle class, 206; 
tensions among, 210, 268 
Guyana: 40-44; importance of dif- 
ferences among, 43-44; introduc- 
tion of, 9-10; political parties of, 
16; political polarization of, 16; 
animosity between, 70; stereo- 
types of, 44 
ethnic identity 

Belize: 196-200, 202-3; factors in, 

197; and religion, 201 
Guyana: 43-44 
European Economic Community (EEC), 
328; assistance from, 104, 213, 340; Be- 
lize's ambassador to, 286; Britain in, 
321; exports to, 85, 86, 98, 235, 245; 
relations with, 123 
Europeans 

Belize: 198 
Guyana: xx, 37, 43 
Exclusive Economic Zone, 147 
executive branch {see also executive presi- 
dent; president): of Belize, 244-50, 
255-58; of Guyana, 113-15 
Executive Council (Belize), 252, 253; 

members, 252 
executive president, xx, 26, 113-15; ap- 
pointments by, 115, 116; as com- 
mander in chief, 136; grounds for 
removal of, 113; loyalty to, 118; pow- 
ers of, 113-15, 117, 118; term of, 113 
Export-Import Bank, 340 
export-processing zones (EPZs), 232-33 
Export-Processing Zones Act (1990), 232 
exports {see also under individual products) 
Belize: of cedar, 174; of chicle, 174; 
under colonial rule, 166; growth 



of, 225; of logwood, 173, 223; of 
mahogany, 173, 174; of sugar, 227 
Guyana: 97-99; of crops, 84; decline 
in, 14; of diamonds, 76; of gold, 
76; in Great Depression, 14; ille- 
gal, 76; of rice, 76, 86; of shrimp, 
76, 88; as source of foreign ex- 
change, 86; of sugar, 76, 85; value 
of, 97 



Falkland Islands (Malvinas): invasion by 
Argentina, 126, 128 

families: Afro-Guyanese, 44-46; Indo- 
Guyanese, 47 

Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
of Guyana (FITUG), 82, 122 

Ferris State College, 213, 271 

financial institutions, 72; foreign invest- 
ment encouraged in, 102 

financial relations, international: normali- 
zation of, 80-81 

Financial Times, 68, 75, 85, 94 

Fiscal Incentives Act (1990), 232 

fiscal performance, 233 

fishing, 240, 298; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 240 

FITUG. See Federation of Independent 
Trade Unions of Guyana 

floods, 85, 86 

food 

Belize: access to, 217; import of, 
173, 217 

Guyana: 60; production, self-suffi- 
ciency in, 67 
Food and Nutrition Institute, 333 
foreign assistance 

Belize: 234; from Canada, 218; from 
European Economic Community, 
218; from relief agencies, 218; 
strings attached to, 281; from 
United States, 217 
Guyana: 104; aid flows, 104; from 
Brazil, 96; from Canada, 104; 
for energy production, 93; from 
European Economic Community, 
104; for transportation, 96; from 
United States, 104, 124 
foreign: borrowing, 73; debt. See debt, ex- 
ternal; economic relations, 235-36 
foreign currency: demand for, 77; illegal 
trading of, 75; legalized trading of, 68, 



387 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



78; shortage of, 76; sources of, 76-77; 
traders, 76 
Foreign Currency Act (1979), 79 
foreign exchange 

Belize: earnings, 228; rate, 229 
Guyana: attempt to ration, 73, 75- 
76; decline in, 73; earnings, 71; 
illegal, 73; legalization of, 96; lib- 
eralization of, 78, 79; regulation 
of, 72, 78, 79; restrictions on, 76, 
94; rice as source of, 86; sugar as 
source of, 85 
foreign exchange rates: black market, 76; 
floating, 79; official, 76, 79; over- 
valued, 75; unified, 68; unofficial, 79 
foreign holdings 

Belize: 204-5; in agriculture, 204; of 

property, 271 
Guyana: nationalization of, 20-21 
foreign investment 

Belize: 232, 245; creation of climate 
for, 230-31, 271; in sugar indus- 
try, 224, 224 
Guyana: 72, 102-4; in agricultural 
production, 102; in bauxite indus- 
try, 70, 90; concerns regarding, 
103-4; encouragement of, 68, 78, 
102; in energy production ,93; in 
fishing industry, 88, 102; in man- 
ufacturing, 93-94; in mining in- 
dustry, 89, 91-92; need for, 94; 
permission for, 67; in pharmaceu- 
tical industry, 93; in sugar indus- 
try, 71; in timber industry, 88; 
in transportation, 96 
foreign management: of manufacturing, 
94; of mining industry, 89, 90; need 
for, 94 

foreign military relations, 300-301; with 
Britain, 300; with Canada, 300; with 
United States, 300 
foreign ownership, 71-72; and economic 

problems, 71-72 
foreign relations 
Belize: 280-86 
Guyana: 123-29 
forestry 

Belize: land controlled by, 172-73; 

as percentage of gross domestic 

product, 240; products, export of, 

174, 224, 240 
Guyana: 88; dispute over, with Suri- 

name, 147-48; as foreign ex- 



change earner, 88; foreign invest- 
ment in, 88, 102; military support 
for, 136; production, 88; products, 
export of, 74, 88; rights, 127 
forests, 33, 86; access to, 88; management 
of, 88 

Fort George Hotel, 242 

France: in British- Dutch war, 8; in Donor 
Support Group, 100; foreign invest- 
ment from, 102; Guyana ruled by, 8; 
Netherlands occupied by, 8; settle- 
ments, 163; war of, with British, 8 

French Guiana, 4 

fuel: imports of, 99 

Fuentes, Ydigoras, 183 

Fuller, Herbert, 269 

Fyffes International, 238 



gangs 

Belize: 209 
Guyana: 143 

Garifuna language, 172, 201 

Garifuna people, xxiii, xxv, 157, 172; 
agriculture pioneered by, 173; distribu- 
tion of, 200; emigration of, 169, 195, 
196; occupations of, 208; origins of, 
198; percentage of, in population, 198; 
religion of, 201, 202; reservations for, 
169 

garment industry, 241 
Garvey, Marcus, 178 
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade 
GAWU. See Guyana Agricultural and 

General Workers' Union 
GCE. See General Certificate of Education 
GDF. See Guyana Defence Force 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
GEC . See Guyana Electricity Corporation 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 

(GATT), 245 
General Certificate of Education (GCE), 

56 

General Workers' Union (GWU), 178, 
234, 270, 274; cooperation of, with 
People's Committee, 275; membership 
in, 274 
geography 

Belize: 161, 189-93; area, 189; 
boundaries, 189; cays, 161, 189; 
geology, 191; lagoons, 189; size, 
189, 225, topography, 191-92 



388 



Index 



Guyana: 31-35; land area, 31; loca- 
tion, 31; zones, 31 
Georgetown, 8, 38, 117; crime in, 133; 

population of, 38 
Germany: in Donor Support Group, 100; 

exports to, 99, 238 
Germany, Democratic Republic of (East 

Germany); trade agreement with, 21 
Giant Resources, 92 
GIWU. See Guiana Industrial Workers' 

Union 

GLU. See Guyana Labour Union 
GNP. See gross national product 
Goa Declaration on International Secu- 
rity (1983), 323 
Godolphin Treaty (1670), 163-64 
gold 

Belize: 192 

Guyana: 91-92; discovery of, 10; 
exports of, 97, 98, 99; foreign in- 
vestment in, 91-92, 102; location 
of, xix, 33; market value of, 92; 
mining of, 75; processing, 93; pro- 
duction, 91, 92; reserves, 89; 
smuggling of, 75, 76, 91 

Golden Star Resources, 92 

Goldson, Philip, xxvi, 180, 269, 271, 272, 
277; jailed, 181 

Goliath-Knight company, 90 

Gombay, 275 

Gordon, Minita, 255 

government 

Belize: xxv; expenditures, 233; 
health policy, 219, 220; Peace 
Corps volunteers in, 281; reve- 
nues, 233; schools run by, 211, 
212 

Guyana: 113-18; church opposition 
to, 122; control of economy, 72, 
75; executive branch, 113-15; for- 
eign exchange rationed by, 73, 
75-76; governor under, 18; minis- 
terial system under, 18; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
74; relations of, with labor, 121; 
response to parallel economy, 77; 
spending, 62, 72, 73, 78 
government, cooperative republic. See 

cooperative republic 
government, first People's Progressive 
Party (1953), 18-19; British suspension 
of, xix, 18; controversial issues under, 18 
government, interim (1953-57), 19 



government, local 

Belize: 263-4 

Guyana: 116, 117 
government, PNC/UF coalition (1964- 
68), 22 

government, second People's Progressive 

Party (1957-61), 19-21 
Government Gazette, 260, 279 
Government Technical Institute, 58 
governor 

Belize: 251; powers of, 251, 253 
Guyana: xix, 12, 18, 109-10, 111; 
elimination of, 24 
governor general 

Belize: 255-58; appointments by, 
256-57, 261, 263; authority of, 
255-56; as commander in chief, 
298; qualifications of, 255; role of, 
255; term of, 255 
Guyana: 111 
Granger, David, 139 
grass roots class. See lower class 
Great Depression 

Belize: xxiv, 174-78, 226; Belize Es- 
tate and Produce Company in, 175 
Guyana: 14 
Greater Antilles: settlement of, 4 
Greenridge, Carl, 78 
Grenada, 18, 325; invasion of, 105, 124, 

126, 128 
gross domestic product (GDP) 

Belize: agriculture, 231; construction, 
242; current expenditures, 233; de- 
fense, 300; development expendi- 
tures, 233; fishing, 240; forestry, 
224, 240; government revenues, 
233; growth of, 228; telecommuni- 
cations, 243; tourism, 231 
Guyana: agriculture, 74; balance of 
payments, 101; budget deficit, 
80; construction, 74; current ac- 
count deficit, 80; debt payments 
arrears, 81; decline in, 67, 82; ex- 
ternal debt, 74, 99; government, 
74; growth of, 72; imports, 97; 
manufacturing, 74; mining, 74; 
service sector, 74; trade, 97; value 
of 67 

gross national product (GNP) 
Belize: 225; 

Guyana: foreign investment as per- 
centage, 71 
Guatemala: attacks by, 295; constitution 



389 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



of, 283; immigrants to Belize from, 
195; relations of, with People's United 
Party, 181; relations with, 282-84, 285; 
territorial claim of, to Belize, xxiv, xxvi, 
157, 181-84, 226, 249, 253, 282-84, 
291, 293, 294-95 

Guevara, Ernesto "Che," 21 

Guiana: etymology of, 4 

Guiana Agricultural Workers' Union, 21 

Guiana Industrial Workers' Union 
(GIWU), 17; strikes by, 19, 22 

Guyana Agricultural and General Work- 
ers Union (GAWU), 82, 121; political 
affiliations of, 82 

Guyana Airports Limited, 96 

Guyana Bar Association, 140 

Guyana Business, 97 

Guyana Chronicle, 122 

Guyana Council of Churches, 51 ; conflict 
of, with Burnham government, 51-52; 
criticism by, of government, 51, 122, 
140; opposition of, to political parties, 
122 

Guyana Defence Force (GDF), 133-40; 
Afro-Guyanese in, 133, 136; border 
security by, xx, 136; capabilities of, 
136-37; civic-action role of, 136; com- 
mander in chief of, 136; connection of, 
to People's National Congress, 133; cri- 
teria for officers, 134; election fraud 
by, 118, 137-40; Indo-Guyanese purged 
from, 134; internal security by, 136; 
materiel for, 136; missions of, 133, 
136, 140; noncommissioned officers in, 
133-34; number of troops in, 133, 136; 
officers in, 133-34; organization of, 
136-37, 140; pay and benefits in, 137; 
political role of, 133, 134-36, 137-40; 
protocol signed with Venezuelan Army, 
147; purged, 139; restructuring of, 139; 
services in, 133; training, 134, 136; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 137; 
women in, 136, 137 

Guyana Defence Force Air Command, 
133, 137 

Guyana Defence Force Maritime Corps, 
133, 137 

Guyana Electricity Corporation (GEC), 
80, 92; capacity of, 92; deterioration of, 
92; generation by, 92; rehabilitation of, 

93 

Guyana Fisheries Limited, 88, 103 
Guyana Fertility Survey, 37 



Guyana Geology and Mines Commis- 
sion, 92 

Guyana Human Rights Association, 144, 
145 

Guyana Labour Union (GLU), 82 
Guyana Manufacturing and Industrial 
Development Agency (Guymida), 102 
Guyana Mining Enterprise Limited 
(Guymine), 74, 89; foreign manage- 
ment of, 90 
Guyana Ministry of Agriculture, 58 
Guyana Ministry of Education, Social 
Development, and Culture, 54; Edu- 
cation Department under, 54 
Guyana Ministry of Higher Education, 
54 

Guyana Ministry of Labour, 58 

Guyana National Guard, 133 

Guyana National Service (see also Guyana 
Defence Force), 133, 140; Afro- 
Guyanese in, 140; avoidance of, 141; 
corps of, 140; created, 140; Indo- 
Guyanese in, 140-41; political indoc- 
trination in, 141 

Guyana National Service State Paper, 140 

Guyana People's Militia, 133 

Guyana Police Force, 142; intimidation 
by, of opposition, 133; Mounted 
Branch, 142; people killed by, 144; 
response of, to gangs, 143; role of, 133; 
Rural Constabulary, 142; shooting of 
workers by, 17; Special Constabulary, 
142 

Guyana Rice Milling and Marketing 

Authority, 86 
Guyana Rice Producers' Association, 

86 

Guyana School of Agriculture, 58 
Guyana Sugar Company (Guysuco), 74, 
84, 85 

Guyana Telecommunications Corpora- 
tion, 97 

Guyana Timbers, 102 

Guyana United Sadr Islamic Anjuman, 
49 

Guyana Volunteer Force, 133 

Guyana Youth Corps, 140 

Guymida. See Guyana Manufacturing 

and Industrial Development Agency 
Guymine. See Guyana Mining Enterprise 

Limited 

Guysuco. See Guyana Sugar Company 
GWU. See General Workers' Union 



390 



Index 



Hallelujah Church, 48 

Heads of Agreement (1981), 184; contents 

of, 283; opposition to, 275-76, 283 
Heads of Government Conference, 

329-30, 334 
health (see also medicine) 

Belize: 218-20; government policy 

on, 219, 220 
Guyana: 60-62; expenditures, 62; 
services, 61-62 
health care 

Belize: access to, 217, 219; distribu- 
tion of, 219; quality of, 225 
Guyana: access to, 62; facilities, 61, 
62; military support for, 136; 
national insurance for, 62; right 
to, 112; in rural areas, 62 
Hererra Campms, Luis, 125 
High Court, 115, 144-45; jurisdiction of, 
116 

Hill, David (see also Washington, Ed- 
ward), 50, 142 
Hill Bank, 298 

Hinduism, 47, 48-49, 202; festivals of, 
49; orthodox, 49; percentage of follow- 
ers in population, xx, 47; political pres- 
sures on, 52; political role of, 122, 123; 
reform, 49; rituals in, 48; status of, 48; 
Vaishavite, 48 

Hoare family, 175-76 

Holi, 49 

Homestake Mining, 92 

Hondo River, 189 

Honduran Independence Party, 271 

Honduras; immigrants to Belize from, 195 

Hong Kong: investment from, 342 

hospitals, 219 

Hotel Training School, 333 

House of Assembly, 110 

House of Israel, 50, 142-43; activities of, 

50, 51, 142-43; number of members in, 

142; and People's National Congress, 

50, 122, 142 
House of Representatives, 253; elections 

to, 266; members of, 259; quorum in, 

259; Speaker of, 259 
housing: access to, 217 
Hoyte, Hugh Desmond, 3, 112, 121; as 

executive president, xxi, 27, 109, 143; 

visit of, to United States, 28 
Hoyte administration (1985-93), 27; 

economy under, 67, 78, 120; elections 

under, 118; foreign policy under, 28, 



123, 124, 128, 129; House of Israel un- 
der, 50; human rights under, 144; Peo- 
ple's National Congress under, 119-20; 
political reforms in, 27-28 

human rights: abuses, 143-44; under 
Hoyte, 144 

Hummingbird Highway, 242, 243, 282 

Hungary: trade agreement with, 21 

Hunt Oil, 103 

hurricanes: of 1931, 175, 193, 251; 

Greta, 193; Hattie, 193; Janet, 193 
Hyde, Evan X., 280 
hydrology 

Belize: 191-92 

Guyana: 34 



Ibo people, 166 
Id al Adha, 49 
Id al Fitr, 49 

IDB. See Inter- American Development 
Bank 

IMET. See International Military Educa- 
tion and Training 

IMF. International Monetary Fund 

immigrants: illegal, 302-3; occupations 
of, 210, 226 

Imperial Conference: of 1926, 321; of 
1932, 321 

imports 

Belize: 227; under colonial rule, 

166; of food, 173 
Guyana: 71, 99; effect of foreign 
exchange restrictions on, 76; il- 
legal, 73; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 97; restrictions 
lifted, 79; value of, 99 
income: average, 217; distribution, 223, 
225 

Income Tax Act (1990), 232 
indentured laborers, 31, 40; and educa- 
tion, 52, 59; from India, xviii, 10, 40; 
recruiting of, 40 
indentured service, 10; abolished, 13, 70; 

terms of, 40 
independence 

Belize: achievement of, xxiv, 184, 
249, 295; demands for, 183, 294; 
influences on, 212; obstacles to, 
xxiv, 181, 283; origins of move- 
ment for, 178; recognition of, 182; 
statements of case for, 1 83 ; transi- 
tion to, 181-84 



391 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Guyana: 3, 111-12; date set for, 23 

India: in Commonwealth of Nations, 322; 
indentured workers imported from, 
xviii, 10, 40; independence of, 322 

Indians. See East Indians 

indigenous people. See Amerindians; 
Maya people 

Indo-Guyanese culture, 14, 46-47; caste 
in, 41, 46; education in, 58-59; family 
in, 47; intimidation of, by military, 133; 
men in, 47; religion in, 50; retention of, 
41; weddings in, 46; women in, 47 

Indo-Guyanese people, 3, 17, 41; accul- 
turation of, 43; under British rule, 52; 
British values of, 44; conflicts of, with 
Afro-Guyanese, 3, 70; education of, 52; 
emigration of, 40; as farmers, 70; gang 
attacks on, 143; geographic distribution 
of, 43; as indentured workers, 41; in 
lower class, 42; occupations of, 14; as 
percentage of population, xx, 37; in 
professional class, 41; purged from 
officer corps, 134; religion of, 47; in 
rural areas, 38; social distribution of, 
43; as teachers, 55 

Industrial Development Unit, 324 

Industrial Programming Scheme, 333 

Industrial Training Centre, 58 

industry 

Belize: 240-42 
Guyana: 92-94 

infant mortality, 35-36, 61 

inflation 

Belize: rate of, 228-29, 229 
Guyana: 75 

infrastructure 

Belize: 245; lack of, 242 
Guyana: 77-78; deterioration of, 27, 
67, 68, 86; foreign investment in, 
102; lack of basic, 77; loans for, 
100; need for investment in, 77, 94 

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 324 

Institute of Education, 58 

insurrection of 1969, 23, 136, 145-46 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 

Inter- American Development Bank 
(IDB), 93, 234, 340 

Inter- American Regional Organization of 
Workers (Organization Regional Intera- 
mericana de Trabaj adores — ORIT), 274 

interior highlands, xix, 31, 33-34, 84; at- 
tempts to populate, 140; mountains in, 



33; savannah in, 33-34 
Internal Revenue Service Code, Section 

936, 104, 340 
internal security, 301-7 
International Confederation of Free 

Trade Unions, 235, 274 
International Development Association 

(IDA), 88 
International Military Education and 

Training (IMET), 300 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Belize: 341; economic stabilization 
plan, 268; presence of, 273; stand- 
by arrangement with, 228; special 
drawing rights, 228 
Guyana: economic recovery program 
of, xxi, 68, 74, 81; loan from, 99, 
100 

international reserves, 228 
International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 243 
International Trade Commission, 340 
investment 

Belize: 231-32 

Guyana: 79 
Iraq, 286 

irrigation: deterioration of, 86; in Mayan 
civilization, 158; and village layout, 38 

Isaiah Morter Harambe Association, 278 

Islam, 47, 48, 49; holidays of, 49; ortho- 
dox, 49; percentage of followers in popu- 
lation, xx, 41, 47; political pressures on, 
52; reform, 49; status of, 48 

Islam, Sunni, 49 

Itza people, 163 

Jagan, Cheddi, xviii, 3, 20; attempt by, 
to resolve conflict with Burnham, 25; 
background of, 16; church opposition to, 
122; conflict of, with Burnham, 15-16, 
18-19; education of, 16; in election of 
1992, xxi-xxii; as executive president, 
xxii; People's Progressive Party founded 
by, 17, 120; as prime minister, xviii, xix, 
21-22, 110, 111; veto by, of participa- 
tion in West Indies Federation, 20, 128 

Jagan, Janet Rosenberg, 16; political 
office held by, 17; political roles of, 123 

Jamaica: Belize Defence Force deployed 
to, 300; conquered by Britain, 163 

Japan: aid from, 325, 340; exports to, 99; 
investment by, 97, 102 



392 



Index 



Jehovah's Witnesses, 48, 278 

Jessell Securities, 71, 72 

Jesuits: influence of, 212, 214, 277 

Joint Consultative Group, 331 

Jones, Jim (see also People's Temple of 

Christ), xx, 25-26, 50 
Jonestown massacre (see also People's 

Temple of Christ), xx, 25, 26, 50-51 
judges 

Belize: appointment of, 261, 305; 

types of, 261-62 
Guyana: appointment of, 116 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 

in London, 262, 306 
judicial officers, 115-16; tenure of, 
115-16 

Judicial Service Commission, 116 

judiciary 

Belize: 261-62; appointments to, 261 
Guyana: 115-16, 144-45; courts in, 
under Dutch rule, 8 



Kaieteur Falls, 34 

Kaieteur Plateau, 33, 34 

Kanuku Mountains, 33, 34 

Kekchi Maya people, 171, 198 

kidnapping, 302 

King, Sydney, 19 

Kinich Ahau, 159 

Koama, Ohena, 144 

Kuru Kuru Cooperative College, 58 

Kwakwani: aluminum mines at, 90 

Kwayana, Eusi, 144 



labor 

Belize: 234-35; force, 234; shortage 

of, 234; unrest, xxiv, 294 
Guyana: 82-84; conditions, 176; re- 
forms, 178; relations of, with gov- 
ernment, 121; shortage, 6; unrest, 
14, 22, 111 
labor movement, 180; and job-related is- 
sues, 275; as political force, 275 
labor unions 

Belize: 274-76; legalized, xxiv, 178 
Guyana: xviii; connection of, to po- 
litical parties, 82, 121; role of, in 
anticolonial movement, 83; role 
of, in nationalization, 83 
Labour Amendment Act (1984), 121 



Labourers and Unemployed Association 
(LUA), 177, 274; in independence 
movement, 178 

Labour Party, 16 

Labour Relations Act (1953), 19, 110 
Labour Relations Bill (1964), 21-22 
Lachmansingh, J.B., 19 
Ladyville Barracks, 300 
lagoons, 189, 191 

Lamanai, 159-60, 161; excavation of, 161 
land 

Belize: arable, 226; ownership of, 
173 

Guyana: arable, 84; area, 31, 84; 
covered in forest, 86; distribution 
of, 40; reclamation, xviii, xix, 3, 7, 
33, 69; tenure, 115 
language (see also under individual languages), 

200-1; and social stratification, 201 
Latin America: education in, 217; sup- 
port by, for Belize's independence, 283 
Latin America Integration Association, 
328 

leader of the opposition, 257 

League of Coloured People, 18 

League of Nations, 321 

Legislative Assembly 

Belize: 250-51; established, 170, 
252; members of, 170, 250-51, 
252; replaced, 251; surrendered, 
250 

Guyana: 21, 110 
Legislative Council 

Belize: 172, 251; agitation for elec- 
tive, 174; elections for, 176, 251; 
members of, 173-74, 251; powers 
of, 251; replaced, 252 
Guyana: 14, 19, 110; elections for, 
110; membership in, 15 
legislature 

Belize: 249, 258-61; bills in, 260 
Guyana: 110, 115; under constitu- 
tion of 1961, 21; members of, 115; 
minority leader in, 115; powers 
of, 115 
Lend-Lease Act (1941), 15 
Lesser Antilles: abandonment of, 7; set- 
tlement of, 4 
Lethem, Sir Gordon, 15 
Leucadia company, 93 
Lewis, Arthur, 328 
Liberal Party, 272 
lieutenant governor, 172, 251 



393 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



life expectancy 

Belize: 218, 225 

Guyana: 61 
Lilian Dewar College of Education, 58 
limestone, 192 

Linden, 117; aluminum mines at, 90; 

population of, 38 
Lindo, Dean, 272 
literacy rate, xx, 52, 58 
livestock, 74, 85, 88 
living costs, 227 
living standards 

Belize: 217-22, 223, 225; in Guy- 
ana, 27 
Guyana: 27 
logwood, xxiii, 223, 224; decline of, 224; 

exports of, 223; harvesting of, 163, 165 
Lome Convention, 85, 235, 238, 322, 334 
London and Scottish Marine Oil Com- 
pany, 103 
London Convention (1814), 10 
London Missionary Society, 52 
Longchamps {see also Georgetown), 8 
lower class 

Belize: 204, 208-10; education of, 
208, 215, 216; ethnic composition 
of, 208; households, 209; mem- 
bers of, 208; occupations of, 208, 
210; rural, 210; unemployment 
among, 209; women in, 209 
Guyana: Amerindians in, 42 
Low German, 201 

LUA. See Labourers and Unemployed 

Association 
Lubaantun, 159 
Luyt, Richard, 133 

McLean, Norman, 139 
Macusi tribe, 42 
Madeira, 41 
magistrate's court 

Belize: 261, 306 

Guyana: 115, 116, 144-45 
magistrates, 261 

mahogany, 223; depletion of, 174, 224; 
exports of, 173, 174, 175, 224; harvest- 
ing of, xxiii, 165, 167; processing, 167; 
production, xxiv, 174, 176; trade, 
decline of, xxiv, 174; workers' rebel- 
lion, 177, 294 

Major, John, 245 

malaria, 60, 218 



Malaysia: investment by, 88 
malnutrition, 60; of prisoners, 145 
Malvinas. See Falkland Islands 
Manatee Hills, 191 

Manche people, 161; displaced by Span- 
ish conquerors, 162 

Manpower Citizens Association (MPCA), 
16, 121 

manufactured products: exports of, 97 

manufacturing 

Belize: 241; protections, 241 
Guyana: 75, 93-94; conditions for 
development of, 94; employment 
in, 82; foreign investment in, 93- 
94, 102; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 74; privatiza- 
tion of, 93, 94; products, 93 

Mao Zedong, 20 

marijuana, 209; efforts to eradicate, 302; 

production, 230, 291, 302 
marriage 

Belize: in elite class, 205; across eth- 
nic boundaries, 2 10 
Guyana: age for, 36; ceremonies, 
46, 47; common-law, 46, 47; dur- 
ability of, 46; first, 46; forbidden 
to slaves, 46; interethnic, 42, 43; 
women in, 36 
martial law (Belize), 294 
Masters and Servants Act (1883), 176, 
178 

materiel: army, 136; from Britain, 136; 
from the Soviet Union, 136; from the 
United States, 136 

Maya Mountains, 191 

Mayan civilization, xxii-xxiii, 157-61; 
agriculture in, 158; archaeology of, 158, 
159; architecture of, 159; art of, 158, 
159; breakdown of, 161; calendrical sys- 
tem of, 158; distinguishing features of, 
158-59; economy of, 158; emergence of, 
158; occupations of, 158; Spanish con- 
quest of, 161-63 

Mayan dialects, 201 

Maya people, xxiii, xxv, 157, 171; agricul- 
ture pioneered by, 173, 240; attacks by, 
on British, 171, 293; distribution of, 
200; identification as, 202; religion of, 
201, 202; reservations for, 169, 293; 
resettlement of, 171, 176, 293; resistance 
by, to British, 170 

media, 122 

Melbourne Declaration (1981), 323 



394 



Index 



Melhado, Henry I., 174 

Mennonites, 198, 200; agriculture by, 

240; exemptions for, 264 
merchant class, 172 
Mestizo people, xxv, 157, 171, 267; 
agriculture pioneered by, 173; culture 
of, 171; distribution of, 198, 200; in 
elite class, 205; identification as, 202-4; 
immigration of, 196; occupations of, 
206-8; physical features of, 197-98; 
power of, 210; religion of, 201, 202, 208 
Methodist Church, 48, 201; missionaries 

of, 167; schools of, 214 
Mexico: aid from, 340; Belize Defence 
Force deployed to, 300; border with Be- 
lize, 293; claim to Belize by, 182; elec- 
tricity from, to Belize, 241; immigrants 
to Belize from, 195-96; recognition of 
Belize's independence, 182; relations 
with, 285; support for Belize's indepen- 
dence, 183, 283 
Michigan Partners, 212 
middle class 

Belize: xvii, 204; Afrocentric cultural 
consciousness in, 208; British cul- 
tural influence on, 268; educa- 
tion of, 206, 210, 216; emigration 
by, 206; members of, 206; reli- 
gion in, 208 
Guyana: xvii, 12; Afro-Guyanese 
in, 17, 24; British values of, 44; 
education of, 52-54, 55; emigra- 
tion of, 40; Portuguese in, 41; 
pressure from, for reform, 12; re- 
action of, to Burnham, 24; respect 
for, 58 
Middle East, 286 
migration (see also emigration) 

Belize: 195-96; of Central Ameri- 
cans to, 189, 211; destinations for, 
195; impact of, on ethnic balance, 
198; urban, 210 
Guyana: 40 
military aid, 281 
military history (Belize), 292-95 
militia, 292 
minerals 

Belize: 192 
Guyana, 93 
mining 

Belize: 240-41 

Guyana: 38, 74, 89-92; employment 
in, 82; foreign investment in, 89, 



102; foreign management of, 89; 
military support for, 136; as per- 
centage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 74 
ministerial system, 18 
ministers 

Belize: 257 
Guyana: 115 
Mirror, 122 

missionaries, 42, 50, 162, 201; attempts 
to convert Mayans, 162; attempts to 
suppress African culture, 167; Protes- 
tant, 278 

Misuse of Drugs Act (1990), 306-7 

Monetary Authority (Belize), 244 

money laundering, 230 

Monroe Doctrine, 11, 170 

Mons Office Cadet Training School, 134 

Mopan Maya people, 161, 171, 198 

Moravian Church, 48 

Morgan, Carl, 139 

Mormons, 278 

mortality, 7 

Mosquito Coast (Costa de Mosquitos), 
165 

Mountain Pine Ridge, 191, 298 
mountains, 33 
Mount Roraima, 33 
Moyne, Lord, 14 

Moyne Commission, 14; directives of, 14 

MPCA. See Manpower Citizens As- 
sociation 

Mulford, David, 101 

municipal councils, 263; elections for, 
263; role of, 263 

Multi-fibre Arrangement, 235, 241, 338 

Musa, Said, 270, 284, 286 

Muslims (see also Islam), 122 



Napoleonic Wars, 8 
National Alliance for Belizean Rights, 
xxvi 

National Assembly 

Belize: 249; elections, 258; estab- 
lished, 253; members' qualifica- 
tions, 258; term of, 258 
Guyana: voting for, 118 
National Congress of Local Democratic 

Organs, 116, 117 
National Democratic Front, 120 
National Democratic Party (NDP), 18 



395 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



National Drug Abuse Control Council, 
306 

National Garifuna Council, 278 
National Guard Service, 141; creation of, 
141; mission of, 141; number of per- 
sonnel in, 141 
National Independence Party, 271 
National Insurance Board, 62 
nationalization, 72, 112; advocated by 
Jagan, 20; under Burnham, xx, 112, 
113, 124; ended, 79, 102; of foreign 
holdings, 20-21, 67; role of labor 
unions in, 83 
National Newsmagazine, 279 
National Party, 181; founded, 271 
National Security Act, 139, 145 
National Trades Union Congress of Be- 
lize, 235, 274 
native Americans. See Amerindians 
Natives First campaign, 179 
natural resources, 192 
Nazarene Church, 48 
NDP. See National Democratic Party 
Nestle, 237 

Netherlands {see also under Dutch): occupied 
by French, 8; settlers from, 69; war of, 
with British, 8 

New Amsterdam, 38, 117; population of, 
38; rainfall in, 35 

New Delhi Statement on Economic Ac- 
tion (1983), 323 

New Nation, 122 

New River, 192 

New River Triangle: dispute over, 147 
newspapers (see also journalists; media) 

Belize: 279 

Guyana: 28, 122 
New Zealand: in Commonwealth of Na- 
tions, 321 

Nicaragua: support by, for Belize's in- 
dependence, 183 
Nimli Punit, 159 
Nisshan Suissan company, 103 
Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 129 
Belize: as member of, 286; Belize's 
case for independence presented 
to, 183, 283 
Guyana: as member of, 24; support 
by, for Belize's independence, xxiv, 
183 

nonalignment, 123 

Norsk Hydro company, 90 

North American Free Trade Agreement, 



237, 245 
North Korea: physicans from, 62 
Northern Telecommunications, 97 
Norway: investment of, in mining, 89, 90 
nurses, 62 



OAS. See Organization of American 

States 
Obeah, 50 

occupations: of immigrants, 210 

Office of the United States Trade Rep- 
resentative, 340 

oil (see also petroleum) 

Belize: imports of, 241 
Guyana: imports of, 99, 100 

Oils and Fats Agreement, 331, 332 

Old River, 192 

OPIC . See Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation 

Orange Walk: courts in, 306; East Indi- 
ans in, 199; street vendors in, 196; vio- 
lence in, 209 

Orange Walk District, 193, 263; Maya 
in, 200; Mennonites in, 200; Mestizos 
in, 198; religion of, 202; Spanish lan- 
guage in, 200-201 

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean 
States, 325, 329 

Organizacion Regional Interamericana 
de Trabaj adores. See Inter- American 
Regional Organization of Workers 

Organization of American States (OAS), 
284, 337; application for membership 
in, 125, 127; support by, for Belize's 
independence, xxiv, 283; support by, 
for Guatemala's claim to Belize, 282 

Orinoco River, 10, 11 

ORIT. See Inter- American Regional Or- 
ganization of Workers 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC), 104, 340 



PAC. See Political Affairs Committee 
PAC Bulletin, 16 
Pakaraima Mountains, 33 
Pakistan: in Commonwealth of Nations, 
322; independence of, 322 



396 



Index 



Panama: support by, for Belize's indepen- 
dence, 183 
Pan American Health Organization, 218 
Paranapanema, 92 
Patamona tribe, 42 

Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD), 
120 

PCD. See Patriotic Coalition for Demo- 
cracy 

Peace Corps, 281, 340; and education, 
212, 214; volunteers in Belize, 200, 
273, 281 

peasant class, 9 

Pembroke Hall, 224 

Pefialoza, Carlos, 147 

pensions, 62 

Pentecostal Church, 48, 201 

People's Committee: cooperation of, with 

General Workers' Union, 275; formed, 

180, 270 

People's Democratic Movement, 120 
People's Development Movement, 272 
People's Militia, 141; creation of, 141; 
mission of, 141; number of personnel 
in, 141; organization of, 141; political 
indoctrination in, 141; recruitment for, 
141; training for, 141; uniforms of, 141 
People's National Committee, 178-79 
People's National Congress (PNC), 109, 
119-20; destabilization campaign by, 
21-22;^ founded, 15, 20, 119; gangs 
sponsored by, 143; Hindus in, 123; and 
House of Israel, 50, 142; under Hoyte, 
27, 119; ideology of, 1 19-20; labor un- 
ions connected to, 82, 121; loyalty to, 
118, 133, 134-36, 145; Muslims in, 
123; in 1961 elections, 21; in 1964 elec- 
tions, 22; in 1968 elections, 24, 1 1 1 ; in 
1980 elections, 27; in 1985 elections, 
27 ; power of, 111, 113; publications of, 
122; support for, 52 
People's Progressive Party (PPP), xviii, 
120; Afro-Guyanese abandonment of, 
20; British aversion to, 17-18; church 
opposition to, 122; coalition govern- 
ment of, xxii; demonstrations against, 
21; founded, 15, 17; labor unions con- 
nected to, 82; in 1953 elections, 110; 
in 1957 elections, 20; in 1961 elections, 
21; in 1968 elections, 24; in 1980 elec- 
tions, 27; in 1985 elections, 27; in 1992 
elections, xxi-xxii; opposition to, 51; 
platform of, xxi-xxii, 20; publications 



of, 122; reform program of, 18; schism 
in, 18-19, 20 

People's Pulse, 279 

People's Republican Party, 178 

People's Temple of Christ {see also Jones, 
Jim; Jonestown massacre), xx, 25-26; 
allegations of abuse at, 51; government 
view of, 26 

People's United Party (PUP), xxvi, 178, 
249, 269-271; business support for, 
276-77; cabinet under, 260; defeat of, 
in 1984 election, 267, 272; dispute with 
UDP, 301-2; dissatisfaction with, 270; 
divisions in, 270, 275; economy under, 
228, 271; education under, 212; in elec- 
tion of 1989, 267, 268; formed, xxiv, 
180; ideology of, 271, 284; and in- 
dependence, 253; leadership of, 270- 
71; orientation of, to Central Ameri- 
ca, 268-69; origins of, 270; relations 
with Guatemala, 181; relations with 
United States, 280; weaknesses in, 
266-67, 272; wings of, 270-71 

Persian Gulf War, 286 

Petrojam, 237 

petroleum (see also oil) 

Belize: dependence of, on imported, 

192; exploration for, 192, 241 
Guyana: exploration for, 103; price 
controls on, 79 

pharmaceutical industry, 93; foreign in- 
vestment in, 102 

Philip Goldson international Airport, 243 

physicians 

Belize: 219 
Guyana, 62 

Pierce, Franklin, 170 

Pilgrim, Ulric, 139 

Pinzon, Martm, 162 

piracy, xxiii, 162, 163, 223; suppression 
of, 292; treaty to suppress, 163 

Placer Dome, 92 

plantation agriculture, 166; efforts to de- 
velop, 714 

Plantation Ruimveldt, 13 

planters: political power of, 11; problems 
of, with Dutch West India Company, 
7-8; resistance of, to constitutional re- 
form, 12 

plantocracy 

Belize: xvii, 166, 172 
Guyana: xvii, 9 

PNC. See People's National Congress 



397 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



polder system, 7 

Police Special Force, 304 

Police Training School, 304 

Political Affairs Committee (PAC), 16 

political: demonstrations, 50, 291; re- 
form, 12; structures in Belize, 249-55; 
system, 225; violence, 26, 111 

political parties (see also under individual 
parties) 

Belize: 250, 269-274 
Guyana: xviii, 119-20; develop- 
ment of, 15-18; labor unions con- 
nected to, 82 

political roles: of business community, 
276; of Chamber of Commerce and In- 
dustry, 276; of Guyana Defence Force, 
133, 134-36, 137-40; of religious 
groups, 122-23, 276-78 

politics: racial polarization of, 16; and 
religion, 51-52, 277 

Pope, Ronald, 133 

population (see also population statistics) 
Belize: 193-96; age distribution, 
194-95; defense force as percent- 
age of, 297; density, 193, 194, 
226; distribution of, 193-94, 225; 
Garifuna as percentage of, 198; 
gender ratio, 194; rural, 193, 225; 
of immigrants, 195; in 1980, 193; 
percentage of, in Belize City, 193; 
percentage of, in Belize District, 
193; percentage of Catholics in, 
202 

Guyana: 35-40; Afro-Guyanese as 
percentage of, xx, 37; age distri- 
bution in, 35; crowding of, 60; 
density, 37; distribution of, xix, 
31, 37-38; distribution of religion 
in, 47; ethnic distribution in, 37; 
of Georgetown, 38; Indo-Guya- 
nese as percentage of, xx, 37; of 
Linden, 38; of native Americans, 
6; of New Amsterdam, 38; in 
1990, 35; rural, 37; of slaves, 6; 
urban, 38 
population statistics 

Belize: birth rate, 195; death rate, 
195, 218; fertility rate, 195; infant 
mortality rate, 195, 218; life ex- 
pectancy, 218, 225; rate of in- 
crease, 195 

Guyana: birth rate, 35; death rate, 
35-36; fertility rate, 36-37; 



growth rate, 35, 37; infant mor- 
tality rate, 35-36, 61; life expec- 
tancy, 61; mortality rate, 7 

ports 

Belize: 238, 243 
Guyana: 102 

Portugal: indentured servants recruited 
from, 40, 41 

Portuguese language, 42 

Portuguese people, xviii, 41; accultura- 
tion of, 43; cooperation of, with other 
ethnic groups, 12; discrimination 
against, 12, 41; as indentured workers, 
41, 70; occupations of, 41; as percent- 
age of population, 37; religion of, 48; 
as sugar plantation workers, 10 

Potaro River, 34 

PPP. See People's Progressive Party 

PPP-Civil coalition, xxii; goals of, xxii 

Presbyterian Church, 48 

president (see also executive branch; execu- 
tive president), 24, 111; position abol- 
ished, 26 

press (see also media; newspapers); free- 
dom of, 122 

Price, Clarence, 134, 139 

Price, George Cadle, 179, 180, 181, 183, 
249, 269, 279, 284; characteristics of, 
270; economy under, 233; ethnicity of, 
267; as leader of People's United Party, 
266, 267, 268-69, 270; orientation of, 
to Central America, 268-69, 272; 
popularity of, 270; as prime minister, 
xxv, xxvi, 283 

Price Barracks, 298 

price controls, 68, 79 

primary products, 71; processing of, 75 

prime minister 

Belize: 249; appointment of, 256-57; 

as defense minister, 298 
Guyana: 115; under constitution of 
1961, 21, 110-11 

prisoners, 145 

prison system, 145 

private investment: encouraged, 120 

privatization, 68; of bauxite industry, 80; 
of manufacturing, 93-94; of sugar in- 
dustry, 80 

productivity, 81; losses in, 83 

professional class, 41 

Project Concern, 218 

Project Hope, 218, 278 

Protestantism (see also under individual 



398 



Index 



denominations), 171; ethnic affiliations 
with, 171, 202, 208; missionaries, 201; 
percentage of followers in population, 
47 

Protocol of Port-of-Spain (1970), 125, 147 
Public Meeting, 166, 249, 250; partici- 
pation in, 250 
public-sector deficit, 80; attempts to cut, 
80; as percentage of gross domestic 
product, 80 
public services 

Belize: 262-63; employees, 262-63, 
301 

Guyana: deterioration of, 27 
Public Services Commission, 262, 305; 

powers of, 262 
Public Service Union, 234, 275 
Puerto Rico, 339 

PuntaGorda, 169; courts in, 306; muni- 
cipal government of, 263; troops sta- 
tioned at, 298, 299 

PUP. See People's United Party 

Queen's College, 54 

radical nationalists, 178, 179 
radio 

Belize: 243 

Guyana: 97 
RAF. See Royal Air Force 
Ramada Royal Reef Hotel, 242 
Rastafarianism, 48, 202 
Reagan, Ronald, 124, 337 
reexport business, 228 
Reform Association, 12 
Reform Club, 12 

Regional Democratic Council, 116, 117 
Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy, 
333 

regional integration, 104-5, 334, 335; 

progress toward, 329 
Regional Shipping Council, 328, 331, 333 
regions, 117 

religion {see also under individual sects) 
Belize: 201-2; and education, 201; 
and ethnicity, 201; in middle 
class, 208; syncretic, 201 
Guyana: 47-52; distribution of, in 
population, 47; importance of, for 
marriage, 46; and politics, 51-52 
religious cults, 50-51 



remittances from expatriates 

Belize: 195, 234 

Guyana: 67, 76, 77 
Reporter, 279 

Representation of the People Ordinance, 
265 

Republic Day, 49 

Reynolds Bauxite Company, 71, 72, 90 
Reynolds Metals Company, 71 
rice, 84; area under cultivation, 86; 
decline in exports of, 14; decline in 
production of, 67, 73, 74, 86; exports 
of, 74, 86; farming, 42, 70; in Great 
Depression, 14; imports of, 74; killed 
by plant diseases, 84; price controls on, 
79; problems with, 86; processing, 75, 
93; production, xviii, 86; shortages, 
xxi, 27, 74; smuggling of, 76 
Richardson, Leigh, 180; jailed, 181 
Ridley, Nicholas, 254 
riots 

Belize: 176-77; against Heads of 
Agreement, 283, 294-95; labor, 
176, 294 

Guyana: xix, xxii, 13, 14; against 
People's Progressive Party admin- 
istration, 21 

rivers 

Belize: 192, 219 

Guyana: 34 
roads 

Belize: 243 

Guyana: construction of, 127; need 
for improvement of, 77; network 
of, 96 

Robertson Group, 92 

Rodney, Donald, 26 

Rodney, Walter, 26; arrested, 26; assas- 
sinated, 26, 144 

Rogers, C.L.B., 254 

Roman Catholic Church 

Belize: 205; ethnic distribution of, 
201; influence of, 277; member- 
ship in, 48, 208; percentage of 
followers in population, 47, 202; 
political role of, 277; publications 
of, 2800; school system controlled 
by, 201, 205 
Guyana: 41, 171; opposition of, to 
People's Progressive Party, 51; 
publications of, 122; role of, 51; 
support of, for United Force, 51 

roots class. See lower class 



399 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Rosenberg, Janet. See Jagan, Janet 

Rosenberg 
Royal Air Force (RAF), 291 
Royal Bank of Canada, 94 
Royal Military Academy (Sandhurst), 

134 

Ruimveldt Riots (1905), 13 
Rules of Origin, 331, 332 
Rupununi rebellion, 23-24, 146; Vene- 
zuela's role in, 146 
Rupununi River, 34 
Rupununi Savannah, 33; Amerindian 

tribes in, 42; rainfall in, 35 
rural areas 

Belize: 209; Central American im- 
migrants in, 193; lower class in, 
209-10; population in, 225; popu- 
lation growth in, 193; schools in, 
209-10 

Guyana: health care in, 62; Indo- 
Guyanese in, 38; malnutrition in, 
60; population in, 37 
Ryan, Leo, 26, 51 



Sahlman Seafoods, 103 
Saint George's Cay, 293 
Saint John's College: graduates of, in pol- 
itics, 179, 269, 277 
Salahuddin, Salim, 121 
Salamanca de Bacalar, 162 
San Ignacio, 263; courts in, 306 
sanitation, 60, 61 
San Jose, 176 
San Pedro, 263 
Sarstoon River, 189 
Sataur, Raymond, 134 
Schomburg, Robert Hermann, 10 
schools 

Belize: 210, 213-14; British model 
for, 214; degrees from, 214; en- 
rollments in, 211, 215-16, 225; 
government control of, 211, 212; 
graduates, 211; Jesuit influence 
on, 214; levels in, 214; number 
of, 211; Peace Corps volunteers 
in, 281; secondary, 214 

Guyana: attendance, 54, 55, 56, 
58; church, 51; entrance exami- 
nations for, 55-56; government 
control of, 51, 54-55; grades, 55; 
number of, 55, 56; number of 



years in, 52; nursery, 55; primary, 
52, 55; private, 52, 54-55; public, 
52; secondary, 55-56; religious, 
54-55; teacher-training, 52; trade, 
56, 58, 59 
seawalls, xviii, 77 

Secondary School Entrance Examination 
(SSEE), 55-56 

Secondary Schools Proficiency Examina- 
tion, 56 

Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) 
(Belize), 268, 301; missions of, 301; op- 
position to, 301 

Security and Intelligence Service Act 
(1987), 302 

self-reliance, 25 

self-rule (Belize), 253 

Senate 

Belize: members of, 260; powers 

of, 253; President of, 259 
Guyana: 21, 110 
Serrano EKas, Jorge, xxvi, 284 
service sector, 94-97; employment in, 82; 
as percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 74 

Settlement of Belize in the Bay of Hon- 
duras, 157, 170, 249, 292; laws of, 
164-65; self-rule of, 249; superinten- 
dent of, 165 

Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 48, 201, 
278 

sewage systems, 219 

Shahabbuddeen, Mohammed, 112 

shamans, 50 

Sharper, 168 

shipping, 102 

Shoman, Assad, 270 

shrimp: catch, 88; exports, 88, 97, 98; for- 
eign investment in, 102, 103; produc- 
tion, 88; smuggling of, 76 

Sibun River, 192 

Singh, J.B., 16 

Singh, Joe, 147 

SIS. See Security and Intelligence Ser- 
vice (SIS) 

slavery, 3, 40, 157; abolished, xviii, 9, 40, 
168; ramifications of abolition of, 9 

slaves, xvii, xviii, 6-7, 166; culture of, 
166-67; division of labor among, 167; 
domestic, 167; emancipation of, 3, 
69, 250; escape by, 168; importation 
of, 6; marriage forbidden to, 46; in 
militia, 292, 293; mortality rate of, 7; 



400 



Index 



oppression of, 167-68; population of, 
6, 69, 166; rebellions by, 7, 168; 
sources of. 166; on sugar plantations, 
31; tax on, 8; trade, abolished, 9; work- 
ing conditions for, 7 
Smith, John, 181 

smuggling, 77; by European powers, 163; 

of diamonds, 75, 76; of gold, 75, 76 
Soberanis Gomez, Antonio, 177, 274 
social security 
Belize: 220 
Guyana: 62 
society, Belizean: dynamics of, 210-11; 

structure of, 204-10 
Society for the Promotion of Education 

and Research, 278-79 
soldiers: riots by, 294 
Southern Christian Union, 275 
South Korea: investment by, 88, 342 
Soviet Union: relations with, 123, 129 
Spain: attacks by, on British settlers, xxiii, 

164, 165-66, 292, 293; rivalry of, with 

Britain, 157, 163-64, 292 
Spanish conquest, xvii; of Greater An- 
tilles, 4; of Mayan societies, 161-64; 

resistance to, 162 
Spanish language, 171, 172, 200 
Spearhead, 279 

Special Service Unit (SSU) (Guyana): 
ethnic balance within, 134; origins of, 
133; recruiting for, 134 

Sri Lanka, 325; in Commonwealth of Na- 
tions, 322; independence of, 322 

SSEE. See Secondary School Entrance Ex- 
amination 

Stabroek (see also Georgetown), 8 

Stabroek News, 122 

Stalin, Josef, 20 

Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers 

of Caricom, 334 
Standing Committees of Ministers, 331 
Stann Creek, 169 

Stann Creek District, 193, 263; agricul- 
ture in, 237; Garifuna in, 200; Mayans 
in, 200; Mestizos in, 200 
State Council, 110 
state enterprises, 77 
state of emergency 

Belize: of 1981, 184 
Guyana: in 1963, 111; of 1964, 22; 
of 1991, 118 
Statute of Westminster (1931), 321, 322 
Stephens, John, 169 



strategic setting, 292-95 
strikes 

Belize: 176-77, 291, 301; against 

Heads of Agreement, 275-76 
Guyana: 84; breaking of, 143; gener- 
al, of 1964, 21-22; by Guiana In- 
dustrial Workers' Union, 19, 22; of 
1905, 13; by sugar workers,22, 25 
structural adjustment program (SAP), 
229 

students: number of, 56; service of, in 

Guyana National Service, 140-41 
suffrage 

Belize: extension of, xxiv, 252; re- 
strictions on, 177, 180 

Guyana: for Afro-Guyanese, 12; 
under constitution of 1980, 118; 
extent of, xviii, 18, 110; qualifi- 
cations for, 15; for women, 14 

sugar 

Belize: 

223, 224, 236-37; exports of, 227, 
231, 236, 245; foreign investment 
in, 224; mills, 237; prices, xxv, 
223, 227-28, 245; production, 
xxiv, 224, 236-37; quotas, 228, 
235, 341; revival of, 229 
Guyana: 3,7, 84-86, 97; decline in 
demand for, 73; decline in exports 
of, 14; decline in production of, 
67, 73, 74; exports of , 74, 84, 85, 
97,98, 129; as foreign exchange 
source, 85; foreign investment 
in, 102; in Great Depression, 14; 
imports of, 74; killed by plant 
diseases, 84; price controls on, 
79; prices of, 72, 85; processing, 
xviii, 75, 93; shortages, xxi, 27, 
74; smuggling of, 76 
sugar industry, 72; employment in, 71; 
energy for, 93; foreign investment in, 
71; labor unions in, 82; nationalization 
of, 21, 84, 124; privatization of, 80; re- 
structuring of, 85 
sugar plantations, xviii, 31; canals in, 34; 
Chinese workers on, 10; departure of 
Afro-Guyanese from, 9-10; drainage 
networks in, 34, 38, 69; East Indian 
workers on, 10; indentured laborers on, 
10, 31, 70; labor on, 43; labor short- 
ages on, 9-10; land reclaimed for, 69; 
number of, 69; Portuguese workers on, 
10; slaves on, 31, 69 



401 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



sugar production, 71, 84; costs, 85; 
decline in, 25; problems in, 84-85 

Sugar Protocol, 235 

sugar workers: organization of, 21; strikes 
by, 22, 25 

Summary Jurisdiction Court, 261, 306 

Sunnatival Jamaat Islam, 49 

superintendent of Belize, 250, 251; as 
commander in chief, 292 

Supreme Congress of the People, 115, 116 

Supreme Court 

Belize: 291, 305 
Guyana: 115, 144-45 

Suriname, 4; border problems with, 123, 
127, 147-48; fishing dispute with, 
147-48; Guyanese living in, 127; rela- 
tions with, 127 

swamps, 33, 34 



Taiwan: Belize's relations with, 286 
Tate & Lyle company, 85, 224 
taxes 

Belize: under colonial rule, 166, 293 
Guyana: 80, 94; evasion of, 77 
teachers, 58; Afro-Guyanese as, 55; con- 
ditions for, 55; Indo-Guyanese as, 55; 
ratio of, to pupils, 55, 56; training of, 
52, 58 

Tecno Bago company, 93 
Teekah, Vincent, 26, 144 
Tele Network, 97 
telephones 

Belize: 243 

Guyana: 97 
television 

Belize: 243 

Guyana: 97 
textiles, 97 

Thomas, Clive, 75, 76 

Thomas Lands School, 55 

timber, 38; exports of, 97; foreign invest- 
ment in, 88; processing, 93; produc- 
tion, 88 

Timehri Airport: constructed, 15; devel- 
opment of, 96; military training at, 134 

Tipu: autonomy of, 163; conquered by 
Spanish, 162; rebellion of, 162 

tobacco: export of, 6 

Toledo District, 193, 263; Central Ameri- 
can immigrants in, 196; Garifuna in, 
200; infant mortality in, 218; Men- 
nonites in, 200; Mestizos in, 200; popu- 



lation density in, 194 
Toledo Maya Cultural Council, 278 
Torrijos, Omar, 184 
Total oil company, 103 
tourism 

Belize: 229, 242, 303; arrivals, 242; 
constraints on, 242; receipts, 242 

Guyana: and economy, 76; foreign 
investment encouraged in, 102; as 
percentage of gross domestic prod- 
uct, 231 

TPC. Tropical Produce Company 
trade {see also exports; imports) 

Belize: 228; patterns, 236; preferen- 
tial agreements, 235, 236 
Guyana: 97-9; agreements, 21; bal- 
ance. See balance of trade; as per- 
centage of gross domestic product, 
97; liberalized regulations for, 68 
Trades Union Congress (TUC), 82, 121; 
elections, 121; political affiliations of, 
82, 121; reform, 121-22 
Trades Union Ordinance (1921), 13 
trade union movement, 13; encouraged, 
14 

trade unions 

Belize: 250; rights of, 301 

Guyana: 120-22 
transportation 

Belize: 243 

Guyana: 96; air service, 96; need 
for investment in, 77; problems 
with, 96; roads, 96 
Treaty of Chaguaramas, 329, 334 
Treaty of Dickenson Bay, 328 
Treaty of Munster (1648), 6 
Treaty of Paris (1763), 164 
Treaty of Saint John's, 328 
Treaty of Versailles (1783), 164, 292 
treaty to suppress piracy (1667), 163 
Trinidad, 18 

Trinidad and Tobago: debt to, 99, 105; 
in Donor Support Group, 100; foreign 
investment from, 102; imports from, 
99, 100; petroleum exploration by, 103 
Trinidad Citrus Association, 237 
Tropical Produce Company (TPC), 240 
Turton, Robert S., 174, 176, 177 



Ubico, Jorge, 182 

UCB. See University College of Belize: 
UF. See United Force 



402 



Index 



Unemployed Brigade, 177 
unemployment 

Belize: 209, 234, 294 

Guyana: 17, 71, 82 
UNICEF. See United Nations Children's 
Fund 

Union of South Africa: in Commonwealth 
of Nations, 321 

United Colony of Demerara and Esse- 
quibo: British takeover of, 8; formed, 8 

United Democratic Party, xxvi, 20, 249, 
271-73; business support for, 276-77; 
disputes with People's United Party, 
301-2; in election of 1984, 213, 267, 
272; in election of 1989, 267, 268, 273; 
in election of 1993, xxvi; formed, 272; 
and independence, 253; internal 
problems of, 268, 272, 273; publica- 
tions of, 280; relations of, with United 
States, 281; Roman Catholic influence 
on, 277 

United Farmers' and Workers' Party, 18 
United Force (UF), xxii, 21, 120, 123; 
destabilization campaign by, 21-22; in 
1961 elections, 21; in 1964 elections, 
22; in 1968 elections, 24; in 1980 elec- 
tions, 27; in 1985 elections, 27; support 
for, 51 
United Fruit, 238 

United General Workers' Union, 275 

United National Party, 18 

United Nations: Belize as member of, 
286; Belize's case for independence 
presented to, 183, 283; resolution 
passed demanding Belize's indepen- 
dence, 184 

United Nations Children's Fund (UNI- 
CEF), 218 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 303 

United Nations International Labour Or- 
ganisation, 220 

United States, 325; aid to Belize, 212, 
234, 280, 281; aid to Guyana, 101, 104, 
124; as arbitrator in border disputes, 
10-11, 183, 282; Belizean population 
in, 195; Development Assistance pro- 
gram, 281; in Donor Support Group, 
100; Economic Support Funds, 281; 
economic ties of, with Belize, 226; edu- 
cation in, 205, 217; emigration to, 38, 
189, 193, 195, 206; expatriates in Be- 
lize, 200; exports to, 85, 97-98, 237; 



foreign policy objectives, 280; Hoyte's 
visit to, 28; and independence of Be- 
lize, 283; imports from, 227, 344; in- 
fluence of, on Belize, 208, 210, 212; 
intervention in Grenada, 105, 124, 126, 
128; investment from, 70, 92, 97, 102, 
280, 342-43; investment of, in mining, 
89; military assistance from, 280, 281, 
300, 302; military training in, 298, 300; 
missionaries from, 201; orientation 
toward, 277, 280; reduction of role of, 
271; relations with Belize, 280-81; re- 
lations with Guyana, 123-24; trade 
quotas, 228, 235, 237; trade with, 236, 
238, 343 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 104, 214, 234, 
340; objectives of, 280-81; presence of, 
273; role of, 281 

United States Association of Junior Col- 
leges, 214 

United States Department of Agriculture, 
340 

United States Department of Commerce, 
340, 342 

United States Department of Labor, 340 
United States Department of State, 82, 
144 

United States Department of Transpor- 
tation, 340 

United States Drug Enforcement Agen- 
cy, 230 

United States Tariff Schedule 807 pro- 
gram, 235, 241, 341, 344 

Universal Negro Improvement Associa- 
tion, 178 

University College of Belize (UCB), 213; 
nationalized, 271 

University of Guyana, 26, 56, 140, 331; 
degrees awarded, 56; enrollment, 56; 
established, 54; Extramural Depart- 
ment, 58; faculties in, 56; teacher train- 
ing in, 58 

University of the West Indies, 214, 328, 
331, 333 

Upper Demerara Forestry Project, 88 
urban areas 

Belize: health care in, 219; schools 

in, 209-10, 215 
Guyana: 38; Afro-Guyanese in, 38, 
40; British values in, 44; Chinese 
in, 42; population in, 38 
Uring, Nathaniel, 164 



403 



Guyana and Belize: Country Studies 



Varig airlines, 96 

Venalum company, 90 

Venezuela, 340; aid to Rupununi seces- 
sion, 146; Ankoko Island seized by, 23, 
145-46; army, 147; border dispute of, 
with Guyana, xx, 10-11,23, 112, 123, 
125, 145; in Donor Support Group, 
100; imports from, 99, 100; relations 
of, with Britain, 10; relations of, with 
Guyana, 125-27, 147; territorial waters 
extended by, 146 

vice president, 115 

Victoria Peak, 191 

villages 

Belize: government of, 263 
Guyana: layout of, 37-38; size of, 
37 

VITA. See Volunteers in Technical As- 
sistance 

Voice of America, 243, 273 

Volunteer Guard, 296; deployment of, 
299; enlistment in, 297 

Volunteers in Technical Assistance 
(VITA), 278 

voter qualifications: in Belize, 178, 251; 
in Guyana, 12 

voting 

Belize: 251, 266; protocols, 265-66; 

rights, 265; by women, 251 
Guyana: 12; ethnic divisions in, xix; 

reform of, 27-28 



wage: increases, 83, 94; minimum, 67; 

strikes, 13, 83 
Waiwai tribe, 42 
Wallace, Peter, 163 
Wapisiana tribe, 42 
war, 163 

Warao people, 42 

Washington, Edward ("Rabbi") {see also 

Hill, David), 50, 142; arrested, 143 
water 

Belize: sources of, 219 
Guyana: access to potable, 61; short- 
ages, 27; system, need for invest- 
ment in, 77 
waterfalls, 34 
welfare 

Belize: 218-20 
Guyana: 61-62 
West India Committee, 12 



West India Association of Glasgow, 12 
West Indians: as indentured laborers, 70 
West Indies: education in, 205, 217 
West Indies Federation, 180; Belize's 
resistance to joining, 226, 227, 268-69, 
270, 284; demise of, 328; problems 
with, 328; Jagan's veto of participation 
in, 20, 128 
West Indies Shipping Corporation, 333 
West Indies States Association, 329 
White Paper on the Proposed Terms for 

the Independence of Belize, 253 
white sand belt, xix, 31, 33, 84 
women 

Belize: emigration by, 194; as house- 
hold heads, 209; as police, 304; 
and politics, 264; as soldiers, 297; 
unemployment of, 209; voting 
rights of, 178, 251 ; in work force, 
234 

Guyana: maternity leave for, 62; 
in military, 136, 137; rights of, 
112, 123; use of birth control by, 
37 

women, Afro-Guyanese: family role of, 

46; fertility rate of, 36 
women, Indo-Guyanese: family role of, 
47; fertility rate of, 36; in Guyana Na- 
tional Service, 140-41; marriage of, 36; 
suffrage for, 14 
Women Against Violence, 278 
Women's Affairs Bureau, 123 
women's associations, 123, 278 
workers 

Belize: demands of, 177; rights, 342; 

riots by, 294 
Guyana: commuting costs for, 96; 
conditions for, 83 ; demonstrations 
by, 1 7 ; effect of economic reform 
on, 83; shooting of, 17 
Workers' Education Unit, 58 
work force: percentage of, employed in 
fishing industry, 88; percentage of, em- 
ployed in sugar industry, 71 
working class 

Belize: 180, 204; education of, 206, 
216; emigration by, 206; indepen- 
dence movement in, 178; mem- 
bers of, 206 
Guyana: 12; Afro-Guyanese in, 17; 
political grievances of, 13; riots 
by, 13 

Working People's Alliance (WPA), xxii, 



404 



Index 



120; demonstration by, 144; founded, 
25; government violence against, 26; in 
1980 elections, 27; in 1985 elections, 27 
World Atlas, 225 

World Bank, 225, 341; aid from, 88; debt 
to, 99, 100; economic recovery pro- 
gram of, xxi, 81 

World Federation of Trade Unions, 275 

World Health Organization (WHO), 218 

World War I, 13, 294 

World War II, 15 

Worrell, DeLisle, 71 

WPA. See Working People's Alliance 

Wrigley, 174 



Xunantunich, 159, 161; excavation of, 
161 



Yalbac, 176 

Yalbac Hills, 171, 191 

Yaum an Nabi, 49 

Young Socialist Movement (YSM), 142; 
number of personnel in, 142; training 
for, 142 

YSM. See Young Socialist Movement 
Yucatan Platform, 191 
Yucatecan people, 198 



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